Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether parties to an action joining a matter already set for trial can elect the mode of trial.
In this week’s case (Catalano v. Ogloff) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions. The Plaintiff started an action for the first collision, set the matter for trial and filed a jury notice. The Defendant did not. A separate action was started for the second collision and all parties filed a consent order providing that the cases be head together on the date already scheduled. The Defendants in the second action then filed a jury notice. The Court found this was a nullity. In striking the Defendant’s jury notice Master MacNaughton provided the following reasons:
 For the following reasons, I have concluded that the defendant’s jury notice is a nullity.
 First, under Rule 12-6(3) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules it is clear that the election of a jury trial is a two-step process. The right is preserved by serving a jury notice but the matter will not be heard by a jury unless and until the jury fees are paid. A jury trial occurs only if both steps are completed. Thus, the defendant to the second action could not presume that the first action was proceeding to a jury trial. It is for that reason that all parties to an action independently preserve their election of a jury trial by serving their own jury notice.
 Second, the early cases which established the principal that it is only the first notice of trial which matters, with respect to the election of a jury, arose in the context of trial adjournments. However, that principal has been expanded. I agree with the conclusion of Master Groves (as he then was) in Bumen v. BC Transit, 2001 BCSC 443:
… when a notice of trial has previously been given in one action, without a jury notice being filed, a subsequent consent by the parties to having other actions tried at the same time ought to be treated as an election to have a trial by judge alone in all the actions. In other words, when parties consent to the consolidation of multiple actions they are bound by the mode of trial specified in the notice of trial filed with respect to the first action. …(para. 20)
Master Groves’ reasoning mirrors that of Master Barber in Wright v. Rose (1995), 32 C.P.C. (3d) 319 where he said:
…there is no valid jury notice issued in the first action…it could be argued that the jury notice is valid for the second and third action. Of course, when actions are tried at the same time they should either be all heard with a jury, or herd by a judge alone. In my opinion, when the defendants consented…to all three actions being tried at the same time, that was an election to have trial by judge alone. … (para 17)
 In my view, the fact that the plaintiff had delivered a jury notice in the first action does not change the result. The defendant in the second action could not rely on the plaintiff’s jury notice as that was merely the first stage of the election process and did not guarantee a jury trial (I note that it has since been withdrawn). The defendants to the first action had not delivered such a notice. To ensure his right to a jury trial, the defendant in the second action should have made it a term of his consent to having the matters tried together or, if no consent was forthcoming, he could have delivered a jury notice and then applied in chambers to have the matters heard together with a jury.
 By proceeding the way he did, the defendant to the second action was not at liberty to deliver the jury notice. It is a nullity.