Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, largely rejecting an ICBC application to have future care benefits from a tort judgment significantly reduced.
In today’s case (Luck v. Shack) the Plaintiff was in a collision and was awarded damages for prolonged injuries including $85,000 for future care costs. The Defendant argued that much of the services covered by this award can be accessed through ICBC no-fault benefits and asked that the award be reduced by $65,000. The Court noted ‘concern‘ about ICBC’s affidavit evidence leaving some uncertainty as to whether discretionary no fault benefits would be paid or denied in the future. In only allowing $3,540 in deductions Madam Justice MacDonald provided the following reasons:
BC’s Insurance Vehicle legislation allows a court to deduct from a claim for future loss those damages that have benefits payable under ICBC’s part 7 scheme. ICBC’s track record of paying benefits and their position of a plaintiff’s entitlement to those benefits at trial don’t always align. The legislation was recently amended to direct a court not consider the likelihood that the benefits will be paid or provided when making such deductions.
In one of the first judgements to consider this new language reasons were published today by the BC Supreme Court refusing ICBC’s application for deductions following a jury trial.
In today’s case (Siverston v. Griffin) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for her damages. Following trial a jury assessed damages which included $60,000 for future care. The Defendant sought to have this award significantly reduced arguing many of the future care items could be paid by ICBC under their part 7 scheme. Madam Justice Jackson was not persuaded, however, and refused to reduce the award. In reaching this conclusion the court found the Defendant simply could not meet their burden with the jury’s lump sum award for future losses. The Court provided the following reasons:
ICBC and the Provincial government have been working overtime trying to persuade British Columbians that stripping collision victims of the right to go to court to be fairly paid for their injuries is a good idea. They claim that by taking away these rights ICBC will treat victims fairly under a so-called ‘care based’ model.
Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that ICBC can be anything but fair when it comes to meeting their obligations to pay for long term injury treatments.
In today’s case (Del Bianco v. Yang) the Plaintiff sustained life long injuries in a collision. At trial he was awarded damages which included payment for future care for massage therapy and kinesiology. Despite being ordered to pay this money ICBC refused saying they will pay that portion of the judgement from the Plaintiff’s ‘no fault’ insurance with them over the years as the treatments are incurred. An ICBC adjuster swore an affidavit declaring payments would be made.
The Court did not accept that ICBC would make payments, however, noting that they refused to pay the mandated no-fault benefits in the years prior to trial leaving little confidence that they would fairly meet their future obligations. In refusing to deduct the vast majority of the awarded future care costs Mr. Justice Groves provided the following criticism of ICBC’s handling of the claim and their unexplained “failure” to pay past benefits they were obliged to:
Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, ordering a reduction of a trial award by over $72,000 to account for paid or payable part 7 benefits.
In today’s case (Sangha v. Inverter Technologies Ltd.) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. Following a 10 day trial the Plaintiff’s claim was assessed at $215,380. Subsequently the Defendants applied to have this assessment significantly reduced by part 7 benefits that were paid or payable to the Plaintiff. In reducing the judgement by over $72,000 Mr. Justice Riley provided the following reasons and provided significant weight and reliance on an ICBC adjuster’s evidence that such benefits would be paid:
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, scrutinizing ICBC’s “checkered record” of paying for a plaintiff’s medical treatments.
In today’s case (Olson v. Farran) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and was awarded just over $92,000 in damages including special damages and funds for future care costs. The Defendant, who was insured with ICBC, requested certain damages to be deducted because of the overlapping coverage for some expenses under the Plaintiff’s own ICBC policy.
Mr. Justice Pearlman denied aspects of the request raising concern about ICBC’s “past partial and disrupted” payments. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons.
 The onus of showing that a deduction should be made is on the defendant. I must estimate the amount to which Ms. Olson is entitled, exercising caution and taking into account any uncertainty concerning whether the benefits will be paid. Any such uncertainty must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff.
 Based on the Dr. Garbuz’s opinion, and the defendant’s position at trial that Ms. Olson would benefit from a three to six-month exercise program under the supervision of a physiotherapist, I am satisfied that a portion of the physiotherapy will be paid. I estimate that amount to be $500 and order that the amount to be deducted with respect to the physiotherapy is $500.
 In light of the Corporation’s past partial and disrupted payment for kinesiology, there is no certainty that the Corporation will pay for any further kinesiology treatments. I therefore decline to deduct any portion of the $800 sought by the defendant for kinesiology sessions.
 Similarly, there is no certainty that the insurer will pay for future massage therapy treatments, particularly where such treatments may only provide temporary relief to Ms. Olson, rather than a lasting improvement in her condition. Again, I decline to deduct any portion of the $920 sought by the defendant for massage therapy.
 The defendant also seeks a deduction of $870 for psychological services. Psychological therapy is a benefit payable in the Corporation’s sole discretion under s. 88(2)(f) of the Regulation.
 The defendant submits the Court should conclude from ICBC’s past funding for physiotherapy and active rehabilitation that there is no uncertainty about whether the Corporation will fund psychological therapy for the plaintiff.
 I disagree. The Corporation’s checkered record of funding the plaintiff’s treatment before trial raises significant uncertainty about whether this benefit will be paid. Further, Mr. Phan, the Corporation’s representative, offers no assurance in his affidavit that ICBC will pay for psychological therapy for Ms. Olson. Nor is there any opinion from the Corporation’s medical advisor, as required under s. 88(2), that the psychological services are likely to promote the rehabilitation of the insured. The uncertainty concerning whether this benefit will be paid must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff. I am not satisfied the Corporation will pay any portion of this benefit. Accordingly, there will be no deduction for psychological therapy.
 The deductions from the award of costs of future care for Part 7 benefits total $4000.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, shutting down an attempt by the Progressive Max Insurance Company from exercising subrogation rights with respect to Part 7 benefits paid.
In today’s case (Middleton v. Heerlin) the Plaintiffs were US residents involved in a motorcycle collision in BC. They were insured with Progressive and received over $100,000 in medical/rehab and other benefits from Progressive by virtue of Progressive filing a Power of Attorney Undertaking promising to provide their insured with minimum coverage required under BC law for BC crashes.
In the Plaintiffs lawsuit against the alleged at fault motorist Progressive sought to get their money back arguing they had rights of subrogation. The Court shut this argument down noting similar arguments were dismissed by the BC Court of Appeal in 2000 and that recent statutory changes do not change this result. In dismissing Progressive’s argument Mr. Justice Johnston noted as follows –
 When Matilda was decided, the relevant portions of s. 25 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act provided as follows:
25. (1) In this section and in section 26, “benefits” means a payment that is or may be made in respect of bodily injury or death under a plan established under this Act, other than a payment pursuant to a contract of third party liability insurance or an obligation under a plan of third party liability insurance, and includes accident insurance benefits similar to those described in Part 6 of the Insurance Act that are provided under a contract or plan of automobile insurance wherever issued or in effect.
(2) A person who has a claim for damages and who receives or is entitled to receive benefits respecting the claim, is deemed to have released the claim to the extent of the benefits.
 The court noted at para. 7:
As the chambers judge noted, in the absence of any express statutory right of subrogation the insurer’s right of subrogation is a derivative right only, which must be advanced in the name of the insured. The insurer is placed in no better position than that of the insured. The revised form of question 1 could be answered “no” simply on the ground that Progressive has no status as a subrogated insurer to advance any claim against the defendants in its own name.
The revised question, to which the above answer was given, was stated in this way at para. 2:
Does Progressive (the third party) have an enforceable right under the contract or the common-law to recover from the defendants all or part of the funds, being $17,800.00 U.S. paid by Progressive to the plaintiff?
 It would seem, therefore, that unless the plaintiffs can point to an express statutory right of subrogation, the answer in these cases must be governed by the result in Matilda set out above.
 In spite of the finding in para. 7, the court in Matilda went on to deal with what it said was a broader issue argued by the parties – provincial legislative competence over extra-provincial insurance contracts, which it framed in this way at para. 8:
The issue is whether the provisions of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act purport to modify the terms of extra-provincial policies and thereby exceed the reach of provincial jurisdiction. In my view, they do not. The focus of s. 25(1) and (2) is on the tort action by Progressive’s insureds against ICBC’s insureds. The torts are the motor vehicle accidents that occurred within British Columbia and clearly are within provincial jurisdiction. The subsections simply provide that accident benefits cannot be claimed in the B.C. tort actions irrespective of where the policy paying the benefits was made. That does not purport to modify the terms of the extra-provincial policies. It merely limits the damages recoverable in tort whether by the insured beneficially or Progressive as subrogated claiming in the name of its insureds. In my opinion, the subsections address an incident of provincial jurisdiction over torts within the province and do not attempt to legislate terms of extra-provincial contracts. [Underlining added.]
 Although there is no argument in these applications that the current version of the statute purports to modify extra-provincial contracts, the underlined portions above would appear to offer no comfort to Progressive, as there is no material difference in wording between the section before the court in Matilda and s. 83(1) and (2) invoked by the defendants in these cases…
 I conclude that Matilda governs the interpretation of s. 83, is not affected by the change in wording from s. 26 to s. 84, and is a full answer to these applications.
 Both applications are dismissed with costs to the defendants.
I have previously discussed Part 7 benefits deductions following BC motor vehicle collision injury trials. In short, a Plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced by the Part 7 benefits (past and future) that they are entitled to.
Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this deduction finding that if there was uncertainty as to whether Part 7 payments will be made there should be no deduction of damages.
In the recent case (Tsang v. Borg) the Plaintiff had damages for future care of $5,000 assessed at trial. The Defendant asked the Court to largely discount this award pursuant to s. 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act on the basis that many of the Plaintiff’s future treatments will covered by ICBC under the no fault benefits plan. Mr. Justice McKinnon noted this argument was “inconsistent” with the Defendant’s trial position and in any event the evidence required for the deduction fell short of the mark. In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:  At trial the defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s injuries for the most part were not caused by the accident. In Paskall v. Schelthauer, 2012 BCSC 1859, the court held that the regulations limit the benefits to injuries that the corporation views flow from the accident. It strikes me as inconsistent for the defendants to now argue that the plaintiff is entitled to benefits payable under part 7 and more to the point, raises the distinct possibility that in future, the corporation will deny claimed benefits as “not flowing from the accident”.  In her affidavit, Shelley Ruggles, the insurance adjuster assigned to administer the plaintiff’s entitlement, indicates some uncertainty about whether future treatments are recoverable. She writes, “Further requests for treatment could be covered under s. 88 of the Regulations”. This suggests some uncertainty.  It is only where there is no uncertainty as to whether the insurer will accept the treatment and pay the cost that deductions can be made, see Ayles (Guardian ad litem of) v. Talastasin, 2000 BCCA 87. At bar there is no such certainty and I therefore resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiff.  The award of $5,000 stands.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Cranbrook Registry, highlighting the Court’s discretion with respect to costs consequences following a trial in which a pre-trial formal settlement offer was made.
In this week’s case (Russell v. Parks) the Plaintiff was injured when struck by the Defendant’s vehicle while walking in a parking lot. Liability was at issue and ultimately the Plaintiff was found 2/3 responsible for the incident. After factoring this split in the Plaintiff’s assessed damages came to $28,305. Prior to trial ICBC paid more than this amount in Part 7 benefits which are deductible from the damage assessment pursuant to section 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.
Despite proving partial liability against the Defendant and further proving damages, the Plaintiff’s claim was ultimately dismissed due to the above statutory deduction with Mr. Justice Abrioux providing the following reasons:  In my view, this reasoning applies to this case, where the application of section 83(5) of the Act results in there being an award of $0 to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the action is dismissed and this should be reflected in the order.
Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer for $25,000 of ‘new money’. The Court needed to consider what costs consequences ought to flow in these circumstances. In awarding the Plaintiff 75% of pre-offer costs and having each party bear their own post offer costs the Court provided the following reasons:  The dismissal of the action does not necessarily mean the plaintiff is disentitled to any costs: see McElroy v. Embleton, at para. 10.  The first question is, putting aside for the moment the issue of Part 7 benefits paid, how should costs be apportioned from the time of the commencement of the action until April 13, 2012? At trial, I found the defendant to be one-third liable for the plaintiff’s loss. ..  Having considered these authorities, and subject to my findings below regarding the Part 7 benefits, I find the plaintiff is entitled to 75% of his costs up to the date of the settlement offer of April 13, 2012. This reflects the fact that although the amount of time spent on determining liability at the trial was not “minimal”, more time was spent regarding the assessment of damages. This was shown in the medical evidence led, the reports which were obtained and the like. It would be unjust not to exercise my discretion to depart from the default rule referred to in paragraph 26 above in these circumstances.  The next issue is whether the payment of the Part 7 benefits should affect the award of costs…  This is not an appropriate case, in my view, to conclude as is submitted by the defendant that the plaintiff should not have proceeded to trial. It was not readily foreseeable to either party what the result was going to be with respect to liability or the quantum of damages. In so far as liability is concerned, I noted at para. 31 of my reasons for judgment that cases dealing with competing duties of pedestrians and operators of motor vehicles are highly fact specific.  Taking all of these factors into account, I conclude that for the time period up to the defendant’s settlement offer of April 13, 2012, the plaintiff shall be awarded 75% of his costs and disbursements…  What is the effect of the settlement offer made by the defendant for $25,000 of “New Money” as defined in counsel’s correspondence dated April 13, 2012? The New Money was in addition to the Part 7 benefits already received by the plaintiff. No objection was taken by the plaintiff to the form of the defendant’s offer to settle…  Upon considering the factors in R. 9-1(6), I do not accept the defendant’s submission that double costs are appropriate. There is no reason for the plaintiff to be subject to a punitive measure. He was not unreasonable in rejecting the settlement offer. The issues at trial made the apportionment of liability quite uncertain. There was also a considerable range in the amount of damages which could have been awarded. The plaintiff’s finances would be greatly impacted if an order for double costs was made against him. In addition, the end result was effectively a nil judgment.  Taking into account the legal principles to which I have referred and the particular circumstances which exist in this case, I conclude each party should bear their respective costs after the date of the defendant’s offer to settle. The plaintiff has already suffered some financial consequences for proceeding to trial in that I have decided he shall not receive 100% of his costs until the defendant’s offer to settle, but rather 75% of those costs.
I have previously discussed Part 7 benefits deductions following BC motor vehicle collision injury trials. In short, a Plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced by the Part 7 benefits (past and future) that they are entitled to.
Two sets of reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this deduction finding that before a Court can deduct damages for ‘discretionary’ Part 7 benefits there must be evidence of the corporation’s medical advisor.
In the first case (Paskall v. Scheithauer) the Plaintiff was awarded just over $65,000 by a jury for her injuries. ICBC sought to deduct mandatory and discretionary Part 7 benefits from this amount. In discussing the burden required for these deductions and in denying the application Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons: 3] The replacement hearing aids and related expenses are a discretionary benefit under s. 88(2). The defendant has provided an affidavit from an ICBC claims examiner who says that the corporation paid for a hearing aid on one occasion, in January 2007, and who says: “I expect ICBC will continue to re-imburse reasonable incurred hearing aid expenses”.  The examiner’s stated expectation falls far short of the evidence required. Before discretionary benefits can be paid, s. 88(2) requires an opinion from “the corporation’s medical advisor”. No evidence from any such person has been put forward. The expert who provided a care opinion for the defendant at trial is an occupational therapist. There is no evidence that ICBC accepts her in the capacity of its “medical advisor” for purposes of s. 88.  Although the opinion of a medical advisor is a precondition to the payment of discretionary benefits, the corporation is still not bound to pay them. The examiner’s expectation is no more than an opinion about what his employer will do in the future. There is no evidence that he has the authority to make that decision and no explanation of the basis on which he feels able to express an opinion on what the corporation will do for the remainder of the plaintiff’s life…  At this stage of the proceeding, I believe it is appropriate to acknowledge the fact that in cases such as this the corporation has conduct of the defence on behalf of its insured. There is certainly no evidence that the corporation now disavows the position it instructed counsel to take at trial.  Accordingly, I find that the defendant has failed to meet the onus of proving the plaintiff is entitled to the benefits for which deduction has been sought.
In the second case (Stanikzai v. Bola) the Plaintiff was awarded just over $189,000 following trial. ICBC sought to deduct some $16,000 in Part 7 items. In disallowing the majority of these Mr. Justice Smith echoed his earlier comments stating as follows:  In her affidavit, the adjuster says that such a fitness program is “similar to physiotherapy” and therefore a mandatory benefit under s. 88(1). I cannot accept that assertion. Section 88(1) refers to “physical therapy”, which presumably means therapy by a licensed physiotherapist. It also refers to certain other specific forms of therapy. It does not refer to services by other professionals that may be “similar” to the named therapies.  Having regard to the requirement for strict compliance with the Act and its Regulations, the training program is not a mandatory benefit under s. 88(1). I accept that it could qualify as a discretionary benefit under s. 88(2), but under that section an opinion from “the corporation’s medical advisor” is a precondition to payment. There is no evidence of any such opinion. The defendants have failed to prove a basis for that deduction.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing benefits which ought to be covered under a plaintiff’s first party insurance (Part7 benefits) with ICBC.
In today’s case (Wepryk v. Juraschka) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision and sued for damages. At trial the Plaintiff’s damages were assessed at just over $83,000. The Defendant then applied to have some of the assessed damages deducted pursuant to section 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. In finding that mileage and parking expenses ought to be covered by ICBC’s no-fault benefits scheme (and therefore deductible from the tort damages) the Court provided the following findings:  I also agree that $22.50 for parking should be deducted as a component of travelling expenses for treatment. Travelling expenses are an integral part of necessary treatment and as such are a benefit subject to deduction: Petersen v. Bannon, (1991) 1 C.C.L.I. (2d) 232 (B.C.S.C.).  The plaintiff also claimed car expenses for driving to and from medical appointments at a rate of .50¢ per kilometre, and I awarded the entire amount of $1,368.90 claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of her calculations. The defendants originally submitted that the entire amount of $1,368.90 should be deducted, but now say the deduction should be $684.45. According to ICBC’s Claims Procedure Manual for Accident Benefits, ICBC will only reimburse the use of one’s own vehicle at a rate of .25¢ per kilometre. Therefore, one half of the $1,368.90 awarded at trial, or $684.45, should be deducted for driving expenses.
When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.
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