In a fairly typical exercise of a Court’s discretion pursuant to Rule 9-1(5), reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Plaintiff to pay a Defendant’s trial costs for failing to accept a reasonable pre-trial formal settlement offer.
In last week’s case (Bevacqua v. Yaworksi) the Plaintiff sustained a fracture wrist in a motor vehicle collision. The fracture went on to cause long term complications
The Plaintiff advanced damages over $500,000. At trial the Plaintiff was awarded $121,000 in damages, $85,000 of which was for non-pecuniary loss. Prior to trial the Defendant tabled a formal offer of $210,000. It is noteworthy that this offer was tabled the last week before trial and was only open for acceptance for two days. The Court found that in these circumstances the offer was reasonable and stripped the Plaintiff of post offer costs and further ordered the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s trial costs. In doing so Mr. Justice Curtis provided the following reasons:
 In personal injury claims, in which liability has been admitted, there is in most cases a somewhat predictable range of possible awards. It is to be expected that counsel taking a case to trial will have discussed with their clients the possible range of damages, the evidentiary issues and the risks of and expense of proceeding to trial. It is to be expected therefore that as the trial approaches, counsel and their client have in mind a possible range of recovery and the risks of litigating. Naturally, a plaintiff hopes for an award in the high end of the range and the defendant for an award at the low end.
 The Rule relied upon by the defendant is clearly intended to encourage settlements on the basis of reasonable offers. To be fair, of course, the offer must have been one which ought reasonably to have been accepted, and must have been presented in a reasonable manner and in sufficient time to be properly assessed.
 Clearly, in this case, the plaintiff and her counsel were of the opinion that it was worth taking the chance that she would do better than the offer at trial.
 In my opinion, on my analysis of the medical evidence put forward to support the claim for future care costs, there was little likelihood of an award of $400,000 for future care costs, however, the general damages could have been $100,000 and $15,000 was received for the in trust claim – which suggests the $210,000 new money offer was an offer of something like $100,000 for future care costs.
 In my opinion, a rigorous analysis of the evidence for the claim for costs of future care at the time the offer was open would have lead to the conclusion that the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted. The recovery at trial, particularly for future care costs was markedly less than offered.
 In the circumstances I find that a just result between the parties in this case is an order Emilia Bevacqua recover the costs of her action up to Friday, March 16, at 4:00 p.m. when the offer expired and that the defendant recover costs thereafter, both to be assessed according to Scale “B”.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Cranbrook Registry, highlighting the Court’s discretion with respect to costs consequences following a trial in which a pre-trial formal settlement offer was made.
In this week’s case (Russell v. Parks) the Plaintiff was injured when struck by the Defendant’s vehicle while walking in a parking lot. Liability was at issue and ultimately the Plaintiff was found 2/3 responsible for the incident. After factoring this split in the Plaintiff’s assessed damages came to $28,305. Prior to trial ICBC paid more than this amount in Part 7 benefits which are deductible from the damage assessment pursuant to section 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.
Despite proving partial liability against the Defendant and further proving damages, the Plaintiff’s claim was ultimately dismissed due to the above statutory deduction with Mr. Justice Abrioux providing the following reasons:
 In my view, this reasoning applies to this case, where the application of section 83(5) of the Act results in there being an award of $0 to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the action is dismissed and this should be reflected in the order.
Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer for $25,000 of ‘new money’. The Court needed to consider what costs consequences ought to flow in these circumstances. In awarding the Plaintiff 75% of pre-offer costs and having each party bear their own post offer costs the Court provided the following reasons:
 The dismissal of the action does not necessarily mean the plaintiff is disentitled to any costs: see McElroy v. Embleton, at para. 10.
 The first question is, putting aside for the moment the issue of Part 7 benefits paid, how should costs be apportioned from the time of the commencement of the action until April 13, 2012? At trial, I found the defendant to be one-third liable for the plaintiff’s loss. ..
 Having considered these authorities, and subject to my findings below regarding the Part 7 benefits, I find the plaintiff is entitled to 75% of his costs up to the date of the settlement offer of April 13, 2012. This reflects the fact that although the amount of time spent on determining liability at the trial was not “minimal”, more time was spent regarding the assessment of damages. This was shown in the medical evidence led, the reports which were obtained and the like. It would be unjust not to exercise my discretion to depart from the default rule referred to in paragraph 26 above in these circumstances.
 The next issue is whether the payment of the Part 7 benefits should affect the award of costs…
 This is not an appropriate case, in my view, to conclude as is submitted by the defendant that the plaintiff should not have proceeded to trial. It was not readily foreseeable to either party what the result was going to be with respect to liability or the quantum of damages. In so far as liability is concerned, I noted at para. 31 of my reasons for judgment that cases dealing with competing duties of pedestrians and operators of motor vehicles are highly fact specific.
 Taking all of these factors into account, I conclude that for the time period up to the defendant’s settlement offer of April 13, 2012, the plaintiff shall be awarded 75% of his costs and disbursements…
 What is the effect of the settlement offer made by the defendant for $25,000 of “New Money” as defined in counsel’s correspondence dated April 13, 2012? The New Money was in addition to the Part 7 benefits already received by the plaintiff. No objection was taken by the plaintiff to the form of the defendant’s offer to settle…
 Upon considering the factors in R. 9-1(6), I do not accept the defendant’s submission that double costs are appropriate. There is no reason for the plaintiff to be subject to a punitive measure. He was not unreasonable in rejecting the settlement offer. The issues at trial made the apportionment of liability quite uncertain. There was also a considerable range in the amount of damages which could have been awarded. The plaintiff’s finances would be greatly impacted if an order for double costs was made against him. In addition, the end result was effectively a nil judgment.
 Taking into account the legal principles to which I have referred and the particular circumstances which exist in this case, I conclude each party should bear their respective costs after the date of the defendant’s offer to settle. The plaintiff has already suffered some financial consequences for proceeding to trial in that I have decided he shall not receive 100% of his costs until the defendant’s offer to settle, but rather 75% of those costs.
Last month I discussed the fact that withdrawn formal settlement offers are capable of triggering costs consequences. Reasons for judgement were released recently confirming this fact and awarding a Plaintiff double costs after besting a formal settlement offer which was withdrawn in the course of trial.
In the recent case (Pitts v. Martin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. The injuries included chronic soft tissue injuries and post traumatic stress which limited the Plaintiff in physical tasks.
Prior to trial she provided a formal settlement offer of $100,000. During the course of the trial the Plaintiff withdrew her formal offer. The trial judgement exceeded her offer by $7,500. The Plaintiff asked for double costs. The defendant objected arguing a withdrawn offer could not trigger costs consequences. Mr. Justice Dley disagreed and awarded double costs. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 …I am satisfied that in a case like this, an offer made on May 15th would have given the defendant sufficient time to make a reasoned analysis and respond in a timely fashion. It is not an offer that was made on the eve of the trial commencing, without an opportunity to have it fully considered. It is no impediment that the offer was withdrawn at the close the the Plaintiff’s case. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for double costs following the offer…
To my knowledge this judgement is not publicly available. As always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.
Further to my previous posts detailing the potential costs consequences following trials with formal settlement offers in place, reasons for judgement were released last week addressing this topic finding that costs consequences should be applied in an “even-handed” way and further should not unduly deter Plaintiff’s from bringing meritorious, but uncertain claims “because of the fear of a punishing costs order“.
In last week’s case (Currie v. McKinnon) the Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries in a collision which substantially recovered within one year. Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $40,000. The Plaintiff rejected this offer and proceeded to trial where he was awarded $22,000 in damages.
ICBC applied for double costs from the time of the offer onward. Madam Justice Adair found that such a result was unwarranted and instead stripped the Plaintiff of post offer costs and disbursements. In doing so the Court provided the following sensible comments:
 I think it certainly can be argued that if a defendant who has made an offer to settle in an amount higher than the amount awarded to the plaintiff at trial (and that is what has been done in this case) was then awarded double costs, this would skew the procedure in favour of defendants and unfairly penalize and pressure plaintiffs. This is because a plaintiff who rejected an offer to settle would potentially risk a triple cost penalty if he or she were to win at trial an amount less than the offer. The plaintiff would suffer loss of the costs that he or she would normally receive on obtaining judgment at trial, and face double costs payable to the defendant.
 In my view, there is a good reason to apply Rule 9-1 in a way that is even-handed, or more even-handed, as between plaintiffs and defendants. I would say for this reason one would expect to see double costs awarded to a defendant, using the offer to settle procedure, in exceptional circumstances only, such as a situation where the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed all together after a plaintiff rejected an offer to settle.
 That is not the case here. In my view, Mr. McKechnie, despite his able arguments, simply did not identify for me how the circumstances here were so exceptional as to justify an award of double costs against Mr. Currie. While the purpose of the Rule is to encourage reasonable settlements, parties should not be unduly deterred from bringing meritorious, but uncertain, claims because of the fear of a punishing costs order…
 Having considered all of the factors in this case, I am not satisfied that it would be appropriate to award the defendants double costs as sought by Mr. McKechnie. I have discussed earlier in these reasons my concerns about how that can have the effect of skewing the procedure in favour of defendants and unfairly pressurize and penalize plaintiffs, and I think that would be the result in this case. Liability was admitted by the defendants. Mr. Currie’s case was not dismissed. Rather, he recovered judgment for non-pecuniary damages in an amount that was greater than what the defendants argued at trial he should recover.
 However, in my view, the defendants’ offer to settle cannot be ignored. That would undermine the purpose behind the rule…
 In my view, therefore, the double costs sought by the defendants are neither a fair nor just result. However, in my view, it is not a fair or just result for Mr. Currie to recover costs after he had had a reasonable opportunity with his counsel to review and consider the defendants’ offer to settle. I would say that by November 30, 2011, Mr. Currie and his counsel had had a reasonable opportunity to review and consider the defendants’ offer and ask any questions they deemed necessary if they thought clarification was necessary.
 In my view, the defendants should not have to pay Mr. Currie’s costs after November 30, 2011. However, I do not think it a fair result that Mr. Currie should have to pay the defendants’ costs after November 30, 20011, given his success ultimately at trial.
 My order then, with respect to costs, is that Mr. Currie will recover his costs and disbursements up to and including November 30, 2011, and that each side bear their own costs thereafter.
Adding to this site’s archived posts of costs consequences following trials with formal settlement offers, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing this topic following a ‘liability only’ trial.
In this week’s case (Cyr v. Blaine) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision. The parties agreed that, subject to proving fault, the value of the claim was $60,000. The parties could not agree on fault both arguing the other was to blame. Prior to trial the Plaintiff delivered a formal settlement offer of $50,000.
At trial the Defendant was found fully at fault entitling the Plaintiff to the agreed damages of $60,000. Mr. Justice Saunders found that it was appropriate to award the Plaintiff post offer double costs in these circumstances. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 The defendants say that it was reasonable for them to try the case on the basis of their theory that the plaintiff had a duty to look to her left as she passed by the front of the vehicle that had stopped for her in the intersection. But even if the plaintiff had been under an obligation to anticipate that there might be another vehicle in the same lane as the stopped vehicle, attempting to pass that stopped vehicle on the left, the defendants had no evidence that, by the time she would have been able to see the defendants’ vehicle, she would have been able to bring her own vehicle to a stop in time to avoid the collision, given the defendants’ speed.
 The defendant Mr. Blaine passed a stopped vehicle, on its left, when he was in the same lane as that vehicle. As I found, it ought to have been apparent to Mr. Blaine from the opening in the divider separating eastbound and westbound traffic that he was passing through an intersection, and that cars travelling in his direction had stopped to let a vehicle or vehicles through the intersection. By the time the subject offer was delivered, it ought to have been apparent to the defendants that they would be found wholly or at least substantially liable for the accident.
 Given that damages had been agreed at $60,000, the plaintiff’s $50,000 offer represented a discount of roughly 17%, or, to put it another way, roughly a 50% chance of a finding of one-third contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part. It was an offer that reasonably ought to have been accepted upon delivery.
 The plaintiff, I find, is entitled to double costs of all steps taken after the offer was delivered.
In my continued efforts to track the judicial shaping of Rule 9-1, reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, ordering double costs following trial where a Plaintiff bested a withdrawn formal settlement offer.
In the recent case (Bartel v. Milliken) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. Prior to trial the Plaintiff delivered a formal settlement offer of $29,800. This offer was withdrawn after trial but before judgement. The trial ended in March of 2012 and judgement was delivered in April. The judgement exceeded the Plaintiff’s formal offer by abot $9,000. The Plaintiff applied for post offer double costs. The Defendant argued these should not be awarded since the offer was withdrawn. Madam Justice Gerow rejected this argument and awarded post-offer double costs. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 As stated earlier, the defendants submit the fact that Ms. Bartel withdrew her offer after trial is a factor which weighs against the awarding of double costs because it deprived the defendants of the ability to accept the offer at a later date as contemplated by the rule.
 However, at the same time the defendants concede that the intention and spirit of the rule governing formal offers to settle is to avoid the cost of a trial. In my view, the fact that Ms. Bartel withdrew her offer to settle between the time the trial ended and judgment was rendered is not a factor that weighs against an award of double costs.
As previously discussed, when a Plaintiff fails to beat a Defendant’s formal settlement offer at trial they can be exposed to significant costs consequences. One factor that Courts can consider when using their discretion is the financial status of the parties including whether the Defendant is insured. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, using this factor in shielding a Plaintiff from potentially hefty costs consequences.
In this week’s case (Cunningham v. Bloomfield) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. She sued for damages and the claim proceeded to jury trial. Prior to trial the Defendant provided a formal settlement offer of $12,500. The jury awarded $5,000 in total damages triggering a Defence application for payment of post offer costs. Mr. Justice Crawford rejected the application finding stripping the Plaintiff of all her costs was a more appropriate result. In addressing the financial position of the parties the Court provided the following reasons:
 The award of the jury was low. But as noted in Cairns at para. 50, the unpredictability of a jury is a relevant consideration.
 It is said that the plaintiff is not lacking in income and no evidence as to her assets have been put forward to properly consider her position. But as discussed in several of the cases, the defendant through their insurer is able to cover their costs. The plaintiff on the other hand has a dependent husband and a reduced income, though that by choice.
 The other factor I consider appropriate is of course my assessment of the plaintiff’s case upon the issuing of the writ and I have found counsel’s assessment was over-optimistic and therefore the plaintiff is already deprived of costs.
 In the circumstances I will allow the plaintiff her disbursements throughout, but I will make no order as to costs payable to either side.
In a good demonstration of the Court’s discretion following a trial where a Plaintiff does not beat a pre-trial defence formal settlement offer, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, taking a Plaintiff’s post offer costs and disbursements away but not requiring the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s costs and disbursements.
In this week’s case (Tompkins v. Bruce) the Plaintiff turned down a pre-trial formal settlement offer of $950,000. Following trial the Plaintiff was awarded net damages of $851,437. ICBC applied for post offer costs. Mr. Justice Curtis found such a result would not be appropriate and instead took away the Plaintiff’s post offer costs and disbursements. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 When the offer in this case was received on October 6, 2011, the plaintiff and his counsel were in possession of the information necessary to make a realistic assessment of the potential recovery. Naturally, there is no mathematical certainty in those matters and differing courts may give differing amounts. The plaintiff and his counsel would clearly have contemplated a range of possible recoveryies. The plaintiff, of course, hopes for the high end of the range and the paying party the low ? settlements are often made somewhere in between.
 The offer in this case was reasonable on the facts of the case as they were known to the parties. It could reasonably have been accepted as being within the range of possible recovery, although likely it would not have been thought by either party at the high end of the range. The amount of the Offer was reasonable as was its timing: the information necessary to assess the claim was in the possession of the parties, yet there was plenty of time to give careful consideration to the matter before the November trial date. On the other hand, Mr. Tompkins was seriously injured. He and his counsel’s view of the matter was that it was worthwhile going to court in the hope of getting a significantly higher award. It cannot be said that such a decision was unreasonable at the time.
 The purpose of cost consequences of reasonable offers is to encourage settlement. On the other hand, onerous cost penalties should not discourage the seriously injured from a proper hearing and a chance to obtain a higher award, nor should they seriously subtract from what the court has found is appropriate compensation for the injury.
 Considering the factors set out in the Rules, it is my opinion that the interests of justice are best served in this case by awarding Mr. Tompkins his costs and disbursements up to and including October 31, 2011, but disallowing them after that date, with the Third Party to bear its own costs. There is then a consequence for not accepting a reasonable Offer, but the consequence is not unduly punitive in the circumstances.
Today’s case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of various Part 7 Deductions following a tort action.
One of the most welcome developments under the New Rules of Court (and for a short while prior to their introduction, Rule 37B) was the introduction of discretion to the costs process following trials where formal settlement offers were made. It used to be that if a Plaintiff had their case dismissed at trial where a formal offer was made before hand (even a $1 offer) the Plaintiff was forced to pay double costs. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this discretion in action.
In last week’s case (Byer v. Mills) the Plaintiff was one of two occupants of a vehicle involved in a serious collision. Prior to trial the Parties agreed to quantum of $125,000. The parties could not agree on the issue of liability with ICBC arguing the Plaintiff was the driver of the at-fault vehicle (not the passenger as he alleged). ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $5,000.
At trial the Plaintiff’s case was dismissed with the Court finding he likely was the driver. ICBC asked for double costs to be awarded. Mr. Justice Harris refused to do so finding a nuisance offer that does not provide a genuine incentive to settle should trigger double costs. The Court provided the following reasons:
 It is in these circumstances that one must assess whether the offer of $5,000 plus costs was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff. Although the prospect of the plaintiff succeeding was always highly uncertain and difficult realistically to assess, I cannot see that it can fairly be characterised as a case that was lacking in some substantial merit. In my view, the offer does not rise above a nuisance offer. The merits of the case, on both sides, and the uncertainties facing all parties, called for a more substantial offer if the offer were to serve the purposes of the Rule. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff while it was open for acceptance.
 In reaching this conclusion, I have approached the question whether the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff from the plaintiff’s perspective. It will be apparent, however, from my general comments about the inherent uncertainties affecting predicting the merits of the case, that I do not view the offer that was made as objectively reasonable. In that sense, I cannot conclude that it provided a genuine incentive to settle the case. The offer does not possess those characteristics that would justify rewarding the party who was successful at trial with an award of double costs.
 I turn to consider the other considerations that may justify an award of special costs, even though the offer is not one that ought reasonably to have been accepted. I approach these factors recognising that the Rule is intended to penalise a party for failing to accept an offer and reward a party who makes a reasonable settlement offer. In brief, I do not find that any of those considerations justify an award of double costs.
 Although the plaintiff would clearly have been substantially better off to have accepted the offer, this consideration standing alone is not determinative.
 I cannot conclude that the relative financial circumstances of the parties lend support to the conclusion that, nonetheless, an award of double costs is justified.
 I am not persuaded that there are any other considerations that would justify an award of double costs. The defendants criticised the cross-examination of their expert, which they characterised as suggesting guilt by association. I did not view the cross-examination as overstepping reasonable professional boundaries.
 The application for double costs is dismissed. There will be one set of costs.
(Update – April 19, 2013 – The below decision should be cross-referenced with reasons for judgement released today (Gonzales v. Voskakis) where Madam Justice Fitzpatrick came to a different conclusion)
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, confirming that the Court cannot award double disbursements following a trial where a formal settlement offer was bested.
In this week’s case (Moore v. Kyba) the Plaintiff was awarded substantial damages in a jury trial following a motor vehicle collision. The damages awarded exceeded both the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s pre-trial formal settlement offers. The Plaintiff brought an application seeking double costs and double disbursements. Mr. Justice Brown held that while it was appropriate to award double costs, Rule 9-1 does not go so far as to give the Court authority to award double disbursements. Mr. Justice Brown provided the following reasons:
I am not convinced by the applicant’s argument. The repeal of the definition relied on in Browne v. Lowe is not determinative and does not require its reversal. In any event, I conclude that the proper interpretation of Rule 9-1(5) does not permit the Court to award double disbursements. In Rule 9-1(5)(a), the rule specifically provides for disbursements, while Rule 9-1(5)(b) does not. Therefore, properly interpreted, Rule 9-1(5)(b) does not permit the Court to award double disbursements after the delivery or service of the offer to settle.