Skip to main content

Tag: Rule 9-1(6)

"Special Costs" Clause Takes the Teeth Out of ICBC's Formal Settlement Offer

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


I’ve written many times about the risks and consequences formal settlement offers can create in the course of a personal injury lawsuit.  Interesting reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, refusing to give ICBC double costs after the dismissal of a lawsuit because of a ‘special costs‘ clause in their formal offer.
In this week’s case (Wong v. Lee) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 motor vehicle collision.  She sued her driver but the lawsuit was dismissed with a Jury finding the driver was not negligent.  Typically such a result obligates the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s costs due to the BC Supreme Court’s Loser Pays system.
Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $60,000.  In these circumstances the Court has the discretion to award ‘Double Costs‘.  ICBC, on the Defendant’s behalf, asked for the Court to make such an order.  Madam Justice Dardi refused, however, finding that the ‘special costs’ clause which is contained in many of ICBC’s formal settlement offers operates to create uncertainty in the settlement process.  The Court provided the following useful reasons:








[27] The plaintiff’s overarching submission is that the inclusion of para. 6 in Appendix A of the Offer to Settle is fatal to the defendants’ application for double costs. The Offer to Settle was subject to the conditions in Appendix A which provides in para. 6 as follows:

Nothing in this offer detracts from the Defendants’ right to seek special costs against the Plaintiff or his counsel above and beyond the Defendants’ entitlement to costs under this offer. Neither the making nor the acceptance of this offer shall be deemed a waiver or estoppel by the Defendants in respect to any reprehensible or improper conduct on the part of the Plaintiff and / or his counsel in respect of this proceeding. [Emphasis added.]

[28] Based upon these terms, even if the plaintiff had accepted the Offer to Settle, the defendants nonetheless would have been at liberty to pursue the plaintiff for special costs. Thus, there was a potential risk that the acceptance of the offer may not have ended all of the outstanding disputes between the parties.

[29] The Court of Appeal, in discussing Rule 9-1(5) in Evans v. Jensen, 2011 BCCA 279, articulated at para. 35 that “the most obvious and accepted intent of this Rule, namely to promote settlement by providing certainty to the parties as to what to expect if they make, or refuse to accept, an offer to settle”. The Court reasoned as follows:

[41]      This conclusion is consistent with the importance the Legislature has placed on the role of settlement offers in encouraging the determination of disputes in a cost-efficient and expeditious manner. It has placed a premium on certainty of result as a key factor which parties consider in determining whether to make or accept an offer to settle. If the parties know in advance the consequences of their decision to make or accept an offer, whether by way of reward or punishment, they are in a better position to make a reasoned decision. If they think they may be excused from the otherwise punitive effect of a costs rule in relation to an offer to settle, they will be more inclined to take their chances in refusing to accept an offer. If they know they will have to live with the consequences set forth in the Rule, they are more likely to avoid the risk.

[42]      This certainty in terms of the result of either making, accepting or refusing to accept an offer is also more conducive to the overall object of the Rules, which is “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits”.

[30] It clearly emerges from the authorities that an important objective of offers to settle under the Rules is to bring certainty and finality to litigation. The reservation of the defendants’ right to seek special costs from the plaintiff after the acceptance of the offer is antithetical to this objective. It cannot be said that the Offer to Settle provided a genuine incentive to settle. As was stated inGiles v. Westminster Savings and Credit Union, 2010 BCCA 282 at para. 88, “plaintiffs should not be penalized for declining an offer that did not provide a genuine incentive to settle in the circumstances”.

[31] In short, para. 6 in Appendix A of the Offer to Settle militates against an award of double costs…





[34] In weighing all of the factors, the most significant being the inclusion of para. 6 in Appendix A of the Offer to Settle, I conclude that the plaintiff should not be required to pay double costs.



The High Risk of Personal Injury Trials: The Costs and Disbursements Swing

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 44 Comments on The High Risk of Personal Injury Trials: The Costs and Disbursements Swing


As previously discussed, personal injury trials can be risky and expensive.  The British Columbia Supreme Court has a so-called ‘loser pays’ system which generally makes the losing side pay the winning side’s costs and disbursements (the hard expenses associated with running a trial such as court filing and expert witness fees).  Last month the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, released reasons for judgement demonstrating this reality.
In this recent case (Sartori v. Gates) the Plaintiff was injured in 2005 when a truck owned by his friend accidentally struck him.  The Plaintiff sued for damages.  As the lawsuit progressed ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $230,000 plus costs and disbursements.
The Plaintiff presented his own formal offer of $600,000 plus costs and disbursements.   These offers were rejected and the claim proceeded to trial.  Ultimately a jury found the Plaintiff 33.3% at fault for the collision but accepted that he was injured and awarded damages.
When all the dust settled, the Plaintiff was awarded $234,000.  ICBC argued that since the final result was “within a knife’s edge” of their offer that the Plaintiff should be stripped of his post offer costs and disbursements.  This was a significant development because the Plaintiff spent over $120,000 in disbursements while advancing his claim.
Ultimately Mr. Justice Wilson found that this result would not be fair.  However, the Court disallowed disbursements associated with one of the Plaintiff’s expert witnesses and further reduced the disbursements the Plaintiff was entitled to by 1/3 to take into account the jury’s finding of fault and section 3 of the Negligence Act.  Some quick math reveals this results in about $40,000 of the real costs of advancing the claim not being recovered by the Plaintiff.  This large swing highlights the need to consider potential costs consequences when deciding whether to settle an ICBC claim or to proceed to trial.
This recent case is also noteworthy for a few other reasons.  ICBC argued that the usual rule of a winner receiving costs should not be followed given how close the settlement offer was to the jury verdict.   Mr. Justice Wilson rejected this argument providing the following useful reasons:

[42] The governing principle on the first issue, is R. 14-1(9).  The material words of that subrule, on this application, are:

… costs of a proceeding must be awarded to the successful party unless the court otherwise orders.

[43] The onus is on the defendant to persuade me why I should otherwise order….

[55] The plaintiff reminds me that the discretion conferred by the cost rules must be exercised judicially.  The parameters of that judicial duty were referred to in Stiles v. B.C. (Workers’ Compensation Board), and iterated consistently thereafter.  The court said:

… The discretion must be exercised judicially, i.e. not arbitrarily or capriciously.  And, as I have said, it must be exercised consistently with the Rules of Court.  But it would be a sorry result if like cases were not decided in like ways with respect to costs.  So, by judicial comity, principles have developed which guide the exercise of the discretion of a judge with respect to costs.  Those principles should be consistently applied; if a judge declines to apply them, without a reason for doing so, he may be considered to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously and not judicially.

[56] The Rules of Court mentioned in that extract are those cited above.  The “principles … developed …” or “purposes”, were referred to in Giles v. Westminster Savings and Credit Union:

The purposes for which costs rules exist must be kept in mind in determining whether appellate intervention is warranted.  In addition to indemnifying a successful litigant, those purposes have been described as follows by this Court:

•     “[D]eterring frivolous actions or defences”:  Houweling Nurseries Ltd. v. Fisons Western Corp. (1988), 37 B.C.L.R. (2d) 2 at 25 (C.A.), leave ref’d, [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 200, [1988] 1 S.C.R. ix;

•     “[T]o encourage conduct that reduces the duration and expense of litigation and to discourage conduct that has the opposite effect”:  Skidmore v. Blackmore (1995), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 201 at para. 28 (C.A.);

•     “[E]ncouraging litigants to settle whenever possible, thus freeing up judicial resources for other cases”:  Bedwell v. McGill, 2008 BCCA 526, 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 343 at para. 33;

•     “[T]o have a winnowing function in the litigation process” by “requir[ing] litigants to make a careful assessment of the strength or lack thereof of their cases at the commencement and throughout the course of the litigation”, and by “discourag[ing] the continuance of doubtful cases or defences”:  Catalyst Paper Corporation v. Companhia de Navegaçao Norsul, 2009 BCCA 16, 88 B.C.L.R. (4th) 17 at para. 16.

[57] Giles is also authority for the proposition that the “usual rule” is that costs follow the event…

Here, this plaintiff did succeed.  The defendant’s argument is that he did not succeed to the extent of his aspirations.  Therefore, goes the argument, the defendant should have the costs of establishing that failure.

[81] In my opinion, that proposition is not a phenomenon contemplated by R. 14?1(14) or Forrest v. Gaidner.

[82] My conclusion on the first issue is that the defendant has not persuaded me that this is a case on which I should otherwise order.  The plaintiff is entitled to his costs, subject to the disallowance of one day of trial and disbursements associated with Dr. Hunt’s involvement.

Winners and Losers: More on Costs Consequences and Formal Settlement Offers

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


How can a Plaintiff who is awarded damages following a personal injury trial end up owing ICBC money?  The answer relates to the costs consequences that can be triggered by formal settlement offers.  I’ve discussed this topic previously and two sets of reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court further demonstrating this reality.
In the first case (Dempsey v. Oh) the Plaintiff was injured in a bicycle accident when he was struck by the Defendant’s vehicle.  In the course of the lawsuit ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $40,000.  As trial neared ICBC increased their formal offer to $165,000.  The Plaintiff rejected this and proceeded to trial.  At trial the Court made some critical findings relating to the Plaintiff’s credibility and awarded damages of just over $20,000.
Following trial ICBC asked for an order pursuant to Rule 9-1(5) that the Plaintiff pay all of the Defendant’s costs following their first formal offer.  The Plaintiff objected to such a result arguing that “if he is ordered to pay the defendant’s costs he will end up owing it money“.  Mr. Justice Myers rejected this argument and ordered that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s post offer costs.  In rejecting the Plaintiff’s submission the Court made the following comment “It is not the court’s function to ensure that a plaintiff makes a net recovery from an action when it has ignored a reasonable offer.  That would defeat the purpose of the Rule and does not accord with common sense”.
On another note, this case is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s discussion of Rule 14-1(10).  The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff should be deprived of his pre-offer costs as there was no sufficient reason to sue in Supreme Court.   Mr. Justice Myers rejected this argument finding that when the lawsuit was started the Supreme Court was an appropriate venue.  In making this finding the Court provided the following useful reasons:
[11]    In part due to the loss of income, this was a more complicated case than Ghelen.  This action was commenced approximately six months after the accident.  At that point I find it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have commenced the action in this Court because he was reasonably entitled to see the impact of the accident on his prior condition.  There is nothing in the rules which imposes a cost penalty on a party who files its suit quickly after its cause of action arises.  And, in Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, the Court of Appeal held that there is no ongoing obligation on a party to assess his action as it progresses in the Supreme Court in order to consider whether it should be moved to Provincial Court.
In the second case released this week (Miller v. Boughton) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision.  She sued for damages and her case went before a jury.  The trial lasted 7 days.  Prior to trial ICBC made a series of escalating formal settlement offers starting at $22,000 with the final offer made shortly before trial topping out at $62,500.
The Plaintiff rejected these offers and proceeded to trial.  The Jury found the Plaintiff 45% at fault for the crash and the Defendant 55% at fault.   After taking this split into account the Jury’s award was a modest $3,880.  ICBC’s motion for post offer costs and disbursements was granted.  After factoring these in the Plaintiff likely ended up owing ICBC a significant amount of money.   (UPDATE September 12, 2011 – click here for follow up reasons confirming the Defendant’s costs were assessed at over $42,000)
Cases such as these illustrate the important lesson that formal offers create a “loser pays” system which could result in significant costs swings following trial.  When considering ICBC formal settlement offers it is important to keep this in mind when deciding whether to accept the offer or proceed to trial.

ICBC Denied Double Costs Despite Significantly Besting Formal Settlement Offer

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on ICBC Denied Double Costs Despite Significantly Besting Formal Settlement Offer

(Update February 9, 2012 – the below decision is under appeal with the BCCA granting leave to appeal on February 9, 2012)

Last year highly publicized reasons for judgement were released assessing damages at $5.9 million for a lawyer who sustained a traumatic brain injury during a dance floor incident.   Despite the headline making award, only a fraction of the damages were recoverable due to the limits of the responsible insurer.  In what may be the final chapter of this long legal saga, reasons for judgement were released addressing costs.
As was widely reported, the Plaintiff was injured in a dance floor incident and successfully sued another lawyer that knocked her down causing her brain injury.  The reason why ICBC played a role is because the Plaintiff was involved in a subsequent car crash.  She sued the motorist for damages claiming the crash aggravated her brain injury.  Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $500,000.  The Plaintiff countered at $1.9 million.   Ultimately her allegations that the crash aggravated the brain injury were rejected and damages of just over $10,000 were awarded for the car crash.
ICBC asked the the Court to award them double costs under Rule 9-1.  Despite ICBC’s success in relation to their formal settlement offer and despite concerns about aspects of the Plaintiff’s trial testimony, Mr. Justice Kelleher declined to award ICBC double costs.  In today’s case (Danicek v. Li) the Court provided the following reasons:
[38] Considering all the factors, I conclude that there should be no award of double costs.  The plaintiff suffered, I found, career ending injuries.  I cannot say it was unreasonable to decline the offer.  Although I considered Ms. Danicek to be less than candid, I conclude on a consideration of all factors that no double costs award should be made.
Despite this, the Court did go on to award Costs and Disbursements at Scale C (the highest scale).  In reaching this decision Mr. Justice Kelleher provided the following Reasons:

[40] Counsel agree that the relevant factors for determining whether Scale C costs should be awarded include:

–       the length of trial;

–       the complexity of issues involved;

–       the number and the complexity of pre-trial applications;

–       whether the action was hard fought with little conceded;

–       the number and length of examinations for discovery;

–       the number and complexity of expert reports; and

–       the extent of the effort required in the collection and proof of facts.

See: Mort v. Saanich School Board, 2001 BCSC 1473 at para. 6; 566935 B.C. Ltd. v. Allianz Insurance Co. of Canada, 2005 BCSC 3032 at para. 7.

[41] Based on these criteria, there will be an award at Scale C.

[42] The trial was 29 days.  A central issue was whether the plaintiff’s symptoms would have resolved but for the motor vehicle accident.  There were reports and/or testimony from physiatrists, neurologists, psychiatrists and others.  The plaintiff alone relied on 21 expert reports.

[43] The action was complex. There were some seven parties involved. The plaintiff was examined for discovery on eleven occasions over several years. There were a number of applications both prior to and during the trial.  This case bears similarity to Graham v. Marek, 2002 BCSC 214; Ramcharitar v. Gill, 2007 BCSC 1268; and Mosher v. Sedens Estate, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2822.

[44] I have considered Hussack v. School District No. 33 (Chilliwack), 2010 BCSC 304, and Radke, when costs at Scale B were awarded.

[45] Hussack was a 23-day trial.  However, the liability issue was not complex; there were only four pre-trial applications and none was complicated.  The examination for discovery of the plaintiff was one full day and three half days.  There was one plaintiff and one defendant.

[46] In Radke, Madam Justice Boyd cited these circumstances in concluding that the matter was not a matter of “more than ordinary difficulty” (at para. 26):

[26]      The one circumstance which I agree made this case somewhat unusual was the fact that the defendant apparently took a very heavy interest in this case, to the point of following her neighbour (the plaintiff) about and gathering evidence to challenge her claims of disability.  In response the plaintiff’s counsel apparently conducted an in- depth investigation of the defendant, including her history of unusual behaviour in the neighbourhood, so as to challenge her own credibility and reliability.  The trial was settled before that evidence was heard.

[47] The complexity of this matter is well beyond what was before the Court in Hussack and Radke.


Formal Settlement Offers, Costs, and the Flexibility of the New Rules of Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 46 Comments on Formal Settlement Offers, Costs, and the Flexibility of the New Rules of Court


Interesting reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing the ‘flexibility‘ that the New Rules of Court give Judges in making costs awards following trials where formal settlement offers were made.
In today’s case (Cairns v. Gill) the Plaintiff brought an ‘exaggerated’ personal injury claim to trial following a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  ICBC made an early formal settlement offer in 2006.   ICBC’s offer was modest at just over $1,200 plus costs.   The Plaintiff rejected the offer and proceeded to trial.   The trial did not go well and the Jury largely rejected the Plaintiff’s claim awarding just over $850 in total damages.
Having beaten their formal offer ICBC applied for an order that the Plaintiff pay their post offer Bill of Costs which was expected to exceed $16,000.  Despited the ‘exaggerated’ nature of the claim Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey found that such a result was unjust.  The Court stripped the Plaintiff of her post offer costs and disbursements however did not award ICBC their costs.  In reaching this result the Court provided the following reasons demonstrating the flexible (but perhaps somewhat unpredictable) nature of the current Civil Rules:
[57] The defendants seek costs and disbursements following the date of the offer to settle, despite the plaintiff obtaining judgment.  This is available pursuant to Rule 9-1(5)(d)…

[59] To make such an order would have a very negative effect on the plaintiff, and have the broader effect of further discouraging those with legitimate claims from bringing their actions in this Court when the defendant, funded by an insurer, has deeper pockets with which to bear the risk of a plaintiff achieving only a minor or, indeed, a pyrrhic victory.

[60] It is clear from the rules and the jurisprudence that costs consequences are to guide counsel in litigation decisions.  The object of the Rules is, “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.”  This object is to be conducted, as far as is practicable, with regard to proportionality.  While this object is frustrated to some extent by a claim worth $851 proceeding to its conclusion at a Supreme Court jury trial where it was more appropriate for determination in Provincial Court, the object and proportionality principle do not appear to accord with the potential cost of litigation in this case.  The bill of costs of the defendants is expected to exceed $16,000.

[61] I note that the Court of Appeal in Giles recognized when dealing with the issue of double costs that “all litigation comes with a degree of risk,” and that, “when faced with settlement offers, plaintiffs must carefully consider their positions.”  However, the court also indicated that plaintiffs, “should not to be cowed into accepting an unreasonable offer out of fear of being penalized with double costs if they are unable to ‘beat’ that offer.”  These considerations also appear relevant in these circumstances.

[62] In this case, pursuing a valid, although exaggerated, personal injury claim to trial, where the offer to settle did not provide a genuine incentive to settle in the circumstances, may, in the face of a defence funded by ICBC, cost the plaintiff almost twenty times what was awarded at trial.  It seems consistent with the object of the Rules generally, and of Rules 9-1 and 14-1(10), to have regard to the need to emphasize litigation decisions that direct cases to the appropriate forum without disproportionately penalizing a party that had some success, however limited.

[63] To this end, as considered in relation to the first issue, Rule 14-1(10) permits the Court to limit a plaintiff to the recovery of disbursements when the amount of the judgment is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court, which I declined to do in this case.  Then, as considered in relation to the second issue, Rule 9-1(5)(a) permits the Court to deprive the plaintiff of any or all of their disbursements after the date of the offer, which I found to be appropriate.  Then, taking the matter even further, Rule 9-1(5)(d) permits the Court to consider requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs in respect of some or all of the steps taken after the date of the offer to settle.

[64] This progression demonstrates the flexibility within the overall framework of the rules to craft an order for costs that is appropriate to the circumstances of each case.

[65] In the present case, the plaintiff, although the “successful” party at trial, agreed to forego her costs after the date of service of the offer to settle and is, by virtue of my decision on the second issue, without disbursements from the date of service of the offer to settle, which occurred very early in the proceedings.  To require her to pay all or some of the defendants’ costs after the date of service of the offer to settle, which at the time was an unreasonably low offer, would be excessive and unjust.  It would not be in keeping with the nature of the offer, the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the principle of proportionality, and the need to avoid decisions that inappropriately discourage plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims.

This case is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s length analysis of many authorities to date addressing costs discretion under the new Rules of Court and further addressing important issues such as sufficient reason to sue in Supreme Court, and the relevance of suing an insured defendant.

Double Costs Ordered for Taking "Extremely Weak" Case to Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


As recently discussed, when a party is on the losing end of a lawsuit in the BC Supreme Court they usually have to pay the winning sides costs.  If the successful party beat a pre-trial formal settlement offer the Court has the discretion of awarding double costs.  Reasons for judgement were released this week considering an application for double costs where a very modest formal offer was made prior to trial.
In today’s case (Brooks v. Gilchirst) the Plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle incidents.  She sued for damages and both claims were heard at the same time.  ICBC disputed the allegation that a collision took place in the first incident.  Prior to trial ICBC made a $1 formal settlement offer.  The Plaintiff rejected this offer and went to trial.  Mr. Justice Sigurdson dismissed the claim finding that “no collision” took place.
ICBC applied for double costs.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that the nominal offer should not trigger increased costs.  Mr. Justice Sidgurson agreed that while this was typically the case, in circumstances where an ‘extremely weak‘ case proceeds to trial double costs could be awarded in the face of a formal settlement offer.   In reaching this result the Court provided the following reasons:

[16]         In terms of the relationship between the terms of settlement offered and the final judgment of the court, the offer was better than the result, but the offer was only for the sum of $1 plus disbursements.  Ordinarily I would think that a nominal offer of one dollar may not attract orders for double costs but I know that in some cases even nominal offers may attract orders of double costs.  See for example MacKinlay v. MacKinlay Estate, 2008 BCSC 1570; Ludwig v. Bos, 2010 BCSC 695.

[17]         This is a case where there had been expenditures on medical and expert reports.  I think that where it becomes clear that liability will be extremely difficult to establish a nominal offer that has the effect of allowing the plaintiff to recover disbursements and avoid liability for the other party’s disbursements may nevertheless be a substantial offer.

[18]         In considering whether the offer ought reasonably to have been accepted, I think it was quite clear that the plaintiff’s original theory that she had been sideswiped as a result of the collision involving the other two adjacent cars was not maintainable once each side had filed their expert reports.  This was not merely a case where the plaintiff had a claim that was difficult to prove at trial; this was a unique case where on the evidence available to her before trial the plaintiff should have realized that she did not have a realistic position on liability…

[23]         In the circumstances, I think that the ICBC defendants should be awarded costs with respect to the main action.  I have estimated the main action consumed 90% of the time at trial.  The defendants were clearly successful and, in my view, it is not an appropriate order for each side to bear its own costs.

[24]         In terms of whether I should award double costs, I think that, in exercising my discretion, the offer reasonably ought to have been accepted in the days prior to trial.  Although the offer was modest, the circumstances at that time were clear that her case was extremely weak, she would have avoided liability for disbursements, and in fact recovered the disbursements she had incurred.

[25]         I award double costs for the period after two days prior to trial.

The High Cost of Losing an ICBC Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


I’ve written many times about the significant costs a party can be exposed to for being on the losing end of a BC Supreme Court lawsuit.  Reasons for judgement were released today further demonstrating this reality under the New BC Supreme Court Rules.
In today’s case (Chen v. Beltran) the young Plaintiff entered an intersection against a red light on his skateboard.  He was struck by a vehicle operated by the Defendant and sustained injuries.  He sued for damages but his claim was dismissed with the Court finding him entirely at fault for the accident.
Rule 14-1(9) of the BC Supreme Court Rules typically requires a losing party to pay costs to a successful party.  ICBC relied on this section and requested that their costs of over $75,000 be paid by the Plaintiff’s family.   The Plaintiff opposed arguing that no costs should be awarded.  One of the reasons advanced by the Plaintiff was that such an order would “financially cripple the (plaintiff’s) family“.
Mr. Justice Greyell rejected this argument.  The Court, while disallowing some of the most significant disbursements claimed by the Defendant, did go on to order that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s costs.  In rejecting the “financially crippling” argument Mr. Justice Greyell reasoned as follows:
[11] The first basis upon which the plaintiff says the defendants should be denied costs is that Allan suffered significant injuries in the Accident and will require ongoing medical and psychological care throughout his life.  His ongoing care will involve significant cost to both his parents.  Allan’s parents have already incurred substantial debt to prosecute the lawsuit, have limited financial resources and will have difficulty providing for Allan’s future care even if they are successful on this application.  The plaintiff says that an order for costs will financially “cripple” the family.  While I have great sympathy for Allan’s parents the case law is clear that the financial circumstances of a litigant, standing alone, are not to be taken into consideration as a factor in the awarding of costs…

[14]         It is clear based on the above authorities that this Court is unable, on any principled basis, to take the plaintiff’s financial circumstances into account in determining whether to award costs.

[15]         To conclude otherwise would undermine the rationale underlying Rule 14-9 and would likely lead to the promotion of litigation rather than to promote the “winnowing” function described by Hall J.A. in Catalyst Paper.  It would lead to a collapse of the general principle discussed in the authorities and result in the unacceptable proposition that costs in each case would be measured not by a party’s success but by the personal financial circumstances of the litigants.

It is worth noting that this result should be contrasted with cases decided under Rule 9-1(5) where the Court does have a discretion to consider a party’s financial circumstances following trial where a formal offer of settlement was made.
Today’s case demonstrates the real world expenses that can be associated with losing an ICBC Claim in the BC Supreme Court.  It is vital to gauge these costs and the risks of trial prior to putting a case before a Judge or Jury.

Plaintiff's "Disadvantaged" Financial Circumstances Disentitle ICBC to Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized. 40 Comments on Plaintiff's "Disadvantaged" Financial Circumstances Disentitle ICBC to Costs


There have been many cases dealing with “the relative financial circumstances of the parties” focussing on whether a Defendant is insured in deciding the costs consequences after trials with formal settlement offers. (The BC Court of Appeal weighed in on this issue earlier this year deciding insurance can in fact be considered).  There have not, however, been many cases dealing with the Plaintiff’s finances (or lack thereof) as a compelling circumstance.  This overdue issue was addressed earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry.
In today’s case (Dickson v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a bicycle accident involving an unknown motorist.  He sued ICBC under s. 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.  ICBC denied fault on behalf of the unknown driver.  Prior to trial ICBC offered to settle the issue of fault on a 50/50 basis.  The plaintiff rejected this offer and went to trial where Madam Justice Russell found both parties equally at fault.
Typically, when ICBC matches or beats their formal offer at trial, ICBC becomes entitled to post offer costs.  Madam Justice Russell refused to follow this usual course, however, noting that the Plaintiff’s financial circumstances put the plaintiff at a ‘serious disadvantage‘.  In awarding the Plaintiff costs to the time of the offer and depriving both parties of post offer costs Madam Justice Russell held as follows:

[13]    It is my view that the plaintiff’s position is one of serious disadvantage as a result of the accident.  I recall that he was unable to work for a long period of time as a result of his injury and was still unable to return to work by the time of the hearing.

[14]    The plaintiff is the sole support of his family and either had run out of disability benefits or was close to the end of those benefits by the time of the summary trial…

[17]    I view the financial circumstances of the plaintiff as compelling on the issue of whether double costs should be awarded.

[18]    In Osooli-Talesh v. Emami, 2008 BCSC 1749, the offer to settle matched the judgment achieved and Sigurdson, J. concluded that the court may award payment of double costs where an offer to settle matches the results at trial.  However, he went on to consider all the factors listed in Rule 37B.  He determined that the parties had divided success and should therefore bear their own costs.

[19]    I am guided by that decision and consider it apposite to the circumstances of this case.

[20]    I award costs of this case to the plaintiff to the date of the receipt of the defendants’ offer to settle and order both parties to bear their own costs thereafter.

More on the New Rules, Formal Settlement Offers and Timelines for Acceptance

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 68 Comments on More on the New Rules, Formal Settlement Offers and Timelines for Acceptance


As I’ve previously written, the new formal settlement offer rule (Rule 9) reads almost identically to the former Rule 37B.   Under the former rules BC Courts were reluctant to have formal settlement offers trigger costs consequences following trial where the offer was open for acceptance for a short period of time.  Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, reaching a similar result under Rule 9.
In today’s case (Hunter v. Anderson) the Plaintiff sued for injuries as a result of a slip and fall incident.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant made a formal settlement offer for $25,000.  This offer was made one week before trial and was left open for acceptance for only 3 days.  The Plaintiff declined the offer and proceeded to trial.  After trial the Defendant was found 25% at fault for the fall and the Plaintiff was awarded just over $9,000 in damages.
The Defendant asked to be awarded their costs from the time of the offer onward.  Mr. Justice Cullen refused to do so finding that the offer was not alive for a reasonable period of time and split the costs the parties were entitled to.   In reaching this verdict the Court provided the following reasons:
[14] In dealing with the first issue under Rule 9-1(6), whether the offer was one that might reasonably have been accepted “the analysis is not one of hindsight, once the final result is known”.  See A.E. v. D.W.J. 2009 BCSC 505; Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372.  In the present case, the operative offer of the defendant was made relatively late in the day and was essentially premised on the defendant having no potential liability, but simply to offset the costs of a potential trial…

[15]         In my view, on balance, in the circumstances, despite the ultimate result, given the short duration of the offer, the fact that it was not based on an assessment of the liability of the defendant, it could not be characterized as one which ought reasonably to have been accepted.  I note that on March 9, 2010, when the offer was made, the defendant had not yet provided her fourth and final list of documents which was provided on March 10th.  As well, there was ongoing disclosure of the plaintiff’s documents.

[16]         In addition I note that in Bailey v. Jang, supra, Hinkson J. (as he then was) considered a seven day period “a reasonable time after which the plaintiff could consider (the defendant’s) offer” for purposes of awarding double costs under the old Rule 37B(6) after the expiry of that period…

Although the defendant tendered her offer on March 9th, six days before trial, it was in the context of ongoing disclosure and was left open, effectively, for only three days.  The plaintiff did not have the benefit of a great deal of time to assess the defendant’s offer.  In the context of Bailey v. Jang, Hinkson J. considered a seven day period “a reasonable period of time after which the plaintiff could consider their offer”.  I conclude a similar period is appropriate to impute in the circumstances of this case where the plaintiff was deprived of the ability to accept the defendant’s offer after only three days effectively commencing March 10th.  In light of that factor and the others I have set forth, I award the plaintiff, as indicated, the costs and disbursements up to and including the first two days of trial, and the defendants their costs and disbursements for the six days comprising the balance of the trial.

BCCA Finds Courts Can Consider Insurance Under Rule 37B

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on BCCA Finds Courts Can Consider Insurance Under Rule 37B


Very important reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Court of Appeal addressing a key factor under Rule 37B.
By way of brief introduction Rule 37B is the current rule dealing with formal settlement offers.   (Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 next month but the new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B).
The Court can take formal settlement offers into account when awarding a party costs.  One factor the Court can consider in deciding whether to award costs or increased costs under Rule 37B is “the relative financial circumstances of the parties“.
In most personal injury lawsuits Defendants are insured such that they don’t have a significant financial stake in the outcome of the trial.  BC Supreme Court judges have been conflicted in whether insurance is a relevant consideration when viewing the financial circumstances of the parties.  Today the BC Court of Appeal addressed this issue for the first time.
In today’s case (Smith v. Tedford) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  Before trial the Plaintiff made a formal settlement offer.   Several days into trial the Defendant accepted the offer.   The parties could not agree on the costs consequences.  The trial judge awarded the Plaintiff costs to the time the offer was made and double costs for the time spent at trial.  (You can click here to read my post summarizing the trial judge’s reasons).  In doing so the Judge considered the fact that the Defendant was insured with ICBC as relevant to his ‘financial circumstances“.
ICBC, on behalf of the Defendant, appealed arguing that the Judge was wrong to consider insurance.   In a welcome development the BC Court of Appeal found as follows:
While I recognize arguments over the implications of a defendant’s insurance coverage being considered in relation to an award of costs may go back and forth, like the judge I consider precluding such from consideration renders an assessment of the parties’ relative financial circumstances, at least in a case of this kind, very artificial indeed. Clearly, with ICBC having assumed the defence, the financial ability to defend was much greater than the financial ability to prosecute, and that is of no small importance to considering whether and to what extent the financial circumstances of the parties, relative to each other, bear on an award of costs where, as here, there has been an offer of settlement made ten days before a trial for the assessment of personal injury damages which was not accepted until the seventh day of the trial.