BC INJURY LAW – Page 177 – The MacIsaac Group of Law Firms

Deposition Applications Under the New Rules of Court

Written by admin on June 29, 2011. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on Deposition Applications Under the New Rules of Court

Earlier this year Mr. Justice Harris provided reasons in obiter setting out some concerns as to why parties should limit the use of deposition evidence at trial. This week, reasons for judgement were released considering a contested application for a witness to testify by way pre trial deposition. This is the first reported case I’m aware of dealing with such an application under the new Rules of Court.
In this week’s case (Seder v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. ICBC spoke with the Plaintiff’s employer and wished to call her as a witness at trial. The employer lived in Alberta so ICBC asked for permission to conduct a pre-trial deposition and introduce that evidence at trial. The Plaintiff opposed this but was willing to accommodate the witness by allowing her to testify via video-link. ICBC did not agree to this compromise and brought an application for an order requiring the witness to attend a deposition.
Master Young dismissed ICBC’s application but did give the witness permission to testify via video-conferencing. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[3] In determining whether to exercise its discretion to order an examination under subrule (1), the court must take into account:

(a) the convenience of the person sought to be examined,

(b) the possibility that the person may be unavailable to testify at the trial by reason of death, infirmity, sickness or absence,

(c) the possibility that the person will be beyond the jurisdiction of the court at the time of the trial,

(d) the possibility and desirability of having the person testify at trial by video conferencing or other electronic means, and

(e) the expense of bringing the person to the trial.

[4] The former Rule 38 is essentially the same rule as the new Rule 7-8, with the exception that a new ground has been included at 7-8(3)(d) regarding the possibility of testifying at trial by video conferencing…

[5] In Abermin Corp. v. Granges Exploration Ltd., [1990] B.C.J. No. 1830, Mr. Justice McColl discussed the purpose and intent of Rule 38 shortly after it was incorporated into the Rules. The Rule, he said, is attempting to strike a balance between the fundamental principle that witnesses should testify live before the court and the preservation of evidence which might not be available at trial because it is not always possible to get witnesses, willingly or otherwise, before the courts. His Lordship said that Rule 38 intended to provide the parties with the opportunity to preserve and present evidence when there is a possibility that a witness would not otherwise be heard and thus adversely affect one of the litigants at trial. The emphasis was on the availability of the evidence, not the convenience of counsel.

[6] The mischief to avoid in interpreting the Rule, is that trial would become a “hodge-podge of deposition evidence along with viva voce evidence in the conduct of a trial merely to convenience counsel or indeed potential witnesses” (Abermin at p. 3)…

[33] Ms. Jacob is not a central witness. She is being called to give brief evidence relating to loss of earnings. It is not proportionate to pay three days’ travel expenses to have her testify for an hour and fly home the same day. This travel expense could be avoided by permitting her to attend at the trial by video conference. She is a cooperative witness, but out of an abundance of caution the third party still intends to subpoena her. The cost of the applications cannot be avoided if the third party wants to ensure her attendance. That cost would be incurred whether she attended for a deposition or for a trial.

[34] I have to keep in mind the problems with preparing defence evidence prior to the trial without a judge presiding, as articulated by Justice Harris in Byer. It strikes me that these problems which interfere with the effectiveness and usefulness of the evidence at trial should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances where the evidence will be lost if not recorded prior to trial.

[35] In cases such as this case before me with the most unexceptional facts, the proportionate procedure would be video conferencing.

[36] I dismiss the third party’s application.

What Do ICBC's 2010 Annual Report and Hot Coffee Have in Common?

Written by admin on June 28, 2011. Posted in Tort Reform, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on What Do ICBC's 2010 Annual Report and Hot Coffee Have in Common?

ICBC’s 2010 Annual Report was recently released to little media attention. Perhaps little attention accompanied the release because there were few exciting facts in the report. At $361 million of Net Income last year alone ICBC continues to be very financially sound and stable.
This stability, however, is newsworthy on its own. British Columbia has Canada’s fullest tort system for motor vehicle collision victims. That means if you are injured through the fault of another you will have access to more meaningful compensation here than anywhere else in Canada. The important underlying story here is that victim rights don’t need to be stripped (as other Provinces have done or proposed) to have a viable auto insurance system.
This story dovetails nicely into another newsworthy matter. HBO’s much anticipated documentary Hot Coffee has now aired. This movie documents, amongst other things, the infamous story of the 1990’s American lawsuit against McDonald’s after a patron burned herself with their coffee. This is a classic example of frivolous lawsuits run a muck, right? Watch the movie and decide for yourself. You can click here to listen to my take on the Hot Coffee case as discussed with Charles Adler last year.
If you don’t have time to watch the documentary I’ll summarize one of the important points made. Stories of a broken system and frivolous claims are often bandied about by the insurance industry. These generate a lot more headlines than stories of financial insurance company stability.
The insurance industry often uses the momentum of these stories to argue that “reform” is necessary because the system is failing due to abuse. As Hot Coffee illustrates, it is important to step back and scrutinize any claims that victim rights need to be stripped in order to have a functioning insurance system. This usually is not the case. When tort reformers ask for proof, point proudly to British Columbia’s full tort system and ICBC’s 2010 Annual Report.

Is an Unentered BC Supreme Court Order Effective?

Written by admin on June 27, 2011. Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

After a BC Supreme Court Judge or Master makes an Order, the parties to the lawsuit typically agree to the order’s terms, reduce it to writing, sign it and enter it with the Court Registry. Can an order be effective if parties fail to take these usual steps? The answer is yes and Reasons for Judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this area of the law.
In this week’s case (Hable v. Hable) the parties were involved in a family law dispute. In the course of the lawsuit a Court Order was obtained. The order was never entered and the lawsuit was eventually discontinued. After this the parties could not agree as to whether the unentered order was effective and the Court was asked to address this issue. The respondent argued that the order could not be entred because the underlying lawsuit was discontinued. The Court disagreed and in finding that the order was valid and effective Mr. Justice Bowden provided the following helpful reasons:

[7] The law in British Columbia regarding the effect of an order that has not been entered, as found in Metro Trust Co. of Can. v. MacDonald, (1988) CanLII 3025 (B.C.S.C.), is that it is “provisionally effective and can be treated as a subsisting order in cases where the justice of the case requires it and the right of withdrawal would not be thereby prevented or prejudiced.” That view of the law reflects an earlier decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Allard v. Manahan, [1974] B.C.J. No. 933, where the Court of Appeal said at para 10:

What is meant by the statement that an unentered order is only “provisionally effective”? I think that it means that the Judge who made it may, in his discretion, alter it or set it aside.

[8] A superior court is not functus officio with respect to an unentered order. (Clayton v. British American Securities Ltd., [1935] 1 D.L.R. 432 (B.C.C.A.). Unlike the dismissal of an action, which is a final order, a discontinuance leaves matters open and is not a bar to further proceedings. (Chrétien v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 925 (Federal Court) and Davis v. Campbell (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 443 (H.C.)

[9] I have concluded that the discontinuance filed in this matter does not preclude me from signing and entering the Order without the signatures of counsel. By doing so, I am simply confirming an order which was made prior to the filing of a discontinuance. Either party is at liberty to apply to settle the order before me or the Registrar, provided that such application is made before July 16, 2011. If no application is made by that date, the Order will be entered.

Google's Driverless Cars: Coming Soon To a Location Near You?

Written by admin on June 25, 2011. Posted in Uncategorized. 59 Comments on Google's Driverless Cars: Coming Soon To a Location Near You?

After lobbying by Google regarding their Driverless Car Project the State of Nevada is reported to have passed Assembly Bill No. 511 into law which paves the way for Driverless vehicles to become lawfully sanctioned. The law requires the Nevada Department of Transportaiton to “adopt regulations authorizing the operation of autonomous vehicles on highways within the State of Nevada“.
The following parameters were set out regarding these regulations:
The regulations required to be adopted by subsection 1
must:
(a) Set forth requirements that an autonomous vehicle must meet before it may be operated on a highway within this State;
(b) Set forth requirements for the insurance that is required to test or operate an autonomous vehicle on a highway within this State;
(c) Establish minimum safety standards for autonomous vehicles and their operation;
(d) Provide for the testing of autonomous vehicles;
(e) Restrict the testing of autonomous vehicles to specified geographic areas; and
(f) Set forth such other requirements as the Department determines to be necessary.
If anyone is aware of any lobbying efforts by Google to change Provincial laws to pave the way for Driverless Vehicles to come to Canada please feel free to contact me and let me know.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for "Sustained and Prolonged" Exacerbation of Fibromyalgia

Written by admin on June 24, 2011. Posted in ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, Uncategorized. 59 Comments on $50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for "Sustained and Prolonged" Exacerbation of Fibromyalgia

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing an assessment of damages for an aggravation of pre-existing injuries.
In today’s case (Iwanik v. Hayes) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 intersection collision. She was 61 years old at the time. Fault for the crash was admitted by the opposing motorist. The trial focused on the quantum of damages (value of the claim).
Prior to the collision the Plaintiff had various health concerns including fibromyalgia. The collision caused, among other injuries, a “sustained and prolonged” exacerbation of her pre-existing condition. In valuing the non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $50,000 Madam Justice Gray provided the following reasons:

[132] As a result of the accident, Ms. Iwanik suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, thorax and lumbar spine, causing a prolonged and sustained exacerbation of her fibromyalgia, and causing intermittent headaches. If the accident had not occurred, her fibromyalgia would have flared up periodically, but not enough to have restricted her from her from work or her other activities.

[133] As a result of the accident, Ms. Iwanik also suffered an injury to her left knee, which caused patellofemoral pain syndrome. It may have caused other problems in her knee, but the evidence at trial did not establish anything further. Although there is no record of Ms. Iwanik reporting the knee pain to treatment providers until August, 2008, I accept her evidence that she was initially more focussed on her other pain, and thought that the knee pain would resolve.

[134] I accept Dr. Bridger’s opinion that Ms. Iwanik also suffered a probable minor compression fracture of her T12 vertebra, and that she suffered a minor head injury with a probable minor concussion which has resolved. However, both of those injuries resolved so quickly that they do not affect the assessment of damages in this case.

[135] As a result of the injuries she suffered in the accident, Ms. Iwanik is no longer able to work at a physically demanding job, and is not capable of working in a 7-Eleven store. Fortunately, Ms. Iwanik found work at a Husky gas station which can accommodate her abilities. However, the job is not as well-paid as her work as a manager at 7-Eleven, and does not offer opportunities for advancement.

[136] As a result of the injuries she suffered in the accident, Ms. Iwanik is no longer able to engage in hour-long walks, or to carry heavy items such as laundry and groceries, or to garden for more than 20 minutes at a time in an elevated garden bed. She is no longer able to contribute to her family and community to the extent she previously did….

[142] In all the circumstances, an appropriate award is $50,000.

Trial Management Conferences and the Attendance Requirement

Written by admin on June 23, 2011. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 23, Uncategorized. 113 Comments on Trial Management Conferences and the Attendance Requirement

The first published reasons for judgement addressing Trial Management Conference attendance requirements pursuant to Rule 12-2(4) were released this week on the BC Supreme Court website.
In this week’s case (Luis v. Haw) the Plaintiff was involved in 4 separate motor vehicle collisions. A lawsuit was started following each collision and these were set for trial at the same time. All the Defendants were apparently insured with ICBC.
As the Trial Management Conference neared ICBC made an application requesting that “(the personal) defendants are exempt from attending the trial management conference; secondly, that Mr. Kevin Munt, who appears to be an adjuster at the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, “represent” the defendants at the trial management conference, and that Kevin Munt be allowed to attend the trial management conference by telephone“.
The Court largely dismissed the application and in doing so Mr. Justice Groves provided the following useful comments about the attendance requirement for Trial Management Conferences:

[19] The first concern raised by the letter and the requisition is the request that Kevin Munt “represent” the defendants at the trial management conference. That is the language in the requisition.

[20] If this is a request for Kevin Munt, who is an adjuster, to appear and that counsel not appear, that is completely inappropriate. Trial management conferences are significant and they are a significant change to the rules. They are mandatory and no trial certificate is issued without the parties attending. Though interlocutory, trial management conferences cannot be done by Masters, who do not hear trials. In my view, this suggests the drafters of the rules have placed significant emphasis on the requirement of trial management conferences.

[21] Noting that, I also then note that there are a number of matters that can be discussed at trial management conferences, as set out in subrule 12?2(9), that require legal analysis and are clearly not within the knowledge of an adjuster representing an insurance company. These include: (a) a plan as to how the trial was to be conducted; (c) amendments to pleadings within a fixed time; (d) admissions of fact at trial; (e) admission of documents at trial; (i) respecting experts’ reports and issues dealing with experts’ reports; (l) an adjournment of trial; and (m) directing the number of days reserved for trial to be changed.

[22] Without even considering the clear requirement that people are represented in court by counsel or by themselves, it is, from my reading of what is to transpire at a trial management conference, completely inappropriate to suggest that when a defendant has counsel, that someone else, in this case an adjuster, appear essentially as counsel at a trial management conference. It is impossible to imagine how the requirements of a trial management conference can be accomplished by an adjuster appearing on behalf of the defendants, as may be the request in this requisition.

[23] If, however, this is a request that the adjuster attend in substitution of the mandatory requirement of the defendants’ attendance, that is governed by Rule 12?2(5).

[24] Rule 12?2(5) clearly contemplates a circumstance, which may be present here, which is that an individual who has full authority to make decisions for a party in the action or an individual who has ready access to the person or group of persons who collectively have full authority to make decisions for a party to an action can attend in place of a party. It appears from the evidence before me that Kevin Munt may fall into this category. I will say, however, that it is not appropriate for an adjuster to attend on behalf of defendants, unless he or she has the real authority to make decisions for the defendants. It is not good enough to say, as has been said before me, “That exceeds my current authority”, “I have to go back to the committee and they won’t be meeting for another week”.

[25] That, in my view, defeats the whole purpose of Rule 12?2(5). Ready access, the words in the rule, means really that the adjuster has to have either authority to make decisions or the ability, while the court stands down, to make a phone call to get the instructions he requires to properly speak for the defendant at the trial management conference.

[26] This lack of authority cannot be used as an excuse that prohibits the proper conduct of court actions at trial management conferences, when it is such a representation that allows the representative of the defendant to attend in the first place. Clearly the rule contemplates letting those who represent defendants, such as insurance adjusters, attend in the place of defendants. Insurers may wish to not require their defendants to personally attend. I do note however that there appears to be an increasingly internal requirement that defendants attend at trial, even when liability is not at issue. The adjuster who does attend must have the ability to deal with all matters or have ready, immediate access to those who can so instruct…

[33] In conclusion, if the suggestion in this requisition is that Kevin Munt attend on behalf of the defendants, he is not counsel, he cannot attend without counsel.

[34] If this is a request that Kevin Munt attend in the place of the defendants themselves, which is permissible under the trial management conference rule, then I am satisfied, if Kevin Munt has the real authority or has ready access, and by that, immediate access to those who have authority, then he can attend pursuant to Rule 12?2(5).

This decision is also worth reviewing for Mr. Justice Groves discussion of Rule 23-5 and the circumstances when the Court should allow a party to attend a Court Proceeding via telephone.

Credibility Cases Not Suitable for Severance of Issues and Summary Trial

Written by admin on June 22, 2011. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.

Earlier this year Mr. Justice McEwan provided reasons for judgement finding that an order to sever issues under Rule 12-5(67) is a prerequisite to having only part of a case tried by way of summary trial. Today, reasons for judgement were released confirming this point and finding that where credibility is an issue a case will likely not be suitable for severance or summary trial.
In today’s case (Erwin v. Helmer) the Plaintiff alleged injuries in a trip and fall incident. She sued for damages under the Occupiers Liability Act. The Defendants applied to dismiss the case via summary trial. Mr. Justice McEwan dismissed the application finding that a a summary trial was not appropriate. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons regarding credibility, severance and summary trials:

[9] This case inherently turns on credibility. While counsel for the plaintiff has not objected to severance, the court must still be concerned with the proper application of summary process and with the sufficiency of the evidence on which it is expected to rule that a party will be deprived of a full hearing.

[10] It appears from what is before the court that the precise nature of the “hole” into which the plaintiff alleges she stepped will not be established with any precision. There nevertheless appears to be a question to be tried on the balance between the risk assumed by the plaintiff and the duty imposed on the defendants to ensure that the premises were reasonably safe. There is simply not enough material presently before the court to reliably make that call. The defendant relies on the fact that the plaintiff had been drinking as if that essentially speaks for itself, but the presence of drinking invitees on the defendant’s premises was, on the material, foreseeable. There is little, if any evidence as to what efforts, if any, were made to render the premises reasonably safe for those who attended the wedding in those circumstances, including, for example, whether paths were designated or lighting was supplied.

[11] The application is accordingly dismissed and, the whole matter will be put on the trial list. The question of severance, if it arises again, should be the subject of an application. Where credibility is a significant issue it should generally be decided on the whole case, not on the fraction of it, unless the test for severance has specifically been met. Otherwise the trier of fact may be deprived of useful information relevant to the over-all assessment of credibility.

Medical Marijuana Costs Deemed Recoverable in BC Personal Injury Claim

Written by admin on June 21, 2011. Posted in Uncategorized.

In what I believe is the first award of its kind, damages of $30,000 were recently allowed in a BC personal injury claim for the purchase medical marijuana to help manage the consequences of chronic pain.
In reasons for judgement released earlier this month (Joinson v. Heran) the Plaintiff sued the Defendant surgeon for medical malpractice. The Plaintiff’s claim was in part successful and damages of just over $310,000 were awarded including a $30,000 cost of future care assessment for medical marijuana. Mr. Justice Brown provided the following reasons setting out his legal analysis in allowing this claimed damage:

[420] As a judge of the law, I cannot make orders that directly or indirectly endorse unsanctioned accessing of medical marijuana. At the same time, my role is now to assess medical needs and necessities. It is the responsibility of Dr. Surgenor and Dr. Bright, as Mr. Joinson’s treating physicians, to address professionally these medical questions and to ensure Mr. Joinson’s medical use of marihuana complies with the rules and regulations. Ultimately, however compensation claims for medical use of marihuana, either as a special damage claim or as a future cost of care claim, must be assessed based on recommended guidelines and on costs charged by legally authorized dispensaries. All said, the foundational principle for an award of a cost of future care is that the expense must be both medically justifiable and reasonable on an objective basis. It is not enough to show merely that it is beneficial; the medical evidence must show it is reasonably necessary:Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] S.C.J. No. 6, at para. 120; Aberdeen v. Langley (Township), Zanatta, Cassels, 2007 BCSC 993, at para. 198; Strachan v. Reynolds et al., 2004 BCSC 915, at para. 632.

[421] There is no bright line distinguishing mere benefit and reasonable necessity in this case. But with basic reasoning and application of the above stated legal principles it can be drawn, if roughly. Pain control and its contribution to Mr. Joinson’s ability to function to his maximum potential are core considerations here. Without use of medical marihuana or a synthetic substitute, Mr. Joinson would have to increase his use of morphine, which is detrimental, particularly to his functioning: he does not function as well, physically or mentally, without use of medical marihuana. His treating physicians endorsed this treatment option, supporting him in his use of medical marihuana. Other physicians may disagree, but his family physician and psychiatrist see him on a regular basis and, in this particular instance, are in the best place to consider what is medically necessary.

[422] The issue remains controversial and is one which more research and clinical experience must ultimately decide, or at least reveal clearer parameters for the safe and effective use of medical marihuana or its synthetic derivatives. Meanwhile, I find the medical evidence supports a finding that compensation for some medical use of marijuana is reasonably necessary in this case. However, I cannot find for compensation based on the quantity used by Mr. Joinson in his claim for exemption or on amounts he has been paying to purchase products from the TAGGS dispensary. The award will based on a maximum of 5 grams per day, and priced as if purchased from a Health Canada legally authorized source, or, alternatively, at the cost of the medically equivalent amount of a synthetic substitute such as Cesamet.

[423] Ultimately of course, any award must make allowance for the fact Dr. Heran’s errant surgery is not responsible for providing Mr. Joinson with a lifetime supply of medical marijuana, certainly not for the portion Mr. Joinson would have used for recreational purposes, irrespective of any of his surgeries. Moreover, I need to account for the medically beneficial effects of his participation in a chronic pain program, notably anticipated benefits that should help reduce his need to use pain medications….

[431] Therefore, I award $30,000 for costs of medical marihuana.

What Do Psychiatrists, Wizards and the American Southwest Have in Common?

Written by admin on June 20, 2011. Posted in Tort Reform, Uncategorized.

OK, this post is a little off-topic but when I came across this bit of legal folklore I had to dig deeper and find out if it was true.
Recently a regular reader of this blog shared a publication with me which stated that in the 1990’s a New Mexico politician became so fed up with psychiatric expert witnesses he proposed an amendment to a State Bill which would have required psychologists and psychiatrists to dress like wizards when giving expert evidence. The Proposed law stated as follows:
When a psychologist or psychiatrist testifies during a defendant’s competency hearing, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall wear a cone-shaped hat that is not less than two feet tall. The surface of the hat shall be imprinted with stars and lightning bolts. Additionally, a psychologist or psychiatrist shall be required to don a white beard that is not less than 18 inches in length, and shall punctuate crucial elements of his testimony by stabbing the air with a wand. Whenever a psychologist or psychiatrist provides expert testimony regarding a defendant’s competency, the bailiff shall contemporaneously dim the courtroom lights and administer two strikes to a Chinese gong
A quick internet search fails to reveal any authoritative source verifying this story. Nor could I find corroboration searching New Mexico’s Legislature’s website.
Having lived in The Land of Enchantment for close to a decade I thought I’d go the extra mile and see if I could verify this story myself. This morning I went straight to the source and asked former New Mexico State Senator Duncan Scott whether this bit of legal folklore was fact or fiction. Mr. Scott, who is now in private practice in Albuquerque, NM, was kind enough to take my phone call.
Turns out the story is true. Mr. Scott tells me that he tacked this amendment onto a Bill in 1995 and, despite its clearly satirical nature, it passed with a unanimous Senate vote. The amendment was then removed from the Bill prior to receiving House approval so it never did become law.