Tag: Rule 11-6(4)

Plaintiff Who Failed to "Re-Serve" Opposing Party's Expert Report Cannot Rely On It

Written by admin on May 30, 2018. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that a party cannot rely on an opposing party’s expert evidence if they fail to ‘re-serve’ the report in the timelines set out in the BC Supreme Court Rules.
In today’s case (Karpowicz v. Glessing) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision and sued for damages. The Defendant retained and served an expert report. The Defendant eventually elected not to rely on the report and at trial the Plaintiff tried to use the report in support of his case. The Court noted that the Plaintiff could not do so as he failed to serve the report as his own pursuant to the BC Supreme Court Rules. In reaching this decision Madam Justice MacNaughton provided the following reasons:

[40] On receipt of Ms. Beattie’s report, the plaintiff did not follow the usual practice of immediately re‑serving Ms. Beattie’s report on the defendant as a report on which he intended to rely. The plaintiff also did not attempt to re‑serve the report as a rebuttal report on which he intended to rely on the 42‑day deadline for doing so under Rule 11‑6(4).

[41] In the process of compiling a joint book of experts’ reports, plaintiff’s counsel was advised by defence counsel that she no longer intended to call Ms. Beattie. In seeking to rely on the report, plaintiff’s counsel argued that as the report had been served, he was entitled to demand that Ms. Beattie be available for cross-examination under Rule 11‑7(3)(b) which states, in relevant part:

(3) A party of record may demand that an expert whose report has been served on the parties of record under Rule 11-6 attend at the trial for cross-examination as follows:

…

(b) if the expert was appointed by a party under Rule 11-4 … any party of record who is adverse in interest to the party who appointed that expert may, within the demand period referred to in subrule (2) (a) of this rule, demand the attendance of the expert for cross-examination.

[42] Plaintiff’s counsel did not refer me to any cases which supported his argument.

[43] In my view, the plaintiff’s argument is just not supported by the rule. The rules with respect to tendering experts’ reports must be read as a whole, and it is the decision of a party to tender an expert’s evidence at trial which triggers the right of the other party or parties to demand the attendance of the expert for cross-examination.

[44] For example, Rule 11‑6(1) sets out the formal requirements for a report that is to be tendered. Rule 11‑6(3) and (4) sets out the requirements for service and focus on a report that is to be tendered at trial. Rule 11‑6(6) deals with the requirements for a supplementary report in the event the expert changes his opinion with respect to an expert report that is to be tendered at trial. The focus is on tendered evidence.

[45] The plaintiff has the burden of proving his case. The defendant is not required to prove anything and, as a result, may elect not to call any evidence and no adverse inference can be drawn from the failure to do so.

[46] As an alternative argument, the plaintiff submits that I should exercise my discretion to waive the 84‑day deadline for delivery of Ms. Beattie’s report to allow the plaintiff to rely on her report and call her as his witness. He submits that the defendant will not be prejudiced as a result of the late delivery of Ms. Beattie’s report, as the defendants are aware of its content and are able to prepare to cross-examine her on short notice.

[47] Rule 11‑7(6) describes when the requirements of Rule 11‑6 may be dispensed with:

(6) At trial, the court may allow an expert to provide [expert] evidence, on terms and conditions, if any, even though one or more of the requirements of this Part have not been complied with, if

(a) facts have come to the knowledge of one or more of the parties and those facts could not, with due diligence, have been learned in time to be included in a report or supplementary report and served within the time required by this Part,

(b) the non-compliance is unlikely to cause prejudice

(i) by reason of an inability to prepare for cross-examination, or

(ii) by depriving the party against whom the evidence is tendered of a reasonable opportunity to tender evidence in response, or

(c) the interests of justice require it.

[48] These provisions are disjunctive, so if any one of them applies, then the report in question may be admissible. For that proposition I cite Kaigo Retirement Communities Ltd. v. Sawchuk Developments Company Ltd., 2014 BCSC 1858 at para. 15, and Perry v. Vargas, 2012 BCSC 1537 at para.s 14 to 15.

[49] In this case, although the plaintiff did not specifically rely on 11‑7(6) or frame his arguments in terms of the reconsiderations in that rule, the plaintiff’s arguments are essentially that the non‑compliance with the 84‑day deadline is unlikely to cause prejudice and the interests of justice require a waiver of the deadline in this case. I accept that the defendant would not be prejudiced in preparing to cross-examine Ms. Beattie. However, I do not consider this an appropriate case in which to exercise my discretion to waive entirely the 84‑day deadline. In my view, the discretion in Rule 11‑7(6) was intended to abridge the timelines in the rules and not to waive them entirely.

[50] The practice of re‑serving favourable opposing parties’ experts’ reports is not uncommon in personal injury litigation. It was a procedure which was open to the plaintiff in this case. In addition, the interests of justice in this case do not require a waiver. The plaintiff has obtained and is relying on reports from Jeff Padvaiskas, an occupational therapist, and from Niall Trainor, an expert in vocational rehabilitation. Admittedly, Ms. Beattie’s report is more current, but it does not address new issues and would be duplicative. If the plaintiff was concerned about the dates of his experts’ reports, it was open to him to obtain updated reports, and for these reasons, I conclude that the plaintiff should not be permitted to rely on Ms. Beattie’s report.

Responsive Report Rule "Is Not a Licence" For Failing to Prepare Expert Evidence

Written by admin on March 9, 2015. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Uncategorized. 112 Comments on Responsive Report Rule "Is Not a Licence" For Failing to Prepare Expert Evidence

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, criticizing and restricting the practice of allowing late defense medical examinations in the guise of obtaining ‘responsive’ reports.
In last week’s case (Timar v. Barson) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2011 collision and sued for damages. The alleged injuries included a concussion. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff served a psychologists report which found the plaintiff suffered from a variety of cognitive issues. As the 84 day deadline approached the Plaintiff served the balance of his reports which included a psychiatric opinion that the Plaintiff suffered from an ongoing concussive injury from the collision. The Defendant applied for an independent medical examination beyond the 84 day deadline arguing they needed a responsive opinion in the face of these new reports. Mr. Justice Smith disagreed and in doing so provided the following reasons criticizing the ‘wait and see’ approach in defendant’s exercising their rights for independent medical exams:

[19] Rule 11-6(4) establishes a notice requirement for responsive evidence, but it does not exempt any party from the basic notice requirement in R. 11-6(3). In other words, it is not a licence for any party to wait until they have seen the other’s expert reports before deciding what expert evidence they need to obtain or rely on. Where each party has properly prepared its case and used the rights given by the Rules to discover the other party’s, responsive reports under R. 11-6(4) should rarely be necessary and IME’s for the purpose of preparing such reports should be rarer still.

[20] A party seeking an IME after expiry of the deadline in R. 11-6(3) must, as stated in Luedecke, satisfy the court that the examination is necessary to properly respond to an expert report served by the other party and not simply to respond to the subject matter of the plaintiff’s case.

[21] However, other factors beyond the meeting of that evidentiary threshold must be considered. The principle one that emerges from virtually all the cases is the extent to which the party seeking the examination can claim to be truly surprised by the expert evidence served by the other party: Jackson at para. 27; Compton v. Vale (4 June 2014), Kelowna M95787 at para. 11 (B.C.S.C.). Defendants who delay obtaining or serving expert evidence until after the plaintiff’s evidence is received, then attempt to introduce all of their expert evidence as response, do so at their peril: Crane v. Lee, 2011 BCSC 898 at para. 22; Gregorich v. Gregorich (16 December 2011), Victoria 09-4160 at para. 11 (B.C.S.C.)…

[31] A defendant in a personal injury action must therefore know that the plaintiff will have to rely on medical evidence if the matter proceeds to trial. Knowing that, the defendant must consider whether an IME is required in order to obtain a report that can be served at least 84 days before trial pursuant to R. 11-6(3). In order to determine that and to identify the type of medical expert to involve, the defendant must determine what the plaintiff is saying about his or her condition. An examination for discovery is the obvious, most effective and most important way to do that.

[32] The defendant in this case chose not to exercise its rights under the Rules. It did not conduct an examination for discovery and made no effort to obtain a timely IME. In the absence of such efforts, I must hold that the Master erred in permitting the defendant to use R. 11-6(4) as a means of obtaining its first medical evidence. In the limited time she had to deal with the application, the Master failed to fully and properly consider the limited purpose of R. 11-6(4) and its interaction with other rules as they affect actions of this kind.

Late Defence Medical Exam May Be Ordered in Exceptional Circumstances

Written by admin on August 22, 2013. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, addressing court orders for late defence medical exams.
In this week’s case (Jackson v. Yusishen) the Defendant brought an application for a ‘responsive’ functional capacity evaluation. Mr. Justice Barrow dismissed the application finding that on the facts before him the evidentiary burden for a late exam were not met. Despite this result the Court provided the following interesting comments addressing that a late defense medical exam may be justified in exceptional circumstances:
[15]         There are three rules engaged by this application. The Rules of Court distinguish between new or fresh expert reports and responsive reports. Rule 11‑6(3) provides that, unless the court otherwise orders, expert reports other than responsive reports must be served on all parties of record at least 84 days before the scheduled trial date.
[16]         Rule 11‑6(4) deals with responsive reports and provides that such reports must be served on every party of record at least 42 days before the trial date.
[17]         The third rule engaged by this application is Rule 7‑6, which provides that the court may order a person submit to an examination by a medical practitioner or another appropriately qualified person. An order under Rule 7‑6(1) is discretionary. While there are a host of factors that should be considered when exercising the discretion conferred by that rule, one of the factors might broadly be taken to be whether the examination sought will advance the litigation, in the sense of potentially yielding relevant evidence touching on a material issue.
[18]         In the context of a personal injury action, meeting that evidentiary threshold where the object of the examination is the eventual production of a fresh or new expert report will not usually be difficult. On the other hand, where the time limited for serving fresh or new expert reports has passed, and thus the only purpose of an independent medical examination is in furtherance of the production of a responsive expert report, the evidentiary burden will generally be more difficult to meet…
[32]         Although the evidentiary burden has not been met in this case, I acknowledge that, on occasion, there may be circumstances which might justify the ordering of an independent medical examination, otherwise than in support of the preparation of a responsive report. It may be that, in some cases, the court may anticipate or at least allow for the possibility that a fresh opinion would be exceptionally admissible, notwithstanding that the 84‑day deadline has passed. Although not framed that way in Luedecke, the issue may have arisen at trial after the production of the report that the master ordered. In this case, however, there is no basis to conclude that an independent medical examination is necessary to level the playing field.

Raising the Bar for "Resposive" Independent Medical Exams

Written by admin on June 19, 2013. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7. 52 Comments on Raising the Bar for "Resposive" Independent Medical Exams

While the BC Supreme Court can order a Plaintiff to undergo an independent medical exam to allow the opposing party to obtain a ‘responsive’ report, a clear evidentiary foundation must exist in order for such an application to succeed. Unreported reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In the recent case (Becker v. Zetzos) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. In support of his claim he served a report from a physiatrist. As trial neared the Defendant sought an order requiring the Plaintiff to undergo an independent exam with an orthopedic surgeon for a ‘responsive’ report. This application was brought after the expiry of the 84 day deadline for conventional expert reports to be served.
In support of the application the orthopedic surgeon provided an an affidavit stating as follows:
In order for me to assist the court and properly prepare a rebuttal to the expert report of Dr. Giantomaso I must physically examine the Plaintiff and ask him the usual questions that a doctor would ask in order to elicit any information upon which to ground my expert rebuttal report. I could not give a proper rebuttal opinion report of the Plaintiff which assist the court and opines on the movement, functioning, diagnosis, prognosis, distribution of symptoms, recommendations, suitability for work, and etiology of the Plaintiff without physically examining the Plaintiff and where appropriate palpating the Plaintiff.
In finding this evidence falls short of the mark, Master McCallum provided the following reasons:
[17] In this case I say the evidentiary threshold has not been crossed. Dr. Dommisse’s letter is simply saying that he cannot give a proper rebuttal opinion report to assist the court without examining the plaintiff. In support of that position he goes through what seems to me to be simply a description of the work he would do if he were preparing a report in the first instance.
[18] He has Dr. Giantomaso’s report. He doe snot say, as he could have, what there is about that report that would lead him to think that he himself needs to examine the plaintiff. The defendant has not met the evidentiary threshold to support the request for a physical examination of the plaintiff prior to preparation of a rebuttal report.
To my knowledge this decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

More on Responsive Opinion Evidence Admissibility

Written by admin on August 13, 2012. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on More on Responsive Opinion Evidence Admissibility

Reasons for judgement were published recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing responsive expert reports and the discretion of the Court to adjourn a trial to permit late expert evidence to be introduced.
In the recent case (Lennox v. Karim) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 collision. 87 days prior to trial the Plaintiff served a medico-legal report diagnosing the Plaintiff with a meniscal tear. The Defendant obtained a report addressing this injury and served it on the Plaintiff. This report was served in less than 84 days before trail. The Plaintiff objected arguing this report was late and that it was not truly responsive. Mr. Justice Armstrong disagreed and admitted the report finding that it was responsive, and if not, the trial should be adjourned to allow admission of the report to address the relatively late disclosure of the meniscal tear. The Court provided the following reasons:

[38] In this case, Mr. Lennox failed to alert the defendant to the central issue of a torn meniscus. His pleadings indicated an injury of both knees without any reference in specific to the torn meniscus. This is significant in this case, because the plaintiff was under the obligation to obtain a court order to permit Dr. Stewart to testify and if that order had been applied for, the defendant would have been put on notice at an earlier time as to the issue which became central to this case.

[39] In my view the Leith report, in the words of Smith J., is not a freestanding medical opinion that ought to have been served under Rule 11-6(3). It is in its entirety a responsive opinion directed solely to one opinion of Dr. Stewart relating to the plaintiff’s medical condition, that being the torn meniscus…

[42] If I am wrong in this decision, it would have also been my further opinion that in the circumstances of this case the defendant would have otherwise been entitled to an adjournment of the trial to secure the medical report of Dr. Leith if it was not otherwise admissible under 11-6(4). It seems to me that 11-1(2) is purposely directed at requiring the plaintiff and defendant to avoid the last minute introduction of medical evidence in cases which may have proceeded for many years on a different track or a different theory. I note that neither of the experts described in the CPC report have been or are going to be called as witnesses in this case, but I am not required to deal with that issue.

[43] It seems to me that Dr. Leith’s report can simply be admitted and I can ignore those provisions which in my view are not appropriate.

The "Shoehorn" Prohibition To Responsive Defence Medical Exam Requests

Written by admin on February 29, 2012. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

(Image via wikipedia)
One rule that has perhaps received more attention than other in recent years is Rule 11-6(4) in the context of Responsive Medical Exams. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further addressing this topic and coining the “shoehorn” prohibition to responsive independent medical exams.
In this weeks’ case (Turnbull v. Tarnohammadi) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was assessed by Dr. Salvian who expressed concern that the Plaintiff suffered from Thoracic Outlet Syndrome. His records were exchanged in the litigation process. As the expert evidence deadline neared the Plaintiff served a proper expert report setting out Dr. Salvian’s findings.
The Defendant then brought an application for the Plaintiff to attend a physician to obtain a ‘responsive‘ report. Master Baker dismissed the application noting it should have been brought sooner and parties are not allowed to “shoehorn” a late request for a medical exam into the responsive evidence rule. In dismissing the application Master Baker provided the following reasons:

[13] Dr. Salvian was consulted and gave a report which became part of the clinical records of the family doctor, Dr. Murphy. The clinical records, including that report, were made known to the defence long ago. In fact, Dr. Salvian’s, I will call it report number one, which was dated 2010, was listed in the plaintiff’s list of documents in April of 2011.

[14] In that report it is clear that Dr. Salvian, if he did not very specifically diagnose carpal tunnel syndrome or thoracic outlet syndrome — and I do not decide at this point whether he did or he did not — made it absolutely clear, at least to me, that that was a significant factor in his mind.

[15] On the last page of his report, page 20, he says:

In any event, it is my opinion that the carpal tunnel syndrome and the post-traumatic thoracic outlet syndrome and the soft tissue injury of the neck are directly caused by the flexion extension injury, …

He then talks a little more about spontaneous carpal tunnel syndrome.

[16] I also agree with Mr. Parsons that his latter report does not add significantly to that, not in such a fresh way that would justify surprise on the part of the defence.

[17] That being the case, I take Mr. Parsons at his word, and I agree it would have been perfectly appropriate had at some point before the 84-day deadline the defence requested an IME to deal with Dr. Salvian’s perspectives; that would have been appropriate.

[18] To wait after that point is to — as I think one authority, perhaps Mr. Justice Macaulay used the phrase — “shoehorn” the opinion into a compacted, truncated chronology, i.e., the 42-day limit for a responsive report, when, in fact, it should have been anticipated well in advance of that and it should have been subject to the same 84-day rule.

[19] Again, nothing in this precludes the defence from delivering a responsive medical report. It is just as in the Gregorich case, I do not see that it is necessary to do that to direct the independent medical examination.

Late DME Application Dismissed; Responsive Exam Limitations Discussed

Written by admin on January 10, 2012. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

Helpful reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dismissing a defence application to have a Plaintiff assessed by a neurosurgeon. In short the Court found the application was brought too late in the claim and that there was insufficient evidence to justify a physical exam for a truly ‘responsive‘ medical report.
In the recent case (Dhaliwal v. Owens) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision. The injuries included low back pain. Surgery was anticipated but as time went on the Plaintiff experienced some symptom improvement and surgery became less likely.
In the course of the lawsuit the Defendants put the matter into fast track litigation (Rule 15). They failed to obtain a medical report in a timely fashion. When they finally did apply the 84 day service deadline set out in Rule 11-6(3) had come and gone. The Defendants argued that they needed the report for responsive purposes and further that the cancellation of the Plaintiff’s anticipated surgery amounted to a change of circumstances justifying the late application. Master Keighley rejected both of these arguments and dismissed the application. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[7] Now, I had indicated earlier that it is likely that had this matter come to light a year ago, this application would not have been before me today. What causes the problem is Rule 11-6(3) which requires that an expert report, in general terms, be delivered at least 84 days prior to the scheduled trial date. The 84th day, I am told by counsel who have done the arithmetic, passed…almost a couple of weeks ago…
[14] Now, this is not a situation, and we do sometimes see it, where the physician has either directly or indirectly provided evidence with respect to the necessity of a physical examination of a party. There is nothing before me in the material to explain why a physical examination is required in this case other than the statements from the paralegal that I have referred to.
[15] In the case of Wright v. Brauer, a decision of Mr. Justice Savage reported as 2010 BCSC 1282, Justice Savage considering similar circumstances said at paragraph 22
“In my opinion, the bare assertion reported to a legal assistant in this case is insufficient to support an order under Rule 7-6(1) that the plaintiff attend the Examination, when the defendants are limited to providing response reports under Rule 11-6(4)”
Justice Savage dismissed the application and is reference to Rule 11-6(4) harks back to his remarks at paragraph 12 of that decision where he said:

“Rule 11-6(4) was enacted to fill a lacuna in the Rules. Under the former Rules, Rule 40A permitted parties to call expert evidence in reply without notice at trial. In order for such evidence to be admitted, however, it had to be truly responsive to the expert evidence of a witness called by the opposing party.”

He noted that in the case before him, the defendants were, as here, limited by the Rule to what referred to as Justice Williamson in the case of Kelly v. Kelly (1995), 20 BCLR (3d) 232 “truly responsive rebuttal evidence” by virtue of the provisions of Rule 11-6.
[16] Similarly, Mr. Justice Cullen in the case of Ludecke v. Hillman, 2010 BCSC 1538, considered an appeal from a master’s order which has allowed an examination to provide “truly responsive” evidence. Justice Cullen upheld the master’s order determining that the necessary evidentiary foundation for the examination was found in the material before him. In reaching that conclusion, he said:
“To reach the requisite threshold under Rule 11-6(4) the applicant must establish a basis of necessity for the examination to properly respond to the expert witness whose report is served under subrule (3) by the other party.”
[17] The plaintiff’s injuries, it seems to me, have not really changed in this case. She has more or less since the outset complained of low back pain, low back problems. What has changed, if anything, in recent months is the decision of the medical practitioners treating her with regard to the advisability of surgery. It appears that they have decided for the meantime that surgery is the less desirable option. Notwithstanding that decision, the plaintiff continues to suffer pain to the extent that she remains, apparently, unable to work. There has been ample time int his litigation, even before this change in the plaintiff’s circumstances, for the defence to seek and obtain evidence from a neurosurgeon or other specialist with respect to her condition. Although the provisions of Rule 7-6 and its predecessor Rule were enacted to attempt to affect a level playing field between the parties with respect to medical evidence, I do not see that the defence will be prejudiced by being restricted to an opportunity to have Dr. Turnbull or another practitioner of their choice examine the available evidence and render an opinion at trial as to the appropriate treatment of the plaintiff’s injuries. Overall, of course, I have been considering the issue of proportionality and in the particularly refined context of an application brought in a case governed by Rule 15-1.
[18] The application is dismissed.
As of today this case is unreported but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy of the reasons for judgement to anyone who contacts me and requests these.

More on the Responding Report "IME" Limitation

Written by admin on November 23, 2011. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on More on the Responding Report "IME" Limitation

Adding to this growing database of caselaw considering the relationship of Rule 7-6 and Rule 11-6(4), reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, demonstrating that “responding” independent medical exams will not be granted as a matter of course.
In the recent case (Godfrey v. Black) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. She sued for damages. Her pleadings specifically identified an alleged TMJ Injury. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was examined for discovery with respect to her TMJ pain. She also served an expert report addressing this injury in compliance with the time-lines set out in the Rules of Court.
The Defendant brought an application for the Plaintiff to be assessed by a TMJ specialist of their choosing. Their application was brought after expiry of the 84 day expert report service deadline They argued an exam was necessary in order to obtain a responding report under Rule 11-6(4). Master Caldwell disagreed and dismissed the motion finding no sufficient evidence was tendered to explain the need for a physical exam. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[2] I am told that the pleadings, when they were issued, specifically identified among other things injury to the temporomandibular joint (“TMJ”). That, it is said, and I agree, put the defence on specific notice that there was an issue relating to the jaw and the TMJ…
[9] There is no evidence before me to indicate why this particular dental expert believes it necessary for him to do a physical examination of the patient. In fact, the instruction letter from counsel specifically asks for among other things a critique of the report of the first dentist. Many of those bullets which appear in the letter which I will not make further reference to appear able to be done on the basis of a criticism of methodology or findings as opposed to requiring an independent examination of the person of the plaintiff…
[13] I have been referred to several cases, but the one which I find the most helpful is the case of Wright v. Brauer, 2010 BCSC 1282 a decision of Mr. Justice Savage in similar circumstances where he was dealing with a trial date in the near future and an examination such as this where there was no medical evidence as to why a physical examination was necessary in order to provide a truly rebuttal or critical report…
[15] In my view, the same reasoning applies in this case…
[18] This application comes late in the day, a year after the defence was well aware that TMJ was an issue that should be looked into. Had they wished to get a full report, they were well able to make that application or the request earlier. I am not satisfied on the material that there is a basis for me to infer from the submissions of counsel or the material filed that an independent medical examination of the person of the plaintiff is required in order for this dentist to provide a truly rebuttal report.
These reasons are unpublished but as always I’m happy to share a copy with anyone who contacts me and requests these.

Prejudice To Defendant Not Enough To Compel Plaintiff to Attend "Responding" IME

Written by admin on September 7, 2011. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 50 Comments on Prejudice To Defendant Not Enough To Compel Plaintiff to Attend "Responding" IME

(Update November 16, 2011 – The case discussed in the below post has now been published and full reasons for judgement can be found here)
One of the patterns that is becoming very clear under the New Rules of Court is that Parties ignore the 84 day requirement for exchange of expert evidence at their peril.
Often times Defendants apply for an order compelling a Plaintiff to attend an Independent Medical Exam beyond this deadline. Numerous cases have considered such applications with the argument that an assessment is necessary in order to obtain a ‘responding‘ report under the more generous 42 day deadline of Rule 11-6(4). Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering and rejecting such an argument.
In today’s case (Scott v. Ridgway) the Plaintiff was injured and sued for damages. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff served the report of a vocational consultant. The Defendant applied for an order to compel the Plaintiff to attend an independent exam in order to obtain a responding report. The Defendant brought the application after the 84 day deadline. Madam Justice Kloegman dismissed the application finding that prejudice is not enough to compel an IME for the purpose of a responding report. The Court provided the following useful reasons:
[6] I am not persuaded that the plaintiff is required to attend before Dr. Banks in order for the defendant to file a responsive report. I am aware of the prejudice claimed by the defendant that their expert’s opinion may be given less weight because of lack of examination of the plaintiff. However, if they are prejudiced, it is of their making and not the result of any conduct of the plaintiff.
[7] The rules are clear. They must be obeyed in the absence of special circumstances. There are no special circumstances here that would allow the defendant to file a report containing fresh opinion. The defendant will be restricted to analyzing and respond to the plaintiff’s report.
I should note that some previous cases have ordered physical examination for responding report purposes, however, in such cases the Court was presented with affidavit evidence from the proposed expert explaining why such an examination is necessary.
In today’s case the Defendant did provide an affidavit from a doctor but the court placed no weight in it and criticized it for being “lifted from another affidavit sworn by another expert in another case with other expertise than that of Dr. Cook”.
Today’s reasons are unpublished but as always I’m happy to share a copy with anyone who contacts me and requests these.

More Judicial Authority of "Responsive" Independent Medical Exams

Written by admin on July 11, 2011. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams. 45 Comments on More Judicial Authority of "Responsive" Independent Medical Exams

One of the New Rules which has received more attention than most is Rule 11-6(4) which deals with responsive reports. The issue of whether the Court could order a Plaintiff to undergo a physical exam for a responsive report has been considered a good half dozen times. In short the authorities have held that such an order is possible but the Courts have been conservative in making these orders to date. Further reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this topic.
In this week’s case (Mahil v. Price) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision. The Defendants did not order an independent medical report in the timelines allowed by Rule 11-6(3) and brought a motion for an exam less than 84 days before trial. They argued that they only wished to obtain a ‘responsive’ report and that the report would comply with Rule 11-6(4). Mr. Justice Voith held that such an appointment was permitted and allowed the order. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[21] Rule 7-6(1), formerly Rule 30, allows for the conduct of an independent medical examination. The object of Rule 30 was succinctly described by Finch J.A., as he then was, in Stainer v. ICBC, 2001 BCCA 133 at para. 8:

…the purpose of Rule 30 is to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence. …

[22] The object of placing the parties on an equal footing is, however, only achieved in real terms if the parties also adhere to those rules which govern the timely exchange of both initial expert reports and responsive expert reports.

[23] The important relationship of what was Rule 30 and what is now Rule 7-6(1) and those Rules which pertain to the time limits for the exchange of expert reports has been recognized in other decisions. In Wright v. Brauer, 2010 BCSC 1282, Savage J. said at para. 9:

In the context of an action seeking compensation for personal injuries, the parties are on equal footing with respect to medical evidence if they can independently obtain medical evidence and if such evidence is served in accordance with the Rules.

[24] In the case of Mackichan v. June and Takeshi, 2004 BCSC 1441, Master Groves, as he then was, said at para. 11:

… It is not simply a question of putting the parties on a level playing field at this stage, it is a question of really balancing the prejudice which will result to the defendants in not having a report and the prejudice that will result to the plaintiff in having a report prepared late which would no doubt, I expect, cause an adjournment of the trial.

[25] If the defendants have Dr. Gropper prepare a properly responsive report, and if that report is delivered in accordance with the Rules, the interests of both parties are concurrently advanced and safeguarded.

[26] I have, based on a request I made, been advised by counsel for the defendants that Dr. Gropper would be able to deliver his report in advance of the 42 days provided for in Rule 11-6(4).

[27] Notwithstanding some misgivings about some of the issues advanced by the defendants, I do not believe that it would be either prudent or appropriate for me to pre-determine that the specific concerns raised by the defendants will not, in fact, be properly responsive to the Reports.

[28] I have, however, earlier in these reasons, identified with some precision the very narrow issues that the defendants assert they wish to respond to in the Reports. These reasons should provide some safeguard against Dr. Gropper’s report extending or straying beyond its permitted ambit, whether inadvertently or otherwise. I note, as did Saunders J., as she then was, in Kroll v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (1995), 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 7 at para. 7 (S.C.), that truly responsive evidence:

… does not permit fresh evidence to masquerade as an answer to the other side’s report.

[29] I am therefore prepared to grant the defendants’ application. Costs are to be in the cause.