Skip to main content

Tag: bc injury law

$30,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Lingering Back Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, Uncategorized. 43 Comments on $30,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Lingering Back Injury

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a lingering back injury caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Sidhu v. Johal) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision.  Fault was admitted by the offending motorist.  Although the Court rejected the Plaintiff’s evidence as to the severity and frequency of his complaints Madam Justice Fitzpatrick accepted the Plaintiff suffered from lingering back pain which flared with heavier activity.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $30,000 the Court provided the following reasons:

[142] After having considered the evidence from Mr. Sidhu, the evidence of his independent witnesses and the medical evidence referred to above, I also find as a fact that Mr. Sidhu suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident and that those injuries were and are as follows:

a)       he suffered driving anxiety for a few days;

b)       he suffered headaches for approximately three weeks;

c)       he suffered pain to his ribcage or chest which was severe in the first three weeks but decreased from that time and was resolved within six months;

d)       he suffered shoulder pain which was resolved within a few weeks and neck pain which was resolved within two months;

e)       he suffered constant and severe pain in his back or lower back immediately following the accident which gradually became intermittent in the two months following the accident;

f)        since August 2007, Mr. Sidhu’s back problems have continued to improve; and

g)       following December 2007, Mr. Sidhu’s back pain was resolved for the most part, however, Mr. Sidhu continues to experience discomfort and mild pain in his back or lower back from time to time on a fairly infrequent basis, which increases to the point of severity depending on his physical fitness (based on his exercise regimen) and depending on the amount of exertion of heavy physical labour.

[143] I specifically reject Mr. Sidhu’s contention that he experienced constant and severe back pain for one and a half years after the accident and that he continues at this time to suffer sharp or severe back pain three to four times per week…

[157] I find that Mr. Sidhu is entitled to non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $30,000.

Hiring Multiple Lawyers Means Paying Multiple Lawyers

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.


As previously discussed, if you are unhappy with your representation in an ICBC claim and are considering changing lawyers a key consideration to take into account is the amount of legal fees you will need to pay.  Hiring multiple lawyers typically means paying multiple lawyers.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Herman v. Ian Sisett Law Corporation) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle collision.  She hired the Defendant law firm to represent her.  She did so on a contingency basis and the contract contained some of the typical provisions dealing with fees in the event the relationship terminated prior to settlement.
In the course of representation a conflict of interest became apparent and the lawyer could no longer represent the Plaintiff.  She hired a second lawfirm who gave an undertaking to protect the fee of the first firm.  The Plaintiff then changed lawyers again hiring a third firm.   The third firm gave no undertaking to protect the account of the first firm.
Ultimately the claim settled while the third firm represented the plaintiff and she paid their account.  The first firm then sent the client a final account of $62,500 for services rendered.   The parties could not agree on payment and the first lawyer brought an application for the third lawyer to produce their full file.  Mr. Justice Burnyeat found that this was an appropriate order to make to help determine a fair amount to be paid to the first lawyer.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[18] Here, there was no undertaking provided by Mr. Gordon that the fees of Sisett would be protected.  In that regard, the only undertaking to Sisett came from Becker Mathers.  Even though there was no such undertaking available to Sisett, I am satisfied that it would only be possible for Sisett to set a statement of account which was reasonable if the total amount of the settlement, any contingency fee arrangement in effect, and an outline of what work had been undertaken by Mr. Gordon was available.

[19] I am satisfied that this approach is in accordance with the decision in McQuarrie, Hunter v. Lord Estate (1983) 41 B.C.L.R. 123 (C.A.) where the trial judge ordered the Defendants to pay to the original firm the sum calculated on a quantum meruit basis immediately after taxation and where the Defendants appealed the ruling of the trial judge.  The question which was before the Court was described as follows:

The essential point at issue before us, therefore, is whether a solicitor who has been discharged without cause from a contingency fee contract is entitled to recover his fees on a quantum meruit basis prior to the conclusion of the action in which he was originally retained (at para. 6).

The question then arises: What compensation, if any, is the discharged solicitor entitled to, and at what time? (at para. 13).

[20] The Court concluded that the first firm would have to wait until after the disposition of the action.  On behalf of the Court, Nemetz C.J.B.C. stated in this regard:

While an obligation to pay arises on discharge, the client and solicitor await the completion of the lawsuit, and the result obtained becomes a factor in determining the value of the services of the original solicitor.  On this approach, no money is due until the value of the services has been determined.

I prefer this approach because of the historic recognition of the solicitor-client relationship as a very special one.  It is a relationship based on confidence and trust.  The dignity and integrity of the legal profession demand that the interests of the client be fully protected.  The relationship is such that the client is justified in seeking to dissolve it whenever he ceases to have absolute confidence in his solicitor.  The fact that the solicitor has rendered valuable services under his employment, or that the client is indebted to him for these services does not deprive the client of this right.  If, however, the client were to become liable to pay the reasonable fees of the solicitor at the time of discharging him, the client would be forced to choose between continuing the employment of a solicitor in whom he has lost faith or, in some cases, discontinuing his action.  This would defeat the underlying rationale of contingency fees.  In addition, if responsibility to pay reasonable fees were to accrue immediately upon discharge and the subsequent damage award to the client were substantially less than that anticipated, a financial disaster for the client may occur.  The risk of success or failure would have been shifted entirely to the shoulders of the client.  It is more consistent with the special relation between solicitor and client and the underlying rationale of a contingency fee agreement to have both parties await the happening of the contingency.  The interests of both parties can then be balanced in light of the outcome of the litigation.

Another reason for preferring this approach is that it does not require the taxing officer either, on the one hand, to tax the solicitor’s account as if the contingency was irrelevant, or, on the other hand, to hear the evidence that would be led in the principal action so that he can anticipate the contingency and assess the fee that the solicitor would have received if he had not been discharged.

Knowing the amount of the award, determined either by the Court or by settlement, the Registrar will be able to settle the amount of the bill of the contracting solicitor in the light of the recovery obtained by the client.  If nothing is recovered or the amount recovered is a modest one, the Registrar may nevertheless award the contracting solicitor some amount for his work.  If, on the other hand, a client, who sees success coming up, discharges his solicitor on the eve of the trial, the lack of any risk remaining in the contingency will be of very great significance.

(at paras. 13-16)

[21] In order to prepare a fair and reasonable bill on a quantum meruit basis, Sisett was entitled to have the information that it had requested:  the details of the settlement; the details of the contingency arrangement that was in effect between Ms. Herman and Slater Vecchio; the time records maintained by Slater Vecchio; any detailed account provided by Slater Vecchio; the fees and disbursements charged by Slater Vecchio; and any fees and disbursements paid to Becker Mathers for the work that they had undertaken.

$35,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For 3 Year Whiplash Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.


Keeping this site’s whiplash database current, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a soft tissue injury claim as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Carter v. Zhan) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision.  Fault was admitted.  The Plaintiff was injured in the crash and alleged the consequences were permanent.  She sought damages between $149,000-$206,000 at trial.  Despite rejecting the severity of the Plaintiff’s claims, Mr. Justice Verhoeven accepted the Plaintiff did suffer a whiplash injury of 36 months duration.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $35,000 the Court provided the following reasons:
[99] On the evidence, I accept that the plaintiff has established to the requisite standard of proof in a civil case that the accident resulted in soft tissue injuries which persisted for approximately 36 months after the accident, gradually lessening over that recovery period.  Thereafter, I conclude that she suffered from only minor lingering effects.  It follows that I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has established that her injuries are essentially permanent as she claims…

[122] In determining an appropriate non-pecuniary award to compensate the plaintiff for her losses, I set out my findings in relation to the relevant Stapley factors:

1. the plaintiff was 32 years old at the time of the accident(she is now 37);

2. she suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her neck, jaw, shoulders, back, and pelvic girdle;

3. these injuries caused her mild to moderate pain and discomfort in her neck, jaw, shoulders, back, and pelvic girdle, primarily on the left side of her body, for approximately three years and minor lingering effects thereafter, with the pain lessening gradually over those three years.  She also occasionally suffered minor chest stiffness and soreness and headaches;

4. the plaintiff’s injuries are not permanent and she is not disabled as a result of the accident;

5. the injuries caused the plaintiff some emotional pain and loss of enjoyment of life over the three-year recovery period;

6. the plaintiff was also somewhat restricted in her physical activities over that time; and

7. the plaintiff did not suffer a loss of lifestyle as a result of her injuries.

[123] Bearing in mind these factors, I find the following cases provide some assistance in determining the appropriate range for non-pecuniary damages: Cameron v. Savory, 2008 BCSC 1708, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2429 [Cameron]; Dhanoa (Litigation guardian of) v. Hui, 2008 BCSC 907, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1307 [Dhanoa]; Mullican v. Steuart, 2003 BCSC 289, [2003] B.C.J. No. 416 [Mullican]; Lane v. Ford Credit Canada Leasing Limited et al., 2003 BCSC 701, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1042 [Lane]; Gray v. Balsdon, [1996] B.C.J. No. 667 (S.C.) [Gray]; and Johnston v. Day, 2002 BCSC 480, [2002] B.C.J. No. 920 [Johnston].

[124] Considering all the circumstances, and the principles enunciated in Stapley, I assess Ms. Carter’s non-pecuniary loss at $35,000.

$10,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for 4 Month Soft Tissue Injury; Costs Denied Under Rule 14-1(10)

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 14, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries sustained in consecutive motor vehicle collisions.
In last week’s case (Liu v. Thaker) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions, the first in October of 2007 and the second a month later.  Both collisions caused relatively minor soft tissue injuries which largely recovered in 4 months.  In assessing Non-Pecuniary Damages at $10,000 Mr. Justice Schultes made the following findings:

[58] On the whole I would say that the plaintiff’s case offered persuasive evidence of relatively minor soft-tissue injuries, rather than the unpersuasive evidence of more serious injuries that is sometimes seen in motor vehicle injury cases.

[59] I find that Mr. Liu did suffer the injuries that he described and that they were caused by the two accidents for which the defendants have admitted responsibility. These were soft-tissue injuries to the neck and shoulder which had largely resolved by the end of February 2009, about four months after the first accident…

[65] In all the circumstances, balancing the various factors, and having due regard to the range, but not being straight jacketed by it, I consider an award of $10,000 for non-pecuniary damages to be appropriate in this case.

Paragraphs 75-82 of the reasons for judgment are also worth reviewing for the Court’s reasoning in denying the Plaintiff costs findng there was no ‘sufficient reason’ to sue in Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-1(10).
Lastly, paragraph 56 is worth reviewing for the Court’s comments addressing the Defendant’s ‘low velocity impact’ testimony.  Mr. Justice Schultes provided the following criticism:
[56] Except as to the bare contours of his involvement in the first accident, I did not find Mr. Thaker’s evidence credible. He sought to portray the impact as so slight as to be virtually negligible — a mere touching of the vehicles, in his view. But he also sought to absolve himself of the responsibility of having caused the accident, even though liability has been admitted on his behalf. This suggested somewhat of a self-serving perspective on his part, which is at odds with the reality of the situation. It also made no sense to me, if the impact had been as trivial as Mr. Thaker claimed, that he would have asked Mr. Liu if he was okay afterwards, as he described. On his version of a mere touching between the vehicles, such an inquiry would have been completely unnecessary.

BC Court Orders Production of Private Facebook Photos in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the production of private social media data in the context of a personal injury claim.
In today’s case (Fric v. Gershman) the Plaintiff sued for damages for injuries sustained in a 2008 collision.  The Plaintiff apparently suffered from “chronic severe headaches and soft-tissue injuries” following the crash.  The Plaintiff, who was a first year law school student at the time of the crash, plead damages for various losses including diminished earning capacity.
ICBC sought production of the Plaintiff’s entire Facebook profile, vacation photos and metadata related to digital photos in her possession.  Master Bouck held that while some of this relief was too broad, relevant photos need to be disclosed and ordered production accordingly.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[54] After considering all of these authorities, I have concluded that some of the plaintiff’s photographs, including those held on the private Facebook profile, ought to be disclosed.

[55] The pleadings define the issues between the parties. Here, there is also evidence on which the court can exercise its discretion to allow for broader document discovery under Rule 7-1(14).

[56] In her pleadings, the plaintiff alleges that the accident led to not only loss of amenities of life, but also loss of mobility and diminished earning capacity.

[57] The diminished capacity is said to be the result of pain and fatigue. Ms. Fric claims that the injuries effected her academic achievements and thus ability to secure employment after her second year of law school. The ongoing symptoms continue to impact Ms. Fric’s working capacity.

[58] How this diminished capacity is measured is yet to be determined. However, the defence fairly argues that a damage award for a young professional’s diminished earning capacity can be very significant. Although plaintiff’s counsel downplays this aspect of the claim, there is no suggestion that the plea is to be withdrawn.

[59] Ms. Fric has also testified that the accident-related injuries have negatively impacted her social life and ability to perform certain sports or recreational activities, either pain-free or at all. While Ms. Fric has remained an active individual, the symptoms from the accident-related injuries are allegedly unresolved. Obviously, the ongoing complaints will influence the award claimed for pain and suffering.

[60] Photographs which show the plaintiff engaging in a sporting or physical recreational activity — from hiking to scuba diving to curling to dancing — are relevant in discovering the plaintiff’s physical capacity since the accident.

[61] I do not agree with the plaintiff’s submission that such information is only relevant when there is a claim or evidence of total disability.

[62] In terms of proportionality and ensuring a fair trial on the merits, the defence should be given an opportunity to discover the plaintiff on all aspects of her physical functioning and activity level since the accident.

[63] Allowing such discovery does not preclude the plaintiff from arguing that some of the produced photographs are inadmissible at trial. The trial judge may accept that the prejudicial effect of a particular photograph outweighs any probative value.

[64] Nonetheless, the order sought by the defendants is too broad…

[70] In my view, the appropriate relief is to order Ms. Fric to produce an amended list of documents which identifies the photographs and video in her possession and control in which in which she is featured:

1.  participating in the December 2008 Law Games; and

2.  on a vacation taken since November 18, 2008.

[71] The photographs should be identified by location, date and time (if this information is available to the plaintiff). The defence may then choose to either inspect the photographs (electronically or otherwise) and/or pay for the photographs’ duplication.

[72] Before disclosure, the plaintiff may edit the photographs to protect the privacy of other individuals appearing in those photographs…

[75] The plaintiff is not obliged to include commentary from the Facebook web?site. If such commentary exists, the probative value of this information is outweighed by the competing interest of protecting the private thoughts of the plaintiff and third parties: Dosanjh v. Leblanc.

[76] Costs of the application will be to the defendants in the cause.

$12,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For 7 month Whiplash Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Penticton Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Kingsfield v. Powers) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision in Oliver, BC.  Fault for the crash was disputed and ultimately the Court held that both parties were to blame with the Plaintiff shouldering 75% of the fault.
The Plaintiff suffered from chronic back pain although the Court did not accept this was caused by the collision.  The Court did, however, accept the Plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury which remained symptomatic for 7 months.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $12,000 (before the reduction for liability) Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following reasons:

[57] It follows from the foregoing that I am not satisfied that the on-going low back problems that Mr. Kingsfield is experiencing are causally related to the injuries he sustained in the motor vehicle accident.

[58] The next issue is an assessment of Mr. Kingsfield’s other injuries. They gave rise to fairly significant pain and discomfort for the first month after the accident. He was unable to do his job during that time, and when he did return to work it was to light duties for about six weeks. He continued to experience headaches until approximately mid-March and his neck was painful beyond that, perhaps until June 2008, some seven months after the accident. During this time his injuries did affect his life. He had difficulty sleeping, did not continue with his recreational activities, curling in particular, and generally felt poorly.

[59] The cases of Dolha v. Heft, 2011 BCSC 738; Morales v. Neilson, 2009 BCSC 1890; and De Leon v. Harold, 2010 BCSC 1802, are instructive in terms of quantum. All involved soft tissue injuries that resolved within a year. In Dolha the plaintiff’s significant injury was to her back and neck. Those injuries resolved within six to nine months following the accident. She was awarded $10,000 in non-pecuniary damages. In Morales the plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to his shoulder, neck and back. While those injuries limited his activities somewhat he was able to work seven days a week in a physically demanding job since the accident. His injuries were all resolved by a year post-accident. He was awarded $11,000 in non-pecuniary damages. In De Leon, the stoic plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries which, due to her active participation, resolved substantially within two months of the accident and almost entirely within six months. She was awarded non-pecuniary damages of $12,000.

[60] I am of the view that an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages in this case is $12,000. Mr. Kingsfield’s injuries significantly affected his life, including how he performed at work. Although he is entitled to compensation for past wage loss, I accept that the plaintiff takes pride in being able to do his job and his inability to do it was a source of significant anxiety while he awaited the resolution of his injuries.

ICBC Internet Domain Name Challenge Fails

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the challenge of the use of “icbc” in a domain name not owned or operated by ICBC.
In today’s case (ICBC v. Stainton Ventures Ltd.) ICBC alleged that the use of ‘icbc’ in a domain name used as a marketing tool for personal injury lawyers was misleading and in breach of ICBC’s intellectual property rights.  Mr. Justice Grauer dismissed these aspects of the claim finding that websites that use the name ICBC in their domain that comment on ICBC would not confuse an “average customer of normal intelligence“.  Mr. Justice Grauer provided the following reasons:

[26] Anyone familiar with motoring in British Columbia would, I expect, conclude that “ICBCadvice.com” was probably about the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia.  ICBC is, after all, a very large institution that is the subject of widespread public commentary.  In this context, would British Columbians be likely to mistake “ICBCadvice.com” for ICBC’s official mark?  I think not.  More probably, I find, they would take it as identifying the subject-matter of the site, not whose site it is.

[27] I therefore conclude that the defendant has not acted contrary to sections 9 and 11 of the Trade-marks Act in its use of the website/domain name “ICBCadvice.com”.  The same logic applies to the defendant’s use of the domain names <icbcadvice.ca>, <fighticbc.com> and <fighticbc.ca>.

[28] In my view, the defendant’s use of the acronym “ICBC” throughout its website also does not contravene the Trade-marks Act.  The defendant does not use that acronym as a “trade-mark or otherwise” in the sense required, which is the use of the mark in connection with its business in some way that is intended to identify and distinguish its products.  Rather, it simply uses the acronym to identify the plaintiff, as thousands do every day, and as I do in these reasons…

[47] As the Court of Appeal observed in Private Career Training Institutions Agency v. Vancouver Career College (Burnaby) Inc., 2011 BCCA 69, 14 B.C.L.R. (4th) 358 at para. 35, “the consumer must be given credit for having normal intelligence.”

[48] In the context of British Columbia’s universal automobile insurance scheme, I am satisfied that the average customer of normal intelligence would not be led astray, and would have no difficulty recognizing that ICBCadvice.com would probably relate to how to deal with ICBC in an arm’s length or even adversarial sense, rather than in a manner endorsed by ICBC.

[49] I conclude that the plaintiff’s claim based upon the common law and statutory tort of passing-off must be dismissed.

$35,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For SI Joint Injury With Flare-Ups; LVI Defence Rejected

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a sacroiliac joint injury caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Bartel v. Milliken) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  Fault was admitted by the Defendant.  Although the Defendant challenged the Plaintiff’s credibility arguing she “is exaggerating her injuries and their effect” the Court rejected this submission and found the Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries which continued to flare with activity.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $35,000 Madam Justice Gerow provided the following reasons:

[26] It is apparent from a review of the whole of the evidence that Ms. Bartel suffered injuries to her neck and back in the accident which had resolved for the most part by February 2009, although she was still experiencing intermittent pain in her sacroiliac joint areas. Since then she has had flare-ups, the October 2009 incident being the most significant. Although there is some evidence of ongoing shoulder problems, the evidence is that Ms. Bartel suffered from shoulder problems prior to the accident. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that her ongoing shoulder problems are as a result of the motor vehicle accident.

[27] Both Dr. Kelly and Dr. le Nobel are of the opinion that Ms. Bartel’s prospect for full recovery is guarded. However, Dr. le Nobel is of the opinion that Ms. Bartel may have significant improvement if not complete resolution of her symptoms with injections into her back and an exercise program.

[28] Based on the evidence, I have concluded that Ms. Bartel suffered a moderate soft tissue injury to her neck, back and sacroiliac joint which resolved for the most part within seven months with occasional flare-ups. The injuries Ms. Bartel suffered have restricted her ability to engage in gardening and walking in the manner she could prior to the motor vehicle accident. It is likely there will be ongoing restrictions on her gardening as a result of the injuries…

[35] Having considered the extent of the injuries, the fact that the symptoms were largely resolved within seven months with occasional flare-ups and the ongoing restrictions on Ms. Bartel’s gardening, as well as the authorities I was provided, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non pecuniary damages is $35,000.

Another noteworthy aspect of the judgement was the Court’s rejection of the so called LVI defence.  The Defendant argued that since there was modest vehicle damage the injury itself was modest.  In rejecting this submission the Court provided the following comments:

[23] Finally, the defendants point to the fact that the accident was not severe enough to cause the ongoing symptoms Ms. Bartel complains of. The defendants’ proposition that a low velocity accident cannot cause any significant injury to a plaintiff has not been accepted in a number of cases, including Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.); Lubick v. Mei, 2008 BCSC 555; and Jackman v. All Season Labour Supplies Ltd., 2006 BCSC 2053. As stated in Gordon at paras. 4 and 5:

I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. This is a philosophy that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may follow, but it has no application in court. it is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have never heard it endorsed as a medical principle.

Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slip and falls. Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed. The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court. Objectivity is thus preserved and the public does not have to concern itself with extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.

[24] Although the severity of the accident is a factor that should be taken into consideration when determining whether Ms. Bartel suffered injuries in the motor vehicle accident and the extent of those injuries, it is not determinative of either issue. Rather the whole of the evidence must be considered in determining those issues.

Jury Election Must Be Made With First Notice of Trial Under New BCSC Rules

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 108 Comments on Jury Election Must Be Made With First Notice of Trial Under New BCSC Rules


Unreported reasons for judgement recently came to my attention addressing, for what I believe is the first time since the New Rules came into force, the issue of whether a party can elect trial by jury when a new Notice of Trial is issued if they failed to so elect in the fist instance.  In short the Court held this is not permitted.
In the recent case (Hung v. Sellars, BC Supreme Court Duncan Registry) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  The case was set for trial and neither party filed a notice requiring trial by jury.  The trial was adjourned by consent.   The Plaintiff filed a new notice of trial (as is required by BC Supreme Court Practice Direction 25).  The Defendant then filed a notice requiring trial by jury.
The Plaintiff brought an application to strike the Jury Notice.  Mr. Justice Bracken granted the application noting that the Rules only allow a jury notice to by filed with the initial notice of trial.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[13]  As noted, the authorities have held the election whether the trial be by judge alone or by judge sitting with a jury contemplates that the election will be made promptly after the first notice of trial.  Some latitude is possible where a party seeks to make an election outside the tie limited by the rules in certain restricted circumstances.
[14]  In some cases, such as removal from the fast track process where there is no right of jury trial, the parties can make the eelction upon a new notice of tiral being filed…
[15] In this case, a jury notice, in accordance with the principle in Hoare v. Firestone and Pelech v. Pelech, could have been filed and served after the first notice of trial that was issued in this action.  The jury notice should have been filed and delivered within the rules after the date of the first notice of trial…Therefore the notice requiring trial by jury in this case…is struck as being filed outside the tine allowed by Rule 12-6.
As of today’s date this decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic, Partially Disabling Whiplash Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for a chronic soft tissue injury sustained in a motor vehicle collision.
In the recent case (Noon v. Lawlor) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear-end collision.  Fault was admitted by the offending motorist focusing the trial on the value of the case.  The Plaintiff sustained a chronic soft tissue injury to his neck and upper back.  The injury caused difficulties with the heavier aspects of the Plaintiff’s job as a journeyman plumber and his symptoms were expected to continue into the future.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Mr. Justice Halfyard provided the following reasons:

[205] I find that the plaintiff sustained injury to the soft tissues of his neck and upper back, as a result of the collision of January 22, 2009. The plaintiff also sustained minor injuries to his forehead and to his low back. The head injury resolved in about three weeks and the plaintiff had recovered from his low back injury, within six months. The plaintiff continued to experience headaches associated with his neck injury, but the headaches had diminished in about a year to the point where they occurred only occasionally, and were not disabling.

[206] The medical experts did not offer an opinion as to the severity of the whiplash injury to the plaintiff. I find that the impact of the collision was violent and that the forces exerted on the plaintiff’s body were capable of causing significant injury. On all of the evidence, I find that the injury was at least moderate in severity.

[207] There is some medical evidence which I accept and which, tends to confirm the plaintiff’s assertion that he has been experiencing ongoing symptoms of pain. The findings of tenderness on palpation and restricted range of motion in the plaintiff’s neck are partly objective and partly subjective. But they do provide some support for the plaintiff’s trial testimony on this issue. But, in my view, the medical evidence does not confirm the plaintiff’s trial testimony as to the degree of the pain that he has been experiencing, and only partly confirms his evidence as to the extent to which his pain has impaired his physical capacities. In a case of this kind, I doubt whether any medical expert could express any conclusive opinion on these issues. To a considerable extent, medical experts must accept and rely on the plaintiff’s complaints as being true…

[225] I find that there is a substantial possibility that the plaintiff will continue to experience his present symptoms and their associated effects, indefinitely. There is no suggestion that the plaintiff’s condition will deteriorate in the future. The plaintiff is still a young man, and in my opinion, the evidence establishes a substantial possibility that he will achieve significant improvement over time. But there is also a substantial possibility that the plaintiff will never again be able to do the heavy overhead work required of a sprinkler fitter, on a regular basis…

[228] The plaintiff must be compensated for the amount of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life that he has incurred to date, as well as the amount that he will experience in the future, as the result of the injury caused by the defendant’s negligence. Having regard to the findings of fact that I have made, it is my opinion that the plaintiff should be awarded $60,000 as damages for non-pecuniary loss, and I so order.