Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering whether a claim involving psychological injury was too complex for a jury trial.
In today’s case (Lee v. Averbach) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions and sued for damages. The Defendants elected trial by jury. The Plaintiff argued given the medical evidence the claim was too complex for a jury trial. The court disagreed and dismissed the Plaintiff’s application to strike the jury notice. In doing so Master Elwood provided the following reasons:
Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing an ICBC application to lengthen the applicable time frame to file a jury notice.
In today’s case (Chapman-Fluker v. Gustavson) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages. The Defendants, insured by ICBC and initially represented by in house counsel, failed to file a jury notice in the applicable time frame.
Months before trial the Defendants applied to allow them to file their jury notice beyond the specified time limits.
Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, striking a jury notice for a personal injury claim with a complex business loss component.
In today’s case (Forstved v. Kokabi) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision and sued for damages. The Defendant elected to proceed to trial with a jury. THe Plaintiff argued that the claim, particularly with its business loss component, was too complex for a jury. The court agreed and struck the Defendant’s jury notice. In doing so Master Dick provided the following reasons:
 In this case, I agree with the plaintiff. The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish that this case will require a prolonged examination of documents or accounts and that the issues require a scientific or local investigation.
 I must now look to whether the examination or investigation may conveniently be made with a jury. In considering this question, I acknowledge that a party’s right to trial by jury is entitled to great weight and ought not to be disturbed except in the clearest of cases.
 In this case, I must consider if the jury can not only understand the evidence as it is presented and rebutted, but also retain it over 19 days and engage in a reasoned analysis at the end of the trial.
 The plaintiff will be calling at least 23 witnesses, of whom 11 are experts. There will be lay witnesses, including the plaintiff’s accountant Mr. Moody. The accountant will be introducing many of the business and tax documents to support the plaintiff’s business arrangements. There will be at least 22 expert reports to be considered.
 If I was just considering the number of experts, the expert’s use of terminology, the volume of medical evidence, and divergent opinions alone, that would not necessarily cause me to strike the jury in this case. What makes this case more difficult is the fact the plaintiff’s income and business losses are not straightforward. The jury will have to review and understand the plaintiff and his spouse’s income tax information as well as the financial statements from all of the corporations he owned. The jury will then have to analyze, understand, and interpret the documents to assess his income and business loss.
 In this case, I accept that the issues of causation and quantification of damages will require prolonged examination of documents and scientific matters going to many issues over a protracted period. The difficulties for the trier of fact in dealing with this task was set out in Wallman v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2012 BCSC 1849 at para. 57:
. . . It may be necessary to retain fine detail from the examination in chief and cross-examination of many witnesses on multiple issues for weeks before those issues are traversed by defence witnesses. Considered on their own, most, but not all, of the expert reports in this case may be understood by a jury in light of the full examination in chief and cross-examination of the experts, but retention of that understanding over several weeks is likely to be so difficult, in my view, that fruitful analysis at the end of the day may be impossible.
 I have considered all of the submissions made by counsel and the factors set out in paragraph 25 of these reasons. In this matter there is a significant dispute about the injuries sustained by the plaintiff and the impact on his life. After consideration of all of the above, I find that the jury will be significantly challenged over the 19 days of trial to retain, understand, and analyze the complex and conflicting evidence and reach factual and legal conclusions on the issues of causation and damages. As a result, I am satisfied that this matter cannot conveniently be heard by a jury.
 I therefore will exercise my discretion to strike the jury notice and there will be an order that the trial of this case will be heard by judge alone.
Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a defence request to have a jury struck from hearing a medical malpractice lawsuit.
In today’s case (Howe v. Hwang) the Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit alleging negligence following a series of complications relating to the surgical treatment of diverticulitis.
The parties settled on damages but the issues of liability (fault) remained open for the court to decide. The Plaintiff elected trial by jury. The Defendants objected arguing a medical malpractice case was too complex for a jury to understand. Master Keighley disagreed and provided the following reasons in upholding the Plaintiff’s right to trial by jury :
 My authority to grant the order sought is discretionary. In exercising this discretion, I must consider the issues holistically, in determining whether, at the conclusion of my analysis, the considerations raised by Rule 12-6(5) support the defence assertion that this case is not appropriate for a decision by a jury.
 It may go without saying that the jury in this case will be required to engage in a prolonged examination of documents, that the resolution of the issues before this jury will require a scientific or local investigation and that the issues are of an intricate and complex nature. Thus my discretion is engaged.
 Amongst the factors which I have considered in determining that it is appropriate to have this case tried by a judge and jury, I have considered the following:
1. The anticipated length of the trial.
 The trial will not be a long one. It is presently anticipated by counsel that it will take perhaps ten or 11 days of the three weeks set aside. This reduction in time is primarily the result of the resolution of the claims against Dr. Crowley, and the agreement which has been reached with respect to damages. The jury will not be obliged to retain the technical knowledge they acquire for many weeks before delivering its verdict
2. The number of experts to be called.
 As I have indicated, the plaintiff will be relying on two experts and the defendant on three.
3. The volume of expert evidence.
 As is the case with most expert reports, the text is dense and replete with scientific terminology. But in objective terms the reports, as I have indicated, total 32 pages, far from a vast volume of expert reports.
4. The nature and character of the expert evidence.
 The jury will be obliged to consider conflicting opinion with respect to the conduct of the defendant. I have reviewed the medical reports. While I am untrained in medical matters I have no difficulty in following the rationale expressed by the experts or understanding the terminology used. I cannot see that a jury, properly instructed, will have difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the basis of technical issues alone. The opinions of all five experts are clearly stated and, apparently, objective. Juries are, of course, often called upon to deal with conflicting expert evidence with respect to medical issues in the context of personal injury litigation. I do not regard the terminology which appears in the pleadings or the expert reports as being mysterious or opaque. I am confident that with supplementary assistance from the experts, counsel and the presiding judge, the reports may be appropriately dealt with by a jury.
 In summary, although the jury in this case will be obliged to deal with technically demanding scientific medical issues and unfamiliar terminology, as well as the conflicting evidence of experts, I am not satisfied that those considerations put this case beyond the range of functions credited to juries in our system.
 As previously indicated to counsel, the application is dismissed. The issue of costs was dealt with at the conclusion of the hearing.
Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a plaintiff request to strike a jury notice in an ICBC injury claim.
In the recent case (Froese v. Wilson) the 17 year old Plaintiff who “became severely intoxicated at a house party” left riding in the cargo box of a pickup truck which then moved and “caused him to fall out of the truck.”.
The Plaintiff sued for damages and the matter was set down for a 20 day trial with the Defendant electing trial by jury. The Plaintiff objected noting that a total of 19 expert witnesses would likely testify, the matter was too complex for a jury and the jury “may take a harsher view of the plaintiff’s conduct than would a judge in assessing liability“. The court noted that while this may be true it is no reason to strip a party’s right to trial by jury. In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:
 This trial is set for 20 days—a length no longer unusual for a jury trial. Although there is a multiplicity of expert evidence, it comes from experts in fields that are commonly at issue in personal injury cases and there appears to be a great deal of common ground as to the nature of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the motor vehicle accident. As said above, the main areas of disagreement relate to the long-term impact of those injuries and the cause of the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms. I am not persuaded that those areas of disagreement are so complex that they cannot be considered by a properly instructed jury on the basis of properly presented and explained expert evidence.
 Counsel for the plaintiff also alluded to a concern that a jury may take a harsher view of the plaintiff’s conduct than would a judge in assessing liability. That is entirely speculative and I presume jurors will be attentive to whatever instructions the trial judge gives them on how they are to go about assessing the relative blameworthiness of both parties. However, the possibility that a jury verdict may reflect community attitudes that differ from those of judges is one of the frequent justifications for retaining the jury system.
 Counsel also argues that the outcome of this trial may determine the course of the rest of the plaintiff’s life and subjecting him to the uncertainties inherent in a jury trial is inconsistent with the object of a just determination on the merits set out in R. 1-3.
 Although I have a certain sympathy with the plaintiff’s concern about the risks and uncertainties in a jury trial, the fact remains that R. 12-6 continues to give either party the right to unilaterally select trial by jury. Unless the party who does not want a jury trial can meet the onus of showing that it is not appropriate in a particular case and the presumptive right to a jury trial should be denied, a jury trial and verdict must be considered to come within the “just determination” envisioned by R. 1-3.
 The plaintiff has failed to meet the onus in this case and the application to strike the jury notice must be dismissed.
Reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating that filing a late trial brief is no remedy once a trial date is lost due to lack of compliance with the Rules of Court.
In today’s case (Carleton v. North Island Brewing Corporation) the parties were scheduled for trial and apparently by consent agreed to file trial briefs “outside the times prescribed by the Rules.“.
The Court did not grant the request for lack of sufficient evidence supporting it and struck the trial date. The parties hoped late briefs would salvage the trial date but the Court declined. In doing so Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:
 Rule 12-2(1) requires a trial management conference to be held at least 28 days before trial. The plaintiff must file a trial brief at least 28 days before the date of the trial management conference (R. 12-2(2)) and other parties must file their trial briefs at least 21 days before the trial management conference (R. 12-2(3.1)). If no trial briefs are filed as required, the matter is removed from the trial list (Rule 12-2 (3.3).
 These Rules are intended in part to assist the court in determining what cases are ready for trial, which in turn assists the court in the allocation of scarce judicial resources. They are not Rules that counsel and parties may opt out of at their convenience. At the very least, any application to extend the time for filing of a trial brief must be accompanied by a reasonable explanation as to why it was not filed in time as well as a proposed new date by which it will be filed.
 In this case, neither party filed a trial brief and counsel simply submitted a draft consent order that “trial briefs of the plaintiff and defendant be filed outside the times prescribed” by the Rules. There was no explanation of why no one had filed a trial brief and no suggestion of when briefs would be filed. The absence of that material was in itself sufficient grounds to deny the application, but a subsequent review of the court record indicated that the matter had already been struck from the trial list.
 The trial management conference had been set for February 16, 2017 and the requisition seeking a consent order for late filing was not submitted until January 30. In other words, the parties were seeking to file trial briefs after the date on which the Rules required the case to be struck from the trial list.
 Rule 12-2 (3.3) reads
(3.3) Unless the court otherwise orders, a trial must be removed from the trial list if no trial brief has been filed under subrule (3) or (3.1).
 Therefore, where a matter is struck from the trial list pursuant to that Rule, it cannot be restored simply by late filing of trial briefs, even if the court permits late filing. At least one party must make a proper application to restore the trial to the list. The question of late filing of trial briefs will only become relevant if that application is successful. Whether such an application is successful will depend on the circumstances, but I expect that in most cases applicants will be required to show both a reasonable excuse for the failure to file trial briefs and some serious prejudice if the trial does not go ahead.
Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, with critical comments about “uninformative” trial briefs.
In today’s case (Kirk v. Nanaimo Literacy Association) the parties wishes to dispense with an otherwise mandatory trial management conference and asked the court to waive the hearing. In refusing to do so the Court was critical of the trial briefs filed and provided the following comments:
 Both parties state in their trial briefs that they expect the trial to be completed within the scheduled time. Yet I don’t know on what basis that assertion could be made because the total time estimates for witnesses and submissions in the two trial briefs exceeds the time set for trial by almost two days. Again, perhaps the trial was rescheduled for more days, but I have not been given any trial briefs reflecting that.
 Further, the trial briefs do not indicate that counsel have fully considered all matters that might usefully be explored at a TMC. For example, the plaintiff’s trial brief, after listing the witnesses to be called, states:
The filing party may call further witnesses to address any outstanding documentary hearsay concerns which the parties are unable to resolve prior to trial.
 If there are unresolved issues about admissibility of documents, particularly if it is going to affect the number of witnesses to be called, that is an issue to be explored at the TMC and the parties are not ready for trial within the meaning of R. 12-2(3.6).
 Under the category of “Admissions”, the plaintiff’s brief says the plaintiff will admit that:
A document which conforms to the requirements set out in the Evidence Act, RSBC 1996, C. 124, s.42 is admissible as prima facie proof of any fact otherwise provable through direct oral evidence.
 Thus, the purported “admission” by the plaintiff amounts to no more than a statement that the law of British Columbia applies to this case. That does not assist the Court in determining what facts will or will not be at issue in trial. I assume there are documents that qualify as business records under the Act, that certain facts stated in them are relevant to the issues in this case and the plaintiff is admitting or not disputing those facts. If that is the case, a party who wishes to be excused from attending a TMC must set out what those admitted facts are.
 The defendant’s trial brief is equally uninformative on this issue. It simply says that the facts the defendant will admit will be “determined prior to trial date”.
 Clearly, as of the date they wrote their trial briefs, counsel had not clearly turned their minds to or discussed the question of what facts could be admitted. Counsel who do not make that effort cannot expect to be excused from attending a TMC.
 Under the heading of “Authorities”, both parties simply state they do not expect a joint brief of authorities at trial. That is not sufficient. The trial brief asks counsel to refer to authorities in order to identify the legal issues that will be argued at trial and in order to satisfy the Court that the parties and counsel have considered the law as it may affect their position at trial. That does not mean counsel need to cite every case they may wish to refer to at trial, but by the time they start preparing trial briefs, counsel should have identified the most important ones.
 This is a wrongful dismissal case, so counsel should by now be familiar with the leading cases in that area as well as any others that are particularly relevant, such as by virtue of comparable facts. Those should have been referred to in the trial brief.
 In short, the trial briefs submitted are largely pro-forma documents that do not give the Court confidence that all issues have been addressed or that all potentially useful discussions between counsel have taken place. The application to dispense with the TMC is therefore dismissed.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, granting a Plaintiff’s jury strike application.
In today’s case (van Driesum v. Young) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2011 collision and sued for damages. The trial was scheduled for 18 days before a jury at the Defendants election. The Plaintiff succeeded in striking the jury from the case largely on the basis that his wage loss claim was complex. In granting the application Mr. Justice Macintosh provided the following reasons:
 The overall question is trial fairness, weighing the Defendant’s presumptive right to a jury against the risk of unfairness to the Plaintiff by having a jury attempt to decide facts and answer questions which are too intricate or complex. My conclusion is that this case should not proceed with a jury.
 The motor vehicle accident giving rise to the claim occurred on February 23, 2011. That year also serves as the approximate dividing line between what I will characterize as two separate careers for the Plaintiff. The methods for determining income loss and lost-earning capacity are complicated within each of his two careers. In what I am viewing as the Plaintiff’s post‑accident career, or second career, determining income loss and lost-earning capacity are, in my view, particularly complex.
 Before the accident, the Plaintiff practised law for 20 years. For the last 17 of those years, he was a partner in a Victoria law firm. During at least part of that time, he practised law through the business model of a personal law corporation. Money he received from the firm went into his law corporation. He did not take all that money out, at least not regularly. Also, he split income with his wife in reliance on the applicable tax laws. Accordingly, his income tax returns do not tell the full story of his pre‑accident earnings. They need to be interpreted together with his personal law corporation’s annual financial statements, and the particulars of his income splitting with his wife.
 In the result, determining the Plaintiff’s pre‑accident earning history will not be a straightforward exercise. The complexity of that exercise, however, pales when it is compared with determining the Plaintiff’s earnings, lost earnings, and diminished earning capacity post-accident.
 The Plaintiff has maintained, at different times, at least three personal companies: through one, after his accident, he became the president of a mining company; through another, also after the accident, he consulted on WorkSafe BC claims; the other was his pre‑existing personal law corporation, which remained in place until December 31, 2014, to receive the Plaintiff’s declining earnings from his residual practise of law. That included some post‑accident legal work by the Plaintiff, as well as some pre‑accident legal work which gave rise to post‑accident remuneration.
 It will, in my view, be extremely difficult for the trier of fact to sort out both the Plaintiff’s true earnings in the post‑accident period, and the extent to which the accident impaired his earning capacity.
 Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s post‑accident earnings history, and evidence of earning capacity, is over-layered with a dispute the Plaintiff had with a post‑accident business colleague, who was a former client from the Plaintiff’s law practice. Plaintiff’s counsel characterized the evidence of that dispute as amounting to a trial within a trial in this proceeding, and that is not an unreasonable analogy.
 The difficulties for a jury in this case would be increased by the difficulties a judge would have in properly charging the jury in matters of causation and the quantification of damages.
 The brief summary above, of the complexities in determining both causation and damages, and in the judge charging the jury, probably would have caused me to strike the jury even if there were no other relevant facts. When I add the other complexities of the case, which are associated with the accident itself, and the related medical evidence, the complexity is only increased.
 I will preface this next part of the analysis by saying that what I call the accident evidence and medical evidence, viewed in isolation, would probably not have caused me to strike the jury. That evidence becomes relevant on this application, however, when it is added to the evidence associated with determining the past and future income loss, and diminished earning capacity, discussed earlier in these reasons.
 Liability is in issue. All the elements of the damages claimed are also in issue. The Defendant, through his pleadings and his expert witnesses, disputes diagnosis, causation, mitigation, prognosis and the Plaintiff’s working capacity. It is probably the case, as well, that at least some clinical records will have to become part of the evidentiary record.
 The Plaintiff plans to call nine expert witnesses in at least seven disciplines, and the Defendant plans to call four expert witnesses and tender eight expert reports. I further note that the Plaintiff intends to object to all or part of three of the Defendant’s expert reports, and the Defendant intends to object to all or part of four of the Plaintiff’s expert reports.
 The law is clear in saying that the judge’s discretion on this application must be exercised having primary regard to his or her assessment of the relevant factors present in the particular application: see Rados v. Pannu, 2015 BCCA 459, at paras. 30‑32 and Such v. Dominion Stores Ltd.,  O.R. 190 (Ont. C.A.). In other words, the analysis, not surprisingly, is driven by the facts present in the application at bar.
 What is appropriate for a jury to try has to do not only with the jury’s capacity to understand the evidence as it is presented and rebutted, but also to retain over several weeks what they have heard and then analyse it in the context of the questions they are required to answer. (See Wipfli v. Britten,  B.C.J. No. 1706 (F.C.) at paras. 30 and 31.)
 When the facts in this application are viewed through the legal prism of the cases cited above, I find that the Plaintiff has established the three grounds he relies upon, noted above in paragraph 5. As stated above in paragraph 6, I conclude that I should exercise my discretion to strike the jury.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a retrial after a jury awarded special damages but nothing for non-pecuniary loss in a personal injury lawsuit.
In today’s case (Harder v. Poettcker) the Plaintiff proceeded to jury trial after alleging injuries in a collision. The jury found the Plaintiff 85% at fault for the crash and awarded a total $5,100 in damages, which were all based on out of pocket expenses and awarded nothing for non pecuniary damages. After applying the split of fault this left an award of $765.
The presiding judge found a new trial was necessary as it was inconsistent to award money for special damages yet nothing for non-pecuniary loss for the injuries underlying the need for those damages. In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Sigurdson provided the following reasons:
17] Notwithstanding the importance of attempting to enforce a jury’s verdict and the fact that even apart from the 85% contributory negligence award against the plaintiff, the award was at best either very modest or nil, I am driven to conclude that to award nothing for non-pecuniary damages but award $1,200 for special damages is an inconsistent verdict.
 Although a possible rationalization of the award is that the jury intended to award the plaintiff say $400 for non-pecuniary damages but rounded it down in accordance with my instructions to zero, I reject that. I find the jury intended to award nothing for non-pecuniary damages. Even if the jury intended to award only a nominal amount for non-pecuniary damages, I think that would still create an inconsistent verdict: see Le v. Luz, 2003 BCCA 640.
 I also reject the submission that the jury verdict could properly be interpreted to mean that they intended to award something for non-pecuniary damages under a pecuniary heading.
 Although the defendant argues forcefully that there was coherence and consistency in the jury verdict, I respectfully disagree. I find that the jury award, although small from the plaintiff’s perspective, is inconsistent and judgment cannot be entered on the defendant’s motion.
 The question then arises whether I can and should sever the issues of liability and damages and enter judgment on liability for the plaintiff including the contributory negligence finding and direct a retrial only on damages, or whether I should order a retrial of the entire case.
 I have concluded that I am bound by the considered decision of my brother Weatherill J. in Kalsi. Although severance may be ordered in many cases before trial, this is not an appropriate case to have issues that are largely dependent on credibility decided by different triers of fact.
 Given that there must be a retrial, how should that take place? A further trial by a new jury would be months, or a year or more, ahead. The mode of trial by jury was at the plaintiff’s request but now he wants the retrial by judge alone. The plaintiff now consents to and requests a retrial being conducted before me.
 I think for a number of reasons that the retrial should be before me. I heard all of the evidence and the submissions of counsel. Given the fact that it would be a lengthy time until the matter is retried before a jury, and given the age of the plaintiff and the question of cost to the parties, I think it is appropriate that I conduct a retrial based on the evidence I have heard and I so order. Accordingly I exercise my discretion under the governing rule that the retrial take place before me without a jury.
 I have heard the submissions of counsel and a recording of those submissions is available to me to refresh my memory. Counsel may make further submissions in writing on liability and damages provided they do not repeat what I have already heard in the submissions to the jury. I ask that the plaintiff file his argument within three weeks and the defendant his argument within three weeks following, with the plaintiff having a right of reply within a week. I will then hand down a written decision.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal finding a personal injury lawsuit with 40 expert reports totaling over 700 pages was not too complex for a jury to determine.
In today’s case (Rados v. Pannu) the Plaintiff alleged serious injuries as a result of a motor vehicle collision including “a traumatic brain injury; a vestibular injury that has impaired the appellant’s balance and induced bouts of nausea, dizziness and vomiting; various musculoligamentous and other physical injuries; and, a major depressive disorder”.
The Defendants elected a jury trial and the Plaintiff objected arguing the case was ‘too complex’ and pointed to the sheer volume of competing expert evidence. The Plaintiff pointed to many cases where discretion was exercised to strike a jury in similar cases. In finding that judicial discretion does allow for competing results and more than ” adding up the number of experts and medical issues or the number of pages of documents or the length of trial” is needed the Court provided the following reasons:
 As I turn to consider the appellant’s argument, it is useful to remember that a decision whether to strike a jury notice is not only discretionary, but also engages important issues of trial management. The determination of such issues is properly a matter for the trial court. Furthermore, the onus is on the applicant to displace the presumptive right to a jury: MacPherson v. Czaban, 2002 BCCA 518 at para. 17, leave to appeal ref’d  S.C.C.A. No. 480. Accordingly and appropriately, decisions of this kind attract considerable deference from this Court. These decisions turn critically on an assessment by the trial court of multiple factors bearing ultimately on the question whether a matter can be conveniently tried with the jury or should be heard without one.
 The appellant points to numerous cases in which jury notices have been struck which share similarities with this case in terms of the number of medical issues, the number of experts, the nature of the issues and the length of trial. He suggests the result in this case cannot be reconciled with the results in those cases. Thus, he argues that the bar for striking a jury notice has been raised to a level beyond anything that can be accounted for by the inevitable variability of outcome inherent in the exercise of discretion.
 I accept that, as was pointed out in Cochrane v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2005 BCCA 399 at para. 28:
It is unassailable that decisions under Rule 39(27) are driven by the particular facts of the case. Even so, the facts in prior decisions are helpful in determining whether the discretion to grant or refuse an order to strike a jury notice has been exercised judicially.
 It follows from this that, even allowing for the inevitable variation in outcomes arising from exercises of discretion, one would expect decisions with broadly similar facts to produce broadly predictable outcomes if discretion is being exercised judicially…
 In my opinion, while other similar cases can assist in assessing whether discretion has been exercised judicially, broad and general similarities may mask material differences. The analysis does not begin and end with adding up the number of experts and medical issues or the number of pages of documents or the length of trial. Those factors may be indicative of whether the trial may be conveniently heard with a jury, but they are not necessarily the last word. They were not here because the judge delved deeply into an analysis of the factual circumstances engaged in the trial and exercised his discretion based on his assessment of those circumstances.
 The appellant is not able to point to any relevant factors the judge failed to take into consideration in exercising his discretion, nor can he point to any irrelevant factors he did consider. He is not able to point to any consideration receiving too much or too little weight. In short, the appellant was not able to direct us to any specific error in the exercise of discretion that would warrant this Court interfering with the order.
 The appellant suggested that if this order is not set aside, this Court would be endorsing a much higher bar for striking a jury notice than has previously been the case in this province. I do not accept that submission. In my view, this case turned on its specific and particular factual circumstances as they stood at the time of the application and as they were analyzed by the judge. The judge then properly applied the relevant considerations to the exercise of his discretion. The case turned on its facts and does not represent a departure of principle or a resetting of the height of a bar.
 Finally, it should be pointed out, as the chambers judge did, that when this matter comes on for trial, the trial judge “may order the trial to proceed without a jury if the interests of justice then require the making of such an order”. It may be that the case that goes to trial may be quite different to what now appears to be the case. As noted by Seaton J.A. in Ball v. Novlesky,  B.C.J. No. 677 (C.A.) at para. 16, we and the chambers judge can examine the issue only on the basis of the record before us. The case at trial may be different and the trial judge would be free to deal with the issue then, if necessary.
 In my opinion, the submissions of the appellant do not rise above an attempt to reargue the case that was rejected by the chambers judge. I do not think that the appellant has identified any error in principle in the exercise of the chambers judge’s discretion. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.