Skip to main content

Tag: examination for discovery

Court Tells Lawyer to "Focus" Their Questioning Instead of Extending Discovery Time

The BC Supreme Court Rules, which used to be open ended with respect to examinations for discovery, now have time limits in place with the Court retaining discretion to extend these limits in appropriate circumstances.
Unreported reasons for judgement were recently released considering and denying such an application with the Court suggesting counsel “focus” their remaining time appropriately.
In the recent case (Ross v. Casimong) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009  collision and sued for damages.  The claim was prosecuted in the usual course (outside of fast track) with the present Rules allowing 7 hours of discovery.  The Plaintiff was examined twice with approximately 44 minutes of the allotted 7 hours remaining.  Defence counsel brought an application seeking a further discovery and allowing up to two hours to finish the job.  The Court dismissed the application noting a focused discovery could canvass what was needed in the remaining time.  In dismissing the application Master Dick provided the following reasons:
Master Dick Reasons for Judgement

"There Is No (Discovery) Continuation As of Right Once a Matter is Removed From Fast Track"

Unreported reasons by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, were recently shared with me finding that there is no right for examination for discovery continuation once a matter is removed from fast track prosecution.
In the recent case (Nordin v. Wong) the Plaintiff sued for damages for injuries and her claim was initially prosecuted under Rule 15.  She underwent examinations for discovery which was limited to the two hour cap under the fast track rule.
The case was removed from Rule 15 and the Defendant sought a further discovery under the greater timelines allowed.  In dismissing the application and finding there was “no continuation as of right” when a matter is removed from fast track Master Scarth provided the following reasons:
[4]  To the extent that this is an application for a continuation of the examination for discovery which took place in May of 2014, I am satisfied that it should be dismissed…
[5]  Counsel conducting the discovery stated it to be concluded.  Responses have been provided to the outstanding document requests, and the defendant here concedes that nothing arises fro the material which was so provided.   Further, there is no continuation as of right once a matter is removed from fast track…No conditions were placed on the removal of the action from fast track, apparently it not being in the contemplation of the defendant at the tine that they might require a further discovery.
[6] In my view, therefore, the fact that Rule 7-2(2) provides for seven hours of discovery does not assist the defendant here.  
 

Liberal Use of Discovery Transcripts Granted in Case of Indivisible Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, considering whether defendants in separate actions could use each others examination for discovery transcripts of the Plaintiff in trial.
In today’s case (Elworthy v. Tillit) the Plaintiff alleged personal injury from two separate matters.  Both parties agreed the separate lawsuits should be heard together given overlapping injury but could not agree if both defendants could use the Plaintiff’s examination for discovery transcripts from the separate actions.  In finding they could Master Bouck provided the following reasons:

6]             The defendant Stewart led the submissions on the law with references to several common law authorities including Gill v. Gill, 2013 BCSC 2365. In that case, the court decided that the implied undertaking rule could be waived so that a transcript of the plaintiff’s examination for discovery in a Part 7 action could be used in the plaintiff’s tort action, and vice versa.

[7]             Although not precisely the same factual matrix as the case at bar, I find that the legal analysis and result in Gill v. Gill should be followed here. The same concerns raised by the plaintiff in this case were considered and rejected by the court in Gill. Here, the issues of causation and indivisible injuries provide the commonality between the actions.

[8]             The defendants differ on the language to be used in this particular case plan order. In my view, the appropriate language is that found in Peel v. Western Delta, 2003 BCSC 784 at para. 30. The order pronounced is that the evidence that is otherwise admissible and relevant, obtained at the examination for discovery in Victoria Registry action no.14-0946 (either concluded or future) will be admissible both in that action and in Victoria Registry action no. 15-2263 as if the evidence had been obtained in the other action.

"En Masse" Document Book and Discovery Transcript Admission Leads to New Trial Following Jury Verdict

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal ordering a new trial after a document book was admitted ‘en masse’ along with a discovery transcript in a personal injury  jury trial.
In today’s case (Han v. Park) the Plaintiff was injured in a 1999 collision that the Defendant admitted fault for.  The litigation had a “somewhat tortured history” finally coming to trial in October 2013.  The Plaintiff was awarded only a fraction of the damages she sought.  The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial finding it was inappropriate to give the jury access to a defence document book without careful limitations as to the use of the various documents contained therein and also for having access to a discovery transcript.  In criticizing these steps the Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[31]         This Court has held that medical records should not be entered en masse: Samuel v. Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd., 2007 BCCA 431:

[39]      The preferable approach is obvious. Clinical records should not be admitted into evidence, by consent or otherwise, unless counsel identify the specific purpose for particular portions of the records. Furthermore, it would be preferable to introduce discrete portions of the records when they become relevant so that their admissibility can be ruled on at that time, when the jury will better appreciate the purpose of those portions in the context of the case and will have the assistance of a contemporaneous limiting instruction. In no event should a “book” of documents simply be handed up to the court and admitted as a whole.

[Emphasis added.]

[32]         I would not restrict this comment to medical records. Further, the fact that an appellant may have consented to the admission of the records is not always the determinative factor in deciding whether documents should have been entered into evidence, and will not preclude the ordering of a new trial with costs to the appellant after prejudicial clinical records were entered into evidence: Owimar v. Greater Vancouver Transit Authority, 2007 BCCA 630, citing Samuel.

[33]         In Owimar the court held that a new trial was required where the admission of certain psychiatric records without a proper limiting instruction resulted in an unfair trial:

[41]      In my opinion, the admission of the psychiatric records in this case rendered the trial unfair. The records were left with the jury at the second day of trial. The limiting instruction as to opinions expressed in the records was given shortly before the jury retired to consider its verdict. In the meantime, there were many statements contained in the records that portrayed the plaintiff as unstable and out of touch with reality. Those statements might easily have been accepted by the jury as further diminishing the plaintiff’s credibility. Although there is no doubt that the plaintiff’s credibility was a central issue in the case and he had much to do to convince the jury of his truthfulness, that issue deserved to be proved independent from psychiatric evidence that had no bearing on the physical injuries he claimed to have suffered. I would accordingly order a new trial.

[34]         I agree with the appellant that like Owimar, the inclusion of some of the clinical records and material contained in the Exhibit had the effect of portraying the appellant as a difficult, manipulating, and stubborn individual. As appellant’s counsel states, this portrayal shifted the focus of the jury to the appellant’s negative character traits, rather than to the main issues of the trial.

[35]         The respondents’ trial counsel assured the judge all the documents in the Exhibit would be referred to in the cross-examination of Ms. Han but they were not. Some of the documents were irrelevant, some were prejudicial, and some were inflammatory. The Exhibit was marked outside the presence of the jury – the trier of fact – which is an irregularity. There was no document agreement in place, so the basis for the appellant’s consent to the admission of the Exhibit is not clear. Even with consent, the trial judge is always the gatekeeper.

[36]         In my view, the Exhibit should not have been admitted en masse. Some of the documents and records should not have been admitted at all, as their admission was highly prejudicial and resulted in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

[37]         On this ground alone, it is in the interests of justice to order a new trial….

[39]         I agree with the appellant there was a significant risk that the jury would give greater weight to the transcribed portions than to the appellant’s testimony since there was no transcript of her answers given in evidence in response. The judge’s instruction to the jury that the transcript was an aide memoir did not overcome the resulting prejudice to the appellant resulting from the jury having only one side of the picture during their deliberations.

[40]          This procedure was highly irregular and prejudicial to the appellant, resulting in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

[41]         I would also allow the appeal on this ground.

Lastly, the Court noted it is inappropriate to conduct a present value calculation when considering the costs consequences of a historic formal settlement offer.

Corporate Plaintiff Not Allowed To Read In Discovery Evidence of Former Employee

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing limits on the use of discovery evidence at trial.
In today’s case (No Limits Sportswear Inc v. 0912139 BC Ltd) the Plaintiff sought to read in evidence at trial of their former employee who was questioned at discovery as a representative of the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff argued that Rule 12-5(47) allowed such a result.  Madam Justice Griffin disagreed and in preventing the Plaintiff from using the discovery evidence of their former employee the Court noted as follows:

[14]         The interpretation of the Rules suggested by the plaintiffs regarding the use at trial of the examination for discovery of a former employee is contrary to the underlying purposes of the procedure.

[15]         The utility of an examination for discovery would be undermined if self-serving parts of evidence of the former employee given on discovery could be read-in at trial by the party who used to employ the witness. Such a result would seriously inhibit the scope of questioning by the examining party, limiting the fact-finding nature of the discovery and its usefulness as a tool to avoid surprise at trial and to encourage settlement.

[16]         The former employer does not need to use the examination for discovery transcript in order to call helpful evidence from its former employee at trial. The former employer always has a choice of calling him as a witness at trial.

[17]         Contrary to the submissions of the plaintiffs, the fact that subrules 12-5(46), (47) and (48) are separate subrules does not lead to the conclusion that each subrule stands alone and that any party can tender the examination for discovery evidence of a former employee.

[18]         Rule 12-5(46) states that evidence given on examination for discovery may be tendered by “any party adverse in interest”. Rule 12-5(47) does not say who it may be tendered by, but instead, deals with the requirement of giving notice of the intention to tender the evidence if it is from a former employee. Subrule (47) does not say the evidence can be tendered by any party and does not supersede the requirement in R. 12-5(46) that it be tendered by a party adverse in interest.

[19]         Also relevant is the restriction on the use of the evidence as set out in R. 12‑5(46)(b). This subrule provides that the evidence is admissible only “against” the adverse party whose status as a party entitled the examining party to conduct the examination. In other words, the evidence of the former employee, if read-in at trial, is only admissible against his former employer, the plaintiff company. It cannot be read-in by one group of defendants as evidence to be used against the other defendant. The plaintiffs’ submission that the plaintiffs should be entitled to read-in portions of the evidence to be used “at large” in the trial would be contrary to these restrictions.

[20]         The purposes of subrules 12-5(47) and (48) are to deal with the situation where the former employee who was examined for discovery is hostile to his former employer, and gave evidence on discovery which the former employer does not accept and wishes to challenge. Subrule (47) requires that the party tendering the former employee’s evidence, which again by subrule (46) must be a party adverse in interest to the party who formerly employed the witness, must give 14 days’ notice before trial of the intention to tender the evidence. This then gives the party who formerly employed the witness, and any other party, the opportunity to require the witness to be produced for cross-examination at trial pursuant to subrule (48).

[21]         To deal with the possibility that the former employee may have loyalties to none of the parties at trial, subrule (48) allows all parties to cross-examine the witness if his presence is required at trial.

[22]         I find support in this interpretation in the commentary to R. 12-5(47) found in McLachlin & Taylor, British Columbia Practice, vol. 2, 3d ed. (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2006) at 12-51 as follows:

Under SCR 1961, M.R. 370rr, only the examination of a person who was an officer or servant of the corporation at the time of trial could be used as evidence. This was subject to SCR 1961, M.R. 370s which effectively excluded the use of discovery of a former officer or servant who had been dismissed from employment except where such dismissal occurred after service of the appointment for examination for discovery, in which case his examination could be used with leave of the court: Seymour v. Fleetwood Logging Co., [1963] B.C.J. No. 64, 45 W.W.R. 511 (S.C.). The apparent reason for these rules was the prospect of the unfair use against a corporation of the discovery of a person no longer in its employ and possibly hostile to it.

These restrictions on the use of examination for discovery of former director, officer, employee, agent or external auditor of a party was abolished by the enactment of SCR 1976, Rule 40(24) (which became SCR 1990, Rule 40(27)): Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd. (No. 2), [1979] B.C.J. No. 526, 13 B.C.L.R. 309 (S.C.), affd [1981] B.C.J. No. 555, 30 B.C.L.R. 286 (C.A.). Because a party has no choice in the selection of who is examined on his behalf under Rule 7-2(5), it is arguably unfair to burden him with such a person’s answers: see Rule 7-2(5) and comments thereunder.

Accordingly, SCR 1976, Rule 40(27) (which became SCR 1990, Rule 40(24)) was amended in 1985 to provide that the examination for discovery of a former director, officer or servant may be given at trial only if notice of the intention to do so is delivered to all parties at least 14 days before the trial. Any party may then require that the person examined attend at the trial and, if any part of the examination for discovery is given in evidence, all parties may then cross-examine the former director, officer or servant.

[23]         I conclude that the plaintiffs are not entitled to read-in passages of the examination for discovery of its former employee, Mr. Darren Hawrish.

Examination For Discovery Objections Canvassed

Adding to this site’s archived procedural cases dealing with examinations for discovery, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Duncan Registry, canvassing the appropriateness of several questions relating to liability.
In today’s case (Higginson v. Kish) the Plaintiff sued the Defendant for damages following a collision for which fault was disputed.  At discovery the Defendant objected to the following three questions:

Do you have any possible explanation why you wouldn’t have seen Mr. Higginson’s vehicle approaching in the left lane?

Will you agree with me that it would have been more reasonable to have approached highway speed before changing lanes?

And you were aware that prior to changing lanes, that you could expect vehicles approaching at highway speed, 80 kilometres an hour? 

In finding the first and third questions fair but the second improper Mr. Justice Johnson provided the following reasons:

[5]             It seems to me that while one of the questions, the first one, “Do you have any possible explanation why you wouldn’t have seen Mr. Higginson’s vehicle approaching in the left lane” may have been inelegantly phrased. What it was getting at or should have been getting at is, “Was there anything obscuring your ability to see to the rear, as Mr. Higginson approached?”

[6]             That does not call upon the witness to speculate, it seems to me, if the question is properly phrased, nor does it call upon the defendant to speculate. It is relevant to the issues, that is was there anything preventing the witness from seeing to his rear. That question, together with any subsidiary questions, ought to be answered.

[7]             Question 295, which was “Will you agree with me that it would have been more reasonable to have approached highway speed before changing lanes,” does not require an answer, in my view. It is not an appropriate question to ask a witness. What that really asks the witness to do is to make the judge’s decision for the judge, and that is answer questions that involve matters of law, that is whether the activities or actions of the defendant were reasonable. I will not order the witness to answer that question or anything relating to that question.

[8]             Question 310:  “And you were aware that prior to changing lanes, that you could expect vehicles approaching at highway speed, 80 kilometres an hour?”  That expectation is a perfectly legitimate and reasonable thing to explore on examinations for discovery. The knowledge of the defendant as to the speed at which traffic was or might reasonably be expected to be travelling at the time of the accident, is permissible as a topic for exploration on discovery.

[9]             I will note that, of course, at examinations for discovery, questions of relevance still are important. But those questions of relevance are finally determined at the trial, not at the discovery, and ordering the defendant to answer question 234 and 310 says nothing about whether or not those answers or any of the evidence developed is admissible at the trial.

[10]         So the defendant will attend, for no more than an hour, to answer questions 234 and 310, and any supplementary questions legitimately and properly flowing from those two questions.

8 Year Old Too Young To Be Examined for Discovery

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a defense application to examine an 8 year plaintiff.
In today’s case (Dann-Mills v. Tessier) the Plaintiff was involved in a ‘serious motor vehicle accident’ when he was 17 months old.  A lawsuit was brought on his behalf by his litigation guardian.  The Defendants sought to examine the Plaintiff for discovery.  The Court found that this would be inappropriate and dismissed the application.  In doing so Mr. Justice Voith provided the following reasons:

[38]        I question the possible utility or value of any examination for discovery of Jorin, particularly in light of some of the medical conclusions I have identified. It was this issue that I canvassed most fully with counsel for the applicant.

[39]        It is generally understood that the central objects of an examination for discovery are:

i)        to enable the examining party to know the case it must meet;

ii)        to enable a party to procure admissions which will dispense with other formal proof of its case; and

iii)       to procure admissions which will damage an adversary’s case.

See e.g. Frederick M. Irvine, ed., McLachlin & Taylor, British Columbia Practice, loose-leaf, 3rd ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2006) at 7-178.

[40]        The applicant and other defence counsel accepted that they had no desire to obtain any “admissions” from Jorin on discovery. Instead, the applicant said that the “primary reason” for Jorin’s intended discovery related to the first consideration I identified; that being, to enable the defence to know the case that it must meet.

[41]        Respectfully, I struggle to see how this can be so. This is not a case where the defendants may be surprised by Jorin’s evidence at trial. Jorin will not be present at the trial. Instead, the whole of Jorin’s case will be established by expert evidence, of which the defendants will have ample notice, and through other witnesses. The defendants can examine Jorin’s father and his grandmother (Jorin’s litigation guardian). They can interview his teachers and his special-needs assistants. In earlier applications, it became clear that Jorin, who requires full-time supervision, has had a series of caregivers. These sources are likely to be far more fruitful and reliable than the examination for discovery of an infant who, there is reason to believe, without deciding that it is so, struggles with comprehension, attention and language difficulties.

[42]        The last basis for an examination of Jorin that was raised by counsel for the applicant was a desire, in a sense, to see Jorin and how he functions. There is significant disparity in the existing medical opinions on Jorin’s functionality. I have referred to some of these differences earlier in these reasons. Other differences are apparent in the letters of Drs. Purtzki and Joschko, respectively. Counsel considers that some opportunity to see and interact with Jorin would potentially be helpful for settlement and other purposes.

[43]        First, it would appear that a discovery of Jorin would only achieve this object for the single counsel who conducted the examination for discovery, and not for the teams of counsel who represent the various defendants in this action. I cannot imagine that the intention would be to conduct the examination in the presence of all counsel who are involved in these actions.

[44]        Second, though I do not question counsel’s expressed goal, I consider that this object can be otherwise achieved. I suggested to counsel that Jorin might be videotaped, or that counsel might possibly view Jorin, at a medical examination, through a glass mirror. Though counsel for Jorin indicated he would not be opposed to such endeavours, I was also told by counsel for the defendants that the examining independent medical practitioners might object. Nevertheless, I consider that with some ingenuity there are far better means available to get a sense of Jorin and his functionality than a brief examination for discovery would yield.

[45]        In all the circumstances, I do not consider that an examination for discovery of Jorin would be appropriate, and I am unprepared to allow that examination to take place.

Pursuing "Unproductive Trains of Inquiry" Fatal in Request for Further Examination for Discovery

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the Court’s discretion to allow a party to conduct an examination for discovery beyond the 2 hour cap called for in Fast Track proceedings.
In today’s case (Henneberry v. Humber) the Plaintiff sued for damages following a collision.  The Plaintiff was examined for discovery for the full two hours allowed under the fast track.  The Defendant brought an application for further time but the court dismissed this finding the examination that was conduced pursued “unproductive trains of inquiry“.  In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Romilly provided the following reasons:
[3]             Counsel for the defendant in this particular case indicates there are many reasons for that. It is a complicated case, liability is in issue, and the plaintiff refused to sign a notice to admit certain facts which could have shortened the length of this examination for discovery.
[4]             Counsel for the plaintiff has taken me through the examination for discovery and pointed out many instances where counsel for the defendant has squandered the opportunity to fully take advantage of this two-hour limit that was placed upon these proceedings.
[5]             Two of the leading members of our court, if I could say that, in civil matters, Madam Justice Susan Griffin and Mr. Justice N. Smith, have both written judgments on these new rules. In one case, the case ofMore Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., 2011 BCSC 166, Mr. Justice N. Smith, says this at paras. 12-13:
[12]      The new Rules also impose limitations on oral examination for discovery, but do so through a different mechanism.  Rule 7-2 (2) now limits an examination for discovery to seven hours or to any longer period to which the person being examined consents.  Although the test for relevance of a particular question or group of questions remains very broad, examining parties who ask too many questions about marginally relevant matters, who spend too much time pursuing unproductive trains of inquiry or who elicit too much evidence that will not be admissible at trial risk leaving themselves with insufficient time for obtaining more important evidence and admissions.
[13]      As Griffin J. said in Kendall, the time limit imposes a “self-policing incentive” on the party conducting the examination: at para. 14.  At the same time, the existence of the time limit creates a greater obligation on counsel for the party being examined to avoid unduly objecting or interfering in a way that wastes the time available. This interplay was described in Kendall at para. 18:
A largely “hands off” approach to examinations for discovery, except in the clearest of circumstances, is in accord with the object of the Rules of Court, particularly the newly stated object of proportionality, effective July 1, 2010.  Allowing wide-ranging cross-examination on examination for discovery is far more cost-effective than a practice that encourages objections, which will undoubtedly result in subsequent chambers applications to require judges or masters to rule on the objections.  It is far more efficient for counsel for the examinee to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence at trial, rather than on examination for discovery.
[6]             In this particular case, counsel for the plaintiff has taken me to the transcript and I am satisfied that there was far too much time spent pursuing unproductive trains of inquiry. As a result, the two-hour limitation passed by without counsel for the defendant being able to deal with all the issues with which they wanted to deal.
[7]             I am not satisfied that this is a case where I should exercise my discretion to give any further time for further examinations for discovery. The application will be dismissed. Thank you.
 

Discovery Continuation Distinct from a Further Examination

As previously discussed, the law sets a heavy burden when a party seeks a second examination for discovery in a lawsuit in the BC Supreme Court.  There is a distinction, however, between a second discovery and a continuation of an incomplete one.  This distinction was discussed in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In this week’s case (Li v. Oneil) the Plaintiff was examined for discovery at which various requests for further information were made.  When the Defendant sought to schedule a continuation of the discovery the Plaintiff opposed arguing the heavy burden for a further discovery was not met.  Master Muir granted the application noting the distinction between concluding an incomplete discovery based on outstanding requests and a genuine further examination.  The Court provided the following reasons:
[11]         The application before me, despite being framed as an application for a further discovery, was in reality an application that the examination of the plaintiff continue, both in accordance with R. 7-2(22) and generally, based on production of new material such as the list of special damages, medical records and employment records. In support, he relies on the decisions in Cowan v. Davies, 2008 BCSC 1239, and Dhami v. Bath, 2012 BCSC 2077…
[15]         I am of the view that the examination for discovery was adjourned as contemplated by these rules. Thus, the defendant is entitled to continue its examination for discovery regarding questions left on the record and I am of the view that logically extends to questions based on documents requested at the discovery and subsequently produced.
[16]         As the examination for discovery was not concluded, the heavy onus required to justify a further discovery referred to in Sutherland v. Lucas is not engaged. Given the extensive document production since the examination for discovery was conducted, I am also of the view that the defendant is entitled to continue its examination for discovery based on the new material, whether or not it was produced in accordance with a request left on the record.
[17]         If this was an application for a second examination for discovery I would come to a similar conclusion.
[18]         On a review of the listing of documents produced by the plaintiff since her examination for discovery as set out in the defendant’s notice of application, it is clear that many are documents that could prove or disprove a material fact and that they were in existence prior to her examination for discovery and as such required to be produced under rules 7-1(1) and 7-1(9).
[19]         The defendant submits that is sufficient to constitute a failure to make full and frank disclosure as contemplated in Sutherland v. Lucas and is such as to warrant a second discovery.
[20]         I agree. In my view it does not behoove a party to fail to make complete document disclosure prior to an examination for discovery and then to take the position that the examination cannot be continued when proper disclosure is made.
[21]         Thus, in the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the defendant did not conclude its discovery and thus the heavy onus referred to in Sutherland v. Lucas does not apply. The defendant is entitled to continue its examination for discovery on the new matters, but is not entitled to examine on matters covered on the first day of examination for discovery.

"Overly-Frequent Interventions, Inappropriate Objections, and an Under-Prepared Witness" Leads To Further Discovery

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a further examination for discovery of a party due to “overly-frequent interventions, inappropriate objections, and an under-prepared witness“.
In this week’s case (CP v. RBC Life Insurance Company) the Plaintiff was suing for disability insurance coverage she had in place with the Defendant.  In the course of the lawsuit the plaintiff examined a representative of the Defendant and the discovery was “at times disruptive, or event fractious“.  The Plaintiff adjourned the discovery before using her full 7 hours.  The Plaintiff sought an order allowing her to reschedule the examination and seeking to exceed the 7 hour cap.  In finding this was appropriate Master Baker provided the following sensible comments addressing the conduct of discoveries under the new rules of court:
[14]         Ms. Hayman adjourned in part due, she says, to the frequent interruptions and interventions by Ms. Carmichael. She argues that many of the interruptions were in and of themselves improper and that, for example, questions that were objected to should be answered by court direction. But perhaps more concerning to Ms. Hayman is that, she says, it was practically impossible to establish “a flow” to the examination which is, after all, in the nature of a cross-examination.
[15]         I have reviewed the 170 pages of the transcript of the two examination intervals. There are comments, objections, interventions, questions, or the like by Ms. Carmichael on 116 of the pages. It must be said that many are typical of an examination and benign; advice to Ms. Edizel, for example, to speak up, or confirmation to Ms. Hayman that the defense does have the proffered document. But the sheer number of recorded comments and interventions lend support to Ms. Hayman’s submission…
[18]         I worry that there is a trend to more oppositional examinations for discovery and that more and more will, inevitably, result in applications such as this. While the court is always available to apply the Rules of Court and decide on procedural issues, the process for examinations for discovery never intended this level of supervision. I agree with N. Smith J. that the court should generally discourage a question by question approach that, essentially, subsidizes counsel’s fundamental duty to conduct an appropriate discovery, on the one hand, or to permit one (including its broad and wide-ranging nature, often), on the other.
[19]         Rule 7-2(1)(a) inevitably increases the responsibilities in that regard. With a seven-hour limitation, examining counsel is obviously required to be efficient, focussed, and effective in conducting his or her examination. Opposing counsel, on the other hand, is obliged to restrict his or her objections and not consume that valuable time with unnecessary objections or interventions. Quite the contrary: if one thinks strategically, why not allow one’s opponent to use the examining time with irrelevant or non-productive questions? Tedious as they may seem, they would offer an excellent response to any application for increased examination time.
[20]         But that choice would be entirely left to the examinee’s counsel. In the main, it is for him or her to avoid intruding on the examiner’s time unless clearly justified.
[21]         There is a parallel obligation on the actual examinee; with the restriction on examination time comes a heightened responsibility to inform oneself in advance of the examination, so that the time can be used fruitfully and the discovery process serve its purpose. In this case Ms. Edizel had a particularly clear obligation in that regard. She was not the case manager or supervisor during the operative times of C.P.’s claim management; both of those individuals, as I’ve said, have left RBC. It was therefore incumbent on Ms. Edizel to redouble her efforts to examine the file and its history and to inform herself as much as possible. Both Ms. Wadhwani and Ms. Rhodes were apparently unwilling to talk to anyone about C.P.’s claim. The best source of information (other than the file entries themselves, one supposes) were therefore denied Ms. Edizel. I can understand, then, her inability to answer some (perhaps many) questions, but on the whole I am not satisfied that she met her obligation to inform herself as much as reasonably possible in advance of her examination. As a consequence, Rule 7-2(22) applies:
In order to comply with subrule (18) or (19), a person being examined for discovery may be required to inform himself or herself and the examination may be adjourned for that purpose.
[22]         The combination, then, of overly-frequent interventions, inappropriate objections, and an under-prepared witness requires that Ms. Edizel be further examined. I will not restrict that examination to outstanding requests. Moreover, her attendance for further examination in British Columbia will be at the expense of the defendant (subject, obviously, to any future rulings on costs). Ms. Hayman will be permitted a further four hours for examination as requested.