Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, scrutinizing ICBC’s “checkered record” of paying for a plaintiff’s medical treatments.
In today’s case (Olson v. Farran) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and was awarded just over $92,000 in damages including special damages and funds for future care costs. The Defendant, who was insured with ICBC, requested certain damages to be deducted because of the overlapping coverage for some expenses under the Plaintiff’s own ICBC policy.
Mr. Justice Pearlman denied aspects of the request raising concern about ICBC’s “past partial and disrupted” payments. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons.
 The onus of showing that a deduction should be made is on the defendant. I must estimate the amount to which Ms. Olson is entitled, exercising caution and taking into account any uncertainty concerning whether the benefits will be paid. Any such uncertainty must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff.
 Based on the Dr. Garbuz’s opinion, and the defendant’s position at trial that Ms. Olson would benefit from a three to six-month exercise program under the supervision of a physiotherapist, I am satisfied that a portion of the physiotherapy will be paid. I estimate that amount to be $500 and order that the amount to be deducted with respect to the physiotherapy is $500.
 In light of the Corporation’s past partial and disrupted payment for kinesiology, there is no certainty that the Corporation will pay for any further kinesiology treatments. I therefore decline to deduct any portion of the $800 sought by the defendant for kinesiology sessions.
 Similarly, there is no certainty that the insurer will pay for future massage therapy treatments, particularly where such treatments may only provide temporary relief to Ms. Olson, rather than a lasting improvement in her condition. Again, I decline to deduct any portion of the $920 sought by the defendant for massage therapy.
 The defendant also seeks a deduction of $870 for psychological services. Psychological therapy is a benefit payable in the Corporation’s sole discretion under s. 88(2)(f) of the Regulation.
 The defendant submits the Court should conclude from ICBC’s past funding for physiotherapy and active rehabilitation that there is no uncertainty about whether the Corporation will fund psychological therapy for the plaintiff.
 I disagree. The Corporation’s checkered record of funding the plaintiff’s treatment before trial raises significant uncertainty about whether this benefit will be paid. Further, Mr. Phan, the Corporation’s representative, offers no assurance in his affidavit that ICBC will pay for psychological therapy for Ms. Olson. Nor is there any opinion from the Corporation’s medical advisor, as required under s. 88(2), that the psychological services are likely to promote the rehabilitation of the insured. The uncertainty concerning whether this benefit will be paid must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff. I am not satisfied the Corporation will pay any portion of this benefit. Accordingly, there will be no deduction for psychological therapy.
 The deductions from the award of costs of future care for Part 7 benefits total $4000.
Interesting reasons were released today by the BC Court of Appeal limiting the scope of a contractual subrogated claim to exclude part 7 benefits a plaintiff recovered in an ICBC claim settlement.
In today’s case (Brugger v. The Trustees of the IWA) the Plaintiff was ordered to repay over $40,000 of a personal injury settlement he obtained to the Defendant’s due to a contractual subrogated claim they enjoyed. The Plaintiff appealed arguing the scope of the subrogated claim could not apply to ICBC part 7 benefits. The BC Court of Appeal agreed and reduced the ordered repayment accordingly. In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons:
 The Trustees have a broad discretion to establish and change the terms upon which benefits are paid but are entrusted to pay the benefits described in the Plan.
 Section 9 of the Plan describes the Disabled Employee’s obligation to reimburse the Plan. It is applicable where a Disabled Employee “recovers compensation from a Third Party [a person whose acts have caused or are alleged to have caused the Disability] or receives a Settlement [the conclusion of a Disabled Employee’s claim for monetary compensation against a Third Party]”. A Settlement is deemed to include payment of compensation by ICBC for damages arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle by an uninsured or underinsured motorist.
 Gross Compensation is defined by the Plan to be the total of sums paid or payable upon Settlement or contingent upon Settlement.
 The Reimbursement Agreement binds the appellant to make the repayment called for in the Plan, hence, repayment of a portion of any lump sum cash payment made upon or contingent upon resolution of a claim for compensation made against a Third Party.
 In my view, Part 7 benefits should not be included in Gross Compensation or calculation of the reimbursement obligation. Such benefits are not paid by or on behalf of a person whose acts or omissions have caused or are alleged to have caused the disability. They are not paid pursuant to Part 6 of the Regulation, which describes third-party liability insurance coverage; they are paid, rather, by the Disabled Employee’s insurer as first-party benefits. Pursuant to s. 79 of the Regulation, they are paid “to an insured in respect of death or injury caused by an accident that arises out of the use or operation of a vehicle” regardless of fault.
 The Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, draws a distinction between Part 7 benefits and a tort claim for damages. Subsection 83(2) states:
A person who has a claim for damages and who receives or is entitled to receive benefits respecting the loss on which the claim is based, is deemed to have released the claim to the extent of the benefits.
“Benefits” are defined in the Act as “the prescribed benefits”, including Part 7 benefits.
 The fact that Part 7 benefits are distinct from and form no part of a tort claim, and that disputes with respect to entitlement to Part 7 benefits must be addressed by separate proceedings, was noted by this Court in Baart v. Kumar (1985), 66 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.). The Court there observed, at p. 12:
The enactments with which we are concerned have been changed from time to time. The general purpose of them, to shift responsibility from the person at fault to a body that provides insurance regardless of fault, has continued. The shift necessarily takes away the right to claim against a person other than the insuring body. That is a common feature in no-fault plans; the workers’ compensation scheme is a familiar example. This Court recognized that shift in Fisher v. Wabischewich (1978), 5 B.C.L.R. 335, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 106.
 While the Trustees are given authority to set the terms upon which Plan Members are entitled to benefits, and have broad discretion to determine what portion of Gross Compensation represents compensation for wage loss, they have established a Plan and must abide by its terms. Without amending the Plan, they do not have discretion to include in Gross Compensation amounts received by the member that are not paid by or on behalf of a tortfeasor.
 The chambers judge proceeded on the basis that the payment of the no-fault insurance benefits established by the statutory scheme of universal compulsory insurance could properly be considered to be compensation as defined by the Plan. Appellate courts must exercise caution in identifying errors of law in disputes arising from contractual interpretation: Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53,  2 S.C.R. 633. However, in my view, the issue of whether Part 7 benefits constitute monetary compensation paid by or on behalf of a person whose acts are alleged to have caused the disability is a question of law requiring consideration of the legal distinction between first-party no-fault insurance benefits and tort damages.
Earlier this year the BC Court of Appeal found that ICBC wage loss benefits can be ‘revived’ if a collision related injury which was initially disabling retriggers disability beyond the 104 week mark. This week a BC Supreme Court judgement confirmed this principle ordering the insurer to pay years of backdated benefits.
In this week’s case (Powell v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and wad disabled for about a month following the collision. She returned to work and pressed on until she could no longer continue several years later due to the lingering effects of her collision related injuries. She applied for ICBC’s disability benefits but was denied with the insurer arguing that she was not longer entitled.
In finding the Plaintiff qualified for benefits under the policy and further that benefits can be revived past the 104 week mark Madam Justice Dillon provided the following reasons:
 This judgment was upheld in Symons where the issue on appeal was whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that Mrs. Symons was entitled to disability benefits under s. 86 of the Regulation. ICBC argued that an insured must have an ongoing disability and be receiving benefits at the end of the 104 week period in order to receive benefits. Because Mrs. Symons was not receiving benefits at the end of the 104 week period and because her disability did not flare up until after that period, the Regulation did not permit for the reinstatement of s. 86 benefits. The plaintiff urged a contextual and purposive approach to statutory interpretation of s. 86 that would not result in absurd results as urged by ICBC.
 Bennett J.A., for the Court, found at para. 17 that the regulations in question should be considered in the context of the legislative scheme to provide universal, compulsory insurance and access to compensation for those who suffer losses from motor vehicle accidents. Benefits-conferring legislation is to be interpreted in a broad and generous manner (at para. 18). The Court concluded at para. 24:
 Reading the words of this legislative scheme in its entire context, harmoniously with the whole of the scheme and purpose, leads to the conclusion that if a person who was disabled as a result of an accident returns to work, and then, because of setbacks or otherwise, is again totally disabled due to the accident, she qualifies for benefits under s. 86, even if she was not disabled on the “magic” day at the end of 104 weeks. This interpretation is consistent with the object of the Act – to provide no-fault benefits for persons injured in motor vehicle accidents.
 The decision in Symons applies directly to the facts in this case. The plaintiff was an employed person who sustained injury in an accident which totally disabled her within 20 days after the accident. She is entitled to disability benefits for the initial period of disability. Although the plaintiff returned to part time work for a time and did not apply for TTD benefits within or at the 104 week mark, if is accepted that she is totally disabled as a result of injuries sustained in the accident, then Symons supports her position that it is not necessary that she be actually receiving benefits or that her disability had been ongoing at the 104 week mark. The issue then becomes whether the plaintiff has satisfied the onus upon her to show that she is totally disabled as a result of injuries sustained in the accident…
 After consideration of all of the evidence, it is concluded that the plaintiff has established entitlement under s. 86(1) of the Regulation.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether ICBC’s no-fault benefits cover payment for treatment at a pain clinic. In short the Court found they do.
In today’s case (Park v. Targonski) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages. At trial future care costs were awarded including $8,500 for treatments from a pain clinic. The Defenant argued that these damages should be deducted as ICBC must cover the cost under the Plaintiff’s no fault beneifts. In agreeing with this submission and finding such treatments are included in ICBC’s no-fault coverage Mr. Justice Fitch provided the following reasons:
 …The narrow issue before me is whether a pain clinic that is focussed on “necessary physical therapy” is a mandatory benefit as contemplated by s. 88(1).
 The mere fact that psychological and/or cognitive obstacles to optimal physical rehabilitation are likely to arise in the administration of what amounts, at its core, to a physical rehabilitation program does not negate the fact that the program is designed to achieve “necessary physical therapy.” The law must take cognizance of our growing awareness of the intersection between physical and mental therapy. Indeed, it is difficult to envision aggressive implementation of the sort of active rehabilitation Back in Motion has in mind without necessarily engaging psychological and/or cognitive issues, particularly for an individual in the plaintiff’s situation. Looking at the issue this way, it is unnecessary and unrealistic to hold that a physical therapy program that incidentally engages psychological and/or cognitive issues ought not to be characterized as a s. 88(1) benefit in circumstances where the language of the provision does not dictate this result. Further, it is undesirable for courts to embark upon the impossible task of deciding which discrete components of a holistic pain program constitute s. 88(1) benefits because they are purely given to physical therapy, and which components fall outside the scope of s. 88(1) because they engage psychological issues that stand as barriers to the successful implementation of an active rehabilitation program. Such an approach is not only artificial, it is one that would breed uncertainty and spawn further litigation in an area already beset by what the Court of Appeal in Raguin charitably described as “jurisprudential inconsistencies”.
 As is evident from the foregoing, I favour the result reached on this point in Klonarakis. In the result, I am of the view that a pain clinic focused on “necessary physical therapy” is a mandatory benefit; one that shall be paid by ICBC even in circumstances where it is anticipated that psychological issues may arise in the implementation of the program.
 As noted in Ayles v. Talastasi, 2000 BCCA 87 at para. 32:
As a claim covered by s. 88(1) I.C.B.C. is obliged to pay the benefits. It is not a matter of discretion under s. 88(2) where entitlement depends “on the opinion of the corporation’s medical adviser”. The risk in deducting too much from the tort award for discretionary benefits is that I.C.B.C. may ultimately refuse to pay on items which although found to be compensable in the tort claim were deducted on the assumption that they would be paid as a no fault benefit. In that instance the claimant is out of pocket for the expense and I.C.B.C. enjoys a windfall. But here the class of future expense is obligatory, not discretionary, and so the plaintiff does not stand to lose anything by the deduction. It is only in circumstances where the classification of the future cost is unclear or an issue arises whether the item is covered by Part 7 at all, that some caution is required.
 As I am satisfied in this case that the pain clinic is a mandatory benefit and that ICBC is obliged to reimburse the plaintiff for all reasonable expenses associated with her attendance at the clinic, there is no uncertainty as to whether this benefit will be paid.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, shutting down an attempt by the Progressive Max Insurance Company from exercising subrogation rights with respect to Part 7 benefits paid.
In today’s case (Middleton v. Heerlin) the Plaintiffs were US residents involved in a motorcycle collision in BC. They were insured with Progressive and received over $100,000 in medical/rehab and other benefits from Progressive by virtue of Progressive filing a Power of Attorney Undertaking promising to provide their insured with minimum coverage required under BC law for BC crashes.
In the Plaintiffs lawsuit against the alleged at fault motorist Progressive sought to get their money back arguing they had rights of subrogation. The Court shut this argument down noting similar arguments were dismissed by the BC Court of Appeal in 2000 and that recent statutory changes do not change this result. In dismissing Progressive’s argument Mr. Justice Johnston noted as follows –
 When Matilda was decided, the relevant portions of s. 25 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act provided as follows:
25. (1) In this section and in section 26, “benefits” means a payment that is or may be made in respect of bodily injury or death under a plan established under this Act, other than a payment pursuant to a contract of third party liability insurance or an obligation under a plan of third party liability insurance, and includes accident insurance benefits similar to those described in Part 6 of the Insurance Act that are provided under a contract or plan of automobile insurance wherever issued or in effect.
(2) A person who has a claim for damages and who receives or is entitled to receive benefits respecting the claim, is deemed to have released the claim to the extent of the benefits.
 The court noted at para. 7:
As the chambers judge noted, in the absence of any express statutory right of subrogation the insurer’s right of subrogation is a derivative right only, which must be advanced in the name of the insured. The insurer is placed in no better position than that of the insured. The revised form of question 1 could be answered “no” simply on the ground that Progressive has no status as a subrogated insurer to advance any claim against the defendants in its own name.
The revised question, to which the above answer was given, was stated in this way at para. 2:
Does Progressive (the third party) have an enforceable right under the contract or the common-law to recover from the defendants all or part of the funds, being $17,800.00 U.S. paid by Progressive to the plaintiff?
 It would seem, therefore, that unless the plaintiffs can point to an express statutory right of subrogation, the answer in these cases must be governed by the result in Matilda set out above.
 In spite of the finding in para. 7, the court in Matilda went on to deal with what it said was a broader issue argued by the parties – provincial legislative competence over extra-provincial insurance contracts, which it framed in this way at para. 8:
The issue is whether the provisions of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act purport to modify the terms of extra-provincial policies and thereby exceed the reach of provincial jurisdiction. In my view, they do not. The focus of s. 25(1) and (2) is on the tort action by Progressive’s insureds against ICBC’s insureds. The torts are the motor vehicle accidents that occurred within British Columbia and clearly are within provincial jurisdiction. The subsections simply provide that accident benefits cannot be claimed in the B.C. tort actions irrespective of where the policy paying the benefits was made. That does not purport to modify the terms of the extra-provincial policies. It merely limits the damages recoverable in tort whether by the insured beneficially or Progressive as subrogated claiming in the name of its insureds. In my opinion, the subsections address an incident of provincial jurisdiction over torts within the province and do not attempt to legislate terms of extra-provincial contracts. [Underlining added.]
 Although there is no argument in these applications that the current version of the statute purports to modify extra-provincial contracts, the underlined portions above would appear to offer no comfort to Progressive, as there is no material difference in wording between the section before the court in Matilda and s. 83(1) and (2) invoked by the defendants in these cases…
 I conclude that Matilda governs the interpretation of s. 83, is not affected by the change in wording from s. 26 to s. 84, and is a full answer to these applications.
 Both applications are dismissed with costs to the defendants.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that an addiction program and a multi-disciplinary pain management program are not mandatory ICBC No Fault benefits.
In today’s case (MacDonald v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was inured in three separate motor vehicle collisions. She was insured with ICBC. She suffered a variety of injuries which resulted in chronic pain and addiction issues. Among the recommended treatments for the Plaintiff were an inpatient residential addiction treatment program along with a multi-disciplinary pain management program.
ICBC refused to fund these under the Plaintiff’s policy of insurance arguing that neither of these programs were ‘mandatory’ benefits covered under section 88(1) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation. Madam Justice Fitzpatrick agreed finding components of the programs (such as physiotherapy) may be covered individually and further that the programs may be covered as ‘permissive’ ICBC benefits, they could not be compelled under section 88. In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned as follows:
 The mandatory provisions in s. 88(1) stand in contrast to those in s. 88(2) where ICBC may provide funds to an insured at its discretion and where ICBC’s medical advisor advises that funded benefits under this section are likely to promote the rehabilitation of the insured who was injured in an accident…
 I am reluctantly driven to the conclusion that Ms. MacDonald’s position is not supportable. As ICBC argues, I think correctly, the Raguin decision has confirmed that the proper interpretation of the section is a more restrictive one in the sense that it is driven by the specific enumerated services that are described in s. 88(1). In accordance with that approach, I see no basis upon which services could be seen to be included as long as they are overseen or supervised by a medical doctor. Services provided by others do not become “medical services” simply because a medical doctor directs them or oversees or supervises them.
 From a public policy perspective, this strict interpretation of the enumerated services presents some difficulties. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended to adopt a rehabilitation-in-pieces approach to legislation that exists to promote reasonable and necessary benefit coverage to injured persons. However, in the absence of clear guidance in the Regulation that s. 88(1) is capable of supporting multi-disciplinary programs, these programs cannot be read-in to include other services not specifically enumerated, such as the court did in Raguin.
 Even accepting Ms. MacDonald’s proposition regarding medical supervision, there is no evidence that in fact, the services at Heartwood and the “other services” at Orion Health either were or would be under the supervision of a medical doctor (although I appreciate that Dr. Mead continued to treat Ms. MacDonald for pain and addiction issues throughout her stay at Heartwood).
 The difficulty is that the argument for both Heartwood and Orion Health is an all or nothing proposition. Both are, as described above, multi-disciplinary treatment programs that bring in various disciplines in order to offer a team approach to dealing with a host of problems, such as Ms. MacDonald has. I have no hesitation in finding that some of the services, such as provided by a medical doctor, were or would be covered under s. 88(1) but it is equally apparent that some are not. In my view, this leads to the conclusion that the treatment programs, as a whole, are not covered under s. 88(1).
Important reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, addressing the entitlement of a claimant to ‘revive‘ ICBC disability benefits after an attempted return to work.
In today’s case (Symons v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a serious collision in 2008. She was rendered initially disabled and ICBC paid her TTD benefits until her ‘creditably stoic and determined‘ return tow work later that year. The Plaintiff’s return was short lived as progressive symptoms eventually led to a series of surgeries and her symptoms continued to disable her at the time of trial.
The Plaintiff applied for disability benefits under s. 86 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation but ICBC denied these arguing that unless TTD’s were being actively paid at the 104 week mark (a period when this plaintiff was back at work) that the legislation does not allow the ongoing payment of disability benefits. Mr. Justice Baird rejected this argument and set out the following reasons clarifying when an insured is entitled to revive TTD benefits with ICBC:
 Following Brewer, Halbauer, and Cai, insured persons currently have a right to revive their TTDs (assuming all the other regulatory requirements are met) in three situations:
1. Entitlement and revival under s. 80: the insured person receives benefits under s. 80, returns to work, and again becomes totally disabled from employment within the 104-week period.
2. Entitlement and revival under s. 86: the insured person receives 104 weeks of benefits under s. 80, transitions to benefits under s. 86, then returns to work for a period before again returning to total disability.
3. Entitlement under s. 80 and revival under s. 86 (intervening alternate insurance benefits): the insured person receives TTDs under s. 80, then receives private insurance benefits for more than 104 weeks, before reviving Part 7 benefits under s. 86.
 Part 7 is also designed to promote the injured person’s rehabilitation, defined in s. 78 as “the restoration, in the shortest practical time, of an injured person to the highest level of gainful employment or self-sufficiency that … is … reasonably achievable”. To this end, Part 7 also includes rehabilitation benefits under s. 88, including the provision of funds for various one-time expenses that are likely to promote the person’s recovery (for vocational training, for example, or alterations to the insured’s residence to improve accessibility), and funds for medical treatments and rehabilitative therapies.
 In other words, Part 7 (at least so far as it is concerned with benefits following injury, rather than death benefits) has two related objects: to compensate an insured person for a portion of the financial loss accrued from temporary total disability caused by a motor vehicle accident; and, where possible, to do so in a manner that brings about the end of the total disability by returning the injured person to employment or self-sufficiency. (For some discussion of these purposes, see Halbauer at para. 41.)…
 I therefore conclude that an insured person is eligible to apply for the revival of TTDs under s. 86 so long as a) they have previously established eligibility and received TTDs under s. 80; b) they can demonstrate that they are totally disabled as defined in s. 80; and c) they can show that the total disability is due to injury sustained in the original accident.
Update – an appeal of this decision was dismissed however the BC Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of s. 101 of the Regulation in concluding that if ICBC is to rely on s. 96(f) to reject a claim for benefits, it must do so on the basis of evidence obtained before the expiry of the 60-day deadline.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, holding that ICBC cannot deny Part 7 benefits based on speculation that a pre-existing condition is causing the injury in question absent evidence justifying this position obtained within 60 days.
In today’s case (Kozhikhov v. ICBC) the Plaintiff submitted over $10,000 in medical treatment expenses which ICBC refused to pay. ICBC relied on s. 96(f) of the Regulations which excludes treatments for conditions caused by “sickness and disease” unrelated to the collision. ICBC did not have evidence justifying this position, at least not in the 60 days following the submitted claim. In holding that ICBC is obliged to pay the Part 7 benefits in these circumstances Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:
 The benefits claimed in this case are subject to s. 101(b). The 60 day period for payment allows ICBC the opportunity to review and investigate the claim. Obviously, it does not give sufficient time for the extensive investigation the corporation may undertake when defending its other insured–the allegedly at fault motorist–in the tort claim, but that is consistent with summary nature of the claim and the relaxed standard of proof required of the plaintiff.
 ICBC relies on s. 96(f) of the Regulation, which reads:
The corporation is not liable to pay benefits under this Part in respect of the injury or death of a person
(f) whose injury or death is caused, directly or indirectly, by sickness or disease, unless the sickness or disease was contracted as a direct result of an accident for which benefits are provided under this Part.
[am. B.C. Regs. 379/85, ss. 36, 37; 449/88, s. 17.]
 Section 96(f) must be read in conjunction with s. 101. If the plaintiff’s injury is caused by the sickness or disease referred to in s. 101, benefits are not payable. But in the absence of evidence that s. 96(f) applies, ICBC must pay benefits within 60 days after it receives proof of the claim.
 In other words, if ICBC is to reject a claim for specific benefits under s. 96(f), it must do so on the basis of evidence obtained before the expiry of the 60 day deadline. In cannot use evidence obtained long after the fact to justify a failure to comply with s. 101.
I have previously discussed Part 7 benefits deductions following BC motor vehicle collision injury trials. In short, a Plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced by the Part 7 benefits (past and future) that they are entitled to.
Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this deduction finding that if there was uncertainty as to whether Part 7 payments will be made there should be no deduction of damages.
In the recent case (Tsang v. Borg) the Plaintiff had damages for future care of $5,000 assessed at trial. The Defendant asked the Court to largely discount this award pursuant to s. 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act on the basis that many of the Plaintiff’s future treatments will covered by ICBC under the no fault benefits plan. Mr. Justice McKinnon noted this argument was “inconsistent” with the Defendant’s trial position and in any event the evidence required for the deduction fell short of the mark. In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:
 At trial the defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s injuries for the most part were not caused by the accident. In Paskall v. Schelthauer, 2012 BCSC 1859, the court held that the regulations limit the benefits to injuries that the corporation views flow from the accident. It strikes me as inconsistent for the defendants to now argue that the plaintiff is entitled to benefits payable under part 7 and more to the point, raises the distinct possibility that in future, the corporation will deny claimed benefits as “not flowing from the accident”.
 In her affidavit, Shelley Ruggles, the insurance adjuster assigned to administer the plaintiff’s entitlement, indicates some uncertainty about whether future treatments are recoverable. She writes, “Further requests for treatment could be covered under s. 88 of the Regulations”. This suggests some uncertainty.
 It is only where there is no uncertainty as to whether the insurer will accept the treatment and pay the cost that deductions can be made, see Ayles (Guardian ad litem of) v. Talastasin, 2000 BCCA 87. At bar there is no such certainty and I therefore resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
 The award of $5,000 stands.
As previously discussed, BC’s Financial Institutions Act requires out of Province vehicle insurers to sign a “Power of Attorney Undertaking” in essence promising to provide the minimum insurance coverage available in BC when their insured vehicles are travelling in this Province and further not to raise any defences which are not available to BC insurers. As many North American jurisdictions have insurance limits well below those required in BC this often creates excess exposure for foreign insurers. Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, stripping a PAU signatory of a defence they otherwise would be entitled to.
In the recent case (McCord v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia) the Plaintiff was injured as a pedestrian in a BC collision. He was insured for no-fault benefits both with ICBC and a private insurer from Ontario. He received benefits from ICBC and subsequently sought coverage with the Ontario provider. The Ontario insurer denied payment relying on an Ontario regulation which limited payments “if the person receives benefits under the law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred“.
The Plaintiff sued arguing the Ontario insurer could not rely on this section as they signed the PAU. Mr. Justice Saunders agreed and provided the following reasons:
 Western Assurance says that there has been no violation on its part of the PAU; it has not set up a defence as to coverage, but has simply taken a position as to the amount of coverage available….
 The PAU sets out two provisions. One is an undertaking not to raise defences. The other is an undertaking to pay limits as set out in (a) and (b) of the PAU. A “position” taken by a foreign insurer that only the minimum amount is payable, and not the full amounts otherwise payable under the foreign insurer’s policy, is, in every sense of the word, a defence. The position being taken here by Western Assurance is one of the types of conduct which the PAU is designed to prevent…
 In my view, the raising of the provisions of the Regulation by Western Assurance is a defence within the meaning of the PAU, and reliance on those provisions as a defence would constitute a breach of the undertaking under the PAU.
 The application is therefore allowed, and s. 57(1.1) of the Regulation will have no application to Mr. McCord’s claim for benefits.