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Tag: Wallman v. Gill

BC Court of Appeal Upholds Jury Strike Applicaiton in "Prolonged" Personal Injury Case

Reasons for judgement were release this week by the BC Court of Appeal upholding a judges decision to strike a jury notice in a complex and prolonged personal injury trial.
In this week’s case (Wallman v. Gill) the Plaintiff alleged that “he suffered serious injuries” in a rear end collision.   The trial was scheduled with “at least 23 experts…as well as some 31 civilian witnesses” and was expected to last 7 weeks.  The Defendants wished to have the trial judge proceed before a jury but a chambers judge struck the jury notice finding the trial was too prolonged and complex for a jury.  In upholding this decision the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:
[7]           The decision to strike a jury notice is a discretionary one that relates to the management of a trial and may not be interfered with lightly on appellate review: MacPherson v. Czaban, 2002 BCCA 518. Absent an error of principle, or failure to give sufficient weight to all relevant considerations, deference must be accorded to such an order.
[8]           The legal test to be applied on review of a discretionary order is whether the judge “has given weight to all relevant considerations”: Mining Watch Canada v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6 at para. 43. The appellants contend that the chambers judge acted on irrelevant considerations or alternatively failed to apply established legal criteria. With respect, I do not agree.
[9]           In this case, the chambers judge found that the issues for trial will require a scientific investigation. This is a factual determination for which deference must be accorded absent palpable and overriding error, which is not alleged. In the exercise of his discretion, he found that the scientific investigation into the proposed evidence could not conveniently be undertaken by a jury. In reaching that conclusion, the judge was satisfied that a proper review of the evidence and the legal issues could not be ensured by a jury that would be required to understand and retain opinion evidence from a large number of expert witnesses over a protracted period of time…
[13]        These decisions, in addition to many others, demonstrate the type of considerations that must be weighed when faced with an application to strike a jury notice. The management of a proposed civil jury trial requires the judge to ensure, as best as he or she can, that all who are involved, including the parties, their counsel, the potential jurors and the trial judge are able to satisfactorily perform their respective duties and responsibilities in order to meet the common objective of a fair trial.
[14]        In this case, the chambers judge applied the correct legal test under R. 12-6(5) for the striking of a jury notice and in my view cannot be said to have erred in the exercise of his discretion in striking the jury notice in order to ensure the proper conduct and management of the trial of this action. Accordingly, I find no basis upon which this Court might interfere with the order and therefore I would dismiss the appeal.

BC Court of Appeal Discusses Two Routes of Challenging Jury Notices

Last year I discussed the fact that the BC Supreme Court can deal with Jury Strike applications both under Rule 12-6(5) and also as part of the trial management process.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal (Wallman v. Gill) addressing this reality but also providing comments on the limits of when the trial management process is an appropriate forum for such an application.   The Court provided the following feedback:
23]         By analogy, although the application to strike the jury in this case was heard by the judge who had been appointed to manage the action, he did not hear it in the course of a trial management conference under R. 12-2(9), but in regular chambers under R. 12-6(5). Indeed, he could not have heard it at a case management conference since it is evident the parties filed affidavits on the application, and this would not have been permitted under R. 12-2(11)(a). Thus, the order striking the jury is not a limited appeal order.
[24]         I would be sympathetic to the plaintiff’s argument that the Legislature did not intend to create a “two-tier” system for appealing orders directing the mode of trial if I were satisfied that was the practical effect of this ruling. However, I am not convinced that this is the case. This argument fails to recognize the unique role of the case management conference. It is held late in the proceeding, when the trial is sufficiently imminent that the parties have been able to prepare a comprehensive trial brief, and meet in person with the judge to make informed decisions about how the trial will proceed. In this limited context, R. 12-2(9)(b) permits a trial management judge to decide whether the trial should be heard with or without a jury, either on application by one of the parties or on his or her own initiative, and without affidavit evidence. I venture the view that this power will be exercised rarely. If the parties have been unable to agree on the mode of trial, it seems most unlikely they would leave this to be determined late in the day at a case management conference, without the benefit of affidavit evidence. It is reasonable to assume that, instead, there will have been an earlier application under R. 12-6(5) to determine this issue. Further, it seems unlikely a trial management judge would then consider revisiting an earlier order dealing with mode of trial or, if no earlier application had been brought, alter the mode of trial in a summary manner late in the day.