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Tag: multiple independent medical exams

No Medical Report Thwarts Request for Second Defence Medical Exam

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, rejecting a defense application for a defense medical exam where they had not provided a report following an initial exam.
In today’s case (Thandi v. Higuchi) the Plaintiff agreed to be assessed by an orthopedic surgeon selected by the Defendant.  No report was produced following this assessment and the Defendant requested a further a exam with a neurologist.  In dismissing the application the Court noted that the lack of a report left the court without a proper evidentiary foundation respecting the equality of the playing field.  Master Harper provided the following reasons:

[6]             The major impediment to the defendant’s application in this case is the absence of Dr. Loomer’s report. It might be the case that the defendant could establish the necessity for a third independent medical examination before a neurologist, but the Court does not have sufficient evidence to assess that issue. Here, I rely on Koulechov v. Dunstan, 2015 BCSC 393 at para. 6, which is on all fours with this application:

[6]        It is counsel’s prerogative, of course, to control the timing of disclosure in a civil case. However, an order for a second independent medical examination under Rule 7-6 is a discretionary remedy that will only go if it is required to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence: Stainer v. Plaza, 2001 BCCA 133 at para. 8. In the present application, in the absence of Dr. Gittens’ report, it is impossible for me to evaluate if there is any inequality in evidence or if an orthopaedic IME could redress it. …

[7]             Applying the Koulechov decision to the present application, I am not in a position to assess whether the medical complaints that involve neurological complaints were addressed by Dr. Loomer, could have been addressed by Dr. Loomer, or whether Dr. Loomer declined to opine on any neurological complaints because it was outside his area of expertise.

[8]             So quite simply, the defendant has not met the evidentiary burden necessary to justify the order sought and, therefore, I dismiss the application.

ICBC Part 7 Exam Once Again Thwarts Defence Medical Exam Request

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

Earlier this month I discussed a case dismissing a defence application for an ‘independent’ medical exam where the Plaintiff already attended an ICBC arranged medical examination.  Further reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, with the same disposition.
In this week’s case (Soczynski v. Cai) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision.  Both she and the Defendant were insured by ICBC. As is the usual practice in BC, the same ICBC adjuster was handling the Plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits and also her tort claim.
The adjuster arranged an independent medical exam with an orthopaedic surgeon.  The Plaintiff attended.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant brought a court motion to compel the Plaintiff to be examined by a second surgeon.  The motion was dismissed, however, with the Court finding that the previous ICBC exam created a ‘level playing field’.  Master McDiarmid provided the following useful reasons:
[21] In reviewing the facts in this case, and keeping in mind the main principle to be looked at here, the principle of keeping the parties on an equal footing, I find that in the circumstances of this case, and in particular, the fact that the ICBC adjuster was handling both the Part 7 and tort claims, and did not respond when she knew that the plaintiff’s position was that the examination in front of Dr. Bishop was to deal with both those claims, I find that the examination which took place at the behest of ICBC on January 27, 2009 by Dr. Paul Bishop constituted the first medical examination as contemplated by Rule 7-6(1). The defendants want a further examination by another medical practitioner who practices in the area of orthopaedics. The plaintiff is not relying on any orthopaedic specialists. Keeping in mind the “level playing field” principle, it is not appropriate to order a further examination of the plaintiff by a medical practitioner having expertise in the area of orthopaedics.
For an example of a recent case where an ICBC Part 7 exam which went beyond Part 7 matters did not prohibit a tort Defence Medical exam you can click here to read Master MacNaughton’s recent reasons for judgement in Assalone v. Le.

ICBC's Part 7 Exam Thwarts Defence Medical Exam Application

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 48 Comments on ICBC's Part 7 Exam Thwarts Defence Medical Exam Application

As previously discussed, when a Defendant is insured with ICBC their ability to set up an ‘independent‘ medical exam can be compromised if ICBC exercised their rights to have the Plaintiff examined under section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation and if that exam went beyond what was required for a ‘part 7’ opinion.  Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Rossland Registry, demonstrating such an outcome.
In the recent case (Wocknitz v. Donaldson) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision.  Both the Plaintiff and Defendant were insured by ICBC.  Before litigation got underway ICBC had the Plaintiff assessed by a physiatrist.   As is not uncommon with these types of examinations, the report generated exceeded the narrow scope of Part 7 Benefit needs.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff obtained their own expert opinion from a physiatrist.  The Defendant’s brought an application to compel the Plaintiff to be assessed by another physiatrist and by a psychiatrist.  They argued this was necessary to ‘level the playing field’.  Mr. Justice Pearlman disagreed and dismissed the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following helpful reasons:

[14] In Robertson v. Grist, 2006 BCSC 1245, at paragraph 14, Madam Justice Dillon addressed the question of whether a Part 7 examination constitutes a first independent medical examination for the purposes of a tort claim. She said this:

[14]      Whether the Part 7 examination constitutes a first independent medical examination depends upon the scope of the examination, given the rest of the circumstances here.  There was no limitation on Dr. Jaworski’s examination and the request letter covered matters that would solely be relevant to a tort action.  The doctor’s report was not limited to a rehabilitation opinion about whether the injuries sustained in the accident totally disabled the plaintiff from work within 20 days of the accident and for a period of 104 weeks or less, the criteria in section 80 of the Part 7 benefits Regulations.  The examination was a first independent medical examination within the meaning of Rule 30.

[15] In this case, the letter from the adjustor instructing Dr. Findlay has not been put in evidence.  However, it is clear from Dr. Findlay’s report that it deals with matters which go beyond an inquiry restricted to Part 7 benefits, and deals with matters directly relevant to the tort claim. ..

[19] In this case, there have been no subsequent unforeseeable events which would, in my view, warrant a second examination by a physiatrist.

[20] With respect to the application of the defendants for an order for an independent medical examination by a psychiatrist, again this is not a case where such an examination is required in order to level the playing field.  This is not a case where the plaintiff has obtained or intends to obtain a psychiatric report.  An independent medical examination by a psychiatrist is a particularly invasive form of examination and, in the circumstances of this case, it is not one that I would be prepared to order.

[21] With respect to the defendants’ submission that because Dr. Findlay provided his report some nine months after the accident, he was not in a position to pronounce in any definitive way with respect to a prognosis, in my view the timing of Dr. Findlay’s examination was a matter that was entirely within the control of the defendants.  That does not provide a basis which would justify an order for a second independent examination by a physiatrist.  As counsel for the plaintiff has pointed out, it would still be open to the defendants to have Dr. Findlay review the report of Dr. Valentine, and the clinical records that have been produced, and to provide a rebuttal report for use at trial.

[22] The application of the defendants for the two independent medical examinations sought is dismissed.

More on Part 7 Medical Exams Barring Tort Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams.

As previously discussed, ICBC can typically arrange an ‘independent’ medical exam (IME) in one of two ways.  The first is when an insured applies for first party no-fault benefits.  Section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation gives ICBC the power to compel an IME in these circumstances.  The second is under Rule 7-6(1) of the BC Supreme Court rules which allows the court to order an independent exam to “level the playing field” in an injury lawsuit.
Two sets of reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention from the BC Supreme Court, Campbell River Registry, discussing when a previous Part 7 Exam will prevent ICBC from obtaining a new expert under the Rules of Court.
In the first case (Robinson v. Zerr) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In the course of dealing with ICBC for his Part 7 Benefits the Plaintiff attended a medical appointment arranged by ICBC with an orthopaedic surgeon.  In the course of the tort lawsuit ICBC attempted to get an opinion from a second orthopaedic surgeon.  The Plaintiff opposed this.  ICBC brought an application to compel the second exam but this was dismissed with the Court finding that the first report strayed beyond what was required for a Part 7 exam.  In dismissing the Application Master McCallum provided the following reasons:
[8]  The authorities are clear that the Part 7 report can be treated, as it was in Robertson v. Grist, as a report in the tort action if it is shown that it effectively covered all of that ground, as I understand it.  It is clear from Dr. Dommisse’s that it does cover all of what one may expect in a report.   Dr. Dommisse did not have access to the pre-accident clinical records.  However, it is clear he knew of the plaintiff’s history because he describes past treatments and past history…
[10]  Dr. Dommisse went through the examination and gave his opinion.  His opinion is not qualified in any way.  He does not suggest that there is more information he needs.  He makes no recommendaiton for treatment.  There is nothing to suggest that, if he had more information or that he wished more information before he could make the determinations he did.
[11]  The report, in my view, is the same of sufficiently similar to the report in Robertson v. Grist and obtained in circumstances that persuade me that this report is indeed the opportunity for the level playing field that the authorities call for.  The defendant has had the opportunity to have the plaintiff examined by an examiner of his choosing.  Although the adjuster references Part 7 claim and the disability benefits, Dr. Dommisse does not, in my view, treat the report as limited in any way and gives his opinion on every aspect of the claim…
[15]  In those circumstances the defendant’s application is dismissed.
In the second case (Lamontage v. Adams) a similar result was reached with a Court finding that a subsequent exam should be with the Part 7 physician as that examiner covered ground relevant in the tort claim.
The above cases are unreported but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy of the reasons to anyone who contacts me and requests these.

"Proportionality" and Multiple Independent Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on "Proportionality" and Multiple Independent Medical Exams


One of the biggest changes in the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules is the requirement that the court secure the determination of a proceeding in ways that are “proportionate to the amount involved in the proceeding, the importance of the issues in dispute, and the complexity of the proceeding“.
Reasons for judgement were released today considering this concept in relation to ICBC’s request for multiple independent medical exams in an injury lawsuit.
In today’s case (Kim v. Lin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 BC collision.  She sued for damages and ICBC defended as statutory third party.  The Plaintiff gave evidence at her discovery that she suffered from pain in numerous areas in her body including “problems with her eyes, ringing in her ears, neck pain, problems with her shoulders and shoulder blades, her upper back, her hip, her lower back, bruising to her hips, leg, knee and ankle pain, as well as headaches, dizziness, hair loss, weight problems and a variety of emotional problems, including impaired memory and concentration, sleep, fatigue and decreased energy levels“.
In the course of the claim the Plaintiff attended two medical appointments arranged by ICBC, the first with a neurologist, the second with a psychiatrist.   ICBC had also secured reports from two of the Plaintiff’s treating physicians.  ICBC wished to have the Plaintiff assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon but the Plaintiff refused arguing such an application was not necessary.  Mr. Justice Voith ultimately decided that this assessment was necessary in order to ‘balance the playing field’ and ordered that the Plaintiff attend.
In reaching this decision the Court considered the role that proportionality plays when a defendant asks a plaintiff to attend multiple independent medical exams.  Mr. Justice Voith provided the following useful discussion:

[28]        Finally, I turn to the relevance of the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and the alleged impact of those injuries on Ms. Kim. These issues are also germane to the plaintiff’s submission that “proportionality” should influence the outcome of this application. While R. 1-3(2) establishes that “proportionality” is an over-arching consideration which informs the interpretation and implementation of the Rules, its significance, however, is greater for some Rules then for others.

[29]        Thus, for example, the former R. 26, which related to document production, imposed a uniform obligation to produce documents under the well-known Peruvian Guano standard, affirmed inFraser River v. Can-Dive, 2002 BCCA 219 at 12, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 146. Rule 7-1(1) has modified this uniform standard. Instead, Rules 7-1(11)-(14) dictate how and when the production of additional documents may be required. Within this regime, “proportionality” will no doubt have much influence.

[30]        In other cases or for other Rules, however, the reality is that “proportionality”, though not expressed in precisely those terms, has historically and inherently already played a significant role. The former R. 30(1) is an example of this. Under R. 30(1), courts routinely considered, as one of many factors, the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and the potential magnitude of the plaintiff’s claim in addressing the appropriateness of further independent medical examinations.

[31]        Thus, for example, in Gulamani v. Chandra, 2008 BCSC, 1601 Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey, in addressing the factors that underlay her decision said, in part, at para.34:

…Third, the nature of some of the plaintiff’s claims in this case, including a thoracic outlet syndrome and chronic pain syndrome, and the plaintiff’s claim relating to her ongoing physical and mental disability such that she is unable to practice her profession and properly care for her family, make it a case of significant size and medical complexity.

[32]        Similarly, the former R. 68, regarding expedited litigation, engaged in very similar considerations, with its reference to “proportionality” in R.68(13) and its presumptive direction of “not more than one expert” in R.68(33).

[33]        Ms. Kim is a young woman. She says she suffers severely from multiple complaints. She asserts that many of these injuries are acute in terms of their severity and the ongoing difficulty they cause her. By way of example, and without addressing each of her injuries, Ms. Kim claims that she presently suffers from both headache and neck pain which she rates on a pain scale at an 8 or 9 out of 10, where 0 equates to no pain and 10 equates to such severe pain that it would cause one to seek emergency medical treatment. She has discontinued her studies. The report of Dr. Tessler at page 3 indicates that she now only works two days a week.

[34]        If it can be established that Ms. Kim’s present circumstances were caused by the Accident, the “amount involved” in her claim has the prospect of being quite significant, a relevant consideration under R.1-3(2)(a). Similarly, the “issues in dispute”, a relevant consideration under R.1-3(2)(b), are important for both parties.

[35]        Accordingly, I am satisfied that considerations of “proportionality” do not militate against the third party’s application but rather support the appropriateness of the medical examination before Dr. Kendall that it seeks. Further, I do not consider that the purpose of the report of Dr. Kendall can properly be said to either bolster the report of Dr. Tessler or to undermine its findings. Instead, I am satisfied that a further examination of Ms. Kim by Dr. Kendall is necessary to have the plaintiff’s concerns properly addressed by a physician with the requisite or appropriate expertise.

ICBC Tort Claims, Part 7 Benefits and Multiple "Independent" Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


As I’ve previously written, ICBC can typically arrange an ‘independent’ medical exam (IME) in one of two ways.  The first is when an ‘insured’ applies for first party no-fault benefits.  Section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation gives ICBC the power to compel an IME in these circumstances.  The second is under Rule 7-6(1) of the BC Supreme Court rules which allows the court to order an independent exam to “level the playing field” in an injury lawsuit.
As a monopoly insurer ICBC often has one adjuster assigned to look after a person’s claim for no-fault benefits and at the same time look after the defendant’s interests in the Plaintiff’s tort claim.  Often times ICBC will obtain a no-fault benefits medical exam and then once a tort claim is launched seek a second exam with a different physician pursuant to the BC Supreme Court Rules.  Can ICBC do this?  The answer is sometimes yes but is highly factually dependent and reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In today’s case (Imeri v. Janczukowski) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision in 2005.  The Plaintiff and Defendant were insured with ICBC.  The same ICBC adjuster was looking after the Plaintiff’s no-fault benefits claim and acting on behalf of the defendant in the tort claim.  ICBC sent the Plaintiff for an IME with an orthopaedic surgeon (Dr. Boyle) as part of the no-fault benefits application process.  In the course of the tort claim the Defendant then sought an order sending the Plaintiff for an IME with a different orthopaedic surgeon (Dr. McGraw).  The Plaintiff opposed this motion and argued that if ICBC is entitled to a second exam it should be with the the same doctor.  Master Shaw sided with the Plaintiff.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons:

[17]        Rule 7-6(1), which is the new Rule 30, provides as follows:

Order for medical examination

(1) If the physical or mental condition of a person is in issue in an action, the court may order that the person submit to examination by a medical practitioner or other qualified person, and if the court makes an order under this subrule, the court may also make

(a) an order respecting any expenses connected with the examination, and

(b) an order that the result of the examination be put in writing and that copies be made available to interested parties of record.

[18]        In Stainer v. Plaza, 2001 BCCA 133, Finch J.A. (as he then was) said at para. 8:

… the purpose of Rule 30 is to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence.

[19]        Although the first question would be whether the defence needs an IME of an orthopaedic specialist to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence, counsel for the plaintiff did not oppose the plaintiff attending a defence IME with an orthopaedic specialist as long as it was Dr. Boyle. The plaintiff agrees to go back to Dr. Boyle for the IME.

[20]        The plaintiff’s submission is that the plaintiff has already attended a first IME for tort purposes with Dr. Boyle and, if a further IME is appropriate, it should be a follow-up with the original expert for the defence.

[21]        In Rowe v. Kim, 2008 BCSC 1710, Master Keighley at para. 14 states:

A party seeking to have a second examination preformed by a practitioner practicing in the same speciality or discipline as a practitioner who has already examined a person faces an uphill battle: Hothi v. Grewal, [1993] 45 B.C.L.R. (3d) 394 (SC); Hamada v. Semple, [1983] B.C.J. No. 1307 (SC). Successful applicants are those who are able to demonstrate that something has happened since the first examination which could not have been foreseen or which could not, for some other reasons, have been addressed by the first examiner. It also seems to me that material filed in support of the application should indicate why a further examination by the doctor who performed the original assessment is not appropriate.

[22]        The evidence submitted in this matter does not set out why it would not be appropriate to send the plaintiff back to Dr. Boyle. There was no evidence why Dr. McGraw should be preferred over Dr. Boyle.

[23]        The plaintiff does not resist seeing Dr. Boyle. It is not necessary to find sufficient reasoning for the further examination by Dr. Boyle.

[24]        I find the February 28, 2006 report of Dr. Boyle contains opinion relevant to both the Part 7 claim and the tort claim. The defence has not provided any evidence to explain the opinion content in the report relevant to the tort claim, other than the statement of the adjuster in her letter to the plaintiff setting the appointment that the IME is for the Part 7 claim purposes. It is not known what the request or instructions to Dr. Boyle were. Based on the content of the resulting report, there is opinion relevant to the tort claim. I find the IME by Dr. Boyle on February 28, 2006 is a first examination by an orthopaedic specialist in the tort claim as well as for a Part 7 claim.

Court Ordered "Independent Medical Exams" and the Standard of Review – A Second Kick at the Can

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams. 49 Comments on Court Ordered "Independent Medical Exams" and the Standard of Review – A Second Kick at the Can


When a court orders a Plaintiff to attend an independent medical exam (click here to read some related posts on this topic) in an ICBC or other Injury Claim and the parties appeal what is the standard of review used in the appellate hearing?
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing this issue.
In today’s case (Barbosa v. Castillo) the Plaintiff attended an Independent Medical Exam (IME) with an Orthopaedic Surgeon chosen by the Defendant.  He gave an opinion that the plaintiff did not have a “functional problem” with respect to any neurological complaints.  The Plaintiff then served expert reports outlining  that he had nerve root irritation which negatively impacted his ability to work.
The Defence asked for a second medical exam, this time with a neurologist.  On application to Court the presiding Master rejected the motion.  The Defendant appealed the ruling.  On hearing the appeal Mr. Justice Schultes had to decide, amongst other things, what the legal test was on these types of applications.  He ruled that the appeal can be a rehearing (as opposed to requiring proof that the Master was ‘clearly wrong’) in essence giving the appellant a second kick at the can.  Specifically the Court held as follows:

[14] Before proceeding further, it is necessary to establish the applicable standard of review of the learned master’s decision.  It is well established that on purely interlocutory matters, it must be demonstrated that the master was “clearly wrong” in his or her decision. However, when the ruling raises questions that are vital to the final issue in the case, the reviewing court approaches the matter as a rehearing.  When the master’s decision deals with a question of law, the standard of review is correctness:  Abermin Corp. v. Granges Exploration Ltd., [1990] B.C.J. No. 1060 (S.C.), and Joubarne v. Sandes, 2009 BCSC 1413 at para. 14.

[15] A decision to deny a defendant the opportunity to have an independent medical examination conducted of the plaintiff can raise questions that are vital to the final issue in the case.  In Belke v. Bennett, 2006 BCSC 536, Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following helpful approach at para. 5:

If the Master’s order amounts to a refusal, whether in whole or in part, of an application to have the plaintiff submit to an independent medical examination, it may deprive the defendant of discovering evidence necessary for a full examination of the plaintiff’s claim or of a defence advanced.  It is in that sense that a decision may be said to go to an issue vital to the trial. […]  If, on the other hand, the Master’s order simply sets terms on which the independent medical examination is to be conducted or directs that such an examination not be performed by a particular professional, the defendant is not deprived of potential evidence, and the order cannot be characterized as going to an issue that may be vital to a final issue at the trial.

[16] I adopt this analysis.  I think the master’s decision in this case fell within the first situation envisioned in Belke.  Denying the defendant’s application effectively foreclosed any exploration of Dr. Hunt’s opinion, let alone any rebuttal of it, on behalf of the defendant by an expert with the specific expertise necessary to cope with the report on its own terms.

[17] If uncontradicted, Dr. Hunt’s opinion could be determinative of several of the kinds of damages claimed by the plaintiff, in particular as to the true nature and extent of his injuries and their impact on his future earning capacity.  These questions appear to be vital to several final issues.  Accordingly, I will treat this appeal as a rehearing.

Mr. Justice Schultes went onto allow the appeal and order the second defence medical exam.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful summary of the law discussing factors courts can consider in applications for multiple independent defence medical exams:

[19] Turning to the actual merits of the defendant’s application on the rehearing, an excellent summary of the applicable law in this area was provided by Madam Justice D. Smith, then a member of this court, in McKay v. Passmore, 2005 BCSC 570 at paras. 15 – 19:

15.       The principles to be followed in deciding whether the defendants have shown an adequate basis for a second IME are set out in Trahan v. West Coast Amusements Ltd.[2000] BCSC 691 (CanLII), [2000] BCSC 691, at para. 48:

The authorities establish that additional medical examinations are in the discretion of the court …  (citations omitted).

That discretion is to be exercised judicially, considering the evidence adduced.  A second examination to permit the defendant a second opinion on the same subject matter will not be allowed.  A second examination may be appropriate where there is some question which could not have been dealt with on the first examination … (Citations omitted).

That the magnitude of the loss is greater than previously known is not in and of itself sufficient to permit a second examination … (Citations omitted).

Where diagnosis is difficult and existing assessments are aged, further assessment may be required …

And in Roberge v. Canada Life Assurance Co. [2002] BCSC 1500 (CanLII), [2002] BCSC 1500 at paragraph 9:

The distinction is quite important.  Simply put, when a person in litigation makes a claim for a personal injury, the defendant is, without oversimplifying the matter, almost always entitled to a medical examination of the plaintiff.  A much higher standard is imposed when the defendant seeks a second medical examination of the plaintiff.

16.       The overriding question is whether a second medical examination is necessary to ensure reasonable equality between the parties in their preparation of a case for trial: Wildemann v. Webster [1990] CanLII 206 (BC C.A.), [1991] 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 244 (C.A.).

17.       Reasonable equality does not mean that the defendant must be able to match expert for expert or report for report.  I refer to Trahan v. West Coast Amusement Ltd. and toMacNevin v. Vroom [21 December 2004] New Westminster S072995 (S.C.).

18.       The defendants must satisfy the court that there is some question or matter that could not have been dealt with at the first examination:  Jackson v. Miller [1999] B.C.J. No. 2751 (S.C.).

19.       In considering how to exercise the discretion to grant a second IME, the court should take into account the timeliness of the application in the light of Rule 40A and the practicalities of trial preparation… [citations omitted.]

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Independent Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

Ok, second post of the day on this topic.
Typically ICBC (on behalf of their insured defendant) are able to send a Plaintiff to an Independent Medical Exam in the course of a BC Supreme Court lawsuit in order to level the playing field.  In certain cases they are entitled to more than one exam.
Reasons for judgement were released today (Norsworthy v. Greene) dismissing a defence applicaiton for a second examination in an ICBC Injury Claim.
In this case the Plaintiff obtained several medico-legal reports including the report of a physical medicine specialist and a Functional Capacity Evaluation.  ICBC had the Plaintiff examined by Dr. Schweigel.  Dr. Schweigel provided the opinion that the Plaintiff had soft tissue injuries and that she “could have been off work for roughly 3 months.  After that she should have been able to return to work in a graduated fashion.  Within five to six months, she should have been able to return to full time work.  This lady is not disabled now from all the activities she was doing prior to the two MVA’s“.
The Plaintiff’s experts disagreed and provided opinion that her injuries were more severe and disabling that opined by Dr. Schweigel.  ICBC applied for a second ‘independent’ exam on the basis that they should be entitled to reply to the Functional Capacity Evaluation opinion obtained by the Plaintiff.  In rejecting the applicaiton Master Caldwell of the BC Supreme Court gave the following summary of the law regarding requests for multiple Independent Medical Exams:

[22] It should be obvious to any reader of these two reports that each was prepared by two persons with two completely different disciplines and approaches; yet there was a noticeable crossover in some of the observations made by each of them.

[23] In Christopherson v. Krahn, 2002 BCSC 1356, Madam Justice Smith made the observations at para. 9 that the test of reasonable equality does not mean that for each specialist relied upon by the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to an IME from a similar specialist.  Smith J. went on to deal with this proposition when she quoted from Henry v. Derbyshire, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1750, a decision of Master Nitikman where, at para. 13, the master stated:

A third applicable principle is that the party seeking the examination is not limited to one independent examination but

The court will not order a second examination merely to permit the defendant to get a second opinion on the same matter.  [She went on to say] A second examination may be appropriate where there is some question which could not have been dealt with on the first examination.  The applicant must show a reason why it is necessary for the second examination.

[24] I take the view that in the case at bar the defendants are seeking a second examination pursuant to Rule 30(2).

[25] The IME sought by Dr. Schweigel was conducted after the defendants had knowledge of the earlier functional capacity evaluation of the plaintiff by an occupational therapist retained by the plaintiff, yet the defendants chose to have an IME conducted by an orthopedic surgeon.  That opinion seems to be firm.  Now the defendants seek an opinion of an occupational therapist which may undermine the opinion of Dr. Schweigel, their own expert.

[26] Respectfully, in my view, although the defendants point to the different purposes of the reports, I do not believe that those differences alone provide a valid reason for a second report pursuant to Rule 30(2).

[27] Accordingly, I dismiss the defendants’ application and award the plaintiff her costs for preparation for and attendance at the hearing of this matter.