Reasons for judgement were published earlier this month dismissing an applicants claim at the BC Civil Resolution Tribunal asking for ICBC to pay physiotherapy treatment expenses as a lump sum.
In the recent case (Smith v. ICBC) the self represented applicant was injured in a October, 2019 collision. He required physiotherapy which ICBC paid for directly to the service provider. The Applicant asked the CRT to award him $12,000 as a lump sum for treatment expenses. The claim was dismissed with the CRT noting that while ICBC can pay a lump sum for treatment expenses doing so is entirely discretionary and continued payment of necessary treatments as they are incurred is acceptable. In dismissing the claim Tribunal Member Kristen Gardner provided the following reasons:
Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, ordering a reduction of a trial award by over $72,000 to account for paid or payable part 7 benefits.
In today’s case (Sangha v. Inverter Technologies Ltd.) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. Following a 10 day trial the Plaintiff’s claim was assessed at $215,380. Subsequently the Defendants applied to have this assessment significantly reduced by part 7 benefits that were paid or payable to the Plaintiff. In reducing the judgement by over $72,000 Mr. Justice Riley provided the following reasons and provided significant weight and reliance on an ICBC adjuster’s evidence that such benefits would be paid:
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that an addiction program and a multi-disciplinary pain management program are not mandatory ICBC No Fault benefits.
In today’s case (MacDonald v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was inured in three separate motor vehicle collisions. She was insured with ICBC. She suffered a variety of injuries which resulted in chronic pain and addiction issues. Among the recommended treatments for the Plaintiff were an inpatient residential addiction treatment program along with a multi-disciplinary pain management program.
ICBC refused to fund these under the Plaintiff’s policy of insurance arguing that neither of these programs were ‘mandatory’ benefits covered under section 88(1) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation. Madam Justice Fitzpatrick agreed finding components of the programs (such as physiotherapy) may be covered individually and further that the programs may be covered as ‘permissive’ ICBC benefits, they could not be compelled under section 88. In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned as follows: [83] The mandatory provisions in s. 88(1) stand in contrast to those in s. 88(2) where ICBC may provide funds to an insured at its discretion and where ICBC’s medical advisor advises that funded benefits under this section are likely to promote the rehabilitation of the insured who was injured in an accident…
[95] I am reluctantly driven to the conclusion that Ms. MacDonald’s position is not supportable. As ICBC argues, I think correctly, the Raguin decision has confirmed that the proper interpretation of the section is a more restrictive one in the sense that it is driven by the specific enumerated services that are described in s. 88(1). In accordance with that approach, I see no basis upon which services could be seen to be included as long as they are overseen or supervised by a medical doctor. Services provided by others do not become “medical services” simply because a medical doctor directs them or oversees or supervises them.
[96] From a public policy perspective, this strict interpretation of the enumerated services presents some difficulties. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended to adopt a rehabilitation-in-pieces approach to legislation that exists to promote reasonable and necessary benefit coverage to injured persons. However, in the absence of clear guidance in the Regulation that s. 88(1) is capable of supporting multi-disciplinary programs, these programs cannot be read-in to include other services not specifically enumerated, such as the court did in Raguin.
[97] Even accepting Ms. MacDonald’s proposition regarding medical supervision, there is no evidence that in fact, the services at Heartwood and the “other services” at Orion Health either were or would be under the supervision of a medical doctor (although I appreciate that Dr. Mead continued to treat Ms. MacDonald for pain and addiction issues throughout her stay at Heartwood).
[98] The difficulty is that the argument for both Heartwood and Orion Health is an all or nothing proposition. Both are, as described above, multi-disciplinary treatment programs that bring in various disciplines in order to offer a team approach to dealing with a host of problems, such as Ms. MacDonald has. I have no hesitation in finding that some of the services, such as provided by a medical doctor, were or would be covered under s. 88(1) but it is equally apparent that some are not. In my view, this leads to the conclusion that the treatment programs, as a whole, are not covered under s. 88(1).
I have previously discussed Part 7 benefits deductions following BC motor vehicle collision injury trials. In short, a Plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced by the Part 7 benefits (past and future) that they are entitled to.
Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this deduction finding that if there was uncertainty as to whether Part 7 payments will be made there should be no deduction of damages.
In the recent case (Tsang v. Borg) the Plaintiff had damages for future care of $5,000 assessed at trial. The Defendant asked the Court to largely discount this award pursuant to s. 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act on the basis that many of the Plaintiff’s future treatments will covered by ICBC under the no fault benefits plan. Mr. Justice McKinnon noted this argument was “inconsistent” with the Defendant’s trial position and in any event the evidence required for the deduction fell short of the mark. In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons: [9] At trial the defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s injuries for the most part were not caused by the accident. In Paskall v. Schelthauer, 2012 BCSC 1859, the court held that the regulations limit the benefits to injuries that the corporation views flow from the accident. It strikes me as inconsistent for the defendants to now argue that the plaintiff is entitled to benefits payable under part 7 and more to the point, raises the distinct possibility that in future, the corporation will deny claimed benefits as “not flowing from the accident”. [10] In her affidavit, Shelley Ruggles, the insurance adjuster assigned to administer the plaintiff’s entitlement, indicates some uncertainty about whether future treatments are recoverable. She writes, “Further requests for treatment could be covered under s. 88 of the Regulations”. This suggests some uncertainty. [11] It is only where there is no uncertainty as to whether the insurer will accept the treatment and pay the cost that deductions can be made, see Ayles (Guardian ad litem of) v. Talastasin, 2000 BCCA 87. At bar there is no such certainty and I therefore resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiff. [12] The award of $5,000 stands.
I have previously discussed Part 7 benefits deductions following BC motor vehicle collision injury trials. In short, a Plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced by the Part 7 benefits (past and future) that they are entitled to.
Two sets of reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this deduction finding that before a Court can deduct damages for ‘discretionary’ Part 7 benefits there must be evidence of the corporation’s medical advisor.
In the first case (Paskall v. Scheithauer) the Plaintiff was awarded just over $65,000 by a jury for her injuries. ICBC sought to deduct mandatory and discretionary Part 7 benefits from this amount. In discussing the burden required for these deductions and in denying the application Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons: 3] The replacement hearing aids and related expenses are a discretionary benefit under s. 88(2). The defendant has provided an affidavit from an ICBC claims examiner who says that the corporation paid for a hearing aid on one occasion, in January 2007, and who says: “I expect ICBC will continue to re-imburse reasonable incurred hearing aid expenses”. [14] The examiner’s stated expectation falls far short of the evidence required. Before discretionary benefits can be paid, s. 88(2) requires an opinion from “the corporation’s medical advisor”. No evidence from any such person has been put forward. The expert who provided a care opinion for the defendant at trial is an occupational therapist. There is no evidence that ICBC accepts her in the capacity of its “medical advisor” for purposes of s. 88. [15] Although the opinion of a medical advisor is a precondition to the payment of discretionary benefits, the corporation is still not bound to pay them. The examiner’s expectation is no more than an opinion about what his employer will do in the future. There is no evidence that he has the authority to make that decision and no explanation of the basis on which he feels able to express an opinion on what the corporation will do for the remainder of the plaintiff’s life… [18] At this stage of the proceeding, I believe it is appropriate to acknowledge the fact that in cases such as this the corporation has conduct of the defence on behalf of its insured. There is certainly no evidence that the corporation now disavows the position it instructed counsel to take at trial. [19] Accordingly, I find that the defendant has failed to meet the onus of proving the plaintiff is entitled to the benefits for which deduction has been sought.
In the second case (Stanikzai v. Bola) the Plaintiff was awarded just over $189,000 following trial. ICBC sought to deduct some $16,000 in Part 7 items. In disallowing the majority of these Mr. Justice Smith echoed his earlier comments stating as follows: [24] In her affidavit, the adjuster says that such a fitness program is “similar to physiotherapy” and therefore a mandatory benefit under s. 88(1). I cannot accept that assertion. Section 88(1) refers to “physical therapy”, which presumably means therapy by a licensed physiotherapist. It also refers to certain other specific forms of therapy. It does not refer to services by other professionals that may be “similar” to the named therapies. [25] Having regard to the requirement for strict compliance with the Act and its Regulations, the training program is not a mandatory benefit under s. 88(1). I accept that it could qualify as a discretionary benefit under s. 88(2), but under that section an opinion from “the corporation’s medical advisor” is a precondition to payment. There is no evidence of any such opinion. The defendants have failed to prove a basis for that deduction.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal confirming that ICBC’s No-Fault Benefits Scheme (aka Part 7 Benefits) requires mandatory coverage of massage therapy benefits. These reasons are useful as they contradict ICBC’s internal policy limiting the availability of coverage for massage therapy.
In today’s case (Raguin v. ICBC) the infant plaintiff incurred several hundred dollars of massage therapy expenses following collision related injuries. ICBC refused to reimburse these arguing massage therapy is a “permissive benefit” and these expenses need not be covered. The Plaintiff sued and at trial ICBC was ordered to pay. ICBC appealed but the BC Court of Appeal dismissed the matter and upheld the trial judgement.
In finding that massage therapy is included as a mandatory part 7 benefit the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:
[31]The following observations about ss. 88(1) and (2) are uncontentious. The imperative word “shall” is used in relation to ICBC’s obligation to pay for the benefits described in s. 88(1), making such payments mandatory. Under s. 88(2), ICBC is given discretion, as indicated by the permissive word “may”, to pay for additional benefits that are “likely to promote the rehabilitation of an insured who is injured in an accident”.
[32]Although the benefits listed in s. 88(1) are mandatory, ICBC has a limited power to challenge an insured’s claim made under that subsection. This power is derived from the requirements that the expenses incurred must be both necessary and reasonable. In determining whether a particular treatment is necessary and reasonable, ICBC may require a medical examination of the insured under s. 99(1) of the Regulation. ICBC may also demand a medical certificate under s. 98(1) of the Regulation or a medical report under s. 28 of the Act. ..
[56]Physical therapy is a mandatory benefit under s. 88(1) but it is not defined in the Regulation. The dictionary definition and the definition in the related regulatory scheme define physical therapy as including massage. The Health Professions Act defines “health profession”. Regulation of health professions, such as physical therapy, includes the restriction of the provision of a designated service to a person registered to practise that specific designated health profession. Massage therapy is designated as a health profession and is governed by the Massage Therapists Regulation. Registration with the College of Massage Therapists is required and no person other than a registrant may practise massage therapy.
[57]In light of the provisions to which I have referred, ICBC’s submission that including massage therapy as a benefit payable under s. 88(1) would open the floodgates to all manner of questionable procedures is unsupportable.
[58]While the Regulation does not refer specifically to massage therapy in s. 88(1), I am of the view that, when all of the relevant provisions in the Regulation are read together with the Health Professions Act and its related Regulations, physical therapy may properly be interpreted as including massage therapy. To be payable under s. 88(1), the other requirements must be met as stated in the section; that is: “[w]here an insured is injured in an accident for which benefits are provided under this Part, the corporation shall … pay as benefits all reasonable expenses incurred by the insured as a result of the injury for … necessary physical therapy … .”
[59]In this case, the respondents’ doctor recommended massage therapy as part of the infant plaintiffs’ recovery. There is no suggestion that the recommended treatment was unnecessary or provided by someone other than a registered massage therapist, or that the expense was unreasonable.
