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Supreme Court of Canada Clarifies Law of Dangerous Driving

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized. 151 Comments on Supreme Court of Canada Clarifies Law of Dangerous Driving


The Supreme Court of Canada released reasons for judgement this morning clarifying the required elements of the Criminal Code offence of Dangerous Driving.
In today’s case (R v. Roy) the Defendant was driving a motor-home carrying a passenger. Visibility was limited due to fog and the road they were on was relatively steep, snow?covered, and slippery. He pulled out from a stop sign to turn onto a highway.  As he did so he pulled into the path of an on-coming tractor-trailer resulting in a serious collision killing his passenger.  He was convicted of Dangerous Driving Causing Death at the trial level.  The BC Court of Appeal upheld his conviction.  The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the conviction and in doing so provided the following exchange highlighting that something beyond mere negligence is required to cross the threshold into criminality:
[30] A fundamental point in Beatty is that dangerous driving is a serious criminal offence.  It is, therefore, critically important to ensure that the fault requirement for dangerous driving has been established.  Failing to do so unduly extends the reach of the criminal law and wrongly brands as criminals those who are not morally blameworthy.  The distinction between a mere departure, which may support civil liability, and themarked departure required for criminal fault is a matter of degree.  The trier of fact must identify how and in what way the departure from the standard goes markedly beyond mere carelessness.

[31] From at least the 1940s, the Court has distinguished between, on the one hand, simple negligence that is required to establish civil liability or guilt of provincial careless driving offences and, on the other hand, the significantly greater fault required for the criminal offence of dangerous driving (American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dickson, [1943] S.C.R. 143).  This distinction took on added importance for constitutional purposes.  It became the basis for differentiating, for division of powers purposes, between the permissible scope of provincial and federal legislative competence as well as meeting the minimum fault requirements for crimes under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (O’Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804; Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238; Hundal).  Thus, the “marked departure” standard underlines the seriousness of the criminal offence of dangerous driving, separates federal criminal law from provincial regulatory law and ensures that there is an appropriate fault requirement for Charter purposes.

[32] Beatty consolidated and clarified this line of jurisprudence.  The Court was unanimous with respect to the importance of insisting on a significant fault element in order to distinguish between negligence for the purposes of imposing civil liability and that necessary for the imposition of criminal punishment…

[37] Simple carelessness, to which even the most prudent drivers may occasionally succumb, is generally not criminal.  As noted earlier, Charron J., for the majority in Beatty, put it this way: “If every departure from the civil norm is to be criminalized, regardless of the degree, we risk casting the net too widely and branding as criminals persons who are in reality not morally blameworthy” (para. 34).  The Chief Justice expressed a similar view: “Even good drivers are occasionally subject to momentary lapses of attention.  These may, depending on the circumstances, give rise to civil liability, or to a conviction for careless driving.  But they generally will not rise to the level of a marked departure required for a conviction for dangerous driving” (para. 71).

Cyclist Found 50% at Fault For Crash After Passing Vehicle on the Right

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on Cyclist Found 5055 at Fault For Crash After Passing Vehicle on the Right

Further to my recent article on this topic, cyclists passing a stopped vehicle on the right can be faulted for a resulting collision.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In this week’s case (Kimber v. Wong) the Plaintiff cyclist was approaching a T intersection.  A vehicle was stopped in his lane of travel leaving a gap for the Defendant who was driving in the opposite direction intending to make a left hand turn.  The Cyclist passed the stopped vehicle on the right.  At the sane time the Defendant turned resulting in collision.

Mr. Justice Pearlman found both parties equally to blame for the incident.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[66] By passing to the right of the stopped eastbound vehicles, Mr. Kimber put himself in a position where he was not visible to a left-turning driver and where his own view of traffic turning across his path was blocked by the vehicles to his left.

[67] The plaintiff maintains that he was the dominant driver with the right of way as he approached the intersection and that under s. 174 of the Motor Vehicle Act, and that Ms. Wong, as the servient driver intending to turn left, was required to yield the right of way to him.

[68] As Madam Justice Ballance observed in Henry v. Bennett, 2011 BCSC 1254 at para. 73:

The dominant/servient driver analysis in Walker is predicated on the footing that the dominant driver has proceeded lawfully …

[69] Here, that analysis does not apply where Mr. Kimber was in breach of s. 158 of the Motor Vehicle Act and his common law duty to take reasonable care by keeping a proper lookout.

[70] However, that does not absolve Ms. Wong from liability.  Ms. Wong made the left turn knowing cyclists using the oncoming lane often rode to the right of vehicles.  She knew she had to keep a lookout and would have to yield to any oncoming traffic, including cyclists that presented an immediate hazard.

[71] She began her turn from a point where she was unable to see beyond the windshield of the vehicle stopped at the western entrance to the intersection.   She made a continuous accelerating turn and did not stop or pause when she reached the point, just across the centre line, where she had a sight-line that would have enabled her to see the plaintiff.  Had she inched forward or stopped when she had a clear sight-line, the plaintiff would have passed safely in front of her and the accident would have been avoided.

[72] I find that in heavy traffic and where her view of the eastbound lane was limited, Ms. Wong was negligent in failing to inch forward until she could see whether there was an obstacle to her safely completing her left-hand turn.

[73] I turn now to consider whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.  As he passed stopped traffic on the right, Mr. Kimber ought to have been alert to the potential danger.  He failed to keep a proper lookout before entering the intersection.  He failed to take reasonable care for his own safety or that of other road users.  Here, the plaintiff could have pulled into the line of slow moving or stopped vehicles and then taken his turn to pass through the intersection.  Alternatively, the plaintiff ought to have been alert to the danger of passing stopped traffic at the intersection and ought to have brought his cycle to a stop to the right of the red Hyundai where he could observe traffic turning into the intersection.  Had he done so the collision would have been avoided.  I find that the plaintiff was also negligent and that his negligence was a cause of the accident.

[74] The apportionment of liability requires a consideration of the degree to which each party is at fault.  Fault is apportioned on the basis of the nature and extent of the departure from the respective standards of care of each of the parties:  Cempel v. Harrison Hot Springs, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2853 at para. 24 (B.C.C.A.).

[75] Here, the plaintiff and the defendant were both familiar with the intersection where the accident occurred.  For her part, the defendant was aware of the risk of cyclists approaching to the right of oncoming eastbound traffic but made her left turn without maintaining a proper lookout for a known risk.

[76] For his part, the plaintiff ought to have slowed down and entered the line of eastbound vehicles before passing through the intersection, or if he remained to the right of the line of stopped vehicles, he ought to have stopped alongside the stationary Hyundai before proceeding into the intersection, where he would have had an unobstructed view of the hazard ahead.

[77] In my view, the plaintiff and the defendant are equally at fault.  I apportion liability 50 percent to each of the plaintiff and the defendant.

ICBC "Nuisance Offer" Fails to Trigger Double Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


One of the most welcome developments under the New Rules of Court (and for a short while prior to their introduction, Rule 37B) was the introduction of discretion to the costs process following trials where formal settlement offers were made.  It used to be that if a Plaintiff had their case dismissed at trial where a formal offer was made before hand (even a $1 offer) the Plaintiff was forced to pay double costs.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this discretion in action.
In last week’s case (Byer v. Mills) the Plaintiff was one of two occupants of a vehicle involved in a serious collision.  Prior to trial the Parties agreed to quantum of $125,000.   The parties could not agree on the issue of liability with ICBC arguing the Plaintiff was the driver of the at-fault vehicle (not the passenger as he alleged).  ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $5,000.
At trial the Plaintiff’s case was dismissed with the Court finding he likely was the driver.  ICBC asked for double costs to be awarded.  Mr. Justice Harris refused to do so finding a nuisance offer that does not provide a genuine incentive to settle should trigger double costs.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[21] It is in these circumstances that one must assess whether the offer of $5,000 plus costs was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff. Although the prospect of the plaintiff succeeding was always highly uncertain and difficult realistically to assess, I cannot see that it can fairly be characterised as a case that was lacking in some substantial merit. In my view, the offer does not rise above a nuisance offer. The merits of the case, on both sides, and the uncertainties facing all parties, called for a more substantial offer if the offer were to serve the purposes of the Rule. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff while it was open for acceptance.

[22] In reaching this conclusion, I have approached the question whether the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff from the plaintiff’s perspective. It will be apparent, however, from my general comments about the inherent uncertainties affecting predicting the merits of the case, that I do not view the offer that was made as objectively reasonable. In that sense, I cannot conclude that it provided a genuine incentive to settle the case. The offer does not possess those characteristics that would justify rewarding the party who was successful at trial with an award of double costs.

[23] I turn to consider the other considerations that may justify an award of special costs, even though the offer is not one that ought reasonably to have been accepted. I approach these factors recognising that the Rule is intended to penalise a party for failing to accept an offer and reward a party who makes a reasonable settlement offer. In brief, I do not find that any of those considerations justify an award of double costs.

[24] Although the plaintiff would clearly have been substantially better off to have accepted the offer, this consideration standing alone is not determinative.

[25] I cannot conclude that the relative financial circumstances of the parties lend support to the conclusion that, nonetheless, an award of double costs is justified.

[26] I am not persuaded that there are any other considerations that would justify an award of double costs. The defendants criticised the cross-examination of their expert, which they characterised as suggesting guilt by association. I did not view the cross-examination as overstepping reasonable professional boundaries.

[27] The application for double costs is dismissed. There will be one set of costs.

Well That's That…Bill 44 and 52 Pass Third Reading

Written by admin on . Posted in Tort Reform, Uncategorized.

Earlier this month I called BC’s Justice Reform Initiative ‘political theatre’ if Bill 44 and 52 passed before the government received Geoffrey Cowper’s final report. My opinion, unfortunately, has fallen on deafened ears as these bills have now gone through Committee and passed Third Reading.
Fortunatly for the those British Columbians unhappy that their right to a fair trial is being taken away when faced with a traffic dispute, you can point to MLA Kathy Corrigan’s comments from the House floor when challenging the Constitutionality of this legislation, where she declares that “The scheme would not survive a Charter challenge as so many personal rights and freedoms are being removed under the legislation“. (Click here for the link and scroll down to 1930 for the MLA’s comments).

Motorist with Right of Way Found 40% at Fault For Intersection Crash

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.

UPDATE – June 12, 2013 -the below decisions addressing liability was upheld by the BC Court of Appeal.  The matter was set back to the trial judge, however, because the BCCA concluded the trial judge made a palpable error when assessing damages)
_____________________________________________________________
As discussed earlier this week, having the right of way is only one factor which determines fault for a collision.  A motorist with the right of way still needs to maintain a proper lookout otherwise they can share fault for a collision.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, in the context of an intersection crash.
In this week’s case (Sangha v. Chen) the Plaintiff was driving northbound on Willow Street in Vancouver, BC.  As he entered an intersection the Defendant, who was faced with a stop sign, came through a side street resulting in a collision.

Although the Plaintiff had the right of way both motorists were found at fault.  In assessing fault at a 60/40 split Madam Justice Boyd provided the following reasons:

[34]In the case at bar, I am satisfied that Chen stopped at the stop sign, that she moved forward to check for northbound traffic and that, finding there was none, she began to move out into the intersection.  Unfortunately from that point forward she simply proceeded forward in her slow course across the intersection, without keeping any continuing lookout for oncoming northbound traffic.  Chen did not, therefore, become the dominant driver.  While she stopped and yielded to traffic, she failed to proceed with caution.  This was also a breach of her common law duty to other users of the highways because she clearly failed to meet the standard of care as set out by Lambert J.A. in Carich v. Cook: “care should be taken throughout the turn and as each new lane is entered to make sure that the situation as it was assessed when the turn started has not changed in the meantime”.

[35]For his part, I am satisfied that the plaintiff was likely travelling over 30-40 kph, although perhaps still within the speed limit.  Contrary to his evidence, I find that at the last moment, he did (perhaps even unconsciously) see the defendant’s vehicle and did slam on the brakes momentarily (accounting for the initial jerking motion Dr. Temple experienced).  While he could not avoid hitting the defendant’s vehicle (which by this time was in his lane of traffic), his vehicle effectively came to a stop on impact, although rotating somewhat to the right in a counter-clockwise direction.

[36]While the plaintiff may have remained the dominant driver, he had a duty to exercise reasonable care even if those around him did not respect his dominant position.  He clearly did not exercise reasonable care as he failed to keep a proper lookout.  The fact the defendant proceeded slowly across the intersection and that the collision occurred on the far side of the intersection convince me he should have seen the plaintiff earlier.  Had he kept a proper lookout he would have seen her vehicle earlier than he did and thus could have applied his brakes to avoid the collision.  But he had not kept a proper lookout and the accident ensued.

[37]In determining the division of liability, the court is to consider the relative responsibilities of the parties for the accident: Salaam, para. 35-38.  This is not a case similar to Amador, Ryonand Salaam where one driver saw the other and made a decision to proceed in a certain manner, while the other driver failed to see them and keep clear.  Here, neither driver saw the other prior to impact when the circumstances are clear that they should have.  Liability must therefore be shared more evenly.  That being said, while both parties failed to keep a proper lookout, and failed to see what was there to be seen, the defendant, as the servient driver, had a higher standard of care and the plaintiff, to a certain extent, was permitted to expect servient drivers to respect his dominant position.  Thus the negligence of Chen contributed more to the accident than that of the plaintiff.

[38]In all the circumstances I find that the defendant is primarily liable for this collision.  In this case, I would divide liability 60% against the defendant and 40% against the plaintiff.

Photocopy Disbursements Allowed at $0.25 per Page in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized. 2 Comments on Photocopy Disbursements Allowed at $0.25 per Page in ICBC Claim


(Update October 2, 2012 – The below post was upheld on appeal in reasons for judgement released today)
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing reasonable photocopy expenses in a bill of disbursements.
In the recent case (Chow v. Nguyen) the parties could not agree to the reasonableness of various disbursements incurred in the prosecution of a personal injury claim.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff’s lawyer made 7,231 photocopies and claimed disbursements at $0.25 per copy.  ICBC argued this was unreasonable.  Master McDiarmid disagreed and allowed this disbursement as presented.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[4]Counsel for the defendant and third party also objected to the photocopy charges. She accepted plaintiff’s counsel’s representation that the 7,231 photocopies were in fact made. There was no argument that the photocopying was not necessary or proper; rather, the argument was that the 25¢ per page was excessive given the actual cost of photocopying. When assessing costs, a registrar must determine which disbursements have been necessarily or properly incurred in the conduct of the proceedings, and I must allow a reasonable amount for those disbursements (Rule 14-1(5) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules (the “Civil Rules”)).

[5]Pursuant to Rule 14-1(1) of the Civil Rules, I am to assess costs in accordance with Appendix B. Administrative Notice 5 effective July 1, 2010 directs that photocopying charges may be allowed at 25¢ per page on a party/party bill of costs. This amount is a guideline only. If it is shown that the actual cost was or should have been different from the guideline charges, the amounts allowed on an assessment may differ from the guideline amounts.

[6]The actual cost of photocopying is difficult to determine, in as much as it involves a combination of fixed costs, per page costs, and labour costs. There was no evidence before me to show what the actual cost was. I find that in the circumstances of this case, the number of photocopies was both necessary and proper, and I allow the photocopying charges as claimed in the amount of $1,807.75, plus applicable taxes.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of document binding charges (dismissed as overhead) and the cost of fairly expensive expert reports which were allowed as being reasonable given the circumstanses of the case.

LVI Defence Rejected; Costs Awarded Despite Small Claims Quantum Judgement

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 14, ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

In my continued effort to document judicial treatment of the LVI Defence, I summarize reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, yet again addressing and rejecting submissions based on this defence.
In last week’s case (Johnson v. Keats) the Plaintiff was injured in a low-speed rear end crash in Burnaby, BC.  The collision resulted in little vehicle damage.  The Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries of a relatively minor nature and claimed damages.
At trial the Defendant argued that the injuries were not connected to this low velocity collision.  Madam Justice Wedge disagreed and found the Plaintiff proved his case and awarded $16,000 in non-pecuniary damages.  In dismissing the LVI Defence the Court provided the following reasons:

[24] The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not established causation between the accident and his alleged injuries. The gist of the defendant’s position on causation was that it did not follow that the plaintiff, a strapping young man in reasonable physical shape, could suffer the alleged soft tissue injuries from such a low velocity impact.

[25] The difficulty with this argument is that there is simply no evidence to support it. The defendant did not have the plaintiff examined by a physician or call any evidence to suggest that low velocity impacts could not cause the kind of soft tissue injuries that the plaintiff claimed to suffer as a result of the accident.

[26] Moreover, the defendant did not put that theory to Dr. Lim when she testified. It was not suggested in cross-examination of Dr. Lim that Mr. Johnson was malingering or exaggerating his injuries.

[27] The defendant attempted to attack the plaintiff’s credibility by pointing to what I can only describe as minuscule discrepancies in his evidence.

[28] The plaintiff was a credible and even a quite remarkably low-key witness. He did not attempt to exaggerate his symptoms. His evidence was straightforward and matter of fact. He readily acknowledged he was sufficiently recovered after three weeks to return to light duties and in slightly less than three months was fit to take on the more strenuous labouring tasks of a longshoreman.

[29] Dr. Lim, too, gave forthright and factual evidence. She did not attempt to advocate on her patient’s behalf.

[30] In summary, I am satisfied the accident of March 12, 2009, caused the soft tissue injuries described by the plaintiff and his physician Dr. Lim.

The global damages awarded were below $25,000.  Despite this the Court awarded the Plaintiff costs finding there was sufficient reason to bring the claim in Supreme Court.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

…I am cognizant that the amount of the award falls within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court. However, the case law establishes that if there is sufficient basis for the plaintiff’s proceeding in this Court, this Court has discretion to depart from the provisions of the Rules limiting costs.

[50] I have considered the issue of costs carefully given the range of non-pecuniary damages for injuries of the nature suffered by the plaintiff. It was reasonable for him to bring his claim in this Court. Accordingly, it is reasonable and fair that the plaintiff receive his costs pursuant to Rule 15-1.

Driver 25% at Fault for Striking Jaywalking Pedestrian

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 54 Comments on Driver 2554 at Fault for Striking Jaywalking Pedestrian

As previously discussed, having the right of way is not determinative of fault for a collision.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, demonstrating this in the context of a pedestrian crash.
In last week’s case (Murdoch v. Biggers) the Plaintiff was crossing Blanshard Street in a marked cross-walk.  She did so against a red light.  There were 3 oncoming through lanes of travel.  The vehicles in the first two lanes stopped for the jaywalking Plaintiff.  The vehicle in the third lane did not stop in time and collided with the Plaintiff resulting in a broken right leg.

The Court found that while the motorist had the right of way they shouldered some of the blame for failing to keep a proper lookout.  In assessing the Plaintiff 75% at fault and the Defendant 25% at fault Madam Justice Power provided the following reasons:
[33] In this case, I do not believe that the defendant exercised the appropriate standard of care to avoid breaching that duty. The drivers in vehicles in the two lanes to her right were able to observe and stop for the plaintiff, and a driver behind her (Ms. Larson) was able to see Ms. Murdoch. Mr. Lukinuk was able to observe that something was happening in his rear-view mirror. In the circumstances, I find that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout by failing to observe Ms. Murdoch’s entry into the crosswalk and by failing to observe that vehicles in the two lanes to her right had stopped for Ms. Murdoch. I find that if the defendant had in fact been keeping a sufficient look out, she would have been able to stop for Ms. Murdoch and avoid the collision…
[36] In all of the circumstances, I conclude that the 75% of the fault for the accident should be borne by the plaintiff and 25% by the defendant.

Verbal Agreements Can Create Binding Settlements of Injury Claims in BC

Written by admin on . Posted in Settlement Law, Uncategorized. 105 Comments on Verbal Agreements Can Create Binding Settlements of Injury Claims in BC

While this is certainly not a new legal development (you can click here to access my archived posts addressing this topic) reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming yet again that a verbal agreement can create a binding injury claim settlement and that refusing to sign the appropriate closing documents does not create an escape route for a litigant that regrets their decision.
In this week’s case (Robertson v. Whistler (Resort Municipality)) the Plaintiff was injured when she fell in a shower owned by the Defendant.  She was 8 years old at the time.  She started a lawsuit when she was 20.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant made a global settlement offer of $1,400.  The Plaintiff, in a phone conversation with the Defendant’s lawyer stated that she “wished to accept the $1,400 offer“.
The Plaintiff later refused to sign an agreed to Consent Dismissal Order.  The Plaintiff testified that “until she signed the offer and signed the order, there was no settlement“.  Madam Justice Hyslop disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit finding there was a binding settlement.  In addition the Court awarded the Defendant costs from the date of the settlement onward (which could result in the Plaintiff owing the Defendant money).
In confirming that a binding settlement was reached with the verbal agreement the Court provided the following reasons:

[31] Contract law applies to settlement agreements provided no contractual grounds to set aside the contract exist. Example: mutual mistake, lack of capacity, duress or fraud: Robertson v. Walwyn Stodgell Cochrane Murray Ltd., [1988] 4 W.W.R. 283, 24 B.C.L.R. (2d) 385.

[32] Settlement agreements need not be in writing to be enforceable. This was recognized in Sekhon v. Khangura, 2009 BCSC 670.

[33] Even if the oral agreement contemplates that it be reduced to writing, it is still enforceable: Young et al v. Fleischeuer et al, 2006 BCSC 1318. A party may decide not to pursue certain heads of damages as claimed and a settlement may be reached without addressing that particular head of damage: Prasad v. Ho, [1992] B.C.J. No. 643…

[47] The plaintiff changed her mind and repudiated the settlement as a result of the reaction of her father and the involvement of her aunt, Ms. MacDonald.

[48] I conclude that on December 16, 2010, the plaintiff entered into a binding settlement agreement. This action is dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant upon the basis that the sum of $1,400.00 due to the plaintiff will be set-off against the defendant’s assessed costs. Costs will be assessed under Appendix B, Scale B of the Supreme Court Civil Rules.