ICBC "Nuisance Offer" Fails to Trigger Double Costs
One of the most welcome developments under the New Rules of Court (and for a short while prior to their introduction, Rule 37B) was the introduction of discretion to the costs process following trials where formal settlement offers were made. It used to be that if a Plaintiff had their case dismissed at trial where a formal offer was made before hand (even a $1 offer) the Plaintiff was forced to pay double costs. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this discretion in action.
In last week’s case (Byer v. Mills) the Plaintiff was one of two occupants of a vehicle involved in a serious collision. Prior to trial the Parties agreed to quantum of $125,000. The parties could not agree on the issue of liability with ICBC arguing the Plaintiff was the driver of the at-fault vehicle (not the passenger as he alleged). ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $5,000.
At trial the Plaintiff’s case was dismissed with the Court finding he likely was the driver. ICBC asked for double costs to be awarded. Mr. Justice Harris refused to do so finding a nuisance offer that does not provide a genuine incentive to settle should trigger double costs. The Court provided the following reasons:
 It is in these circumstances that one must assess whether the offer of $5,000 plus costs was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff. Although the prospect of the plaintiff succeeding was always highly uncertain and difficult realistically to assess, I cannot see that it can fairly be characterised as a case that was lacking in some substantial merit. In my view, the offer does not rise above a nuisance offer. The merits of the case, on both sides, and the uncertainties facing all parties, called for a more substantial offer if the offer were to serve the purposes of the Rule. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff while it was open for acceptance.
 In reaching this conclusion, I have approached the question whether the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff from the plaintiff’s perspective. It will be apparent, however, from my general comments about the inherent uncertainties affecting predicting the merits of the case, that I do not view the offer that was made as objectively reasonable. In that sense, I cannot conclude that it provided a genuine incentive to settle the case. The offer does not possess those characteristics that would justify rewarding the party who was successful at trial with an award of double costs.
 I turn to consider the other considerations that may justify an award of special costs, even though the offer is not one that ought reasonably to have been accepted. I approach these factors recognising that the Rule is intended to penalise a party for failing to accept an offer and reward a party who makes a reasonable settlement offer. In brief, I do not find that any of those considerations justify an award of double costs.
 Although the plaintiff would clearly have been substantially better off to have accepted the offer, this consideration standing alone is not determinative.
 I cannot conclude that the relative financial circumstances of the parties lend support to the conclusion that, nonetheless, an award of double costs is justified.
 I am not persuaded that there are any other considerations that would justify an award of double costs. The defendants criticised the cross-examination of their expert, which they characterised as suggesting guilt by association. I did not view the cross-examination as overstepping reasonable professional boundaries.
 The application for double costs is dismissed. There will be one set of costs.