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Summary Trials and the Severance of Issues

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 58 Comments on Summary Trials and the Severance of Issues


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with an interesting question: is a Court order for severance of issues required prior to a Court adjudicating an issue (as opposed to the entirety of a claim) in a summary trial?
The reason why this is an issue is due to two competing Rules of Court.  Rule 9-7(2) permits a party to “apply to the court for judgement…either on an issue or generally“.  On the face of it this rule seems to permit a party to apply for only part of a case to be dealt with summarily.  However, Rule 12-5(67) requires a Court Order to sever issues in a lawsuit stating that “the court may order that one or more questions of fact or law arising in an action be tried and determined before the others“:.
In this week’s case (Chun v. Smit) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  He brought a motion for the issue of liability to be addressed on a summary trial.  The Defendant opposed arguing that a summary trial was not appropriate.  Mr. Justice McEwan agreed and dismissed the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons finding that an order to sever issues under Rule 12-5(67) is a prerequisite to having only part of a case tried by way of summary trial:

[7] The question is really whether Rule 9-7 merely describes a mode of trial, while the claim or cause of action remains otherwise subject to the rules that govern trial, or whether the trial of an “issue” under Rule 9-7, where that issue is the severance of liability from quantum, somehow bypasses Rule 12-5 (67) and falls to be decided on a lower standard.

[8] In the brief passage excerpted from Bramwell (above), three different approaches are apparent. It seems to me, however, that whether the test for severance, or of a trial of an “issue” is rationalized as within or outside Rule 9-7, it must meet the standard set out in Bramwell. Rule 9-7 is, in itself, a departure from the ordinary mode of hearing a trial, and proceedings within it are contingent upon the court accepting that the compromises inherent in that process will not impair the courts’ ability to do justice. That being so, it would be illogical that collateral to the compromises inherent in proceeding by summary trial, other aspect of the process were similarly downgraded. If a trial of an issue is found to be an appropriate way to proceed, it may be tried under Rule 9-7, if Rule 9-7 itself is properly applicable.  Where a party seeks to proceed on only part of a case under Rule 9-7, the first question is whether there should be severance at all, and the second is whether Rule 9-7 is appropriate. The correct approach is set out in Bramwell, which would bind me in any case (see Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd. (Re), [1954] 4 D.L.R. 590 (B.C.S.C.)).

British Columbia Ordered to Pay $605,000 in Damages to Victim of Childhood Sexual Abuse

Written by admin on . Posted in Sexual Assault Civil Cases, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on British Columbia Ordered to Pay $605,000 in Damages to Victim of Childhood Sexual Abuse

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, ordering the Government of BC to pay a Plaintiff $605,000 in damages as a result of childhood sexual abuse.
In today’s case (D.K.B. v. British Columbia) the Plaintiff was sexually abused by his hockey coach when he was 13 years old.    The abuse occurred in 1988.    The hockey coach was a convicted sex offender and his probation officer failed to warn the minor hockey association of this fact.  In 2005 the Province of BC was found vicariously liable for the sexual abuse.  Today’s case focused on damages.
The details of the abuse are set out in paragraphs 5-10 of today’s judgement.  The Plaintiff suffered harm as a result of this abuse.    Dr. O’Shaughnessy testified about the extent of the harm and his opinion was accepted by the Court.  Specifically Dr. O’Shaughnessy provided the following opinion:
Ultimately, however, I am impressed that given the nature of the sexual assaults and in particular at the critical developmental point that more likely than not the sexual assaults were a material factor in the development of his Mood Disorder and his substance abuse as well as his Personality Disorder. While indeed he may have gone on to develop problems with substance abuse in any event, I think the sexual abuse was a critical factor and more likely than not he would not have gone on to develop these difficulties had the sexual assaults not occurred
The Plaintiff went on to have a career in professional hockey and subsequently as a realtor.  He testified that this was impacted by the consequneces of the abuse.  Mr. Justice Dley agreed and awarded just over $450,000 for the impact the abuse had on the Plaintiff’s earning capacity.
The balance of the claim was made up largely of non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).  The parties settled this head of damage at $125,000.  Since this aspect of the case was privately settled today’s judgement is not, strictly speaking, a binding precedent on the issue, however, given the relative lack of reported cases dealing with non-pecuniary damages for sexual abuse in British Columbia I thought it would be useful to add today’s case to this site’s civil sex abuse claims database.

Multiple Defence Medical Exams: The Prohibition of "Belt and Suspenders" Applications

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


While the Rules of Court permit Defendants to compel a Plaintiff to attend multiple medical exams in certain circumstances, there is a general prohibition in having multiple exams to address the same topic.  Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing an application in these circumstances calling it a “belt and suspenders application“.
In today’s case  the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In the course of the claim she attended numerous ‘independent‘ medical exams with physicians selected by the Defendant.   Some of these physicians opined that the Plaintiff’s difficulties were not from the collision but due to “opioid dependencies“.
The Defendant asked that the Plaintiff attend a further exam with Dr. Baker, a so -called “addictionologist“.  The Plaintiff refused and an application was brought.  Master Baker dismissed the application noting the general prohibition of multiple exams to bolster a previous opinion.  In dismissing the application the Court provided the following helpful reasons:

[7] To get back to the point, the defence’s position is that some or much of these difficulties relate to, they say, opioid dependencies that have arisen in advance of this motor-vehicle accident.  This is denied or contradicted by the report of her family physician, Dr. Singhal.

[8] Dr. Baker a specialist, in this area, not just of addiction and addiction parameters or aspects of that, but also chronic pain management, I understand.  Even the brief c.v. to which I was referred was impressive.  His membership in various societies, the committees he serves on, all of which impressed me.

[9] Having said all that, I cannot see that this case is in any significant way distinct from that decided by Mr. Justice Voith, to which I just referred.  With greatest respect, at least two specialists for the defence have commented on, concluded, and been quite specifically direct that they regard (the Plaintiff) as having been either habituated, as one — Dr. Smith, I think, said it — or dependent, euphemistically perhaps, addicted to opioids.  This has had consequences for her recovery, or her response to the accident.

[10] I agree entirely, with greatest respect, with Mr. Justice Voith and his impression of the case that he decided.  I agree that there’s no doubt that Dr. Baker has greater expertise on that particular point.

[11] But as Mr. Justice Voith says, that’s not the measure of whether or not to direct an I.M.E.  The phrase — I know it has a pejorative ring to it — but it was used at least a couple of times, once by me — that this is a “belt and suspenders application” by the defence.  They already have expert opinion on the subject.

[12] They were met, from the plaintiff’s perspective, by opposition to Dr. Hashimoto opining on that aspect.  The view, as taken by the plaintiff, that Dr. Hashimoto is not qualified to give this opinion that’s outside his expertise.  They have not taken that perspective in respect of Dr. Smith.

[13] It doesn’t really matter to me whether they did or didn’t, because whether or not a second or subsequent I.M.E. should be ordered does not rely upon the plaintiff’s opinion as to the admissibility of an expert’s opinion, or in fact any other evidence.  That is for the court to decide; and it is, with respect, for the defence to structure its case and its strategies.

[14] I am satisfied, on the circumstances and facts before me, that this does constitute a situation in which the defence is wishing to bolster the opinion of Dr. Smith at least, and possibly Dr. Hashimoto, with the further and yes, more focused opinion of Dr. Baker.

[15] The law in this area does not support that course.  That is sufficient, in my respectful view, to decide the issue.

For the sake of convenience I should point out that the decision of Mr. Justice Voith that Master Baker referenced was Zawadzki v. Calimoso which was recently transcribed and can be found here.

Can you add a Party to a Lawsuit After the Limitation Period Expires?

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 64 Comments on Can you add a Party to a Lawsuit After the Limitation Period Expires?


Often times as a lawsuit progresses a Plaintiff learns of new allegations that could be made or new parties who may be responsible.  Lawsuits can take time to get to trial and often when these new revelations are made the limitation period to sue the new party has already expired.  When this happens can the party be added to the existing lawsuit?  The answer is yes, however, the Court’s permission must be granted to do so.  Today the BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgement providing a detailed overview of this area of law.
In today’s case (Chouinard v. O’Connor) the Plaintiff was injured in an altercation that took place during a lacrosse game.  He sued his alleged assailant and a variety of others alleging battery.  As the lawsuit progressed the Plaintiff wished to amend the claim to add allegations of negligence.  By the time this happened the limitation period to sue in negligence had expired.  The Plaintiff applied to Court to allow an amendment to the lawsuit but this was denied.  The Plaintiff appealed but was also unsuccessful.  In dismissing the matter the BC Court of Appeal provided the following useful legal overview addressing factors a Court should consider in allowing amendments to a claim after a limitation period has expired:

[17] This Court has considered the proper approach to amendments to pleadings after the expiry of a limitation period on numerous occasions.  The issue has arisen frequently under both former Rule 15(5)(a)(iii) (now replaced by Rule 6-2(7)), where a plaintiff wished to add a party after the expiry of the limitation period, and under former Rule 24(1) (now replaced by Rule 6-1(1)) where a plaintiff sought to plead a new cause of action against an existing defendant after the expiry of the limitation period for bringing the cause of action.

[18] In Teal Cedar Products (1977) Ltd. v. Dale Intermediaries Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 282, 34 C.C.L.I. (2d) 211, this Court determined that the Supreme Court has broad discretion to allow or disallow an amendment, holding that the overriding test is whether it is “just and convenient” to allow the amendment.  Finch J.A. (as he then was), with the concurrence of Ryan J.A., stated:

[36]      This application was brought … under Rule 24(1) which permits a party to amend pleadings at any time, with leave of the court.  The rule is discretionary and contains no criteria for the exercise of that discretion.

[37]      The rule most often involved in questions arising under the Limitation Act is Rule 15(5)(a)(iii). It is invoked on applications to add parties. Rule 15(5)(a)(iii) says that the court may order a person to be added as a party where there exists a question which, in the opinion of the court, would be “just and convenient” to determine as between a party and the person sought to be added. The qualifying phrase “just and convenient” is not to be found in Rule 24(1).

[38]      Discretionary powers are, of course, always to be exercised judicially. It would clearly be unjudicial to permit an amendment to pleadings under Rule 24(1) if it appeared to be either unjust or inconvenient to do so. So, even though the words “just and convenient” are not found in Rule 24, justice and convenience would, in my view, be relevant criteria for the exercise of the discretion found in that rule.

…

[45]      [T]he discretion to permit amendments afforded by … Rule 24(1) … was intended to be completely unfettered and subject only to the general rule that all such discretion is to be exercised judicially, in accordance with the evidence adduced and such guidelines as may appear from the authorities.  Delay, and the reasons for delay, are among the relevant considerations, and the judge should consider any explanation put forward to account for the delay. But no one factor should be accorded overriding importance, in the absence of a clear evidentiary basis for doing so.

…

[67]      In the exercise of a judge’s discretion, the length of delay, the reasons for delay and the expiry of the limitation period are all factors to be considered, but none of those factors should be considered in isolation. Regard must also be had for the presence or absence of prejudice, and the extent of the connection, if any, between the existing claims and the proposed new cause of action. Nor do I think that a plaintiff’s explanation for delay must necessarily exculpate him from all “fault” or “culpability” before the court may exercise its discretion in his favour….

[19] The concurring reasons of McEachern C.J.B.C. (Ryan J.A. also concurring) were to similar effect:

[74]      Applying the same principles regardless of whether the application is to add new defendants … or new causes of action, … I believe the most important considerations, not necessarily in the following order, are the length of the delay, prejudice to the respondents, and the overriding question of what is just and convenient.

[20] In Letvad v. Fenwick, 2000 BCCA 630, 82 B.C.L.R. (3d) 296, Esson J.A. for the Court cited from Teal Cedar, and then said:

[29]      My understanding of the phrase “completely unfettered” in this context is that the discretion is not fettered by the relevant legislation, i.e., the Rule and the Limitation Act.  It is, however, fettered to the extent that, as was held in Teal, it must be exercised judicially, in accordance with the evidence adduced and such guidelines as may appear from the authorities.  It was held inTeal that the guidelines to which the chambers judge is required to have regard include these:

– the extent of the delay;

– the reasons for the delay;

– any explanation put forward to account for the delay;

– the degree of prejudice caused by delay; and

– the extent of the connection, if any, between the existing claims and the proposed new cause of action.

[21] As can be seen from the chambers judgment in the case before us, this list of factors has come to be seen as a checklist in applications to add a cause of action or a party after the expiry of the limitation period.  It is sometimes forgotten that the list of factors is not an exhaustive one, and that the overriding concern is whether the proposed amendment will be “just and convenient”.  The factors listed in Teal Cedar and in Letvad will typically be important factors to be considered by a chambers judge, but the decision is ultimately a discretionary one.  Thus in Boutsakis & Kakavelakis, A Partnership v. Boutsakis, 2008 BCCA 13, 77 B.C.L.R. (4th) 113, this Court upheld the granting of amendments even though not all of the Teal factors had been specifically referred to in the judgment of the chambers judge.  Newbury J.A., speaking for the Court, said:

[21]      … [I]t seems to me that although the summary trial judge did not mention the authorities, she did consider many of the factors listed in Teal Cedar – the reasons for the plaintiffs’ delay, the question of prejudice to the appellants; Mr. Kakavelakis’ difficulty in obtaining Mr. Boutsakis’ cooperation in enforcing the Partnership’s rights against Crown Travel; and the overall context of the two actions generally.  Given the high degree of deference that is to be accorded to a discretionary decision of this kind, I see no basis on which this court should interfere with her conclusion that both amendments to the Statement of Claim in the “F” action should be permitted and given effect to notwithstanding that between the issuance of the writ in 1989 and the 1997 and 2004 motions to amend, fresh causes of action advanced by those amendments would have become barred by the lapse of time.

Bus Passenger Injuries: When Can a Driver be sued in Negligence?

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 46 Comments on Bus Passenger Injuries: When Can a Driver be sued in Negligence?


When a Bus Driver is involved in an at-fault collision causing injury to the passengers a suit for damages can usually be brought.  What if there is no collision but instead the bus driver makes an abrupt move causing injury to the passengers, can a suit succeed on these facts?  Depending on the circumstances the answer is yes.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing this area of the law.
In this week’s case (Habib v. Jack) the Plaintiff was injured while riding on a bus in Burnaby, BC.  The Plaintiff testified that the driver went over a speed bump and that “her seat cushion slid out from under her and she became briefly airborne during which time her neck snapped forward and back“.  The Court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit finding that the Defendant drove the bus appropriately.  Prior to making this finding Madam Justice Ross provided the following useful discussion addressing this area of the law:

[26] The standard of care owed by a transit operator to a passenger was addressed in Day v. Toronto Transportation Commission, [1940] S.C.R. 433. Justice Hudson described the duty as follow:

Although the carrier of passengers is not an insurer, yet if an accident occurs and the passenger is injured, there is a heavy burden on the defendant carrier to establish that he had used all due, proper and reasonable care and skill to avoid or prevent injury to the passenger. The care required is of a very high degree: 4 Hals., p. 60, paras. 92 and 95. In an old case of Jackson v. Tollett [(1817) 2 Starkie 37], the rule was stated by Lord Ellenborough, at p. 38, as follows:

Every person who contracts for the conveyance of others, is bound to use the utmost care and skill, and if, through any erroneous judgment on his part, any mischief is occasioned, he must answer for the consequences.

[27] In this province, Madam Justice Humphries summarized the principles to be applied in Lawson v. B.C. Transit, 2002 BCSC 1438, as follows at paragraph 18:

As set out in Wang v. Harrod, supra, once an accident has occurred, the defendant must meet the heavy burden of establishing that he used all proper and reasonable care and skill to avoid or prevent injury to the passenger. The standard of care imposed is the conduct expected of a reasonably prudent bus driver in the circumstances. The court must consider the experience of an average bus driver, as well as anything that the particular driver knew or should have known about the passenger. The standard of care required is higher when the driver knew or ought to have known that the passenger was handicapped or elderly.

[28] Mr. Justice Berger in Sawatsky v. Romanchuk, [1979] B.C.J. No. 964 (S.C.) noted that:

…this is not a case where negligence has been established. I say that because, though the bus lurched as it started up, it was a lurch that she, as someone who had travelled on the buses for twenty years had experienced in the past. Anyone who travels on the buses must expect that from time to time the movement of the buses will not be smooth and uneventful. Lurches are part of the movement of these buses and something that the people who travel on the buses learn to expect. Accidents do happen. And there are bound to be some accidents on the bus system. And some of them, like this accident, will not give rise to a right to damages.

Madam Justice Ross goes on to cite about a dozen other cases dealing with Bus Passenger injuries in BC making this week’s case a good starting point in researching bus driver liability for injury to passengers.

Court Ordered Medical Exams and Location: Can ICBC Send You Out of Town?

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on Court Ordered Medical Exams and Location: Can ICBC Send You Out of Town?


When ICBC requests a Plaintiff to attend an ‘independent’ medical exam they often pick physicians in the Lower Mainland for these assessments.  One of the obvious reasons for this is that the Lower Mainland has the highest concentration of physicians who provide these consultations to ICBC.  Is it reasonable to object to such an appointment on the basis of location?  The answer is usually not and reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In today’s case (Parsons v. Mears) the Defendant was involved in an incident where he became trapped in an overturned tractor trailer.  The Plaintiff “allegedly suffered various injuries when attempting to rescue the Defendant“.  The Plaintiff sued for damages and in the course of the lawsuit the Defendant requested that the Plaintiff attend a Vancouver based medical exam.  The Plaintiff agreed to the assessment but insisted it take place in Victoria.  The parties could not reach agreement on this issue and an application was brought.  Master Bouck ordered that the Plaintiff attend and in doing so provided the following summary of the law:

[19] The following principles are applicable to this discussion:

a.  The purpose of an independent medical examination is to put the parties on a basis of equality. It is not for the plaintiff to decide which doctor can examine him or her on behalf of the defendant: Sinclair v. Underwood, 2002 BCSC 354 at para. 5;

b.  Nonetheless, an independent medical examination is an examination conducted by a person appointed by the court. The convenience of the plaintiff is to be considered in appointing such a person: Willis v. Voetmann, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2492 (S.C.) at para. 5;

c.  Convenience to the plaintiff is but one of several factors for the court to consider in exercising its discretion under Rule 7-6: Adelson v. Clint (1993), 16 C.P.C. (3d) 209 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 17; and

d.  It may be appropriate for the court to consider appointing a specialist other than the proposed examiner but only where the plaintiff demonstrates, on a preponderance of evidence, sufficient grounds to justify the court in concluding that its discretion should not be exercised in favour of the appointment of the defendant’s nominee: Sinclair v. Underwood and Adelson v. Clint, supra.

[20] In terms of convenience to the plaintiff, I do not understand the authorities to say that an independent medical examination should, or even might preferably, take place at the examinee’s town or city of residence. Nor do I understand those authorities to say that all things being equal, the defence should be required to schedule an examination with a specialist practicing near the examinee’s residence. For example, the court in Willis v. Voetmann, supra, deemed it reasonable for a resident of Port McNeil to travel to Victoria or Vancouver for an examination.

[21] It is almost always an inconvenience to a plaintiff to attend an independent medical examination. An employed person might miss a day’s pay; a homemaker with young children might be required to pay for childcare. However, that inconvenience can be remedied at trial by an award of damages for this suggested loss.

[22] On a very rare occasion, the court may order that the defendant’s nominee travel to the plaintiff’s town or city of residence to conduct the independent examination or assessment. Such an order might be appropriate where the examination or assessment is requested so late in the day that travel time would unduly interfere with the plaintiff’s trial preparation. The alternative to such an order would be to deny the defendant’s entitlement to an examination altogether: White v. Gait, 2003 BCSC 2023.

[23] In this case, there is no objection to the qualifications of either Dr. Leith or the proposed evaluator at Progressive Rehabilitation. The plaintiff can obviously travel although the defendant may need to offer special accommodations for that travel.

[24] In short, convenience to the plaintiff is one of several factors for the court’s consideration on this application. It is not the predominant factor and in itself does not provide justification for denying the defendant’s entitlement to the order sought.

$25,000 For "Mild to Moderate" Lingering Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Adding to this ever-growing British Columbia non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) caselaw database, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing a claim involving lingering soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Manson v. Kalar) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in 2008.  The crash was fairly significant resulting in over $5,000 in damage to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Fault for the collision was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.
Madam Justice Boyd ultimately found that the Plaintiff suffered mild-moderate soft tissue injuries and that while these were on-going some three years after the fact there was still room for improvement.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $25,000 the Court provided the following reasons:
[38] …The plaintiff here has suffered injuries which are limited to his lower back and neck.  He has pursued very little treatment for his injuries and, despite his doctor’s recommendations, he has not attended few physiotherapy treatments or undertaken any core muscle conditioning programs.  Nevertheless it is expected that he will recover in the foreseeable future.  As I have already noted, while I satisfied that his ongoing pain and discomfort has limited his participation in his former sporting activities, some of his social withdrawal appears to be the result of other factors. ..
[46] …In the case at bar, the plaintiff has suffered a mild to moderate soft tissue injuries, where the symptoms have persisted for almost three years since the accident and are still not resolved.  In these circumstances, I find that a fair and reasonable award of damages is $25,000.
For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC court cases dealing with damages for soft tissue injuries.

BC Court of Appeal Discusses Mitigation of Damages in Injury Claims

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Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal providing a useful summary of the law of mitigation of damages in the context of a personal injury lawsuit.
In this week’s case (Gregory v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision in White Rock, BC.  She was injured and sued for damages.  At trial her damages were assessed at just over $140,000 and then reduced by 10% for an alleged ‘failure to mitigate‘.  In short the trial judge held that the Plaintiff unreasonably failed to follow her doctor’s recommendation to have cortisone injections.
The Plaintiff appealed this deduction arguing that there was no evidence before the Court that these injections would have improved the Plaintiff’s symptoms.  The BC Court of Appeal agreed and overturned this deduction.  In doing so Madam Justice Garson provide the following short but useful discussion of the law of mitigation of damages in personal injury lawsuits:

[53] In Chiu v. Chiu, 2002 BCCA 618 at para. 57, this Court set out the test for failure to mitigate as follows:

[57]      The onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff could have avoided all or a portion of his loss. In a personal injury case in which the plaintiff has not pursued a course of medical treatment recommended to him by doctors, the defendant must prove two things: (1) that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in eschewing the recommended treatment, and (2) the extent, if any, to which the plaintiff’s damages would have been reduced had he acted reasonably. These principles are found in Janiak v. Ippolito, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 146.

…

[56] I would describe the mitigation test as a subjective/objective test.  That is whether the reasonable patient, having all the information at hand that the plaintiff possessed, ought reasonably to have undergone the recommended treatment.  The second aspect of the test is “the extent, if any to which the plaintiff’s damages would have been reduced” by that treatment.  The Turner case, on which the trial judge relies, uses slightly different language than this Court’s judgment in Chiu: “there is some likelihood that he or she would have received substantial benefit from it …”.

[57] In this case the trial judge found as a fact that the cortisone shots were “not necessarily curative, they reduce the inflammation… Sometimes the relief is only temporary but sometimes the injections bring long term benefits”.  She did not find that the treatment would have reduced the symptoms.  In addition there is the fact that the plaintiff reasonably believed the diagnosis was a tear and that the injections would have no healing effect on a tear.

[58] Regardless of whether the trial judge erred in finding on the evidence that it was objectively reasonable for the plaintiff to undergo the injections, I conclude that she erred in her application of the correct test, as articulated in Chiu.  The physicians testified only that it was a reasonable treatment to try, and it might afford some relief.  In my view such an opinion does not meet the threshold for reducing an award as described in Chiu.

[59] I would accede to this ground of appeal and reverse the judge’s decision to reduce the award by 10%.

Expert Witnesses Stripped of Immunity From Negligence Suits in the UK

Written by admin on . Posted in independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

Significant reasons for judgement were recently released by the Supreme Court of the UK stripping expert witnesses of their immunity from lawsuits in negligence.  While this development is not binding in British Columbia it is noteworthy as the law in BC is often shaped or at least influenced by developments in other common law jurisdictions.
The issue of expert witness immunity is important as the outcome of a personal injury trial can largely turn on the testimony of various exeprt witnesses.  Often times there is disagreement about the extent of a Plaintiff’s injuries as between his/her treating physicians and ‘independent’ medical examiners hired by opposing parties.  If the opposing expert is negligent in providing their opinion BC Courts have held that they generally cannot be sued for any losses that follow.
The justification given for this immunity is that if experts could be sued “ there will be a chilling effect on the willingness of health care providers to deliver their necessary assistance to the Court, and to be full and frank in their opinions when doing so.”
This same rationale gave expert witnesses in the UK immunity for over 400 years.  This immunity has now been overturned by the Supreme Court of the UK in the decision of Jones v. Kaney.  In Jones, the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In the course of the damages suit he was assessed by a psychologist.  After resolving his claim he sued the pscyhologist alleging she was negligent in providing her opinion.  The lawsuit was initially dismissed based on the long standing immunity enjoyed by expert witnesses.
In overturning this immunity the UK Supreme Court held that no justification had been shown for continuing  to hold expert witnesses immune from suit for breach of duty in relation to the evidence they give in court or for the views they express in anticipation of court proceedings
Given that BC’s expert witness immunity is grounded in the same logic as the UK’s was it will be interesting to see if our Courts are willing to re-visit this issue.

Future Care Claims: What Expert Evidence Is Needed?

Written by admin on . Posted in Cost of Future Care Cases, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on Future Care Claims: What Expert Evidence Is Needed?


Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal discussing the type of expert evidence necessary to prove damages for cost of future care in a BC injury claim.
In this week’s case (Gregory v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision. At trial the Plaintiff sought damages including an award of $123,000 for cost of future care.  In support of this claim the Plaintiff relied on the opinion of an occupational therapist.  This aspect of the claim was largely rejected with the Court awarding just over $8,000 for this head of damage.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the evidence of the occupational therapist suggesting a medical doctors evidence was necessary for this aspect of the claim.   The BC Court of Appeal agreed in part and increased the assessment by $30,000.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons addressing the type of expert evidence needed to advance a future care claim:

[38] Courts do accept testimony from a variety of health care professionals as to necessary and reasonable costs of future care: Jacobson v. Nike Canada Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 63, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 377 (S.C.) at para. 182; in which Levine J. (as she then was) said:

[182]    The test she enunciated does not, in my view, require that the evidence of the specific care that is required by the plaintiff be provided by a medical doctor. In Milina v. Bartsch, McLachlin J. accepted the evidence of a rehabilitation expert as to the type of care that should be provided.

See also: Aberdeen v. Zanatta, 2008 BCCA 420 at paras. 43-53, 63; Rizzolo v. Brett, 2010 BCCA 398 at paras. 72-83.

[39] I do not consider it necessary, in order for a plaintiff to successfully advance a future cost of care claim, that a physician testify to the medical necessity of each and every item of care that is claimed.  But there must be some evidentiary link drawn between the physician’s assessment of pain, disability, and recommended treatment and the care recommended by a qualified health care professional:  Aberdeen at paras. 43, 63…

[46] And, there was a consensus among the physicians that Ms. Gregory has difficulty lifting above shoulder height, difficulty with prolonged heavy or repetitive motion above shoulder level, and that in general she will continue to have persistent pain and weakness.

[47] The evidence of the physicians does therefore provide some evidentiary basis for the recommendations for assistance with heavy housework, and yard maintenance.  In my view the trial judge fell into error by failing to consider these claims on the basis only that, “there are no recommendations from the medical practitioners for housekeeping assistance, or home and yard maintenance … ”.

[48] Rather than remit this question to the trial judge, I am of the view that it is appropriate for this Court to substitute an appropriate award under this head of damages.

[49] That part of Ms. Percy’s recommendations in which she estimated assistance for heavy home and yard maintenance is set out above.  I would substitute an award of $30,000 over and above the amount already awarded under this head of damages.  This represents a reasonable assessment of the present value of the cost of some modest assistance with the housework, and yard maintenance, that Ms. Gregory could not perform herself in a reasonable manner, as a consequence of the impairment in her shoulder.