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Tag: failure to mitigate

BC Court of Appeal Upholds Across The Board Mitigation of Damages Reduction

Reasons for judgement were published this week upholding a trial judge’s 50% reduction of damages in a personal injury lawsuit for failure to mitigate.
In the recent case (Mullens v. Toor) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2012 collision caused by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff suffered physical and psychological injuries and the Court concluded the Plaintiff’s recovery could have been improved had she more diligently followed medical advice.  As a result the Plaintiff’s assessed non-pecuniary damages, loss of earning capacity, loss of pension and deferred profit sharing were reduced by 50% and the future cost of care by 10%.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing the failure to mitigate reduction should only apply to her non-pecuniary damages.  The BC Court of Appeal disagreed.  In upholding the trial result the Court provided the following reasons:

[54]         Failure to mitigate is a positive allegation that should be pleaded and argued at trial:  Hosking v. Mahoney, 2010 BCCA 465 at para. 34.  Ms. Mullens thus submits that the judge erred in deciding issues on a basis that was not specifically pleaded or argued before him and properly should have invited counsel to address the claim: see e.g., Carmel Pharmacy Ltd. v. Tri City Contracting (B.C.) Ltd., 2014 BCSC 337 at para. 2.

[55]         In their response to civil claim the respondents pleaded as follows:

The Plaintiff has failed to follow medical advice with respect to treatment or exercise.

The Plaintiff could, by the exercise of due diligence, have reduced the amount of any alleged injury, loss, damage or expense, and the Defendants say that the Plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages.

[56]         The respondents say it is a mischaracterization to say that they did not argue for a reduction across all heads of damages because of a failure to mitigate.  A fair reading of the written submissions and the evidence as presented at trial is that mitigation was a key issue for all of Ms. Mullens’ claims.

[57]         In my view, the respondents’ pleading is clearly not deficient.  In Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28 at paras. 10‑12, Brown J., for the Court, found that a claim for “general damages for pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity past, present and future, loss of opportunity, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of physical heath…” was sufficiently broad to put the opposing party on notice that the claim encompassed mental injury.  Here the pleading is explicit.

[58]         Much of the evidence at trial, both in direct and cross-examination, concerned matters related to the mitigation issue pleaded: the appellant’s failure to return to work, her delay in taking medication, not seeking psychiatric treatment, not having consistent treatment, and the delay in obtaining recommended treatment being a negative factor in her prognosis.  These issues were canvassed by both the expert witnesses (Dr. Zoffman, Dr. Finlayson, Dr. Robertson, Dr. Maloon) and lay witnesses (Mr. Gill, Ms. Macpherson, Ms. Percy and Mr. Towsley).

[59]         The issue of mitigation was both specifically pleaded and extensively explored at trial.  Experts testified to the mental health benefits of returning to work and the benefits of comprehensive psychiatric treatment.  Counsel raised a failure to mitigate in general terms during closing submissions, and made specific reference to the benefits of returning to work, such as improved mental heath.  The specific arguments made with respect to a failure to mitigate past loss of income were logically connected to the other heads of damage claimed.

[60]         In my view, it cannot fairly be said that mitigation was not an issue properly before the court with respect to all of Ms. Mullens’ claims for damages.  I see no merit to this ground of appeal.

BC Court of Appeal – The Phrase Crumbling Skull is "Rarely Helpful"

Reasons were released today by the BC Court of Appeal criticizing  the phrase ‘crumbling skull’ and spelling out the analysis a Court must take when dealing with non tort related causes to a Plaintiff’s position.
In the recent case (Gordon v. Ahn) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision and was awarded $50,000 at trial.  In reaching the award the trial judge noted that the plaintiff was a ‘crumbling skull’ and further that she failed to mitigate her damages and reduced the damage assessment by some unspecified amount.  The BC Court of Appeal ordered a new trial noting the trial judge did not properly address the evidence to justify any reductions.  In discussing what is needed of a Court when deciding what position a plaintiff would be in but for the tort the following reasons were provided:

[33]        The use of the phrase “crumbling skull” to describe a plaintiff’s condition is, in any event, rarely helpful. As Major J. explained in Athey, there are no special rules or analyses that apply to claims made by plaintiffs who, before becoming victims of a tort, are affected by conditions that may deteriorate in the future. Damages are always to be assessed by reference to the situation that the plaintiff would be in but for the wrongdoing. Describing a plaintiff as coming within the “crumbling skull doctrine” does not eliminate the need for a complete analysis of the pain and suffering caused by the accident.

[34]        The judge found that there was “an inter-relationship between the pain that the plaintiff experienced from her physical injuries and her emotional or psychological problems”. He also found that her psychological problems “worsened because of the accident”. Even in cases where a plaintiff is suffering from serious chronic depression, an aggravation of the symptoms attributable to a tort is compensable: Sangha v. Chen, 2013 BCCA 267. In the present case, where the plaintiff’s symptoms were fairly minor before the accident, but developed into major depression as a result of the accident, it is clear that damages ought to have been awarded.

[35]        It is not apparent, from the judge’s reasons, whether he awarded any damages in respect of the depression brought on by the accident. Beyond referring to the “crumbling skull doctrine”, he did not undertake any analysis of the issue of damages in relation to Ms. Gordon’s emotional and psychological deterioration.

[36]        A proper analysis of the issue would have required the judge to consider the degree to which Ms. Gordon’s psychological and emotional health was damaged by the accident. Such an analysis would have required a detailed consideration of her pre-accident and post-accident mental health, as well as an assessment of the likelihood that a deterioration would have occurred even in the absence of an accident (see Laidlaw v. Couturier, 2010 BCCA 59). The judge failed, in this case, to undertake such an analysis.

Failure to Mitigate Cuts Pain and Suffering Award in Half

Update November 6, 2017Today the BC Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of the below judgement
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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, cutting a Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damage award in half due a failure to mitigate loss.
In today’s case (Mullens v. Toor) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2012 collision caused by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff suffered physical and psychological injuries and the Court concluded the Plaintiff’s recovery could have been improved had she more diligently followed medical advice.  As a result the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary assessment of $140,000 was reduced by 50%.  In reaching this result Mr. Justice Verhoeven provided the following reasons:
[116]     She has been unreasonably resistant and reluctant to accepting that her psychological condition requires medical treatment, including the use of anti-depressant medication, and psychiatric treatment. She was resistant to the early advice of Dr. Chu about anti-depressant medication in August 2012. She resisted the advice of Dr. Hanson until finally relenting in December 2012 only when he insisted. She testified that she was concerned that a diagnosis of depression and taking anti-depressant medications could have some negative consequences, such as for insurance. She did not give much detail about this. This could justify some degree of reluctance but no more. Embarrassment about accepting treatment for a mental injury is not a valid excuse. ..

[121]     In sum, the plaintiff ought reasonably have begun use of anti-depressant medication earlier than she did initially.  She could have resumed use of Pristiq or other suitable anti-depressant medication by July 2015 when she stopped breastfeeding, if not earlier. She ought to have been treated by a psychiatrist. Better engagement with medical and psychiatric treatment would have also increased the chances of a successful attempt to return to work which could have been attempted in early 2013 and again in 2015, and 2016.

[122]     I doubt that the plaintiff has engaged in physical exercise to the extent recommended. Physical exercise has been consistently recommended to her. In examination in chief she testified that she followed the exercise advice of Dr. Chu and of her physiotherapist to the greatest extent possible.  However on cross examination she was vague and evasive about the extent to which she had followed this advice. She testified that she tried to do what was recommended but could not recall exactly. Currently she participates in pilates at a local facility 3 to 4 times per week. Her husband candidly acknowledged that she was not doing much exercise other than attending pilates. However the evidence concerning exercise does not allow me to derive sufficiently firm conclusions that would be necessary to conclude that the defendant has met its burden to establish a failure to mitigate in this respect.

[123]      A question is whether the plaintiff’s refusal to attempt to return to work and her reluctance to accept and failure to obtain full psychiatric treatment is rooted in her accident injuries, such that a deduction for failure to mitigate would not be appropriate. However there is no basis for such a finding in the medical or other evidence. The plaintiff is highly educated and intelligent. There is some evidence that she has experienced some cognitive difficulties but these are not severe. She displayed considerable intelligence in giving her evidence, especially in describing her previous work. I do not accept that the plaintiff was impaired in her rational decision-making capacity in relation to her career and her treatment…

[216]     Based on all of the circumstances of this case, including consideration of the cases cited to me my both counsel, in my view a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary loss is $140,000

[217]     I reduce this by 50% to $70,000 on the basis of failure to mitigate loss.

Mitigation of Damages – "The Law Does Not Encourage Indolence"

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, reducing a Plaintiff’s pain and suffering award by 20% for failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages.
In today’s case (Rasmussen v. Blower) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 rear end collision.  Fault was admitted.  The Plaintiff suffered “whiplash type injuries” with some symptoms persisting to the time of trial.  The Court found that the Plaintiff failed to follow reasonable treatments recommended to him.  In reducing his non-pecuniary damages by 20% as a result of this Mr. Justice Funt provided the following reasons:

[38]         The law does not encourage indolence.  An injured party has a duty to mitigate:  see Graham v. Rogers, 2001 BCCA 432, at para. 35.  In this type of case, the plaintiff must seek and follow the advice of his or her physician with the goal of overall improvement and recovery.

[39]         Regarding lack of mitigation, plaintiff’s counsel submits that the plaintiff did not follow the recommended treatment of physiotherapy and massage, stating that the two sessions that he did attend were painful, that he was constantly travelling, and that he could not afford the treatments.

[40]         The Court rejects the plaintiff’s reasons for failure to mitigate.  Realistically speaking, perseverance is often the key to allowing medical treatments a chance to work.  During the approximately three months for which the plaintiff claims past wage loss, he could have attended physiotherapy and massage sessions.  The Court is satisfied that he had sufficient funds or, as noted by defence counsel, he could have claimed Part 7 benefits (Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation, B.C. Reg. 447/83, Part 7).

[41]         The defendant did not argue that, if the plaintiff had followed the medical advice he received, the plaintiff’s injuries would have resolved within “6 months to a year or so”:  Price, supra.  The defendant stated that the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary award should be reduced by 10%-20% in order to take into account the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.  The defendant has satisfied the two-pronged test in Chiu v. Chiu, 2002 BCCA 618, set forth by the late Mr. Justice Low, writing for our Court of Appeal:

[57]      The onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff could have avoided all or a portion of his loss.  In a personal injury case in which the plaintiff has not pursued a course of medical treatment recommended to him by doctors, the defendant must prove two things: (1) that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in eschewing the recommended treatment, and (2) the extent, if any, to which the plaintiff’s damages would have been reduced had he acted reasonably. These principles are found in Janiak v. Ippolito, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 146.

[42]         The Court will reduce the non-pecuniary award it would otherwise have ordered by 20%.  The plaintiff failed to mitigate by not following the reasonable treatments recommended to him.  He also consumed alcohol in quantity which, pragmatically viewed, probably reduced or nullified the effectiveness of the prescribed medications.

No Failure to Mitigate Damages For Refusing Medical Marijuana

While BC Courts do recognize that the cost of medical marijuana can form a basis for damages in a personal injury claim, one matter that, to my knowledge, has never been addressed is whether failing to take prescribed medical marijuana can amount to a failure to mitigate damages.  This issue was dealt with in reasons for judgement released today.
In today’s case (Glesby v. MacMillian) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision.  Liability was admitted.  In the course of the claim a physician suggested medical marijuana.  The Plaintiff did not follow this advice.  The Defendant apparently argued the damages should be reduced for this failure to mitigate however Mr. Justice Baird declined to do so.  The Court, despite having reservations about the Plaintiff’s credibility, accepted her explanation for not following the advice to try medical marijuana.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following comments:
[47]         Dr. Hershler examined the plaintiff on May 2, 2013, some five months before trial. His diagnosis was much the same as Dr. Kleinman’s, but without discussion of a possible interrelationship of physical and psychological factors. Soft tissue injury and chronic pain were the culprits, he said, and echoed Dr. Kleinman’s recommendation that the plaintiff should embark upon a core strengthening program. He also encouraged the plaintiff to consider the use of medical cannabis to manage her pain. The plaintiff has not taken this advice, either. She has reservations about the legality of the acquisition and use of cannabis, and, in any event, she is a committed life-long abstainer from narcotics and drugs of all sorts…
[69]         I decline to find that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her losses by not taking medical cannabis. Dr. Hershler’s advice came after the end of what, for the reasons just stated, I consider to be a reasonable recovery period. In any event, I accept as sincere the plaintiff’s reservations about the acquisition and use of cannabis.
 

"Textbook Example of Failure to Mitigate" Leads to Over $100,000 of Stripped Damages

It pays to take reasonable efforts to get better.  Not only does it make good sense to take all reasonable steps to recover from injury for the sake of your well being but failing to do so can strip significant damages from a personal injury award.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with a “textbook” example of this.
In this week’s case (Maltese v. Pratap) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The Plaintiff was injured which continued to cause problems by the time of trial and were expected to continue in the future.  The court noted that the Plaintiff received “remarkably similar” treatment advice which he unreasonably refused to follow.  The Court reduced the awarded damages by just over $100,000 and further stripped the Plaintiff of future care costs on the basis that “it is entriely unlikely” that the Plaintiff would follow the recommended treatments.  In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Kelleher provided the following reasons:
[55]         The facts of this case represent a textbook example of a failure to mitigate.  There is a consensus among the professionals who assessed and treated the plaintiff that Mr. Maltese needed to undertake a program of physical rehabilitation and fitness with a kinesiologist or personal trainer.  Their recommendations are remarkably similar.  Mr. Maltese has chosen to ignore them…
[59]         I am satisfied that the first stage of the test in Gregory has been met: I have no difficulty concluding that Mr. Maltese, having all the information at hand that he possessed at the time, ought reasonably to have undergone the recommended treatment of active rehabilitation through a kinesiologist or personal trainer.
[60]         Among other reasons, Mr. Maltese submitted that because he felt worse after attending physiotherapy, he made a decision to not pursue an active rehabilitation program. I cannot accede to this argument. The medical evidence taken as a whole also establishes that, on a balance of probabilities, there would have been a significant improvement in the plaintiff’s condition or a reduction in his damages. 
[61]         On such a clear case, a reduction of 30% in the awards for non-pecuniary damages, wage loss after his return to work and loss of future earning capacity is appropriate…
[77]         In this regard, the plaintiff relies on the fact that Drs. Travlos, le Noble, Chan and Kokan all recommended an active rehabilitation program.  The plaintiff argued that there is a consensus among these physicians that he needs to recondition himself and would benefit from the assistance of a kinesiologist or personal trainer.
[78]         But there must be a likelihood that a plaintiff will incur costs before an award can be made under this head of damages.  I conclude that it is entirely unlikely that Mr. Maltese will avail himself of these services in the future.  After all, the plaintiff has been advised by medical professionals on numerous occasions to engage in active reconditioning.  He has not done so.  I conclude an award for cost future care costs in these circumstances is inappropriate: Izony v. Weidlich, 2006 BCSC 1315 at para. 74.

"It is Not for the Tortfeasor" To Dictate Timelines for a Plaintiff's Retirement

Interesting reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing mitigation of damages in a personal injury claim seeking compensation for reduced pension benefits.
In this week’s case (Wangert v. Saur) the Defendant died when his vehicle collided with a train operated by the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and missed some time from work.  The Plaintiff retired in 2012 and sought damages for a reduced pension arguing that had he not been psychologically injured by the collision he would have worked more hours thereby having greater pensionable earnings.
The Defendant argued that since, at the time of the Plaintiff’s retirement at age 55, he was able to work full time and had no residual difficulty from the Accident he failed to mitigate his damages by not working past his otherwise planned retirement in order to earn a greater pension.  Mr. Justice Abrioux rejected this argument providing the following reasons:
[34]         In this case, I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that he had always planned to retire at the age of 55. He had spent many years working for CP Rail.
[35]         The defendant did not cite any legal authority supporting his position that a plaintiff could have mitigated losses by working past his or her planned retirement age. I was also unable to find any.
[36]         In my view, planning for retirement is a very important stage in a person’s life. When one has the opportunity to retire at a certain age, even though continuing to work remains available, the decision to retire is not entered into lightly. It is not for the tortfeasor to take the position that the plaintiff‘s failure to change his life plan due to an accident which occurred through no fault of his own, amounts to unreasonable conduct.

Lack of Financial Means Defeats "Failure to Mitigate" Allegations

As discussed on numerous occasions, a Plaintiff who fails to take reasonable steps to aid in their own recovery can have their damages reduced for a ‘failure to mitigate’.  In considering weather a Plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment is reasonable their personal circumstances are taken into account.  It is well established that lack of funding can reasonably excuse a course of otherwise helpful therapy.   Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further demonstrating this principle.
In this week’s case (Rozendaal v. Landingin) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions.  She was faultless for both.  She suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, shoulders and upper back which continued to the time of trial and were expected to carry on in the future.  Non-Pecuniary damages of $40,000 were awarded.
The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s damages should be reduced due to her failure to carry on with physiotherapy.  Madam Justice Holmes found that greater therapy indeed would have made a difference but given the Plaintiff’s circumstances her failure to attend was not unreasonable.   In dismissing the defendant’s arguments the Court provided the following reasons:
[66]         On the medical evidence, I find that Ms. Rozendaal likely could have improved to a greater extent and more quickly had she undertaken a focussed course of strengthening and conditioning therapy or training designed for her particular injuries, such as Dr. O’Connor outlined in his second report.  The various forms of massage Ms. Rozendaal undertook gave her relief from her pain, but, as Dr. O’Connor explained, passive therapies did not help rehabilitate the muscles which, ultimately, were causing that pain.
[67]         The question is whether Ms. Rozendaal acted unreasonably by failing to undertake the recommended therapies or programs.  I find that in her particular personal circumstances, she did not.  ..
[70]         As I find, Ms. Rozendaal’s life circumstances left her unable to fund any form of ongoing treatment or therapy.   From their early days together, she and Mr. Landingin have worked extremely hard to educate themselves for careers and to provide financial support and loving care for their young family.  It is clear from the evidence that life was not easy for them.  I have no difficulty accepting that other financial priorities displaced ongoing physiotherapy or active rehabilitation for Ms. Rozendaal, particularly since it seemed to her that massages from Mr. Landingin and exercises she did at home were just as helpful. 
[71]         As I find, Ms. Rozendaal was mistaken in this assessment.  However, it was only when Dr. O’Connor saw Ms. Rozendaal before preparing his second report (of January 18, 2012), and asked her to demonstrate the exercises she had been doing since he had seen her six months earlier, that he realized that he had not given his instructions specifically enough:  Ms. Rozendaal was doing light aerobic work and some gentle neck exercises, but no real strengthening.  Dr. O’Connor testified that because Ms. Rozendaal had evidently misunderstood his recommendation in the previous report, he described the recommended conditioning more explicitly in the second report.
[72]         The law does not require perfection in the pursuit of rehabilitation.  It requires instead that a plaintiff make efforts which are reasonable and sincere in the plaintiff’s own personal circumstances:  Gilbert at para. 203.
[73]         On this basis, in Tsalamandris v. MacDonald, 2011 BCSC 1138 at paras. 227-30, varied on other grounds 2012 BCCA 239, the Court found no failure to mitigate where the plaintiff was unable to pursue the recommended treatments because of life circumstances that included a pregnancy, the care of small children at home, and her inability to perform the recommended exercises properly without the help of a personal trainer.
[74]         I find similarly that Ms. Rozendaal’s efforts at rehabilitation were reasonable and sincere in her own personal circumstances.

Soft Tissue Injury Damages Round Up – The Kelowna Road Edition


As regular readers of this blog know, I try to avoid ‘round up‘ posts and do my best to provide individual case summaries for BC Supreme Court injury judgements.  Sometimes, however, the volume of decisions coupled with time constraints makes this difficult.  After wrapping up holidays in the lovely City of Kelowna this is one of those times so here is a soft tissue injury round up of recent BC injury caselaw.
In the first case (Olynyk v. Turner) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 rear-end collision.  Fault was admitted.    He was 43 at the time and suffered a variety of soft tissue injuries to his neck and back.  His symptoms lingered to the time of trial although the Court found that the Plaintiff unreasonably refused to follow his physicians advise with respect to treatment.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $40,000 (then reduced by 30% to reflect the Plaintiff’s ‘failure to mitigate’) Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following reasons:
[83]I find that Mr. Olynyk suffered a soft tissue injury to his neck and low back. I would describe the former as mild and the later as moderate. There is no necessary correlation between the amount of medication consumed, the frequency of visits to the doctor, or the nature of the attempts to mitigate the effects of one’s injuries and the severity of those injuries and their consequences. There may be many explanations for such a lack of congruity: a person may be particularly stoic or may have an aversion to taking medication for example. On the one hand, in the absence of such an explanation, when there is a significant disconnect between these two things, that can be a reason for treating self reports of pain and limitation with caution…

[87]Given that it is now three years post accident, I am satisfied that Mr. Olynyk’s pain is likely permanent, although as Mr. Olynyk told Dr. Laidlow in the fall of 2011, his symptoms improved in the years since the accident, inasmuch as his level of pain declined as did the frequency of more significant episodes. Leaving aside the issue of his pre-existing back problems, and in view of the authorities referred to above, I consider that an award of non-pecuniary damages of $40,000 is appropriate. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken account of the dislocation that the plaintiff’s loss of employment has caused him. That loss is greater than the mere loss of income that it occasioned and for which separate compensation is in order. The plaintiff had to move to a different community to take a job that he was physically able to do. That is a matter of some consequence.

[88]The next issue is the effect of the plaintiff’s pre-existing back problems. According to Dr. Laidlow because of the plaintiff’s spondylolisthesis, and given the heavy nature of his work, he likely would have experienced back problems similar to those he now experiences in 10 years even if he had not been involved in an accident.

[89]As noted above, such future risks or contingencies are taken into account through a combination of their likely effect and the relative likelihood of them coming to pass (Athey at para. 27). I find that there was a 60 percent likelihood that Mr. Olynyk would experience the same symptoms he now experiences in 10 years in any event. It is not appropriate to reduce the award for general damages by 60 percent to account for that likelihood because the pre-existing condition would not have given rise to symptoms and limitations for 10 years. Mr. Olynyk is now 47 years old. I think it reasonable to reduce the award for general damages to account for his pre-existing condition by 30 percent.

[90]The plaintiff is entitled to $28,000 in general damages ($40,000 less 30 percent). That amount must be further reduced to account for Mr. Olynyk’s failure to mitigate. The net award of non-pecuniary damages is therefore $22,400.

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In the second case released this week (Scoffield v. Jentsch) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision on Vancouver Island.  Although the Defendant admitted fault there was “a serious dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the severity of the force of impact“.

Mr. Justice Halfyard noted several ‘concerns about the Plaintiff’s credibility‘ and went on to find that the impact was quite minor finding as follows:

[201]I find that, after initially coming to a full stop, the defendant’s vehicle was moving very slowly when it made contact with the rear bumper of the plaintiff’s car. The plaintiff’s car was not pushed forward. The damage caused by the collision was minor. The force of the impact was low. The defendant backed his car up after the collision, and the bits of plastic picked up by the plaintiff some distance behind her car, fell away from his car as he was backing up. I do not accept the plaintiff’s estimate that the closest pieces of plastic on the roadway were eight feet behind the bumper of her car.

Despite this finding and the noted credibility concerns, the Court found that the Plaintiff did suffer soft tissue injuries to her neck and upper back and awarded non-pecuniary damages of $30,000.  In doing so Mr. Justice Halfyard provided the following reasons:

[202]The defendant admits that the plaintiff sustained injury to the soft tissues of her neck, upper back and shoulders as a result of the collision of April 9, 2009. I made that finding of fact. But the plaintiff alleges that the degree of severity of the injury was moderate, whereas the defence argues that it was only mild, or mild to moderate in degree…

[221]I find that, from April 16, 2009 until August 9, 2009, the pain from the injury prevented the plaintiff from working. After that, she was able to commence a gradual return to working full-time, which took a further two months until October 10, 2009. For the first four months after the accident, the pain from the injury prevented the plaintiff from engaging in her former recreational and athletic activities. She gradually resumed her former activities after that time. I find that, by the spring of 2010, the plaintiff had substantially returned to the level of recreational and athletic activities that she had done before the accident. After that time, any impairment of the plaintiff’s physical capacity to work or to do other activities was not caused by the injury she sustained in the accident on April 9, 2009…

[226]The plaintiff must be fairly compensated for the amount of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life that she has incurred by reason of the injury caused by the defendant’s negligence. In light of the findings of fact that I have outlined above, I have decided that the plaintiff should be awarded $30,000.00 as damages for non-pecuniary loss.

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(UPDATE March 19, 2014 – the BC Court of Appeal overturned the liability split below to 75/25 in the Plaintiff’s favour)

In this week’s third case, (Russell v. Parks) the pedestrian Plaintiff was injured in a parking lot collision with a vehicle.  The Court found that both parties were to blame for the impact but the Plaintiff shouldered more of the blame being found 66.3% at fault.

The Plaintiff suffered a fracture to the fifth metacarpal of his right foot and a chronic soft tissue injury to his knee.  The latter injury merged with pre-existing difficulties to result in on-going symptoms.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $45,000 (before the reduction to account for liability) Mr. Justice Abrioux provided the following reasons:

[63]I make the following findings of fact based on my consideration of the evidence both lay and expert as a whole:

(a)      the plaintiff’s “original position” immediately prior to the Accident included the following:

·being significantly overweight and deconditioned;

·having a hypertension condition which had existed for many years;

·asymptomatic degenerative osteoarthritis to both knees, more significant to the right than the left; and

·symptomatic left foot and ankle difficulties.

(b)      prior to the Accident, the plaintiff’s weight and deconditioning, together with the left foot and ankle difficulties caused him to live a rather sedentary lifestyle. Although he was able to work from time to time and participate in certain leisure activities, these were lessening as he grew older.

(c)      the Accident did not cause the degenerative osteoarthritis in the right knee to become symptomatic. It did, however, cause a soft-tissue injury which continued to affect the plaintiff to some extent at the time of trial.

(d)      the plaintiff’s ongoing difficulties are multifactoral. They include:

·his ongoing weight and conditioning problems. Although Mr. Russell’s pre-Accident weight and lack of conditioning would likely have affected his work and enjoyment of the amenities of life even if the Accident had not occurred, the injuries which he did sustain exacerbated that pre-existing condition;

·the plaintiff’s pre-existing but quiescent cardiac condition would have materialized the way it did even if the Accident had not occurred. This condition would have affected his long term day-to-day functioning including his ability to earn an income;

·notwithstanding this, the injuries sustained in the Accident, particularly the right knee, continue to affect his ongoing reduced functioning. This will continue indefinitely, to some degree, although some weight loss and an exercise rehabilitation program will likely assist him;

·an exercise and weight loss program would have been of benefit to the plaintiff even if the Accident had not occurred.,,

[73]From the mid range amount of approximately $60,000 I must take into account the plaintiff’s original position and the measurable risk the pre-Accident condition would have affected the plaintiff’s life had the Accident not occurred. Accordingly, I award non pecuniary damages in the amount of $45,000.

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In the final case (Hill v. Swayne) the 35 year old Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision.  Fault was admitted by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries to his neck and back.   The Court noted some reliability issues with the Plaintiff’s evidence and found his collision related injuries were largely resolved by the time of trial.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $20,000 Mr. Justice Armstrong provided the following reasons:

[68]Mr. Hill suffered a neck strain and lumbar strain and received 13 physiotherapy treatments ending February 2, 2010. He was absent from work from December 14, 2009 to January 4, 2010..

[74]I accept that an injury of the type suffered by Mr. Hill was particularly troublesome in light of the heavy work in his role as a journeyman/foreman roofer. A back injury to a person in his circumstances, even if not disabling in itself, would require extra care and watchfulness on the job to ensure that the injury is not exacerbated. In considering the criteria in Stapely, it is significant that Mr. Hill, who was a heavy lifting labourer, injured his back and that the injury has lingering effects. The injuries have minimally impacted his lifestyle, and he has dealt stoically with his employment.

[75]The severity of his pain was modest and the extent to which the duration of his discomfort was related to the accident is uncertain. However, I accept that there is some connection between the collision and his ongoing complaints.

[76]I have considered various cases cited by counsel and additionally referred to the Reichennek case. Although comparisons are of some assistance, I am to focus on the factors set out by the Court of Appeal and the specific circumstances of the plaintiff in this particular case. In the final analysis, I would award the plaintiff non-pecuniary damages of $20,000.

Mitigation of Damages and Chronic Obesity


When a Plaintiff fails to take reasonable steps to recover from injury their right to compensation can be reduced accordingly.  Reasons for judgement were released yesterday addressing this topic in the context of pre-existing obesity.
In yesterday’s case (Deligilgio v. British Columbia (Puclic Safety and Solicitor General)) the Plaintiff suffered a back injury as a result of a 2009 collision.  The Plaintiff struggled with obesity.  The evidence suggested that weight loss could help reduce the Plaintiff’s back symptoms.  The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s damages should be reduced due to the Plaintiff’s failure to lose weight.
Madam Justice Gropper rejected this argument finding the Plaintiff made “contextually reasonable and sincere efforts” to deal with his weight issues.  In rejecting the Defendant’s argument the Court provided the following sensible reasons:

[87] Once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant is liable for his injuries, the burden shifts to the defendant. In order to prove that the plaintiff did not meet his duty to mitigate, the defence must prove that he acted unreasonably and that reasonable conduct would have reduced or eliminated the loss. Whether the plaintiff acted reasonably is a factual question: Gilbert v. Bottle, 2011 BCSC 1389 at para. 202. Gilbert continues at para. 203:

A relevant circumstance in cases such as this is the plaintiff’s personality and condition before and after the accident. The law does not require a plaintiff to do that which cannot be controlled, nor does it require perfection in the pursuit of rehabilitation. In addition, the defendant must take the victim as found, which may affect what is to be reasonably expected. For example, a person who has struggled with life-long obesity may not be expected to lose substantial weight to discharge the duty to mitigate, even though weight loss would assist recovery. What the law requires is that the plaintiff makes contextually reasonable and sincere efforts to limit his or her damages and loss [citations omitted].

[emphasis added]

[88] The evidence is clear that Mr. Del Giglio has struggled with lifelong obesity. He has attempted to lose weight in accordance with his doctor’s advice and has been somewhat successful. The plaintiff asserts that with assistance, including physiotherapy, kinesiology, the healthy heart program, a dietician and a gym membership he will likely lose weight and build his core strength.

[89] I find that Mr. Del Giglio has made “contextually reasonable and sincere efforts” to lose weight, but would benefit considerably from professional assistance. I disagree with the defendants that his damages should be reduced to reflect his reflected failure to mitigate. The defendants have not proven a failure to mitigate.