Skip to main content

Tag: summary trial

BC Government Shielded From Liability in "Shaken Baby" Lawsuit

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 9, Shaken Baby Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, discussing when a government authority can be pursued for damages for the negligent excercise of their powers.
In last week’s case (Sivertson (Guardian ad litem of) v. Dutrisac) the infant Plaintiff was brain injured allegedly “while in the care of…a licensed daycare ‘Kare Bare Child Care’ “.  The Plaintiff sued various Defendants including the Capital Health Region “CHR” who were responsible for licensing the Daycare in question.
The CHR brought an application to dismiss the lawsuit against them arguing that even if they inadequately exercised their duties the lawsuit could not succeed because the CHR did not owe the Plaintiff a ‘private law duty of care‘.  Madam Justice Boyd agreed and dismissed the lawsuit against the CHR.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[51] The overall statutory scheme governing the licensing of daycare facilities provides an efficient framework to ensure the operation of community care facilities “in a manner that will maintain the spirit, dignity and individuality of the person being cared for “(s. 4(1)(a)(i)). …

[57] As in the Cooper decision, the CHR and its inspectors must balance a myriad of competing interests when dealing with the licensing and inspection of daycares, including the daycare owner’s interest in the continued operation of her business and the parents’ and the public’s interest in the protection of children in the care of the daycare owner.

[58] In my view, this balancing of interests is inconsistent with the imposition of a private duty of care.  Thus, on a review of all of the authorities, and a consideration of the legislation in issue, I reject the notion that any private law duty of care was owed by the CHR (and its employees) to the infant plaintiff and his family.

[59] If however I am in error, and it is found that such a private duty of law does arise in the circumstances of this case, then I nevertheless find that the application of the second stage of theAnns test yields no different result.  As the Ontario Court of Appeal held in Williams v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 378, at para. 17, at the second stage :

…the court considers whether there are “residual policy considerations” that militate against recognizing a novel duty of care.  …These are policy considerations that “are not concerned with the relationship between the parties, but with the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system and society more generally”.

[60] In my view, any private law duty of care which may arise in this case would be negated for overriding policy reasons as in the Cooper case.  This is because (i) the licensing officers were exercising both policy and quasi-judicial functions such that any decision required the balancing of both public and private interests.  The Director must act fairly or judicially in removing an operator’s license and this is potentially inconsistent with a duty of care to children and families; (ii) the Director must make difficult discretionary decisions in an area of public policy.  His decisions are made within the limits of the powers conferred on him in the public interest; and (iii) if there was a private duty of care owed by the Director to the children and parents, it would effectively create an insurance scheme for all those children attending licensed daycares within the Province, at great costs to the taxpaying public.  As the Court held in Edwards, there is no indication here that the Legislature intended that result.  Indeed the statutory immunity from liability provision suggests the contrary.

Affidavits and Exhibits: Take Care To Review the Whole of the Evidence

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 22, BCSC Civil Rule 9, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.


Once evidence is introduced at trial it is fair game for the finder of fact to rely on it even if the party that introduced it opposes this result.  Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, illustrating this fact.
In this week’s case (Chow-Hidasi v. Hidasi) the Plaintiff was injured in a single vehicle accident.  She was a passenger and sued the driver claiming he was at fault for losing control for “overdriving the road conditions“.  The Defendant argued that he lost control because he experienced a sudden and unexpected mechanical failure and could not avoid the collision.  Ultimately this explanation was accepted and the Plaintiff’s lawsuit was dismissed.  Prior to reaching this conclusion the Court ruled on an interesting evidentiary issue.
The trial was a “summary trial” under Rule 9-7 in which the evidence is introduced through affidavits.  The Plaintiff’s lawyer’s legal assistant attached portions of the Defendant’s examination for discovery transcript as an exhibit to her affidavit.
The Plaintiff wished to only rely on portions of the reproduced transcript.  The Defendant decided to take advantage of other portions of his discovery evidence which was included in the affidavit.  The Plaintiff objected arguing that he introduced the evidence and only wished to rely on limited portions of it.  Mr. Justice Barrow rejected this argument finding once the evidence was introduced through the affidavit it was fair game for the defendant to rely on it.  The Court provided the following insightful reasons:

[6] The plaintiff objected to the admissibility of some of the examination for discovery evidence of Mr. Hidasi, evidence that Mr. Hidasi points to in support of his position. All of the impugned discovery evidence is exhibited to an affidavit of the plaintiff’s counsel’s legal assistant. As I understand the objection, it is that the questions in dispute were reproduced and exhibited to the legal assistant’s affidavit because they appear on pages of the transcript that contain other questions and answers which the plaintiff wishes to rely on. I pause to note that while that may be so, the affidavit itself does not contain a statement to that effect. On the first day of the hearing the plaintiff’s counsel provided the defendant with a list of specific discovery questions that he wished to rely on. The questions and answers to which objection is taken are not on that list.

[7] I am satisfied that the questions and answers are admissible, and that no prejudice inures to the plaintiff as a result. They are admissible because the plaintiff put them in evidence. As to the notice of the specific questions and answers the plaintiff wished to rely on, it does not alter of the foregoing. If it was intended to be a notice as contemplated by Rule 9-7(9), it was not filed within the time limited under Rule 8-1(8). It is therefore of no moment. As to the question of prejudice, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the plaintiff’s notice of application is that the impugned evidence formed part of the plaintiff’s case. The defendant could have addressed the matters about which he gave evidence on discovery in his affidavit evidence. He may not have, I infer, because he concluded it was unnecessary given that the plaintiff had already put those matters into evidence. In any event, if the discovery evidence is excluded, fairness would require an adjournment to allow the defendant to supplement the evidence given the changed face of the evidentiary record he had reasonably thought would form the basis for the hearing. All that would have been accomplished in the result is that the evidence that is contained in the discovery answers would be before the court in the form of an affidavit.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of the legal principle of ‘spoiliation’ at paragraphs 30-33 of the reasons for judgement.

Botox Injections for Rehabilitation and ICBC No-Fault Benefits

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized. 48 Comments on Botox Injections for Rehabilitation and ICBC No-Fault Benefits

You are insured with ICBC and are injured in a BC Car Accident.  You experience chronic pain and your doctor tells you that you will likely benefit from Botox Injections to aid in your rehabilitation.  Botox treatment is expensive, so you apply to ICBC to have this covered under your No-Fault Benefits (sometimes referred to as Part 7 benefits).  ICBC tells you, “sorry, Botox treatment for injury is not covered under Part 7.” Are they right?  Wrong.
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court ordering that ICBC cover the expenses associated with a Plaintiff receiving Botox treatment.
The Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 BC car crash.  The Plaintiff applied for and received previous funding for various treatments of injuries from ICBC.  The Plaintiff then saw a rehabilitation specialist who recommended Botox injections.  The cost of these was expected to be $3,500.  ICBC, without a contrary medical opinion as to the reasonableness of this treatment, failed to fund it and took the position that this expense did not have to be covered.
Section 88 (1) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation deals with ICBC’s no-fault medical and rehabilitation benefits and requires that ICBC cover all reasonable expenses incurred by the insured as a result of the injury for necessary services, therapy or treatment as set out in the Regulation.
Justice Macaulay, in very well thought out reasons for judgment, ordered that ICBC had to pay for the Botox injections in the circumstances of this case.  The key reasoning in the judgment can be found at paragraphs 33 – 40 which I will publish as soon as the judgement is released on the BC Court’s website.
This case is also very interesting to me from a procedural point of view.  The Plaintiff brought this application by way of summary trial under Rule 18-A.  The Plaintiff relied on his affidavit and a medico-legal report.  ICBC did not have the opportunity to cross examine the Plaintiff or the treating doctor and typically litigants are entitled to do so.  ICBC took the position that this application should not be heard until they had the chance to cross-examine.
Mr. Justice Macaulay disagreed with ICBC and allowed the application to proceed.  He ruled that “There is nothing to be gained by directing cross examination of either the doctor or the Plaintiff.  The doctor makes it clear that she recommends this treatment as one of several options because the plaintiff’s lower back problems have been intractable.  It is primarily a legal issue whether that is sufficient to trigger an obligation on ICBC under s. 88(1).  There is also no reason to expect that the cross examination of the plaintiff will result in any alteration of the evidence…cross examination will not be ordered [in Rule 18A summary trials] absent some likelihood that the procedure will produce evidence in support of the other side…I am satisfied that the proposed cross-examination of the plaintiff and his doctor are speculative and not likely to produce evidence in support of ICBC.”