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Tag: Rule 12

Sexual Assault and Vicarious Liability Claims are not "Too Complex" For a Jury

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Sexual Assault Civil Cases, Uncategorized.

Useful reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing a jury strike application in a personal injury lawsuit for damages from sexual abuse.
In the recent case (JG v. Kolesar) the Plaintiff was sexually abused by her teacher.  He was criminally convicted for his acts.  The Plaintiff sued him and his employer for damages alleging negligence and vicarious liability on the part of the School District.  The matter was set for trial by jury.  The School District opposed this and brought an application to strike the Jury Notice under Rule 12-6(5) arguing that  “the law on the questions of causation (the concept of indivisible injury), vicarious liability, and assessment of damages is all too complex for a jury to understand”
Master Bouck disagreed and dismissed the School District’s jury strike application.  In doing so the Court provided the following helpful reasons:
[31]  On the question of causation, damages and the concept of indivisible injury, some authorities cited by (the School Board’s lawyer) have since been refined by the court of appeal’s decision in Bradley v. Groves, 2010 BCCA 361.  Notably, the appellate court has refined the method by which a finder of fact can determine causation and apportion damages where there are multiple tortfeasors contributing to the plaintiff’s injury and loss.
[32]  In my view, the step-by-step analysis set out in Bradley v. Groves can be nicely imported into a set of instruction and questions for the jury.
[33]  Accordingly, I am not at all pessimistic about the jury’s ability to decide the questions which the defence says are too complex in this litigation.  A trial judge will be perfectly capable of instructing a jury on the relevant legal concepts of causation, apportionment of damages, and vicarious liability…
[35]   Once properly instructed, the assessment of the plaintiff’s damages is most certainly not a question beyond the capability of a modern jury.  In my observation and experience, juries are often called upon to assess damages where there are multiple tort-feasors and pre-existing conditions.
Today’s case is unpublished however, as always, I’m happy to share a copy of the reasons for judgement with anyone who contacts me and requests a copy.

Defendant Called During Plaintiff's Case in Traumatic Brain Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Civil Procedure, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on Defendant Called During Plaintiff's Case in Traumatic Brain Injury Claim

In most BC Supreme Court lawsuits Plaintiff’s obtain evidence from the opposing side prior to trial by way of examination for discovery.   Helpful portions of the discovery transcript are then read into the trial record in support of the Plaintiff’s claim.   This is a controlled way to lead helpful evidence from a potentially damaging source.
There is, however, another way (albeit a riskier way) to use the Defendant in support of a Plaintiff’s claim.  The Rules of Court allow one party to call an “adverse party” as part of their case in chief with delivery of a subpoena and witness fees.   Rule 12-5(22) goes further and allows a Plaintiff to put the Defendant on the witness stand without notice if the Defendant is “in attendance at the trial“.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, demonstrating this seldom used option in action.
In last week’s case (Rintoul v. Gabriele) the Plaintiff pedestrian was struck while in a cross-walk.   The Plaintiff was born without upper limbs and after being struck “would have been unable to break her fall.  In landing on the pavement, she hit her head and was briefly unconscious“.
Both liability and quantum (fault and value of the case) were at issue with the Defendant arguing the Plaintiff was to blame at least in part for the collision and that her on-going issues were not related to the brain trauma suffered in the collision.  Mr. Justice Saunders disagreed and found the Defendant fully at fault for the impact.  In the course of the trial the Plaintiff’s lawyer took advantage of Rule 12-5(22) and put the Defendant on the stand as their first witness.  Damaging admissions were extracted which could not be remedied when the Defendant was re-called as a witness in the Defence case.  In highlighting this interesting turn of events Mr. Justice Saunders provided the following reasons:
[7] The defendant, Ms. Gabriele, was in attendance on the first day of trial. She was called to the witness stand as the first witness for the plaintiff’s case, and cross-examined…























[14] Ms. Gabriele testified that she was turning her vehicle and had just started to enter the pedestrian crosswalk, going perhaps 10 or 15 km/h, when she felt a bump, and saw a flash of a face in her headlights. She stopped and got out, and ran to the front of her vehicle. The plaintiff was lying unconscious in the crosswalk.

[15] Ms. Gabriele was not challenged on her estimate of her speed.

[16] Ms. Gabriele was asked why she did not, after looking to the right, look to the left again before making her turn, to see if any of the pedestrians she had previously seen on the southeast corner were walking in the crosswalk. She replied, “I made a mistake”….
























[24] There was a break in the trial of just over two months. During that time period, Ms. Gabriele walked through the accident scene with her counsel. After the trial resumed, Ms. Gabriele was called to give evidence as part of the defence case. Testifying in chief, she gave a slightly different version of events. She said in her evidence in chief that after looking at the southwest corner, she looked back in front of her, did not see anything, and then proceeded to make her turn.

[25] I do not accept this second version of events…

The Court went on to conclude that the Plaintiff did suffer from long term consequences as a result of her injuries and assessed global damages at just over $950,000 including non-pecuniary damages of $175,000.  In addition to the above point of civil procedure, this case is worth reviewing in full for Mr. Justice Saunders lengthy discussion of the expert evidence called to address the issue of the Plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury.

Trial Management Conferences and the Attendance Requirement

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 23, Uncategorized. 113 Comments on Trial Management Conferences and the Attendance Requirement


The first published reasons for judgement addressing Trial Management Conference attendance requirements pursuant to Rule 12-2(4) were released this week on the BC Supreme Court website.
In this week’s case (Luis v. Haw) the Plaintiff was involved in 4 separate motor vehicle collisions.   A lawsuit was started following each collision and these were set for trial at the same time.  All the Defendants were apparently insured with ICBC.
As the Trial Management Conference neared ICBC made an application requesting that “(the personal) defendants are exempt from attending the trial management conference; secondly, that Mr. Kevin Munt, who appears to be an adjuster at the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, “represent” the defendants at the trial management conference, and that Kevin Munt be allowed to attend the trial management conference by telephone“.
The Court largely dismissed the application and in doing so Mr. Justice Groves provided the following useful comments about the attendance requirement for Trial Management Conferences:

[19] The first concern raised by the letter and the requisition is the request that Kevin Munt “represent” the defendants at the trial management conference. That is the language in the requisition.

[20] If this is a request for Kevin Munt, who is an adjuster, to appear and that counsel not appear, that is completely inappropriate. Trial management conferences are significant and they are a significant change to the rules. They are mandatory and no trial certificate is issued without the parties attending. Though interlocutory, trial management conferences cannot be done by Masters, who do not hear trials. In my view, this suggests the drafters of the rules have placed significant emphasis on the requirement of trial management conferences.

[21] Noting that, I also then note that there are a number of matters that can be discussed at trial management conferences, as set out in subrule 12?2(9), that require legal analysis and are clearly not within the knowledge of an adjuster representing an insurance company. These include:  (a) a plan as to how the trial was to be conducted; (c) amendments to pleadings within a fixed time; (d) admissions of fact at trial; (e) admission of documents at trial; (i) respecting experts’ reports and issues dealing with experts’ reports; (l) an adjournment of trial; and (m) directing the number of days reserved for trial to be changed.

[22] Without even considering the clear requirement that people are represented in court by counsel or by themselves, it is, from my reading of what is to transpire at a trial management conference, completely inappropriate to suggest that when a defendant has counsel, that someone else, in this case an adjuster, appear essentially as counsel at a trial management conference. It is impossible to imagine how the requirements of a trial management conference can be accomplished by an adjuster appearing on behalf of the defendants, as may be the request in this requisition.

[23] If, however, this is a request that the adjuster attend in substitution of the mandatory requirement of the defendants’ attendance, that is governed by Rule 12?2(5).

[24] Rule 12?2(5) clearly contemplates a circumstance, which may be present here, which is that an individual who has full authority to make decisions for a party in the action or an individual who has ready access to the person or group of persons who collectively have full authority to make decisions for a party to an action can attend in place of a party. It appears from the evidence before me that Kevin Munt may fall into this category. I will say, however, that it is not appropriate for an adjuster to attend on behalf of defendants, unless he or she has the real authority to make decisions for the defendants. It is not good enough to say, as has been said before me, “That exceeds my current authority”, “I have to go back to the committee and they won’t be meeting for another week”.

[25] That, in my view, defeats the whole purpose of Rule 12?2(5). Ready access, the words in the rule, means really that the adjuster has to have either authority to make decisions or the ability, while the court stands down, to make a phone call to get the instructions he requires to properly speak for the defendant at the trial management conference.

[26] This lack of authority cannot be used as an excuse that prohibits the proper conduct of court actions at trial management conferences, when it is such a representation that allows the representative of the defendant to attend in the first place. Clearly the rule contemplates letting those who represent defendants, such as insurance adjusters, attend in the place of defendants. Insurers may wish to not require their defendants to personally attend. I do note however that there appears to be an increasingly internal requirement that defendants attend at trial, even when liability is not at issue. The adjuster who does attend must have the ability to deal with all matters or have ready, immediate access to those who can so instruct…



[33] In conclusion, if the suggestion in this requisition is that Kevin Munt attend on behalf of the defendants, he is not counsel, he cannot attend without counsel.

[34] If this is a request that Kevin Munt attend in the place of the defendants themselves, which is permissible under the trial management conference rule, then I am satisfied, if Kevin Munt has the real authority or has ready access, and by that, immediate access to those who have authority, then he can attend pursuant to Rule 12?2(5).



This decision is also worth reviewing for Mr. Justice Groves discussion of Rule 23-5 and the circumstances when the Court should allow a party to attend a Court Proceeding via telephone.

Credibility Cases Not Suitable for Severance of Issues and Summary Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


Earlier this year Mr. Justice McEwan provided reasons for judgement finding that an order to sever issues under Rule 12-5(67) is a prerequisite to having only part of a case tried by way of summary trial.   Today, reasons for judgement were released confirming this point and finding that where credibility is an issue a case will likely not be suitable for severance or summary trial.
In today’s case (Erwin v. Helmer) the Plaintiff alleged injuries in a trip and fall incident.  She sued for damages under the Occupiers Liability Act.  The Defendants applied to dismiss the case via summary trial.  Mr. Justice McEwan dismissed the application finding that a a summary trial was not appropriate.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons regarding credibility, severance and summary trials:



[9] This case inherently turns on credibility. While counsel for the plaintiff has not objected to severance, the court must still be concerned with the proper application of summary process and with the sufficiency of the evidence on which it is expected to rule that a party will be deprived of a full hearing.

[10] It appears from what is before the court that the precise nature of the “hole” into which the plaintiff alleges she stepped will not be established with any precision. There nevertheless appears to be a question to be tried on the balance between the risk assumed by the plaintiff and the duty imposed on the defendants to ensure that the premises were reasonably safe. There is simply not enough material presently before the court to reliably make that call. The defendant relies on the fact that the plaintiff had been drinking as if that essentially speaks for itself, but the presence of drinking invitees on the defendant’s premises was, on the material, foreseeable. There is little, if any evidence as to what efforts, if any, were made to render the premises reasonably safe for those who attended the wedding in those circumstances, including, for example, whether paths were designated or lighting was supplied.

[11] The application is accordingly dismissed and, the whole matter will be put on the trial list. The question of severance, if it arises again, should be the subject of an application. Where credibility is a significant issue it should generally be decided on the whole case, not on the fraction of it, unless the test for severance has specifically been met. Otherwise the trier of fact may be deprived of useful information relevant to the over-all assessment of credibility.



Theft/Fire Loss Claims and ICBC "Examinations Under Oath"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 22, Uncategorized.


If you purchase Theft of Fire Damage coverage from ICBC and need to take advantage of this insurance can ICBC force you to provide a statement under oath before processing your claim?  The answer is yes and reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Nelson Registry, dealing with this area of the law.
In this week’s case (Cort v. ICBC) the Plaintiff had fire insurance coverage with ICBC.  On September 18, 2010 his vehicle was destroyed by fire.  He asked ICBC to pay his loss but ICBC refused to respond until he provided them with an “Examination Under Oath“.  He refused to do so and sued ICBC.  ICBC brought an application for various pre-trial relief including an order to ‘stay‘ the lawsuit until the Examination Under Oath was provided.  Master Keighley granted this order finding that the lawsuit could not move ahead until this ‘investigative’ step took place.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[28] Sections 6 and 8 of the Prescribed Conditions to the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation B.C. Reg. 156/2010 read as follows:

6(1)      If required by the insurer, the insured must, on the occurrence of loss or damage for which coverage is provided by this contract, deliver to the insurer within 90 days after the occurrence of the loss or damage a statutory declaration stating, to the best of the insured’s knowledge and belief, the place, time, cause and amount of the loss or damage, the interest of the insured and of all others in the vehicle, the encumbrances on the vehicle, all other insurance, whether valid or not, covering the vehicle and that the loss or damage did not occur through any wilful act or neglect, procurement, means or connivance of the insured.

(2)        An insured who has filed a statutory declaration must

(a)        on request of the insurer, submit to examination under oath,

(b)        produce for examination, at a reasonable time and place designated by the insurer, all documents in the insured’s possession or control relating to the loss or damage, and

(c)        permit copies of the documents to be made by the insurer.

8(1)      The insurer must pay the insurance money for which it is liable under this contract within 60 days after the proof of loss or statutory declaration has been received by it or, if an arbitration is conducted under section 177 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation, within 15 days after the award is rendered.

(2)        The insured must not bring an action to recover the amount of a claim under this contract unless the requirements of conditions 4, 5 and 6 are complied with and until the amount of the loss has been ascertained by an arbitrator under section 177, by a judgment after trial of the issue or by written agreement between the insurer and the insured.

(3)        Every action or proceeding against the insurer in respect of loss or damage for which coverage is provided under this contract must be commenced within 2 years from the occurrence of the loss or damage.

[29] Accordingly, says ICBC, since the insured may not commence an action to recover the amount of his claim until he has, inter alia, submitted to an examination under oath, at the very least he should be enjoined from proceeding with the claim…

[32] ….The purpose of an EUO, on the other hand is investigative. The insured is contractually bound to co-operate with his insurer by submitting to an examination which may assist the insurer in determining its response to the claim. The insured may not, as a matter of contract, seek to attach conditions to his attendance.

[33] In the circumstances the contract claim will be stayed until the plaintiff has complied with the requirements of the Prescribed Conditions. In the event that the parties cannot resolve the issue of compliance by agreement, they will have liberty to apply.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of transfer of claims to Small Claims Court under section 15 of the Supreme Court Act and further the severance of bad faith claims from breach of contract claims pursuant to Rule 22-5(6) and 12-5(67) of the Supreme Court Rules.

More on the Affidavit Evidence Prohibition At TMC's and CPC's

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 5, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on More on the Affidavit Evidence Prohibition At TMC's and CPC's


Further to my recent post on this topic, the law regarding the Affidavit Prohibition at Case Planning Conferences and Trial Management Conferences appears to be taking shape.  Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, taking a common sense approach to this prohibition.
In this week’s case (Enns v. Cahan) the Plaintiff sued for damages under the Family Compensation Act.  A trial management conference was held and the Defendant brought an application to strike the Plaintiff’s Jury Notice.  The Defendant did not provide any affidavits in support of his application relying only on the pleadings and an expert report which was intended to be introduced at trial.  The Defendant argued the case was too complex for a jury.
The application was dismissed with Madam Justice Gray finding that the case could appropriately be heard by a Jury.  Prior to making this finding the Court provided the following useful reasons about when it’s appropriate for a contested application to be heard at a TMC given the affidavit evidence prohibition:

[9] Rule 12-2(11) provides that:

(11)  A trial management conference judge must not, at a trial management conference,

(a) hear any application for which affidavit evidence is required, or

(b) make an order for final judgment, except by consent.

[10] Mr. Brun, Q.C., argued on behalf of Mr. Cahan that his application could proceed without affidavit evidence and on the basis of submissions by counsel alone. Mr. Brun provided the Court with a copy of the Bruce-Aldridge report and seeks to rely on that and the statement of claim as the basis for his application. Mr. LeBlanc argued on behalf of Mr. Enns that Mr. Cahan’s application requires evidence and that it is therefore one of the prohibited orders set out in Rule 12-2(11).

[11] The new Rules include Rule 1-3 as follows:

(1)  The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.

(2)  Securing the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of a proceeding on its merits includes, so far as is practicable, conducting the proceeding in ways that are proportionate to

(a) the amount involved in the proceeding,

(b) the importance of the issues in dispute, and

(c) the complexity of the proceeding.

[12] The new Rules have procedures which enable the court and the parties to design the procedure necessary to resolve a particular issue which is in question. The question of whether an application requires affidavit evidence will not always be determined by what remedy is sought. The question of what is in dispute will play a role, as well. In this case, Mr. Brun’s submissions are based on the Bruce-Aldridge report and the statement of claim. It is not necessary to require the parties to go to the trouble and expense of preparing affidavits when counsel can simply provide the court with a copy of the report in question and the pleadings.

[13] In my view, requiring affidavit evidence would not be consistent with the object of securing the inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits. Here, counsel agree that the Bruce-Aldridge report was tendered by Mr. Enns as a report he intends to rely on at trial as an expert report. As I have said, that report, together with the statement of claim, form the basis of Mr. Brun’s submissions. As a result, Mr. Cahan’s application can proceed as an application before the trial management judge.

Jury Notice Struck in Complex "Shaken Baby" Case

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Shaken Baby Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, striking a Jury Notice in a complex “shaken baby” case.
In this week’s case (Sivertson (Guardian ad litem of) v. Dutrisac) the Plaintiff claimed damages “for a brain injury suffered on June 11, 2001 while in the care of the defendant Dutrisac who was the owner and operator of a licensed daycare… The plaintiffs allege that the defendant Dutrisac was negligent in her care of the infant plaintiff, resulting in his fall to the floor where he struck his head and suffered a brain injury.  They claim that following the initial injury, Dutrisac further exacerbated that injury when she allegedly shook or jostled the infant so as to have him remain conscious.  The plaintiffs’ claim against the CHR is that it was negligent in its ongoing inspections of the daycare facility and in continuing to license that facility notwithstanding a number of complaints made by various parents over the weeks and months preceding the infant plaintiff’s injury.”
The Defendants brought an application pursuant to Rule 12-6(5) to strike the Plaintiff’s Jury Notice.  Madam Justice Boyd agreed that the case was not appropriate for a Jury to preside over and granted the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[16] Having considered the submissions of counsel and having reviewed the many expert reports which have been filed, I find that there are a plethora of elements in this case which raise issues of both complexity and intricacy.  The trial will be long.  It will involve two sets of defendants, each involving different standards of care.  The CHR defendants’ duty of care will be particularly complex to determine, given the statutory scheme and whether or not that scheme negates any private duty of care.

[17] However most complex of all will be the issues concerning the causation of the infant plaintiff’s brain injury, whether there was any pre-existing brain injury, and what damages may be attributed to the pre-existing brain injury, if any.  The determination of these issues will require that the jury consider and weigh the conflicting and highly complex evidence of a number of different medical experts from a number of different specialties.

[18] At the heart of this debate will be the central theme of the “shaken baby syndrome”, since, even on the basis of the plaintiffs’ expert’s amended opinion, the acceleration/deceleration theory of injury is advanced regarding the jostling of the child, following the initial fall.  As Mr. Lindsay has pointed out, the Shaken Baby Syndrome or the acceleration/deceleration mechanism of injury remains one of the most highly debated areas in the field of forensic pathology.  The debate continues to rage in the medical and scientific community concerning these types of injuries in infant children.  In this regard, I take particular note of the comments of Chief Judge Crabtree of the British Columbia Provincial Court in British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Service v. Z.B., 2011 BCPC 0072.

[19] I must note that while I have treated this application to strike the jury notice as a joint defence application, in fact, in my companion ruling I have already dismissed the action against the CHR.  In my view this does not result in any different ruling regarding the striking of the jury notice.

[20] On a consideration of all of these issues, but most particularly the medical and scientific evidence to be weighed, I find it is completely unrealistic to believe that even a well instructed, intelligent jury would be able to cope with the determination of all the issues here.  Thus I exercise my discretion under the rule and order that the jury notice be struck in this case.

New Rules Caselaw Update: More on Contested Applications at TMC's and CPC's

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 5, Uncategorized. 63 Comments on New Rules Caselaw Update: More on Contested Applications at TMC's and CPC's


Late last year reasons for judgment were released by the BC Supreme Court finding that Trial Management Conferences and Case Planning Conferences “are not generally the forum to determine contested applications.” . Reasons for judgement were released this week by Mr. Justice Smith taking a less restrictive view of this issue.
In today’s case (Jurczak v. Mauro) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  As trial neared the Plaintiff brought an application for an adjournment and this was granted in order to give the Plaintiff time to gather appropriate medico-legal evidence.  The Court was specifically asked whether it was permissible for contested applications to be heard at TMC’s.  Mr. Justice Smith held that such practice was permitted under the Rules.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[1] At a Trial Management Conference (TMC) on March 31, 2011, I made an order adjourning the trial in this matter, which had been set for May, 2, 2010.  I indicated that I would provide written reasons because the application raised a procedural question about the circumstances under which a judge at a TMC may hear and rule upon a contested adjournment application.

[2] The TMC was created by the new Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009 that came into effect on July 1, 2010.  Rule 12-2 (9) sets out a broad range of orders that can be made by the presiding judge at a TMC “whether or not on the application of a party.”  These include, at subparagraph (l), an order adjourning the trial.  However, Rule 12-2 (11) prohibits a TMC judge from hearing an application for which affidavit evidence is required…

[7] I do not understand Vernon to be suggesting that a judge at a TMC can never order an adjournment if one party objects.  No such restriction appears in Rule 12-2.  The Rule prohibits hearing applications that require affidavit evidence.  It is for the judge to decide whether a particular application requires affidavit evidence and whether any affidavits that have been tendered are relevant.

[8] The orders permitted by Rule 12-2 (9) are, broadly speaking, procedural in that they deal with the conduct of the trial, including how certain evidence is to be presented, the length of the trial and, in subparagraph (q), “any other matter that may assist in making the trial more efficient.”

[9] Rule 12-2 (3) requires the parties to file trial briefs in Form 41 identifying the issues in dispute (which, by that stage, may not be all of the issues raised in the pleadings), listing the witnesses, including experts, to be called and estimating the time necessary for the evidence of each witness.  The trial brief is an unsworn statement of counsel or the self-represented party.  The Rule clearly contemplates that the judge will make orders based on the information contained in the trial briefs, as supplemented by what is said at the TMC.  That is the only basis on which the orders permitted by the Rule could be made.

[10] In some cases where an adjournment, or any other order is sought, a judge may decide that supporting information is not adequate.  That was the situation in Vernon, where Goepel J. was presented with an affidavit of the plaintiff setting out the prejudice that would flow from an adjournment.  That evidence had to be weighed against any evidence of prejudice to the defendant if the adjournment was not granted.  Once the plaintiff’s affidavit was found to be relevant, evidence in proper form was required from the defendant and counsel’s statements, standing alone, were not acceptable.

[11] However, there are situations where the need for an adjournment can be clearly assessed on the basis of information provided at the TMC and affidavit evidence would be of no assistance.  For example, a judge may be able to determine simply from the trial briefs that the trial cannot possibly be completed in anything close to the estimated time, or that the number of pre-trial matters still to be dealt with shows that the case is not ready for trial.  If the judge could not order an adjournment in those circumstances, a large part of Rule 12-2’s purpose would be defeated….

[18] In summary, the fact that the adjournment application was contested would not, in itself, have prevented me from hearing and deciding it at the TMC.  In the circumstances, affidavit evidence was not necessary. I had jurisdiction to consider the adjournment application on the basis of information in the trial briefs and the statements of counsel at the TMC and I would have made the same decision had the matter proceeded on that basis.

Summary Trials and the Severance of Issues

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 58 Comments on Summary Trials and the Severance of Issues


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with an interesting question: is a Court order for severance of issues required prior to a Court adjudicating an issue (as opposed to the entirety of a claim) in a summary trial?
The reason why this is an issue is due to two competing Rules of Court.  Rule 9-7(2) permits a party to “apply to the court for judgement…either on an issue or generally“.  On the face of it this rule seems to permit a party to apply for only part of a case to be dealt with summarily.  However, Rule 12-5(67) requires a Court Order to sever issues in a lawsuit stating that “the court may order that one or more questions of fact or law arising in an action be tried and determined before the others“:.
In this week’s case (Chun v. Smit) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  He brought a motion for the issue of liability to be addressed on a summary trial.  The Defendant opposed arguing that a summary trial was not appropriate.  Mr. Justice McEwan agreed and dismissed the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons finding that an order to sever issues under Rule 12-5(67) is a prerequisite to having only part of a case tried by way of summary trial:

[7] The question is really whether Rule 9-7 merely describes a mode of trial, while the claim or cause of action remains otherwise subject to the rules that govern trial, or whether the trial of an “issue” under Rule 9-7, where that issue is the severance of liability from quantum, somehow bypasses Rule 12-5 (67) and falls to be decided on a lower standard.

[8] In the brief passage excerpted from Bramwell (above), three different approaches are apparent. It seems to me, however, that whether the test for severance, or of a trial of an “issue” is rationalized as within or outside Rule 9-7, it must meet the standard set out in Bramwell. Rule 9-7 is, in itself, a departure from the ordinary mode of hearing a trial, and proceedings within it are contingent upon the court accepting that the compromises inherent in that process will not impair the courts’ ability to do justice. That being so, it would be illogical that collateral to the compromises inherent in proceeding by summary trial, other aspect of the process were similarly downgraded. If a trial of an issue is found to be an appropriate way to proceed, it may be tried under Rule 9-7, if Rule 9-7 itself is properly applicable.  Where a party seeks to proceed on only part of a case under Rule 9-7, the first question is whether there should be severance at all, and the second is whether Rule 9-7 is appropriate. The correct approach is set out in Bramwell, which would bind me in any case (see Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd. (Re), [1954] 4 D.L.R. 590 (B.C.S.C.)).

More on ICBC Claim Adjournments: Discretion and Court Ordered Conditions

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Uncategorized. 7 Comments on More on ICBC Claim Adjournments: Discretion and Court Ordered Conditions


Rule 12-1(9) gives the BC Supreme Court the discretion to adjourn trials.  When asked for an adjournment the Court must balance the interests of the parties.   When adjourning a trial the Court can attach a variety of conditions which can even include damage advancements in personal injury lawsuits.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this area of law.
In today’s case (Kailay v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate motor vehicle collisions.   The matter was set for trial previously but was adjourned following an application by ICBC.
The Plaintiff became pregnant shortly before the rescheduled trial and this apparently aggravated some of her accident related stress and psychological symptoms.  ICBC argued a further adjournment was necessary as a result of this development.  Master Baker agreed and granted ICBC a second adjournment, however, the Court attached several conditions to this order.  In doing so Master Baker discussed the Court’s ability to attach terms to adjournments and provided the following reasons:
[12] Taking these various positions, I am satisfied of the following. First, the court’s jurisdiction to make an order for conditions of an adjournment that include advances, whether to meet specific costs and expenses, or as simple advances on likely general damages cannot be seriously disputed. ..
13]         I do not accept that liability must be absolutely established before an advance can be ordered. The real issue, in such a case, is: in the event the plaintiff is unsuccessful, can the advance be recovered? I see no reason why that would not be the case here, particularly assuming that any advance would be accompanied by an undertaking from Ms. Kailay in that respect…

[19]         As a consequence of the above, I direct that the conditions of the adjournment will be:

1.       The defence will fund up to 30 further counselling sessions at up to $200.00 per session;

2.       Ms. Kailay will receive $20,000.00 toward her general damages claim;

3.       The defence will advance $10,000.00 toward Ms. Kailay’s costs incurred to date, including, of course, her experts’ fees;

4.       Ms. Kailay will give her undertaking that, in the event her claim fails at trial or that advances to date (including the above) exceed the damages awarded by the court, she will repay the advances as required.

These are the conditions of the adjournment. If, for any reason, the defence does not acknowledge and accept them by March 7 the trial will continue on April 4 as currently scheduled.

[20]         Costs of this application will be costs in the cause.