Multiple Defence Medical Exams: The Prohibition of "Belt and Suspenders" Applications
While the Rules of Court permit Defendants to compel a Plaintiff to attend multiple medical exams in certain circumstances, there is a general prohibition in having multiple exams to address the same topic. Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing an application in these circumstances calling it a “belt and suspenders application“.
In today’s case the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. In the course of the claim she attended numerous ‘independent‘ medical exams with physicians selected by the Defendant. Some of these physicians opined that the Plaintiff’s difficulties were not from the collision but due to “opioid dependencies“.
The Defendant asked that the Plaintiff attend a further exam with Dr. Baker, a so -called “addictionologist“. The Plaintiff refused and an application was brought. Master Baker dismissed the application noting the general prohibition of multiple exams to bolster a previous opinion. In dismissing the application the Court provided the following helpful reasons:
 To get back to the point, the defence’s position is that some or much of these difficulties relate to, they say, opioid dependencies that have arisen in advance of this motor-vehicle accident. This is denied or contradicted by the report of her family physician, Dr. Singhal.
 Dr. Baker a specialist, in this area, not just of addiction and addiction parameters or aspects of that, but also chronic pain management, I understand. Even the brief c.v. to which I was referred was impressive. His membership in various societies, the committees he serves on, all of which impressed me.
 Having said all that, I cannot see that this case is in any significant way distinct from that decided by Mr. Justice Voith, to which I just referred. With greatest respect, at least two specialists for the defence have commented on, concluded, and been quite specifically direct that they regard (the Plaintiff) as having been either habituated, as one — Dr. Smith, I think, said it — or dependent, euphemistically perhaps, addicted to opioids. This has had consequences for her recovery, or her response to the accident.
 I agree entirely, with greatest respect, with Mr. Justice Voith and his impression of the case that he decided. I agree that there’s no doubt that Dr. Baker has greater expertise on that particular point.
 But as Mr. Justice Voith says, that’s not the measure of whether or not to direct an I.M.E. The phrase — I know it has a pejorative ring to it — but it was used at least a couple of times, once by me — that this is a “belt and suspenders application” by the defence. They already have expert opinion on the subject.
 They were met, from the plaintiff’s perspective, by opposition to Dr. Hashimoto opining on that aspect. The view, as taken by the plaintiff, that Dr. Hashimoto is not qualified to give this opinion that’s outside his expertise. They have not taken that perspective in respect of Dr. Smith.
 It doesn’t really matter to me whether they did or didn’t, because whether or not a second or subsequent I.M.E. should be ordered does not rely upon the plaintiff’s opinion as to the admissibility of an expert’s opinion, or in fact any other evidence. That is for the court to decide; and it is, with respect, for the defence to structure its case and its strategies.
 I am satisfied, on the circumstances and facts before me, that this does constitute a situation in which the defence is wishing to bolster the opinion of Dr. Smith at least, and possibly Dr. Hashimoto, with the further and yes, more focused opinion of Dr. Baker.
 The law in this area does not support that course. That is sufficient, in my respectful view, to decide the issue.
For the sake of convenience I should point out that the decision of Mr. Justice Voith that Master Baker referenced was Zawadzki v. Calimoso which was recently transcribed and can be found here.
bc injury law, DME, ime, Master Baker, Mr. Justice Voith, Rule 7, Rule 7-6, Rule 7-6(1), Rule 7-6(2), Zawadzki v. Calimoso