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Tag: Park v. Targonski

Plaintiff Stripped of $56,207 of Costs and Disbursements for Not Beating Formal Defense Offer at Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, highlighting the judicial flexibility and potential financial risks that come into play when a formal offer of settlement is not beat at trial.
In today’s case (Park v. Targonski) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages.  Prior to trial the Defendants made a formal offer of $321,407.  The Plaintiff declined this offer and proceeded to trial where she was awarded $302,643 after applicable statutory deductions.
The Defendants asked the Court to strip the Plaintiff of her post offer costs and disbursements of $56,207 and further to pay the Defendants’ post offer costs and disbursements of $63,769.
The Court found that the offer ought to have been accepted and that it was appropriate to strip the Plaintiff of her post offer costs and disbursements.  The Court noted, however, that awarding the Defendant their costs would create “an unduly punitive sanction”.  In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Fitch provided the following reasons:

[47]         Upon consideration of the above-noted factors, as well as the overall purpose of the rules respecting formal offers, I conclude that, pursuant to Rule 9-1(6)(a), the plaintiff shall have her costs at Scale B up to the date of the offer to settle, but not thereafter.  The costs sanction to the plaintiff arising from this order is significant.  She will be denied her costs and disbursements totaling $56,207 from the date of service of the offer to settle.

[48]         I have given close consideration to whether the defendants should be awarded all or a portion of their costs for steps taken in the proceeding after service of the offer to settle pursuant to Rule 9-1(6)(d).  Balancing the applicable considerations as best I can, I have determined not to make this order.  In my view, it is unnecessary to make this order to give effect to the purposes underlying the rule.  More importantly, and for the reasons already given, doing so in this case would visit upon the plaintiff an unduly punitive sanction – one that fails to give any weight:  (1) to the challenges associated with forecasting how a court might assess her loss of future earning capacity claim; and (2) to the plaintiff’s compromised ability to accurately evaluate her own situation.

[49]         The parties will bear their own costs arising out of this application.

Pain Clinic Treatment a "Mandatory" Item Under ICBC's Part 7 Benefits

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether ICBC’s no-fault benefits cover payment for treatment at a pain clinic.  In short the Court found they do.
In today’s case (Park v. Targonski) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages.  At trial future care costs were awarded including $8,500 for treatments from a pain clinic.  The Defenant argued that these damages should be deducted as ICBC must cover the cost under the Plaintiff’s no fault beneifts.  In agreeing with this submission and finding such treatments are included in ICBC’s no-fault coverage Mr. Justice Fitch provided the following reasons:

[44]         …The narrow issue before me is whether a pain clinic that is focussed on “necessary physical therapy” is a mandatory benefit as contemplated by s. 88(1).

[45]         The mere fact that psychological and/or cognitive obstacles to optimal physical rehabilitation are likely to arise in the administration of what amounts, at its core, to a physical rehabilitation program does not negate the fact that the program is designed to achieve “necessary physical therapy.”  The law must take cognizance of our growing awareness of the intersection between physical and mental therapy.  Indeed, it is difficult to envision aggressive implementation of the sort of active rehabilitation Back in Motion has in mind without necessarily engaging psychological and/or cognitive issues, particularly for an individual in the plaintiff’s situation.  Looking at the issue this way, it is unnecessary and unrealistic to hold that a physical therapy program that incidentally engages psychological and/or cognitive issues ought not to be characterized as a s. 88(1) benefit in circumstances where the language of the provision does not dictate this result.  Further, it is undesirable for courts to embark upon the impossible task of deciding which discrete components of a holistic pain program constitute s. 88(1) benefits because they are purely given to physical therapy, and which components fall outside the scope of s. 88(1) because they engage psychological issues that stand as barriers to the successful implementation of an active rehabilitation program.  Such an approach is not only artificial, it is one that would breed uncertainty and spawn further litigation in an area already beset by what the Court of Appeal in Raguin charitably described as “jurisprudential inconsistencies”.

[46]         As is evident from the foregoing, I favour the result reached on this point in Klonarakis.  In the result, I am of the view that a pain clinic focused on “necessary physical therapy” is a mandatory benefit; one that shall be paid by ICBC even in circumstances where it is anticipated that psychological issues may arise in the implementation of the program.

[47]         As noted in Ayles v. Talastasi, 2000 BCCA 87 at para. 32:

As a claim covered by s. 88(1) I.C.B.C. is obliged to pay the benefits. It is not a matter of discretion under s. 88(2) where entitlement depends “on the opinion of the corporation’s medical adviser”. The risk in deducting too much from the tort award for discretionary benefits is that I.C.B.C. may ultimately refuse to pay on items which although found to be compensable in the tort claim were deducted on the assumption that they would be paid as a no fault benefit. In that instance the claimant is out of pocket for the expense and I.C.B.C. enjoys a windfall. But here the class of future expense is obligatory, not discretionary, and so the plaintiff does not stand to lose anything by the deduction. It is only in circumstances where the classification of the future cost is unclear or an issue arises whether the item is covered by Part 7 at all, that some caution is required.

[48]         As I am satisfied in this case that the pain clinic is a mandatory benefit and that ICBC is obliged to reimburse the plaintiff for all reasonable expenses associated with her attendance at the clinic, there is no uncertainty as to whether this benefit will be paid.