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Tag: Rule 11-6(1)

"All Actual Instructions Received by the Expert" Required by BC Rules of Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Civil Procedure.

Reasons for judgement were released today (Pinch v. Hofstee) addressing the scope of expert instructions that need to be disclosed to make expert evidence admissible.  In short the Court noted that a “paraphrased summary of instructions” was insufficient.
In noting what Rule 11-6(1)(c) requires Mr. Justice Burnyeat provided the following reasons:

[1]             The parties presented a number of expert reports.  While some of the expert reports attached the instructions that were provided to the expert by counsel, some of the expert reports merely provided a paraphrased summary of instructions.

[2]             Rule 11‑6 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules provides that, for an expert report to be tendered in evidence, it must set out a number of matters including “the instructions provided to the expert in relation to the proceeding” [Rule 11‑6(1)(c)].

[3]             In order to meet the requirement of Rule 11‑6(1)(c), all actual instructions received by the expert should be appended to the expert report that is to be tendered into evidence.  It is not sufficient to satisfy Rule 11‑6(1)(c) to have the expert either to paraphrase the instructions received or to include some but not all of the instructions received.

[4]             The parties will be at liberty to file affidavits setting out the instructions that were provided to the experts who have provided reports which have now been tendered into evidence.

BC Court of Appeal Criticizes Consultation Reports Being Shoehorned As Expert Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Civil Procedure. 112 Comments on BC Court of Appeal Criticizes Consultation Reports Being Shoehorned As Expert Reports

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Court of Appeal criticizing and restricting the practice of shoehorning physicians consultation reports into evidence as expert opinion.
In today’s case (Healey v. Chung) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 pedestrian/vehicle collision.  At trial he Plaintiff claimed it was a ‘catastrophic accident’ and sought damages between $485,000 and $1,037,000.  The trial judge rejected much of the Plaintiff’s evidence and awarded damages of just over $50,000.
In the course of the trial the Defendant introduced consultation reports of treating medical practitioners into evidence.  These did not meet the strict requirements of Rule 11-6.  The Plaintiff objected but the trial judge allowed the reports to be entered.  In finding this was improper and ordering a new trial the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[19]         It is well established that clinical consulting reports, without more, may not be admitted for the validity of opinions expressed in them…

[21]         It is true, as the respondent contends, that Seaman and F.(K.E.) are cases in which the opinion sought to be adduced was found in clinical records that were voluminous, but I do not consider that circumstance detracts from the principle that a clinical record containing an opinion, such as these consulting reports, must substantially comply with the requirements of the Rules in order to attract the exception to the usual rule for examination of witnesses spoken of by Mr. Justice Hutcheon.

[22]         The respondent contends that she gave notice to Mr. Healey of her intention to use the letters, that Dr. Kuo knew of the qualifications of the two doctors, and that other deficiencies were “minor”. She says Mr. Healey was obliged to express his objections as required by R. 11-6(10) and (11).

[23]         Forthrightness between counsel is favoured and is to be expected in litigation. Yet I cannot say there was anything to which we have been referred that put the positive legal duty on Mr. Healey to object under those Rules for the reason that the consulting reports sent to Dr. Kuo and disclosed as part of her clinical records were simply not ‘expert reports’ as regulated by the Rules. While they may be professional opinions from one doctor to another in the course of treatment, the impugned documents do not comply with R. 11-2; I do not consider they carry the basic hallmark of an ‘expert report’, being an opinion intended by the author, at some point, to be presented for the assistance of the court. Significantly, they contain none of the information that is essential to qualification of the author as an expert, nor the information reviewed by the author by which the court may assess the cogency of the opinion.

[24]         As I do not consider that these clinical records can be considered to be ‘expert reports’ as that term is used in the Rules, entitled to the privileged treatment for receipt of hearsay evidence discussed by Mr. Justice Hutcheon, I conclude that R. 11-6(10) and (11) did not require a notice of objection.

[25]         In the alternative to the two documents coming within R. 11-6, Ms. Chung says the judge could have exercised his discretion and admitted the documents as opinions under R. 11-7. Rule 11-7 provides latitude to a judge to receive opinion evidence that is not included in an expert report:

(1)   Unless the court otherwise orders, opinion evidence of an expert, other than an expert appointed by the court under Rule 11-5, must not be tendered at trial unless

(a) that evidence is included in a report of that expert that has been prepared and served in accordance with Rule 11-6, and

(b) any supplementary reports required under Rule 11-5 (11) or 11-6 (5) or (6) have been prepared and served in accordance with Rule 11-6 (5) to (7).

…

(6)   At trial, the court may allow an expert to provide evidence, on terms and conditions, if any, even though one or more of the requirements of this Part have not been complied with, if

(a) facts have come to the knowledge of one or more of the parties and those facts could not, with due diligence, have been learned in time to be included in a report or supplementary report and served within the time required by this Part,

(b) the non-compliance is unlikely to cause prejudice

(i)    by reason of an inability to prepare for cross-examination, or

(ii)   by depriving the party against whom the evidence is tendered of a reasonable opportunity to tender evidence in response, or

(c) the interests of justice require it.

                                                                        [Emphasis added.]

[26]         Ms. Chung does not contend the judge exercised his discretion under R. 11-7(1). Her approach is consistent with the record that shows the judge was not asked to exercise his discretion, and it is consistent with Ms. Chung’s submission at trial which approached the question as one of compliance with R. 11-6. We are invited, however, to approach these documents as admissible in the exercise of discretion.

[27]         I do not consider that this is an appropriate case for us to engage for the first time in a full analysis of discretion, so as to draw our own conclusions. At trial the judge did not consider his R. 11-7 discretion and accordingly the possibility of exercising discretion is without his expansion. In XY, LLC v. Zhu, 2013 BCCA 352, 366 D.L.R. (4th) 443, Madam Justice Newbury for the Court adopted this description from Perry v. Vargas, 2012 BCSC 1537 at para. 22:

In my view the discretion provided for in R.11-7(6)(c) must be exercised sparingly, with appropriate caution, and in a disciplined way given the express requirements contained in Rules 11-6 and 11-7. That is, the “interests of justice” are not a reason to simply excuse or ignore the requirements of the other Rules. There must be some compelling analysis why the interests of justice require in a particular case the extraordinary step of abrogating the other requirements of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. None was provided.

[28]         Adopting that approach, in my view this is not a case for us to exercise the discretion that was available to the judge under R. 11-7.  There was ample medical evidence before the court, absent the opinions from these documents, to guide the trial judge in findings of fact. Further, it was open to the defendant to develop her own body of medical opinion and to advance it in proper form, including as to the required description of qualifications and experience and listing of opinion sought and matters considered. I see no compelling reason to derogate from the requirements of either R. 11-2 or R. 11-6 in this case. To do so, in my view, would admit into evidence opinions that were not crafted for that purpose and that are without the necessary information to permit consideration of their substance and effect in the context of the issues before the court.

[29]         Last, Ms. Chung contends that the two documents, in any event, were inconsequential in the judge’s reasons, and thus the admission of these documents had little impact on the outcome of the case.

[30]         One of the issues at trial was the assertion by Mr. Healey that he suffered from depression caused by the accident. This allegation bore upon the assessment of damages. To support this allegation was an expert report from Dr. O’Shaughnessy. Based upon the medical records and his interview with Mr. Healey, Dr. O’Shaughnessy diagnosed Mr. Healey as having an Adjustment Disorder with anxiety and an Adjustment Disorder with depressed mood. Yet the judge rejected all allegations of depression and instead relied upon the two consulting reports, saying:

[58]      Mr. Healey stated that he suffered from depression because of the accident. Depression was not reported in his post-accident symptomatology until 2008. Dr. Kuo’s records do show that in 2003 she concluded that Mr. Healey had symptoms consistent with depression. This reporting, however, preceded the accident, and according to the psychiatric specialists Dr. Kuo referred Mr. Healey to in 2009 and 2010, no evidence supported any Axis 1 diagnosis in the DSM-IV, and no symptoms met the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder.

[31]         I would first observe that Dr. Truong’s report cryptically states “Axis 1: Adjustment d/o with depressive symptoms – in remission” and by so saying Dr. Truong’s report appears to be inconsistent with the judge’s statement: “according to the psychiatric specialists [Dr. To and Dr. Truong] no evidence supported any Axis 1 diagnosis”. Perhaps this exemplifies the effect of non-compliance with the requirements for expert reports, as the judge drew from the report a categorical absence of any Axis 1 diagnosis which appears to be inconsistent with Dr. Truong’s report. Setting that discrepancy between the judge’s assertion and the notation in Dr. Truong’s report aside, it is clear from the judge’s para. 58 that he put weight on the consulting reports and drew conclusions from them adverse to Mr. Healey. In other words, they were consequential in the judge’s reasoning; one cannot say the reports had little bearing on the outcome, in my view.

 

Failure To List Documents Leads To Expert Report Exclusion

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11. 50 Comments on Failure To List Documents Leads To Expert Report Exclusion

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, excluding an expert report for failing to disclose a list of documents reviewed.
In today’s case (Lawrence v. Parr) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision and sued for damages.  The Plaintiff alleged that the collision caused some hearing loss.  Prior to trial the Defendant served a report from an otolaryngologist which opined that the hearing loss was not from the collision.  The report was criticized for a number of reasons including being served beyond the timelines required under the Rules of Court.  The report as ultimately excluded from evidence with Mr. Justice Tindale noting that the expert’s failure to list documents reviewed and relied on was a fatal error.  In excluding the report the Court provided the following reasons:

[126]     Rule 11-6 (1) states a number of mandatory requirements of an expert report. Dr. David’s report did not contain the certification required under Rule 11-2 (2) though that was remedied at a later date. It does not contain the instructions provided to Dr. David. His report is not clear as to the nature of the opinion being sought and the issues in the proceeding to which the opinion relates. But most importantly it does contain a description of the factual assumptions on which his opinion is based. There is not a comprehensive list of the documents that he relied on. Where he does discuss a document that he relied on he either makes vague, inaccurate or misleading references to that document.

[127]     I am mindful of Rule 11-7 (6) however. The admission of this report will cause prejudice to the plaintiff because despite a very lengthy cross-examination it is not clear what the purpose of Dr. David’s report was and what his factual assumptions were.

[128]     In my view, for all the above noted reasons Dr. David’s report and evidence at the video deposition are inadmissible.

Supplementary Expert Reports Bound By Document Disclosure Duties

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Uncategorized. 60 Comments on Supplementary Expert Reports Bound By Document Disclosure Duties

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the scope of document disclosure when dealing with supplementary reports.  In short the Court held the same duties apply to supplemental reports as to ‘original’ reports, namely to identify the documents relied on by the expert in forming their opinion.
In this week’s case (Amini v. Khania) the Defendant’s expert authored a supplemental report without listing all the documents relied on.  The Defendant argued the Rules for listing all documents relied on in expert reports do not apply to supplemental reports.  Mr. Justice Burnyeat disagreed and in doing so provided the following reasons:
 [18]         The submission of counsel for the Defendants is that it is not necessary in a supplementary report to include a list of every document relied upon by the expert providing a supplementary opinion.  I am satisfied that the failure of Dr. Dommisse to list the documents that he relied upon is not “cured” by the provisions of Rule 11-6(7).  While it is clear that supplementary reports have a narrow scope and purpose and are only intended to set out where and how a previous opinion has changed in a material way, there is nothing in Rule 11‑6(7) which would allow me to conclude that the filing of a supplementary report can circumvent the clear and mandatory requirements of Rule 11‑6(1)…
[21]         The very purpose of Rule 11‑6 is that all expert reports should be tendered in a way that neither side can be ambushed or surprised at trial…
[23]         A supplementary expert report remains an expert report.  It must comply with the rules set out in Rule 11‑6(1).  Otherwise, the supplementary opinion would be based on unknown facts and assumptions.  It would be impossible to give the necessary weight to a supplementary expert opinion as it would be impossible to compare the facts upon which that opinion was based with the findings of fact ultimately made by the Court.  The provision of a supplementary report which does not comply with Rule 11‑6(1) should not be used to circumvent the requirement that no party will be caught by surprise by an expert report.
 

Show Your Work! – Medical Opinion Rejected For Failing to Outline Supporting Reasons

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on Show Your Work! – Medical Opinion Rejected For Failing to Outline Supporting Reasons


Remember grade school math problems?  You needed to not just give your teacher the answer but also show your work.  The conclusion without the supporting paper-trail wouldn’t pass muster in Grade 5.   The same is true with medical opinions in BC injury trials.  It is not enough for a doctor to relate injuries to a collision, the physician must explain the factual basis underlying their opinion.  Failure to do so can result in a Court placing little weight on a physicians opinions.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released recently by the BC Supreme Court.
In the recent case (Perry v. Vargas) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision.  She sued for damages claiming long-standing injuries with disabling consequences.  The Court accepted the Plaintiff was indeed injured but disagreed with the Plaintiff’s assertion of long-standing disability being related to the crash.
In the course of the trial the Plaintiff introduced evidence from her treating physician supporting her position.  The Court struggled in giving “much weight” to the physician’s opinion, however, noting that the physician provided “no insight into the reasons for (her) conclusion“.  In addressing the lack of reasoning underlying the opinion Mr. Justice Savage provided the following criticism:
[56]         I find it difficult to give much weight to Dr. Tesiorowski’s opinion with respect to causation. Most of the report appears to simply reiterate what she has been told by others. She was not in fact treating Ms. Perry for the complaints until the passing of Dr. Condon. She only did one physical examination. In the report she does not address any of the intervening events.
[57]         In my opinion there is another more fundamental problem with Dr. Tesiorowski’s report. There is no reasoning linking the current complaints with the December 4, 2006 Accident. That is, she states a conclusion as quoted above but provides no insight into the reasons for that conclusion. I examine this matter in greater detail below…
[122]     The report of Dr. Tesiorowski has another important failing. It refers to a history gained from Ms. Perry and others and then simply states a conclusion. To be useful an opinion must be more than a conclusory assertion on causation. In Montreal Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Quebec (Attorney-General) (1908), 41 S.C.R. 116 at 132, Idington J. said “I refuse to accept unless absolutely necessary the mere ipse dixit of any expert when presented for my acceptance merely as an act of faith, and without the aid of such reasons as his reasoning power, or means of, and result of the use of means of, observations may have developed”.
[123]     The same kind of concern is noted by Binnie J., speaking for the court in R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51 at para. 56, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600. The opinion must assist the trier of fact to form an independent conclusion by “an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith”:
56          In Mohan , Sopinka J. held that the expert evidence in question had to be more than merely helpful. He required that the expert opinion be necessary “in the sense that it provide information, which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury, … the evidence must be necessary to enable the trier of fact to appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature” (p. 23). In Béland , supra , McIntyre J., speaking about the inadmissibility of a polygraph test, cited at p. 415 Davie v. Edinburgh Magistrates, [1953] S.C. 34 (Scotland Ct. Sess.) , at p. 40, on the role of expert witnesses where Lord Cooper said:
Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. [Emphasis added.]
The purpose of expert evidence is thus to assist the trier of fact by providing special knowledge that the ordinary person would not know. Its purpose is not to substitute the expert for the trier of fact. What is asked of the trier of fact is an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith.
[124]     As there is no reasoning linking the facts referenced in the medical report with the conclusory assertion on causation, I am unable to form an independent conclusion from this opinion. To accept the opinion would simply be a leap of faith, applying the logical fallacy of ipse dixit, in this context, “because she said it”.
[125]     For all of these reasons Dr. Tesiorowski’s opinion is of little assistance to the court.

Chiropractor Qualified to Opine on Diagnosis and Prognosis in BC Injury Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Civil Procedure, independent medical exams. 54 Comments on Chiropractor Qualified to Opine on Diagnosis and Prognosis in BC Injury Trial


In my continued efforts to highlight unreported injury law decisions of the BC Supreme Court, reasons for judgement were recently provided to me addressing the qualifications of a chiropractor to opine on injury causation and prognosis.  This unreported case is a little dated (from 2008) however the discussion is of value and I am happy to publish the decision here.
In the recently provided case (Sloane v. Hill) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision.  She sued for damages and proceeded to jury trial.  In the course of the trial the Defendant objected to the qualifications of the Plaintiff’s chiropractor arguing that a “chiropractor has no basis in training or expertise” to offer opinions regarding diagnosis and prognosis for traumatic injuries.  Mr. Justice Grist disagreed and allowed the chiropractor to be qualified as an expert.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[5]  Chiropractors are licenced to provide this form of care, and there is no indication that chiropractors are generally incompetent in what they do or, in particular  in the process of forming diagnosis and prognosis.  If nothing else here, the forecast for the future ties to what the chiropractor expects to be the future cost of performing her services…
[6]  The chiropractor will testify and will be subject to cross-examination…
[8]  The admissibility of an expert’s report is dealt with in R v. Marquard [1993] SCJ No. 119 (SCC).  At issue is the witness’s ability, through experience and training, to aid the triers of fact in opinion based on special training or experience; opinion the triers are not likely to be able to form on their own.
[9]  Here, I think the chiropractor does offer something towards this end.  Further, through cross-examination and with the medical evidence to be called, I think there will be ample opportunity for counsel to put the opinion in proper perspective, and there is little likelihood of prejudice.  I think the public is well-acquainted with different healthcare providers, what they can offer and their limitations.
[10]  On balance, I am of the view these opinions can be taken in evidence.
As always I am happy to provide a copy of the full transcript of this unreported decision to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

Expert Report Excluded For "Advocacy" and Other Short-Comings

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on Expert Report Excluded For "Advocacy" and Other Short-Comings

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, excluding an expert report from evidence for multiple short-comings.  The Court’s criticism included the fact that the report failed to properly set out the expert’s qualifications, offended the ‘ultimate issue‘ rule, failed to list documents relied on in forming the expert’s opinion and lastly for being ‘advocacy‘ in the guise of opinion.
In this week’s case (Turpin v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company) the Plaintiff purchased travel insurance with the Defendant.  While on a trip to California she fell ill and required medical treatment.  Her expenses quickly grew and exceeded $27,000.  The Defendant refused to pay relying on a pre-existing condition exclusion in the policy.  The Plaintiff sued and succeeded.
In the course of the trial the Defendant tried to introduced a report from a doctor of internal medicine to “provide an opinion as to whether (the Plaintiff’s) medical treatment between October 5, 2007 and October 9, 2007 was the result of a pre-existing condition as defined in the Travel Insurance Policy“.
Mr. Justice Wilson ruled that the report was inadmissible for multiple reasons.  The case is worth reviewing for the Court’s full discussion of the shortcomings of the report.  In my continued effort to highlight expert reports being rejected for ‘advocacy’ I reproduce Mr. Justice Wilson’s comments on the frowned upon practice of experts using bold font to highlight portions of their opinion:

[29] Finally, the plaintiffs object that the report is advocacy on behalf of the defendants.

[30] This objection is based, in part, upon the author’s use of bold font and italicized portions of the report.

[31] In Warkentin v. Riggs, this court was faced with an expert’s report which adopted “… a particular format”:

He uses bold font to highlight words and phrases which benefit the plaintiff’s claim and support his diagnosis. This is apparent in his review of Ms. Warkentin’s history and medical reports. That which is contrary to the plaintiff’s claim or does not support his diagnosis is either omitted or presented in non-bolded font. This emphasis in support of the plaintiff’s claim and the exclusion of contrary matters is advocacy.

I adopt those comments as applicable in this case.

[32] This use of emphasis is not a practise to be encouraged. In this case, it may have been introduced by counsel’s letter of instructions, which suggested that the author may “indicate the relative degree of importance of any particular fact or assumption”.

[33] If the author of the report regards a factor as a major premise leading to the conclusion, then it should be so stated. Not left to unexplained emphasis in the body of the report.

[34] It was for those foregoing reasons that I ruled the report inadmissible.

Expert Reports and the New Rules of Court: The "Factual Assumptions" Requirement

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases. 59 Comments on Expert Reports and the New Rules of Court: The "Factual Assumptions" Requirement


One of the requirements in the new BC Supreme Court Rules is for expert reports to clearly set out the “factual assumptions on which the opinion is based“.  Failure to do so could result in a report being excluded from evidence.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this requirement.
In this week’s case (Knight v. Li) the Plaintiff attempted to cross 41st Avenue in Vancouver, BC when his vehicle was T-boned by a the Defendant.  The Plaintiff had a stop sign and was the ‘servient driver’.  The Defendant was speeding.  Mr. Justice Harris found the Plaintiff 75% at fault for the crash and the Defendant 25% at fault.  The reasons for judgement are worth reviewing in full for the Court’s through discussion of the legal principles at play in intersection crashes.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff introduced an expert report from an engineer.  The Defendant objected to the report arguing that it did not comply with the rules of Court.  Mr. Justice Harris ultimately did allow the report into evidence but made the following critical comments addressing an experts need to clearly set out the factual assumptions underpinning their opinions:

[38]         Our new Supreme Court Civil Rules codify the obligations of experts testifying in our Court. In my view, they restate obligations our law has long recognised. The Civil Rules require a clear statement of the facts and assumptions on which a report is based. It was incumbent on Mr. Gough to state clearly the assumptions on which his report was based. He did not do so. He did not provide me with an opinion of the effect of Mr. Li’s excessive speed on his ability to avoid the collision as he claimed. He gave me an opinion of Mr. Li’s ability to avoid the collision if certain assumptions favourable to Mr. Knight were made. He said nothing about being instructed to make those assumptions and nothing about the effect on Mr. Li’s ability to avoid the Accident if those assumptions did not hold.

[39]         It must be remembered that Mr. Gough’s report is his evidence. In my view, the report as written did not comply with the requirements in the Civil Rules to state the facts and assumptions on which it is based. There is nothing improper in an expert accepting assumptions of fact that affect the opinions the expert provides, but they must be clearly stated. If they are not, there is a real risk that the trier of fact could be misled. In this case it required cross-examination to demonstrate the implications of the assumptions for the conclusions reached about Mr. Li’s ability to avoid the Accident. In my view, in this case, given the opinion being offered, the report should have clarified the effect of the assumptions about Mr. Knight’s driving on the conclusions about Mr. Li’s ability to avoid the Accident. By failing to do so, this aspect of the report descended into little more than a piece of advocacy.