Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a plaintiff full fast track costs despite settlement 7 months pre-trial.
In today’s case (Yuan v. Fan) the Plaintiff was involved in a head on collision in 2012. She sued for damages and fault was admitted. 7 months pre trial the case settled for $48,000 plus costs but the parties could not agree on their assessment with the Defendant arguing that full fast track costs should not be awarded as there was still significant trial prep work needed. District Registrar Nielsen disagreed and awarded the full costs. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 The defendants take the view that the plaintiff had significant work left to do in order to be prepared for trial. They submit the plaintiff would have to meet with her experts prior to trial and prepare lists of questions for their witness’s. I agree. However, that still begs the question of whether “significant preparation for trial” had taken place in the current circumstances.
 In the present case liability was admitted, therefore work in that regard wasn’t needed. The plaintiff abandoned her claim for wage loss, and therefore, no pre-trial work was necessary in that regard. Discoveries had been completed, document exchanges had been completed, and medicolegal reports had been obtained. Detailed settlement offers had been exchanged. All that remained to be done was the filing of a trial brief, attending a trial management conference, and immediate trial preparation. Immediate trial preparation is required in each and every case whether settlement occurs two weeks, or two months prior to trial.
 This was not a complex case. It was a simple case of assessing damages where there wasn’t a wage loss claim. Simple cases require less work to be ready for trial. The plaintiff’s case has met the threshold of being significantly prepared for trial in all the circumstances. I award the full fast track cap.
Reasons for judgement were released today finding that a slow moving prosecution, in part, was a factor in removing a claim from Rule 15.
In today’s case (Bagri v. Bagri) the Plaintiff alleged injury as a result of two collisions, the first in 2007 and the second in 2009. The matters were prosecuted subject to the fast track Rule (Rule 15) and the Defendants brought an application to remove the claims from this rule.
In finding that the claims were not suited for fast track prosecution, both based on the claims potential value and the likely length of trial, the Court also commented on the speed of prosecution. In removing the cases from the fast track rule Master Scarth provided the following reasons:
 There are other factors which support a finding that these actions are not fast track actions. Given that the earlier accident is from almost 8 years ago, the fast track procedures have not assisted the parties in resolving the disputes quickly or efficiently. In contrast, applying fast track procedures restricts the defendants’ right to proceed as a jury trial and caps their potential costs. While it has not been made out that the plaintiff has invoked Rule 15-1 specifically to defeat the defendants’ jury notice, it is fair to conclude that, in the circumstances, using fast track procedures would negatively impact the defendants more than it would positively assist the plaintiff or advance the purposes of Rule 15-1.
 In my view, taking all these factors into account, it is fair to conclude that Rule 15-1 does not apply to these proceedings. Accordingly the application by the defendants to remove the actions from fast track is allowed.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing what costs are payable when two actions, set for trial at the same time, settle prior to trial.
In today’s case (Wang v. Dhaliwal) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions and filed separate lawsuits both of which were set to be heard at the same time. The cases settled for trial for an agreed sum plus costs. The Plaintiff argued that two sets of costs were warranted while the Defendant suggested a single set of costs was appropriate given ‘the efficiencies achieved by having the cases joined“. In agreeing that two sets of costs were appropriate District Registrar Nielsen provided the following reasons:
21] Although the two actions were ordered to be tried together, by consent, they involved different defendants and the issues were not identical: liability had been denied in the December 15, 2010 action and an allegation of contributory negligence had been raised by the defendant in the June 14, 2011 action. Further, the defendants required two examinations for discovery of the plaintiff in the two separate actions and the plaintiff had to conduct an examination for discovery of each defendant in the two actions.
 The only commonality in the two actions was the fact that they involved injuries to the same plaintiff. In the circumstances, it was appropriate to bring two separate legal actions involving the different defendants and circumstances. It was equally appropriate to eventually join the cases for the purposes of trial once it became apparent this approach was workable and efficiencies would be achieved…
 There will be circumstances where two sets of Civil Rule 15-1 costs will not be appropriate. In the presence case, the defendants have had the benefit of the streamlined process of Civil Rule 15-1 and the benefit of the two actions having been combined for the purpose of being heard together. The defendants have also had the further benefit of two separate legal actions having been commenced, which allowed the plaintiff to be examined for discovery twice, once in each action. In both actions, trial preparation was substantially completed.
 In the circumstances, the sum of $6,500 in fees is awarded for each action, with applicable taxes.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the Court’s discretion to allow a party to conduct an examination for discovery beyond the 2 hour cap called for in Fast Track proceedings.
In today’s case (Henneberry v. Humber) the Plaintiff sued for damages following a collision. The Plaintiff was examined for discovery for the full two hours allowed under the fast track. The Defendant brought an application for further time but the court dismissed this finding the examination that was conduced pursued “unproductive trains of inquiry“. In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Romilly provided the following reasons:
 Counsel for the defendant in this particular case indicates there are many reasons for that. It is a complicated case, liability is in issue, and the plaintiff refused to sign a notice to admit certain facts which could have shortened the length of this examination for discovery.
 Counsel for the plaintiff has taken me through the examination for discovery and pointed out many instances where counsel for the defendant has squandered the opportunity to fully take advantage of this two-hour limit that was placed upon these proceedings.
 Two of the leading members of our court, if I could say that, in civil matters, Madam Justice Susan Griffin and Mr. Justice N. Smith, have both written judgments on these new rules. In one case, the case ofMore Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., 2011 BCSC 166, Mr. Justice N. Smith, says this at paras. 12-13:
 The new Rules also impose limitations on oral examination for discovery, but do so through a different mechanism. Rule 7-2 (2) now limits an examination for discovery to seven hours or to any longer period to which the person being examined consents. Although the test for relevance of a particular question or group of questions remains very broad, examining parties who ask too many questions about marginally relevant matters, who spend too much time pursuing unproductive trains of inquiry or who elicit too much evidence that will not be admissible at trial risk leaving themselves with insufficient time for obtaining more important evidence and admissions.
 As Griffin J. said in Kendall, the time limit imposes a “self-policing incentive” on the party conducting the examination: at para. 14. At the same time, the existence of the time limit creates a greater obligation on counsel for the party being examined to avoid unduly objecting or interfering in a way that wastes the time available. This interplay was described in Kendall at para. 18:
A largely “hands off” approach to examinations for discovery, except in the clearest of circumstances, is in accord with the object of the Rules of Court, particularly the newly stated object of proportionality, effective July 1, 2010. Allowing wide-ranging cross-examination on examination for discovery is far more cost-effective than a practice that encourages objections, which will undoubtedly result in subsequent chambers applications to require judges or masters to rule on the objections. It is far more efficient for counsel for the examinee to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence at trial, rather than on examination for discovery.
 In this particular case, counsel for the plaintiff has taken me to the transcript and I am satisfied that there was far too much time spent pursuing unproductive trains of inquiry. As a result, the two-hour limitation passed by without counsel for the defendant being able to deal with all the issues with which they wanted to deal.
 I am not satisfied that this is a case where I should exercise my discretion to give any further time for further examinations for discovery. The application will be dismissed. Thank you.
When a claim is prosecuted under the fast track (Rule 15) the Court has discretion to remove the case in appropriate circumstances. Reasons for judgement were recently published by the BC Supreme Court addressing such an application.
In the recent case (Peters v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was struck in a crosswalk by an unidentified motorist. She sued ICBC for damages under section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. The case was prosecuted under Rule 15 and was set for trial. The initial trial date was adjourned because there was no judge available. The trial was reset and following this the Plaintiff applied to remove it from the Fast Track arguing damages in excess of $100,000 would be sought. Mr. Justice Gaul dismissed the application noting it was brought too late in the litigation process. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following brief reasons:
 The plaintiff’s law suit has been in the fast track stream under Rule 15-1 since shortly after it was launched in the fall of 2011. The plaintiff’s examination for discovery has been completed. The matter was set to go to trial as a fast track trial in the fall of 2012 and would have but for a lack of judicial resources. The matter is now set for trial, again under Rule 15-1, for June of this year. I agree with the defendant’s argument that it is too late at this point to change tack and to remove the case from the provisions of Rule 15-1.
 For all of the above reasons, the plaintiff’s application is denied.
Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry,(Berekoff v. McMath) finding that full Rule 15 costs were appropriate where a matter settled 3 months before trial and the only meaningful work that was left related to witness preparation.
In finding costs of $6,500 were appropriate in these circumstances District Registrar Cameron provided the following reasons:
 The parties are at odds as to whether or not the costs that should be awarded to the Plaintiff as mandated by Rule 15-1(15) should be reduced at all from what is called the “cap amount”, or $6,500, for a matter that settles before trial. The Plaintiff asserts that the full amount should be awarded and the Defendant argues for a significant reduction to take into account that not all of the preparation for trial had been done on behalf of the Plaintiff before the settlement…
 In this case, I am satisfied on the evidence that very significant preparation had been done by Mr. Caissie on behalf of the Plaintiff. He submitted if the case had not settled all he would have been left to complete was the final preparation of his client to give evidence at trial, to prepare the Plaintiff’s family physician and his chiropractor to ready them for giving their evidence at trial, and lastly, an attendance at a trial management conference that would have been held on July 11, 2013.
 With all of this I would have awarded the Plaintiff the entire cap amount of $6,500. However, Mr. Caissie had agreed before this hearing that a 10% reduction should be applied and as such I will allow the costs as claimed of $5,850 plus applicable taxes.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing assesable costs when a fast track trial exceeds 3 days.
In today’s case (Peacock v. Paul) the plaintiff was involved in two collisions. Although only one of the cases was put into the fast track the Court deemed that Rule 15 applied to both actions. The trial took a total of 5 days. ICBC argued that costs should be capped at $11,000 but Mr. Justice Affleck declined to do so and used his discretion to increase costs by $1,500 for each additional day of trial. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
 Madam Justice Neilson held that the formula set out in Anderson v. Routbard, 2007 BCCA 193 should be applied to determine what amount should be awarded. This formula involves first determining what portion of the lump sum provided for in the Rule is for pre-trial and trial costs. Madam Justice Neilson calculated this by taking the amount enumerated for a one day or less trial and subtracting it from the amount allowed for a two day or more trial. The difference is then multiplied by the number of days that the trial went over (paras. 31, 39). She concluded:
39 I would therefore allow the appeal, and calculate costs under R. 66(29) as follows. Under the present limits of $5,000 and $6,600 I take the pre-trial portion of costs to be $3,400, and $1,600 as representative of each day of trial. The plaintiff’s offer to settle was delivered only six days before trial. Thus, she is not entitled to double costs for trial preparation. She is, however, entitled to double costs for three and a half days of trial, calculated at $3,200 per day. Total costs are thus $14,600 ($3,400 plus $11,200) before disbursements and taxes.
 Similarly, this approach was used in Lam v. Chui, 2013 BCSC 1281 where the court considered the appropriate costs award in a fast track action where the trial took 13.5 days. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs for 11.5 days after it deducted 2 days representing time wasted as a result of an error made by the parties concerning the date of the loan in question. Calculating the cost of a trial day at $1, 500 using the formula from Majewska, the court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to $23, 750 in costs ($11,000 for the first three days of trial and $1,500 per day for 8.5 days). The same approach was used inShiekh v. Struys, 2013 BCSC 1148.
 In Coutakis v. Lean, 2012 BCSC 1447, the court considered a successful plaintiff’s claim for costs in a fast track action. The trial took five days including one day where trial did not proceed due to illness of the judge. The court held:
10 Under subrule 15-1(15), the court is given a wide discretion to order an amount of costs other than the fixed amounts set out therein. In my view, this is a case which clearly calls for the exercise of that discretion, in favour of the plaintiff. That the hearing of the evidence took three days, rather than two, was largely as a result of the defence’s cross-examination of four of the plaintiff’s treating physicians, and the defence’s tendering as opinion evidence of the consultation report of a neurosurgeon. Hearing the evidence of all of these physicians took more than three hours, and, as I stated in my judgment, all of it was ineffectual. Further time was spent hearing irrelevant evidence from the defendant.
13 Using the amounts prescribed in the subrule as reference points, I award the plaintiff base costs of $14,000, plus disbursements.
 In the case at bar, the trial took two days longer than contemplated by R. 15-1(15)(c). Applying the authorities discussed above, in my view, the costs award should exceed $11,000 by adding a further $1,500 for each of the additional days of trial for a total costs award of $14,000 not including disbursements.
In 2011 the BC Supreme Court confirmed that the factors listed in the overhauled fast track rule (case value and trial length) were exclusive of each other and if either was satisfied that was sufficient for a fast track proceeding. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, confirming this interpretation of the Rule.
In last week’s case (Foster v. Chandel) the Defendant brought an application to remove a case from Rule 15 arguing the claim was not suitable for fast track prosecution. The Plaintiff conceded that the case “might exceed $100,000” but the Court noted that this in and of itself was insufficient to take a case out of Rule 15. In dismissing the defense application Master Bouck provided the following reasons:
 It appears on the evidence before me that the trial can be completed in three days. The plaintiff says that she can complete her case in just over one day. The defendants’ need to cross-examine the plaintiff’s two experts has not been firmly determined, but the time required for this purpose should not be more than one day. That leaves sufficient time to hear the defendants’ witnesses as well as closing submissions. In any event, the defendants are not even certain of the witnesses to be called or the medical evidence that will be led at trial. To a large extent, the defendants’ evidence concerning the length of trial is based on a yet to be determined witness list and trial plan.
 The fact that the plaintiff’s claim for damages might exceed $100,000 is not in and of itself justification for removal of the action from Fast Track: Hemani v. Hillard,  B.C.J. No. 1924 (S.C.).
 Finally, the plaintiff is prepared to continue her examination for discovery for up to three hours beyond the time allowed under Fast Track. That concession removes any potential prejudice to the defendants who say that certain subject matters have yet to be explored. No order is made with respect to the examination time as the relief was not specifically sought. The defendants always have the opportunity to apply for an order extending the time if this remains an area of contention.
 The defendants’ application for removal of this action from Fast Track is at best premature. As the evidence develops, it may become obvious to the parties that the action ought to be removed if only because the trial will certainly consume more than three days. In those circumstances, it might be in the plaintiff’s best interests to consent to the removal to ensure that a trial date is not lost and costs are not so limited: Rule 15-1(14), Sandhu v. Roy, 2011 BCSC 1653.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry addressing two important topics; the assessment of costs for fast track actions when they settle before trial and the recoverability of Trust Administration Fees as a disbursement.
In last week’s case (Christen v. McKenzie) the Plaintiff settled his ICBC claim after litigation was well underway for specified damages plus “costs payable“. The parties couldn’t agree on these with the Plaintiff seeking full Rule 15 costs and ICBC arguing that a lesser amount should be paid because “a number of pre-trial steps involving a substantial amount of work were still required to be performed as the case settled seven -and-a-half months prior to the commencement of trial“. Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey awarded the full cap noting that while the trial was a ways off significant trial preparation steps were undertaken and this was sufficient to trigger the Rule 15 cap. The Court provided the following reasons:
 To my mind significant preparation for trial ought to be sufficient to entitle the successful party to costs for pre-trial preparation to the full amount of the cap, presently $6,500 pursuant to Rule 15-1(15). Pre-trial preparation may take various forms given the demands of the particular action. Whether the parties engage in extensive negotiations or mediation and thus achieve a settlement months or days before trial, the preparation by counsel may easily approach that required to actually conduct the trial. The focus ought to be on the amount of useful preparatory work done and not where in the pre-trial timeline the resolution was reached. Indeed, the focus of Rule 15-1 and the Civil Rules generally is to encourage early and fulsome preparation to resolve cases earlier as opposed to later if possible; and also to limit the scope of the proposed trial to what is truly at issue, thus reducing the time and costs associated with resolving the dispute.
 In the present case it is clear that the matter was substantially prepared to the level necessary to achieve a significant settlement prior to trial. While there may be fast track cases where a review of the costs amount claimed for preparation is warranted, this is not one. However one dissects and analyzes what was done or not done to prepare this case for trial, a considerable amount of preparation was performed by plaintiff’s counsel to achieve the sizable settlement. Extensive and protracted negotiations, such as occurred here, ought not to be regarded as requiring significantly less preparation than preparing a case for mediation or trial. Indeed, such negotiations are to be encouraged as the most cost‑effective way of dealing with cases that would otherwise proceed to trial. The efficacy of conducting a fast track action ought not to be undermined by a costs analysis that bogs down in the picayune.
The Court also noted that a Trust Administration fee is a fair disbursement a successful litigant can claim. Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey provided the following comments addressing this:
37] I note that the plaintiff’s claim for the trust administration fee of $10 plus $1.20 in taxes is not now disputed by the defendant McKenzie and the third party. The following authorities support it being claimed:Parrotta v. Bodnar, 2006 BCSC 787 at para. 25; Polubinski v. Twardowski, 2007 BCSC 843; and McCreight v. Currie, 2008 BCSC 1751. Therefore the plaintiff’s claim for $11.20 in relation to the trust administration fee (including tax) is successful.
As previously discussed, Rule 15 is applicable to BC Supreme Court injury trials with a quantum of less than $100,000 or to trials that can be completed in three days or less. This week reasons for judgement were published by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, addressing what costs flow following a Rule 15 trial which exceeds three days.
In this week’s case (Travelbea v. Henrie) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. Following a four day trial which was prosecuted under Rule 15 damages of just over $68,000 and costs were awarded. The Plaintiff sought costs under the Tarriff and the Defendant argued that the capped costs of Rule 15 should apply. Mr. Justice Barrow agreed with the Defendant and noted that there is nothing sufficient in a trial exceeding three days to depart from Rule 15 costs. The court provided the following reasons:
6] In general, the case was conducted in accordance with the parameters set by Rule 15-1. The plaintiff did not conduct an examination for discovery of the defendant. The defendant’s examination for discovery of the plaintiff was completed within two hours. There were no interlocutory applications by either party. The only substantive exception to the limitations imposed by the fast-track regime is that the trial spanned four days…
 The only aspect of this case to which the plaintiff points by way of special circumstance is that the trial was set for four days and, in fact, took almost four days to be heard. I am not persuaded that the circumstance is sufficient to justify otherwise ordering. First, when the notice of trial was filed indicating that four days would be necessary, the plaintiff was content that the matter should remain in the fast-track regime. That is apparent by virtue of the endorsement on the notice and the fact that no application to the court or request to the defendant was made seeking to remove the case from the regime. Second, although the trial took more than three days, it took only marginally more, less than half a day.
 I acknowledge the plaintiff’s submission that the case may have taken much longer had counsel not dealt with the matter so efficiently and co-operatively. To accede to that submission would be, in effect, to sanction a party for doing that which the Rules are intended to promote, namely, to conduct trials in an expedient and efficient way.
 In the result, I am satisfied that the lump sum costs provided for in Rule 15 ought to be imposed in this case, and I order that the plaintiff is entitled to costs under Rule 15-1(15)(c) in the amount of $11,000.