Reasons for judgment were published this week by the BC Court of Appeal overturning a low jury award for non-pecuniary damages where they also awarded damages for future medical care and diminished earning capacity.
In the recent case (Thomas v. Foskett) the Plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury in a collision and sued for damages. At trial, some 5 years later, a jury awarded the Plaintiff damages including non-pecuniary damages of $15,000, $16,308 for loss of future income earning capacity and $20,336 for costs of future care.
The Plaintiff appealed the non-pecuniary assessment arguing that the findings of needing future medical treatment and having a diminished earning capacity are inconsistent with such a low assessment of non-pecuniary damages. The Court of Appeal agreed, set aside the jury’s award and substituted an assessment of $60,000 for non-pecuniary loss. In reaching this result the court provided the following reasons:
When assessing damages for injuries the BC Supreme Court will not address the injuries as ‘items on a grocery list’. The exact label attached to an injury is far less important than the ways in which an injury compromises a Plaintiff’s life. This was highlighted in a recent judgement from the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry.
In the recent decision (McKay v. Powell) the Plaintiff was involved in three rear-end collisions. As a result she suffered from a chronic pain disorder. As is often the case, in the course of her lawsuit the Plaintiff was assessed by a variety of physicians who had competing diagnoses for the Plaintiff’s symptoms, namely fibromyalgia vs thoracic outlet syndrome. Demonstrating that whatever the correct diagnosis, the symptoms were caused by the collision and the plaintiff was entitled to appropriate compensation, Mr. Justice Meiklem provided the following reasons:  Clearly the cumulative effects of the three accidents in this case have placed Ms. McKay in a position where she has chronic pain disorder as stated by Dr. Mosewich, regardless of the lack of consensus as to whether there is possibly a thoracic outlet syndrome or fibromyalgia in play. No expert has ventured a specific prognosis as to complete resolution of her symptoms. Dr. Wade holds out a hope that further rehabilitation with exercises will reduce her symptoms while participating in daily activities, recreation and occupation. Dr. Mosewich recommended regular exercise and physiotherapy, but recognized a continuing need for pain modulating medication. If Dr. Apel’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia is correct, the plaintiff’s condition will wax and wane, but there will be no full recovery…  Considering the cited cases, the individual circumstances in the present case, and the factors relevant to assessing this head of damages as set out in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, I assess non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $65,000.
A common focus when assessing non-pecuniary damages deals with looking at recreational activities and how they have been curtailed as a result of physical injuries. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, addressing this in the context of lingering soft tissue injuries.
In last week’s case (Travelbea v. Henrie) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. Fault was admitted by the Defendant focussing the case on an assessment of damages. The court found that the Plaintiff suffered a “mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back“. Her symptoms remained “painful and limiting” at the time of trial and while there was room for further improvement the Court was satisfied that there would still be “residual pain and limitations“.
Prior to the crash the Plaintiff was very fit regularly training for and participating in endurance events. The injuries had a “significant effect..(on the Plaintiff’s) reasonably demanding athletic endeavours“. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following reasons addressing this loss:  From the foregoing I conclude the following. The plaintiff sustained a mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back. Now, some four years after the accident, it remains painful and limiting. I think it more likely than not that if she commits to the focused stretching that Dr. Laidlow recommended she will increase her level of functioning. I think it more likely than not that if she takes the course of medication, whether nortriptyline or Celebrex, that Dr. Travlos recommended, she will experience an even greater improvement in her functionality. She will, however, be left with residual pain and limitations. I think it unlikely she will ever be able to ride a road bicycle for any appreciable period of time. As a result both that training and triathlon racing will remain beyond her ability. She may be able to ride a bicycle that can be operated in a more upright posture. I think it more likely than not that she will be able to swim and run, albeit not at the level or for the distance she did previously. I think it also likely that with this improvement in function she will recover some of her self confidence and some of the depression which seems to have settled over her will lift.  Ms. Travelbea’s injuries have affected her much more significantly than they would someone whose life did not revolve around the kinds of athletic endeavours she and her husband enjoy. Ms. Travelbea enjoyed training and did it four, five or six days a week. She enjoyed training as much or more than competing. It was in the midst of athletic pursuits that she met her husband. Training was a significant part of their relationship. They trained together and often raced together. It was the focus of much of their social activity. Her ability to train and the level of fitness she was able to sustain as a result was an important aspect of her sense of self worth…  Taking all of the foregoing into account, and having regard to the non-exhaustive list of factors set out at paragraph 46 in Stapley v. Hejslet, I consider that an award of $50,000 is appropriate in this case. Included in this amount is $3,000 which I have determined is the appropriate compensation for the plaintiff’s lost capacity to perform housekeeping tasks.
The current judicial cap for non-pecuniary damages in Canada for negligently caused injuries rests at just over $342,000. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing whether such an assessment was appropriate for a severe traumatic brain injury coupled with multiple orthopaedic injuries.
In last week’s case (Clost v. Relkie) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision described by the trial judge as “a shocking scene of mayhem”. The Plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and multiple bone fractures These disabled her for life from her own occupation as a pharmacy technician. The Plaintiff’s limitations were profound enough that a Committee was appointed to manage her affairs. Despite this she made a satisfactory recovery to the point where she gained a fair level of independence in her daily life. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $300,000 Madam Justice Baker provided the following reasons:  Ms. Clost is seeking an award for non-pecuniary damages at the upper limit set by the Supreme Court of Canada. Counsel agreed the upper limit, adjusted for inflation, was $342,500 at time of trial. The defendants submitted that an award of $175,000 to $225,000 would adequately compensate Ms. Clost for the pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life caused by the accident injuries.  The submissions made by counsel largely focused on the issue of whether Ms. Clost’s injuries should be characterized as “catastrophic” ? the term most often used by judges who have awarded the upper limit for non-pecuniary damages. The plaintiff says “catastrophic” is merely a synonym for “severe” or “devastating”; the defendants submit that given the significant recovery Ms. Clost has made, particularly in relation to her cognitive functioning, the injuries have not had a “catastrophic” impact on her life…  Ms. Clost does not, as did many of the plaintiffs in the cases referred to by plaintiff’s counsel, require constant supervision for her own protection. She continues to enjoy a considerable degree of independence and to exercise control over most aspects of her life. She has returned to living in her own home. She is able to do most activities of daily living without assistance. She is entirely capable of bathing, toileting, dressing and feeding herself. She can walk, she can swim, she can drive, she can use a computer; she can cook, she can bake, she can shop ? for necessities and for enjoyment. She goes out to the library; for lunch and visits with friends. She can still do many household and outdoor chores although there are also some she cannot do or can only do in a modified way or with assistance. She has continued to manage her own finances, taking care of banking and bill-paying on-line, as she did before the accident. She has not demonstrated a propensity to engage in behaviours that make her a danger to herself or others, as was the case with the plaintiffs in Spehar andCoulter.  I am of the view, however, that Ms. Clost has experienced pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and will continue to experience losses for which she is entitled to very significant compensation and to an award above the range suggested by defendants’ counsel. Having considered the various authorities, I have concluded that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $300,000.  I have already reviewed the evidence of Ms. Clost’s numerous serious orthopedic injuries and the details of the injuries to her brain. She was in a coma for a month and only gradually returned to consciousness. She has a gap in her memory of events for some period before and after the accident. She required two major orthopaedic surgeries within the month following the accident to repair numerous fractures. I have concluded she will require at least one and possibly more surgeries in future to fuse the joint in her left foot and ankle; to remove hardware in the ankle and possibly in her wrists as well; and a possible ankle replacement surgery. Her orthopedic injuries caused her considerable pain; and she was essentially confined to a hospital bed and unable to bear weight or to walk for several months. There was a period during which she was unable to use her arms due to injuries to her arms, wrists and hands.  In total, Ms. Clost was confined to one type of hospital or another for five months following the accident. Her rehabilitation was ongoing at time of trial. She continues to have pain or discomfort in many parts of her body. She has frequent headaches. The most significant and frequent sources of pain are her left foot and ankle; she also has swelling there and the injury disables her from walking or standing for extended periods of time. Although a fusion of the joint may reduce the amount of discomfort she experiences, the medical opinions I accept indicate that she is unlikely to be pain-free. At time of trial she still needed to take strong medications to control her pain and to help her to sleep.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry providing some useful comments in an assessment of non-pecuniary damages for a Plaintiff with pre-existing, long-standing chronic pain and disability.
In the recent case (Morgan v. Scott) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision. The Defendant admitted fault focusing the trial on an assessment of damages. The Plaintiff had a host of pre-existing problems including chronic pain in his neck and low back. He was also on a disability pension as a result of a chronic lung condition.
The collision caused soft tissue injuries which aggravated his pre-existing pain making his symptoms more “enduring in nature and markedly more severe“. Mr. Justice Voith noted that this was a marked change in the Plaintiff’s pre-accident condition and assessed non-pecuniary damages at $100,000. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
The defendant argues that the Accident caused an “exacerbation” of these conditions. As a matter of definition this is true. There are instances, however, where a worsening in a condition gives rise to more than a change in degree. Instead, in real terms, it gives rise to a change in kind.
I find that this is so for several of Mr. Morgan’s symptoms. I have said that his pain symptoms changed from being recurring in nature, with periodic “flareups” or, as Dr. Caillier described it, of an “on and off” nature, to being enduring in nature and markedly more severe. That reality has dramatically curtailed Mr. Morgan’s ability to follow his exercise regime. That regime, in turn, is vital to his respiratory health and to the management of his chronic pain. It was also one of the few physical activities that Mr. Morgan could participate in and it provided him with a sense of confidence. Further, it is clear to me that it also provided him with pleasure and with a sense of pride.
There is no question that Mr. Morgan has become further de-conditioned since the Accident. He testified that his respiratory function has worsened. There was no admissible evidence before me that Mr. Morgan’s chances of being accepted onto a list of prospective transplant donees have diminished as a result of the Accident. Nevertheless I consider that I can, in my assessment of Mr. Morgan’s non-pecuniary losses, weigh the anxiety or stress that Mr. Morgan has expressed over his weakened state and its significance for his long term health.
Still further, I find that Mr. Morgan has been transformed from a generally positive, outgoing, and confident person into one who is reclusive, who suffers from consistent depression of significant severity, and who is without energy. I also consider that it is noteworthy that notwithstanding the significant challenges of various kinds that Mr. Morgan has faced since childhood, he has always persevered and by virtue of his determination improved his state. Since the Accident, that is no longer true…
Based on the findings I have made and on the considerations I have identified, I consider that an appropriate award for Mr. Morgan’s non-pecuniary losses is $100,000. This figure recognizes and accounts for the various positive and negative contingencies which exist as well as the various non-exhaustive factors that are identified in Stapely v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34 at para. 46. I also emphasize that this award recognizes the difficulties that Mr. Morgan laboured under prior to the Accident and does not compensate him for such pre-existing difficulties.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for injuries sustained from two motor vehicle collisions.
In last week’s case (Parker v. Lemmon) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate crashes, the first occurred in late 2008 the second the following month. Fault was admitted by the Defendants for both collisions. The crashes caused an overlapping indivisible injury and damages were assessed globally.
The Plaintiff’s injuries included a Grade 2 Whiplash Associated Disorder in her upper and lower back long with her neck muscles and ligaments. This injury persisted and caused the Plaintiff a partial disability in her job as a care-aid with restrictions associated with “repetitive reaching and pulling and pushing…as well as the repetitive bending with regards to her lower back“.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $45,000 Mr. Justice Savage provided the following reasons:
In considering non-pecuniary damages in this case I am also cognizant of the Supreme Court of Canada’s summary of the purpose of non-pecuniary damages as set out in Lindal v. Lindal,  2 S.C.R. 629 at p. 637:
Thus the amount of an award for non-pecuniary damage should not depend alone upon the seriousness of the injury but upon its ability to ameliorate the condition of the victim considering his or her particular situation. It therefore will not follow that in considering what part of the maximum should be awarded the gravity of the injury alone will be determinative. An appreciation of the individual’s loss is the key and the “need for solace will not necessarily correlate with the seriousness of the injury” (Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, Personal Injury Damages in Canada(1981), at p. 373). In dealing with an award of this nature it will be impossible to develop a “tariff”. An award will vary in each case “to meet the specific circumstances of the individual case” (Thornton at p. 284 of S.C.R.).
Such awards will vary in each case to meet specific circumstances. A specific circumstance here is the plaintiff’s overall health condition. That said, I accept that her injuries have significantly impacted her enjoyment of life, including her work, family and social life…
In Fata, the injuries were found to be such that they would not have prevented a return to full-time employment, although with discomfort. Some of the sequelae were resolved at the time of trial, although there was some lingering shoulder pain that would likely not resolve. The Court awarded $45,000 non-pecuniary damages. The factual circumstances are not in all respects similar to the case at bar, but in my view the award in Fata most appropriately approximates what is appropriate here. I note in that case the Court found that the plaintiff could have returned to work but chose not to. In this case the plaintiff did return to her former employment, which her specialist physician opined she could, but she ultimately chose to discontinue that employment and is considering retraining.
In my opinion the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial in a motor vehicle collision injury claim. The Court found that the Jury’s award for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) was “almost derisory” and not compatible with the other awards made.
In last week’s case (Evans v. Metcalfe) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision. The Plaintiff sought substantial damages. A jury was not receptive to much of the Plaintiff’s claim and awarded a fraction of the sought damages. The awards included $6,000 in special damages, $10,300 for past loss of income and $1,000 for non-pecuniary damages. The trial judge found these awards to be “shockingly unreasonable”.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing the non-pecuniary damage award could not be reconciled with the other awards. The BC Court of Appeal agreed stating that the other awards were consistent with a finding of a 9 month injury and a $1,000 pain and suffering award is not compatible with such a finding. In ordering a new trial the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:
In the present case, there was a body of medical evidence that did not depend on the veracity or reliability of the appellant plaintiff or her primary treating physician that was supportive of the thesis that she continued to suffer from the sequelae of the April 2006 accident throughout 2006 into the early months of 2007. As I earlier noted, the quantum of the awards made by the jury under the heads of past income loss and special damages are reasonably susceptible of the interpretation that the jury made a factual decision that the effects of the accident did persist for about nine months post-accident.
In my respectful opinion, these findings of the jury as reflected in their pecuniary awards make the award for non-pecuniary damages very anomalous. It is not impossible that the jury may have taken a quite censorious view of the appellant because of her economic circumstances or because of her conduct in importuning the physician to give her a note in aid of possible financial advantage. These would not be judicious reasons for denying her an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages. As I observed, there was a body of credible evidence that would support an award under this head significantly greater than the amount awarded at trial. While there can be considerable variance in awards made under this head as the cases cited to us demonstrate, this award seems almost derisory.
Generally this Court must be very restrained in any interference with a jury disposition as a consistent body of precedent makes plain. However, I have been persuaded that this is one of those rare cases where the interests of justice make intervention appropriate. The degree of anomaly in the respective awards, coupled with a very real possibility of the triers of fact taking an unduly severe view of the appellant’s conduct unrelated to her physical condition persuade me that the award made by the jury for non-pecuniary damages cannot stand.
We were invited by counsel for the appellant to either fix awards under various heads ourselves, or refer the matter to the trial judge for assessment. The latter course does not commend itself to me for two reasons: the judge has previously expressed certain fairly strong preliminary views and it is of course the right of the defendant respondent to choose the forum of a jury if so minded. As to the possible remedy of this Court adjusting upward awards made by the jury, this is very much dependent on factual issues, including particularly issues of credibility. Historically this Court has been properly reluctant to engage in factual determinations in this class of matter. In my view, the only appropriate resolution of this case is to set aside the order made at trial and order a new trial and I would so order.
Reasons for judgement addressing quantum of damages were released last year by Arbitrator Camp in an ICBC UMP Dispute assessing $75,000 in non-pecuniary damages for a Claimant who suffered relatively modest injuries.
In last year’s case (Undisclosed v. ICBC) the three Claimants suffered injury in a 1996 collision in Washington State. At trial each was awarded over one million dollars. As the at fault motorist was under-insured the Claimants applied to ICBC for UMP. They had to re-litigate the value of their claim as the Washington Jury award was not binding on ICBC for UMP purposes.
The collision injured all occupants of the vehicle all of whom were related to each other. The Claimant and her three daughters were injured, some of these injuries were severe. While the Claimant’s injuries themselves were not severe her “matriarchal role…has been significantly and adversely affected“. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Arbitrator Camp provided the following reasons: 97. With respect to general damages for pain and suffering, this is a claim in my opinion in which more attention needs to be paid to the rubric of “suffering” than “pain”. I turn to a few fairly recent British Columbia decisions which offer guidance in this area…. 102. Hence, in addition to listing “emotional suffering” (not defined) as a common factor influencing the award of non-pecuniary damages, the Stapley case considers, and adds commentary and an award for the “loss of lifestyle”. 103. In Kuskis v. Tin, 2008 BCSC 862, the plaintiff suffered from a worsening of a pre-existing migraine disorder, a new form of headache and low grade but persistent neck and shoulder pain as a result of soft tissue injuries caused by a motor vehicle accident. In awarding Ms. Kuskis non-pecuniary damages, the court noted that she was “sometimes exhausted, irritable and unhappy”, and while she could work, travel and socialize most of the time without significant impairment, her personal life has been diminished by her increased headaches and pain. Specifically, her ability to form and maintain intimate relationships has been compromised by her increased irritability and fatigue (para 143). 104. Other factors taken into consideration under the general concept of “pain and suffering” include: anxiety, depression, deleterious impact on quality of life (specifically comparing personality and lifestyle before and after the accident) (see Djukic v. Hahn, 2006 BCSC 154 at paras. 61-64); changes in personality including being more “withdrawn and distracted”, increased tiredness, and inability to enjoy activities previously enjoyed (see Fox v. Danis, 2005 BCSC 102 at paras. 112-122); and depression affecting concentration and attention (Maillet v. Rosenau et al., 2006 BCSC 10 at paras. 63-65). 105. I find that Mrs. T has suffered much more than just aches, pains and headaches. Her world was and is hinged on her matriarchal role that has been significantly and adversely affected by this accident as described above. Taking all of the circumstances into account, I find an appropriate award of damages for pain and suffering to be $75,000.
Reasons for judgement were released this week providing feedback on valuing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) noting that injuries cannot be addressed in a piece-meal fashion and instead the total consequences need to be considered.
In this week’s case (Engqvist v. Doyle) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions. She was not at fault for either. The crashes caused various soft tissue injuries which required diagnostic medial nerve blocks and depending on the result the possibility of facet rhizotomies. The Plaintiff also sustained a dental injury. Given the planned further medical intervention there was likelihood of improvement but also a good chance that the Plaintiff’s injuries would pose permanent difficulties. Global Non-Pecuniary Damages of $70,000 were assessed for the Plaintiff’s injuries.
In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Rogers provided the following comments addressing the fact that it is wrong to stack injuries in assessing non-pecuniary damage awards:
The plaintiff’s approach to assessing non-pecuniary damages is flawed. Discrete physical injuries are not items on a grocery list, and the court is not a cashier totting up the damage. The plaintiff’s dental injuries cannot be given a separate line-item in the assessment of her non-pecuniary loss. The assessment is a global exercise and must be based upon the effect that the injuries as a whole have and will have upon the plaintiff’s life.
I find that the plaintiff’s injuries have had and will in the future have a significant impact upon the plaintiff’s ability to enjoy life. The injuries have curtailed the plaintiff’s otherwise active lifestyle. She does not ride her bicycle as much as she used to, she does not play golf with the same frequency or engagement as before the accidents, and her overall participation in life has been diminished. She has a constant ache in the soft tissues over her right shoulder blade. It takes very little use of the plaintiff’s right arm to cause that ache to escalate to a serious pain. The plaintiff will likely undergo at least one series of medial nerve block injections. These will be painful procedures. They are diagnostic in nature – that is to say: the discomfort that she will experience during these injections will be only part of the price in pain that she will have to pay. If the nerve blocks are effective, then the plaintiff will likely undergo one or more rhizotomies. These will be wildly painful. If successful, the rhizotomies will afford the plaintiff with considerable but not complete relief from her symptoms. The relief will likely not be permanent and will last anywhere from six months to five years. The plaintiff may choose to undergo as many as two more rhizotomies. She might, on the other hand, decide to simply live with the pain. In either case, the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life will be reduced by symptoms attributable to the accidents.
I have reviewed the authorities upon which the parties rely in support of their respective positions. No one case is entirely on point, nor is any one case completely irrelevant. In my view, the proper amount of non-pecuniary damages for the first collision is $65,000 and for the second collision it is $5,000.
As previously discussed, frequent doctor visits in and of themselves add no value to a personal injury claim. Seeing a doctor simply to ‘paper’ a personal injury claim really does nothing to add to the amount of compensation a claimant is entitled to receive not to mention that it creates a costly and unnecessary burden on the medical system. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that medical visits to address ‘inconsequential‘ matters with a view to assisting a personal injury claim are frowned upon.
In this week’s case (Hough v. Wyatt) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision. He sued seeking over $350,000 in damages. The Court largely rejected the Plaintiff’s claim finding that while the collision did cause some injuries these were little more than a ‘minor degree‘ of aggravation of pre-existing injuries. Non-Pecuniary damages of $15,000 were assessed.
In the course of the judgement Madam Justice Stromberg-Stein had provided the following critical comments: Mr. Hough was a very difficult witness. He is a poor historian, which is understandable given his extensive medical history. However, he bears the burden of proof. He was argumentative, abrasive, sometimes rude, often unresponsive, and many times inconsistent in his evidence. Mr. Hough clearly demonstrates an attitude of entitlement to insurance benefits, at one point indicating he doesn’t understand the problem here, it is only insurance money. He reports everything, no matter how inconsequential, even a broken fingernail, so if there is a problem in the future, he can get compensation. The trouble for Mr. Hough is he was a medical disaster before the accident, and the defendant is not obliged to pay for all that ails him or ailed him. Mr. Hough’s pre-existing medical condition, his original position, as outlined in the evidence of Dr. Waiz, and what Mr. Hough can recall, would have manifested debilitating effects in any event, regardless of the accident. His original condition would have detrimentally affected him even absent the defendant’s negligence. The defendant is not required to compensate him for debilitating effects not caused by the accident…. Dr. Waiz’s evidence is unsatisfactory on many levels, not the least of which his manner in which he managed Mr. Hough’s care with increasing doses of narcotics. His records are unreliable. He blames computer programs and computer generated forms. He has been willing to fill out reports to benefit Mr. Hough, for example, claiming all Mr. Hough’s drugs were WCB-related so Mr. Hough could be compensated, and claiming a wrist fracture was a WCB injury due to ongoing weakness and pain in his right leg. This is the same broken wrist that Mr. Hough now claims was caused by the accident for the same reason. Where it has suited Mr. Hough, Dr. Waiz has reported to WCB Mr. Hough is unable to work in any capacity. Now he was reporting to this court that, because of the accident, Mr. Hough cannot work. The concern is he is parroting what Mr. Hough wants him to say.
While it is true that serious injuries warrant higher damage awards than minor injuries and that serious injuries typically result in more medical appointments, the mere number of doctor’s visits in and of themselves do not assist in valuing a personal injury claim. You can click here for a short discussion addressing the factors Court’s often consider when assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering) in a BC personal injury lawsuit.
When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.
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