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Tag: Mr. Justice Voith

Multiple Defence Medical Exams: The Prohibition of "Belt and Suspenders" Applications


While the Rules of Court permit Defendants to compel a Plaintiff to attend multiple medical exams in certain circumstances, there is a general prohibition in having multiple exams to address the same topic.  Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing an application in these circumstances calling it a “belt and suspenders application“.
In today’s case  the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In the course of the claim she attended numerous ‘independent‘ medical exams with physicians selected by the Defendant.   Some of these physicians opined that the Plaintiff’s difficulties were not from the collision but due to “opioid dependencies“.
The Defendant asked that the Plaintiff attend a further exam with Dr. Baker, a so -called “addictionologist“.  The Plaintiff refused and an application was brought.  Master Baker dismissed the application noting the general prohibition of multiple exams to bolster a previous opinion.  In dismissing the application the Court provided the following helpful reasons:

[7] To get back to the point, the defence’s position is that some or much of these difficulties relate to, they say, opioid dependencies that have arisen in advance of this motor-vehicle accident.  This is denied or contradicted by the report of her family physician, Dr. Singhal.

[8] Dr. Baker a specialist, in this area, not just of addiction and addiction parameters or aspects of that, but also chronic pain management, I understand.  Even the brief c.v. to which I was referred was impressive.  His membership in various societies, the committees he serves on, all of which impressed me.

[9] Having said all that, I cannot see that this case is in any significant way distinct from that decided by Mr. Justice Voith, to which I just referred.  With greatest respect, at least two specialists for the defence have commented on, concluded, and been quite specifically direct that they regard (the Plaintiff) as having been either habituated, as one — Dr. Smith, I think, said it — or dependent, euphemistically perhaps, addicted to opioids.  This has had consequences for her recovery, or her response to the accident.

[10] I agree entirely, with greatest respect, with Mr. Justice Voith and his impression of the case that he decided.  I agree that there’s no doubt that Dr. Baker has greater expertise on that particular point.

[11] But as Mr. Justice Voith says, that’s not the measure of whether or not to direct an I.M.E.  The phrase — I know it has a pejorative ring to it — but it was used at least a couple of times, once by me — that this is a “belt and suspenders application” by the defence.  They already have expert opinion on the subject.

[12] They were met, from the plaintiff’s perspective, by opposition to Dr. Hashimoto opining on that aspect.  The view, as taken by the plaintiff, that Dr. Hashimoto is not qualified to give this opinion that’s outside his expertise.  They have not taken that perspective in respect of Dr. Smith.

[13] It doesn’t really matter to me whether they did or didn’t, because whether or not a second or subsequent I.M.E. should be ordered does not rely upon the plaintiff’s opinion as to the admissibility of an expert’s opinion, or in fact any other evidence.  That is for the court to decide; and it is, with respect, for the defence to structure its case and its strategies.

[14] I am satisfied, on the circumstances and facts before me, that this does constitute a situation in which the defence is wishing to bolster the opinion of Dr. Smith at least, and possibly Dr. Hashimoto, with the further and yes, more focused opinion of Dr. Baker.

[15] The law in this area does not support that course.  That is sufficient, in my respectful view, to decide the issue.

For the sake of convenience I should point out that the decision of Mr. Justice Voith that Master Baker referenced was Zawadzki v. Calimoso which was recently transcribed and can be found here.

Post Accident Alcoholism Deemed Compensable in BC Tort Claim


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing an interesting issue: whether alcoholism following accident related chronic pain is compensable in a tort claim.  In short, Mr. Justice Voith held that it could be.
In today’s case (Zawadzki v. Calimoso) the Plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a U-Haul truck driven by the Defendant.   The Defendant was found fully at fault for the collision.  The Plaintiff sustained various physical injuries the most serious of which was an elbow joint fracture which required three surgeries and resulted in a permanent partial disability.
Following the collision the Plaintiff began to drink in excess.  This turned into clinical alcoholism the extent of which caused serious health consequences.  In his lawsuit the Plaintiff claimed compensation not only for his physical traumatic injuries but also for the consequences of his alcoholism.  The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff cannot be compensated for this as it is ‘too remote‘.
Mr. Justice Voith addressed this issue at length and paragraphs 99-123 are worth reviewing in full for the Courts analysis.  Ultimately Mr. Justice Voith held that the Plaintiff’s alcoholism was caused in part by the consequences of the crash and was therefor compensable.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[99]         Shortly after the Accident, the plaintiff began to drink heavily. The results of blood tests performed on the plaintiff in late December 2004 indicated that certain liver enzyme levels were extremely elevated. The medical evidence uniformly establishes that such elevated results are directly referable to alcohol consumption. Dr. Smith confirmed that such elevated enzyme levels would not arise as a result of binge drinking, but rather reflected weeks or months of drinking.

[100]     The plaintiff admits he began to drink excessively after the Accident and that his alcohol consumption reached the point where he was drinking 26 ounces of vodka on a nightly basis. ..

[117]     In this case, Mr. Zawadzki’s original physical injuries were foreseeable. So too, the defendants concede, were his depression and anxiety. It was the combination of pain and mood that Drs. Shane and Smith said gave rise to the plaintiff’s excessive drinking. Dr. Smith also confirmed that Mr. Zawadzki had a “genetic predisposition”, by virtue of the alcoholism of his parents, to alcohol abuse. A genetic vulnerability to alcohol abuse is the very type of pre-existing susceptibility that the “thin skull” rule addresses.

[118]     It is clear that both a susceptibility to physical harm and to psychological harm fall within the ambit of the “thin skull” rule: Hussack at para. 143; Yoshikawa v. Yu (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 318 (C.A.) at para. 19. I can see no principled reason why a similar vulnerability to an addiction disorder should be treated or viewed differently…

[123] I find that Mr. Zawadzki’s alcohol abuse was caused by the Accident and that such alcohol abuse was reasonably foreseeable.

ICBC Claims and Default Judgement – A Seldom Pursued Remedy


Default Judgement is a step under Rule 3-8 of the BC Supreme Court Rules which lets a Plaintiff win their lawsuit if a Defendant fails to file a response in the time-lines set out in Rule 3-3.
Default judgement, however, is not a remedy that’s typically used in ICBC claims.  The reason being that in addition to serving the Notice of Civil Claim on Defendants personally, Section 22 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act requires that “Every person commencing an action for damages caused by a vehicle in BC must serve (ICBC) with a copy of the originating process….and file proof of the service in the court in which the action is pending…A further step in the action must not be taken until the expiration of 8 days after the filing“.
What this means is that if a Defendant fails to respond to a BC motor vehicle collision lawsuit in time you cannot successfully obtain default judgement unless you also served ICBC with the documents and they failed to respond.
Even if you’ve taken the above steps Default Judgement is not granted automatically and this was demonstrated in reasons for judgement published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Sandhu v. ICBC) the Plaintiff sued for injuries apparently sustained in a 2002 motor vehicle collision.  He filed and served the documents to start a lawsuit but ICBC did not file a defence in the time required by the Rules of Court.  The Plaintiff then brought an applicaiton for judgment.  Mr. Justice Voith refused to grant default judgement and noted that the Court had discretion with respect to these applicasitons.  Specifically the Court held as follows:

9]             I am advised by Mr. Schroeder, though there are no materials before me, that the plaintiff was injured in a car accident in the late 1990s and that his claim was settled in January of 2002. Furthermore and importantly, Mr. Schroeder confirms that because of the passage of time, his file has been destroyed, and that he has made inquiries with ICBC whose own file in relation to the matter has also, for the most part, been destroyed.

[10]         Mr. Schroeder requires these materials to properly respond to Mr. Sandhu’s claims.

[11]         I am not going to issue judgment. What I am going to do is adjourn the matter because of the following series of factors.

[12]         First, the primary focus of Mr. Sandhu’s application is one that deals with Mr. Schroeder’s lack of compliance with time requirements. I have some flexibility or discretion with respect to such issues and, under the circumstances where Mr. Schroeder was endeavouring to ascertain what had happened in the past and to retrieve relevant file materials, I would be hesitant to award judgment.

While delay is rarely welcome in Injury Lawsuits sometimes it is part of the process.  Very few ICBC claims are won by default judgment.  It is always preferable for claims to be dealt with by their merits.

As a courtesy most plaintiff lawyers grant ICBC defense lawyers a little extra time if necessary to put in their formal defense.  If you’re faced with this situation you’ll want to consider whether an application for default judgement has a meaningful chance of success prior to spending time and effort on a seldom used motion.

"Proportionality" and Multiple Independent Medical Exams


One of the biggest changes in the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules is the requirement that the court secure the determination of a proceeding in ways that are “proportionate to the amount involved in the proceeding, the importance of the issues in dispute, and the complexity of the proceeding“.
Reasons for judgement were released today considering this concept in relation to ICBC’s request for multiple independent medical exams in an injury lawsuit.
In today’s case (Kim v. Lin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 BC collision.  She sued for damages and ICBC defended as statutory third party.  The Plaintiff gave evidence at her discovery that she suffered from pain in numerous areas in her body including “problems with her eyes, ringing in her ears, neck pain, problems with her shoulders and shoulder blades, her upper back, her hip, her lower back, bruising to her hips, leg, knee and ankle pain, as well as headaches, dizziness, hair loss, weight problems and a variety of emotional problems, including impaired memory and concentration, sleep, fatigue and decreased energy levels“.
In the course of the claim the Plaintiff attended two medical appointments arranged by ICBC, the first with a neurologist, the second with a psychiatrist.   ICBC had also secured reports from two of the Plaintiff’s treating physicians.  ICBC wished to have the Plaintiff assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon but the Plaintiff refused arguing such an application was not necessary.  Mr. Justice Voith ultimately decided that this assessment was necessary in order to ‘balance the playing field’ and ordered that the Plaintiff attend.
In reaching this decision the Court considered the role that proportionality plays when a defendant asks a plaintiff to attend multiple independent medical exams.  Mr. Justice Voith provided the following useful discussion:

[28]        Finally, I turn to the relevance of the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and the alleged impact of those injuries on Ms. Kim. These issues are also germane to the plaintiff’s submission that “proportionality” should influence the outcome of this application. While R. 1-3(2) establishes that “proportionality” is an over-arching consideration which informs the interpretation and implementation of the Rules, its significance, however, is greater for some Rules then for others.

[29]        Thus, for example, the former R. 26, which related to document production, imposed a uniform obligation to produce documents under the well-known Peruvian Guano standard, affirmed inFraser River v. Can-Dive, 2002 BCCA 219 at 12, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 146. Rule 7-1(1) has modified this uniform standard. Instead, Rules 7-1(11)-(14) dictate how and when the production of additional documents may be required. Within this regime, “proportionality” will no doubt have much influence.

[30]        In other cases or for other Rules, however, the reality is that “proportionality”, though not expressed in precisely those terms, has historically and inherently already played a significant role. The former R. 30(1) is an example of this. Under R. 30(1), courts routinely considered, as one of many factors, the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and the potential magnitude of the plaintiff’s claim in addressing the appropriateness of further independent medical examinations.

[31]        Thus, for example, in Gulamani v. Chandra, 2008 BCSC, 1601 Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey, in addressing the factors that underlay her decision said, in part, at para.34:

…Third, the nature of some of the plaintiff’s claims in this case, including a thoracic outlet syndrome and chronic pain syndrome, and the plaintiff’s claim relating to her ongoing physical and mental disability such that she is unable to practice her profession and properly care for her family, make it a case of significant size and medical complexity.

[32]        Similarly, the former R. 68, regarding expedited litigation, engaged in very similar considerations, with its reference to “proportionality” in R.68(13) and its presumptive direction of “not more than one expert” in R.68(33).

[33]        Ms. Kim is a young woman. She says she suffers severely from multiple complaints. She asserts that many of these injuries are acute in terms of their severity and the ongoing difficulty they cause her. By way of example, and without addressing each of her injuries, Ms. Kim claims that she presently suffers from both headache and neck pain which she rates on a pain scale at an 8 or 9 out of 10, where 0 equates to no pain and 10 equates to such severe pain that it would cause one to seek emergency medical treatment. She has discontinued her studies. The report of Dr. Tessler at page 3 indicates that she now only works two days a week.

[34]        If it can be established that Ms. Kim’s present circumstances were caused by the Accident, the “amount involved” in her claim has the prospect of being quite significant, a relevant consideration under R.1-3(2)(a). Similarly, the “issues in dispute”, a relevant consideration under R.1-3(2)(b), are important for both parties.

[35]        Accordingly, I am satisfied that considerations of “proportionality” do not militate against the third party’s application but rather support the appropriateness of the medical examination before Dr. Kendall that it seeks. Further, I do not consider that the purpose of the report of Dr. Kendall can properly be said to either bolster the report of Dr. Tessler or to undermine its findings. Instead, I am satisfied that a further examination of Ms. Kim by Dr. Kendall is necessary to have the plaintiff’s concerns properly addressed by a physician with the requisite or appropriate expertise.

New Rules of Court Get First Judicial Interpretation: The Transitional Rule

I have volunteered to keep an eye on the New BC Supreme Court Rules and write about decisions interpreting and applying these.  Today the first judgement considering the New Rules has come to my attention.  Today’s case dealt with Rule 24, the transitional rule.
In today’s case (Easton v. Cooper) the Plaintiff was involved in 3 motor vehicle collisions.  The Plaintiff sued for damages for each crash.  The lawsuits were started under the old Rules of Court but were set to proceed to trial in November, 2010 (some 5 months after the New Rules came into force).  The lawsuits were all started under Rule 68 of the old rules which required parties to exchange summaries of the evidence they expect their witnesses to give at trial.  The Plaintiff did not produce statements in compliance with this requirement.
The Defendant brought a motion to force  the Plaintiff to provide this evidence.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that she no longer needs to exchange these statements because the trial will proceed under the new rules.  Mr. Justice Voith sided with the Defendants and ordered that the Plaintiff provide summaries of evidence as required under the old rules.  In reaching this conclusion the Court had the first opportunity that I’m aware of to consider section 24 of the New Rules of Court (the section dealing with parties obligations in lawsuits started under the old rules but that are ongoing aftger the New Rules came into force).  Mr. Justice Voith provided the following interpretation of this section:

[4]             Rule 24-1(14) of the New Rules provides:

(14)      If a step in a proceeding is taken before July 1, 2010, the former Supreme Court Rules apply to any right or obligation arising out of or relating to that step if and to the extent that that right or obligation is to have effect before September 1, 2010.

[5]             The interpretation of Rule 24-1(14) turns on both the meaning of “step in a proceeding” as well as the time period that is book-ended by the two dates within the provision…

[13]         Based on the foregoing authorities, within the “Rules context”, a “step” means a formal step expressly permitted or required by the Rules.

[14]         Rule 24-1(14) specifically focuses on a narrow window of time. It addresses instances where a step undertaken prior to July 1, 2010 gives rise to an obligation that is required to be satisfied prior to September 1, 2010. By way of example, the “step” of delivering a demand for discovery of documents created a right on the part of the initiating party and a concomitant obligation on the part of the recipient of the demand to comply with the time frames and substantive requirements of the former Rules. So long as the time frame for that obligation ends before September 1, 2010 the response or action is governed under the former Rules.

[15]         In this case Rule 24-1(14) is not engaged.

[16]         Rule 68(31) of the former Rules provided:

Witnesses

(31)      Within 90 days after the close of pleadings or within 90 days after the action becomes an expedited action, whichever is later, each party to an expedited action must deliver to each other party

(a)        a list, in Form 141, of the witnesses that the party delivering the list proposes to call at the trial of the expedited action, which list must

(i)    include the party delivering the list, if that party intends to give evidence at trial, and

(ii)    exclude any expert witnesses referred to in subrule (33), and

(b)        for each of the witnesses included in the list, a written summary of the evidence that the party believes that witness will give at trial.

[17]         In each of the three actions commence by Ms. Easton, the 90 day period provided for by the former Rule 68(31), as well as the obligation or formal step created by that Rule, had expired well before July 1, 2010. The application of Rule 24-1(14) simply does not come into play. The fact that the ultimate trial of these various actions will post-date September 1, 2010, is of no moment and does not detract from the obligation to adhere to the formal requirements established by the earlier Rules…

[21] The plaintiff is directed to provide proper witness statements to counsel for the defendants within 21 days of the date that these Reasons for Judgment are issued.

In addition to the usual variety of topics I cover on this blog I will continue to post about the new Rules of Court.  If anyone is aware of any recent cases worth noting here please don’t hesitate to contact me.

More on Rule 37B – The Conduct of the Parties as a Factor

Further to my numerous posts revieiwng BC Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying Rule 37B following an injury claims trial, reasons for judgement were released today dealing with a unique issue; in exercising discretion under the Rule can the Court consider the conduct of the successful litigant?
In today’s case (Lakhani v. Elliott) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 car crash.  Before trial the Plaintiff made a formal offer to settle her case under Rule 37B for $95,000 plus costs and disbursements.
While the Plaintiff did not obtain all the compensation she sought at trial she fared well enough to beat her formal offer.  Specifically, after an 11 day trial Mr. Justice Voith awarded the Plaintiff just over $105,000 in total damages (You can click here to read my post summarizing the trial findings).
Despite the Plaintiff’s relative success at trial all did not go smoothly.  Mr. Justice Voith made some damaging findings with respect to her credibility.  Some of the highlights of these findings were as follows:

[33]      The defendants asserted that Mrs. Lakhani’s credibility was suspect. I agree in significant measure. I believe there are a number of distinct factors that have caused me to question, in some cases reject, and in other cases to significantly discount her evidence. In the main, I find that Mrs. Lakhani has overstated her symptoms resulting from the Accident; downplayed the significance of her 2001 workplace injury; and has been untruthful regarding the Accident’s effect on her graduation from nursing school. I will discuss these concerns in turn…

[40]      I believe that Mrs. Lakhani has tended to considerably overstate the severity of the symptoms that she suffers from as a result of the Accident….

[46]      For the plaintiff to assert that she has routinely and consistently suffered from pain, from the date of the Accident to the trial, which approaches the worst pain possible is not tenable. For her to describe her pain in terms which would be comparable to that of patients who are heavily medicated to assist with their pain management or who are inextremis goes beyond mere subjectivity or imprecision. It is instead either so inaccurate a description as to be of no value or it is a description intended to overstate. In either case it is not a description that can be relied upon….

[51]      The second significant concern with the plaintiff’s evidence was a tendency to downplay the significance of her 2001 workplace injury or to suggest some improvement in her symptoms in relation to that injury prior to the Accident…

[54]      Indeed Mrs. Lakhani sought broadly to suggest that in late 2004 she reclaimed or reassumed control of her life. She said this was so with respect to spending time with her sister, with respect to gardening and even with respect to her household activities. This too is all inconsistent with the objective record of what she told others she could do, with the medical assessment that her condition had plateaued or with her admission that things had become “as good as they were going to get”…

[59]      Quite simply the overall picture which the plaintiff sought to paint with her evidence was one where the very significant “life altering changes” brought on by her low back injury occupied little or no space. This absence of balance in her evidence had the affect of considerably detracting from its weight.

[60]      A third concern with Mrs. Lakhani’s evidence arises from having testified that the Accident caused her to graduate two terms later than she otherwise would have. Specifically, Mrs. Lakhani said that the pain and difficulty associated with the Accident caused her to skip the May to August 2005, as well as the January to April 2007 academic terms. This is not credible on an objective basis…

[66]      Plaintiff’s counsel sought to persuade me that an eight month delay in Mrs. Lakhani’s graduation was a very modest component of the plaintiff’s claim and not one that would cause the plaintiff to be less than forthright. In my view, however, the focus of the plaintiff’s evidence was not designed to obtain the modest financial benefit that receiving her degree earlier would have generated, but rather to impress upon the court the ongoing severity of her injuries. Quite apart from her motivation, the documents I’ve referred to as well as the admissions she made in cross examination, simply do not accord with the evidence she first gave.

With this background at hand the Plaintiff brought an application for double costs under Rule 37B.  The Defendants opposed and argued that given the Plaintiff’s “failure to be forthright at trial” the Court should not exercise its discretion to award the Plaintiff double costs.  Mr. Justice Voith agreed and provided the following analysis:

0] While the dominant objective of Rule 37B, found under the heading “Offers of Settlement”, is likely to promote early or reasonable settlement, additional factors, and in particular the conduct or honesty of one of the parties, can be relevant in considering whether to make an order of double costs under 37B(5)(b). This is apparent from numerous sources…
[13] Second, both the permissive nature of Rule 37B(5), which establishes that the new rule does not purport to create any automatic double cost consequences, and the non-exhaustive list of factors in Rule 37B(6) acknowledge the flexibility inherent in Rule 37B and the prospect that the Rule is amenable to furthering legitimate policy objectives apart from settlement…

[15] It is important to emphasize that in this case there is no issue of depriving the plaintiff of the ordinary costs to which she is entitled or of any award of special costs being made against her. Instead, the only issue is whether she should be entitled to double costs in light of various findings that I made in my Reasons for Judgment.

[16] Having regard to the foregoing authorities, and the underlying rationale that drives them, I can see no principled reason why a lack of candour or probity on the part of a party who gives evidence at trial should not constitute an “other factor the court considers appropriate” under Rule 37B(6)(d) in any potential award of double costs. An award of double costs, or a refusal to award such costs, is one of the means available to a court of signalling to litigants the types of conduct or behaviour it considers as either worthy of promotion or, conversely, as worthy of rebuke…

[20]        The same considerations apply to a party whose evidence is found by a court to be dishonest or designed to exaggerate or inflate a claim. Such a party should understand the seriousness with which that conduct will be regarded. It should similarly understand the potential consequences of that conduct, including its relevance to an award of double costs that the party might otherwise be entitled to.

[21]        In making these comments I am mindful that there are a great many cases where a party’s evidence is not accepted by the court for a variety of reasons. In many cases a party’s best recollection may simply not accord with other objective evidence. A party’s candid evidence may not, in light of the expert evidence, be accepted. Indeed it is not remarkable or unusual for a party to place a somewhat positive slant on given events. The mere fact that a party’s evidence is not accepted by the court, without more, does not engage the considerations I have identified. There is nothing in the conduct of such a party that warrants any reproach or criticism. It is, instead, the natural result of all cases where competing memories or competing versions of given events require resolution…

[24] In this case, the specific findings I referred to go beyond the “normal trial process” and do extend to a finding that the plaintiff sought to mislead the court and to significantly exaggerate the claim being advanced. Such conduct is worthy of censure and, in the circumstances of this case, disentitles the plaintiff to the award of double costs that she seeks.

This case serves as an important reminder of the crucial role that Plaintiff credibility plays in injury litigation.
In my continued efforts to get us all prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I will again point out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.

Be Nice, Clear Your Ice…Fault for Slip and Fall Accidents


When I was growing up in Toronto I remember public service commercials often being played in the wintertime with the slogan “Be Nice, Clear Your Ice“.  Due to the temperate climate of Victoria, BC I have not heard a similar public service announcement for years.  That being said, regardless of where in Canada you live if you are responsible for a roadway/driveway/sidewalk/parking-lot that is covered in ice/snow reasonable steps should be taken to remove it.  Not only is removing it from your property the sensible thing to do, failing to do so can lead to a successful lawsuit and reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In today’s case (O’Leary v. Rupert) the Plaintiff rented a basement suite in the Defendants home.  When returning from work one day the Plaintiff parked her car in the driveway and attempted to walk up the driveway to the stairs of her basement suite.  It was dark outside and none of the lights were on.  Before reaching the stairs the Plaintiff slipped and fell.   The Plaintiff sued for damages and succeeded.  In finding the Defendants liable Mr. Justice Voith found that they did not take reasonable steps to keep the driveway clear of hazards.  Specifically the Court summarized and applied the law as follows:

[38] The obligation of the Ruperts under the Tenancy Agreement was to “maintain the residential property in a reasonable state of …. decoration and repair.” Conversely, the obligation of Ms. O’Leary under s. 10 of the Tenancy Agreement was to “maintain reasonable health, cleanliness and sanitary standards.” In saying this, I recognize that as a matter of practice Mrs. O’Leary swept and shovelled the stairs and pathway leading to her suite.

[39] Second, as I have said, it is common ground that the Ruperts maintained and shovelled the whole of their driveway without ever suggesting to Mrs. O’Leary that this obligation properly fell to her. Liability may be imposed on a party who has voluntarily undertaken to do something they were not otherwise obligated to do: see Goodwin v. Goodwin, 2007 BCCA 81, 64 B.C.L.R. (4th) 280, at para. 26. Where that voluntary task is performed negligently and causes foreseeable harm to a plaintiff, liability may arise. Once the Ruperts undertook to maintain and shovel the whole of their driveway, regardless of whether they were under a legal obligation to do so, they had a duty not to perform this task negligently.

Analysis

[40] In MacLeod, Mr. Justice Burnyeat listed a series of factors, and the legal authorities where they are referred to, that are relevant in considering whether an occupier has fulfilled the duty imposed by s. 3 of the OLA. These factors include “whether an unusual danger was present, whether a warning had been provided to the plaintiff, the ease or difficulty and the expense with which the unusual danger could have been remedied, and any prior record of safe usage of the premises by others or by the plaintiff.”

[41] In this case, the application of most of these factors, together with the factors I have referred to earlier that emanate from Zavaglia, support the conclusion that the defendants breached the duty of care they owed to the plaintiff. The driveway of the Rupert home was sloped. I have found that it was routinely slippery and that it was icy on the night of January 12, 2007. It was dark on that evening and it was routinely unlit. These factors, in combination, gave rise to a situation that was unsafe or hazardous. In addition, the defendants knew that Mrs. O’Leary was required to cross over parts of the driveway, after exiting her car, to access her suite. Her use of the areas in question and the hazards it presented were thus foreseeable.

[42] In saying this, I recognize that we live in a relatively northern climate and that our winter weather conditions often create an environment that is inherently precarious. In Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420 at p. 439, the court said “Ice is a natural hazard of Canadian winters. It can form quickly and unexpectedly. Although it is an expected hazard it is one that can never be completely prevented.”

[43] Still further, I accept that the standard or test is one of “reasonableness and not perfection”: Fournier v. Grebenc, 2003 NBQB 221, [2003] N.B.R. (2d) (Supp.) No. 28 at para. 31. Finally, I recognize that this case deals with a residential home rather than an apartment building, as in Neilson v. Bear, [1999] B.C.J. No. 86 (S.C.), or a shopping centre, as in Murphy v. Interprovincial Shopping Centres Ltd., 2004 NLSCTD 210, 241 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 316, or a parking lot, as in Parmar v. Imperial Parking Ltd., [1977] B.C.J. No. 486 (S.C.), where the standards and procedures established by the landlord in response to winter conditions are designed to accommodate greater volumes of personal traffic. Accordingly, they are likely to be more rigorous or exacting.

[44] Nevertheless, the conditions that existed at the Rupert home were unnecessarily unsafe. I say unnecessarily unsafe because with little effort and at modest expense the conditions on the driveway could have been much improved. The simple installation of lighting that worked either on a timer or on a motion detector would have provided Mrs. O’Leary with the illumination necessary to better see where she was walking. Both devices are inexpensive. Both would have addressed the inconsistency with which the Ruperts turned on their outside lights or the occasions where, as in the case of the evening when Mrs. O’Leary fell, they had not yet arrived home from work to turn on the lights.

[45] Similarly, the use of salt or some other traction agent would have addressed the icy condition of the driveway. Though the Ruperts were diligent about shovelling their driveway, that step, without more, was not enough. Once again this step would have been relatively inexpensive and would not have been time consuming.

[46] I am also satisfied that the failure of the defendants to take these measures to address the icy and precarious condition of the driveway caused Mrs. O’Leary to fall.

[47] It is noteworthy that the Ruperts have, since Mrs. O’Leary’s accident, both taped the switch for the outside lights open and begun to apply salt to their driveway following a snowfall. It is clear that post-accident conduct cannot be viewed as an admission of negligence: Anderson v. Maple Ridge (District) (1992), 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 68, 17 B.C.A.C. 172 (C.A.) at p. 75. Nevertheless, in Anderson, Wood J.A., as he then was, concluded that moving a stop sign after an accident was relevant to the question of whether it was difficult to see prior to the accident. Here the steps taken by the defendants post-accident are relevant to whether the driveway was dark and whether it remained slippery or icy after being shovelled.

[48] Similarly, post-accident conduct can be used as an indication of the ease with which a risk might have been avoided: Niblock v. Pac. Nat .Exhibition. (1981), 30 B.C.L.R. 20 (S.C.) at p. 25.

Mr. Justice Voith awarded the Plaintiff $25,000 for non-pecuniary damages.  Her most serious injury was a “second degree sprain of her ankle” which continued to impede the Plaintiff in some recreational activities some two years later.  There are not too many cases out there dealing with ankle sprains from the BC Supreme Court and this precedent may prove useful for others with similar injuries.

ICBC Injury Claims and Your Privacy: The Implied Undertaking of Confidentiality

When you sue for damages in the BC Supreme Court in an ICBC Injury Claim you are subject to certain rules of compelled disclosure.  These rules require you to give verbal, documentary and even physical discovery (independent medical exams).
When ICBC gets access to this private information in the lawsuit process it is subject to an “implied undertaking of confidentiality“.  What this means is this information is not to be used by ICBC for purposes outside of the lawsuit.
If you have a further ICBC Claim involving similar injuries making the previous records relevant, can ICBC provide these records to their lawyer to be used against you in a subsequent claim?  Reasons for judgement were released today addressing this issue and the answer is no, at least not without your consent or a court order.
In today’s case (Chonn v. DCRS Canada Corp dba Mercedez-Benz Credit Canada) the Plaintiff had a history of ICBC Injury Claims.  In the most recent claim the Defence Lawyer gathered documents from the previous claims and intended to use them in the current lawsuit.  The Plaintiff objected to this.  A motion was brought before the BC Supreme Court and Mr. Justice Voith was asked to decide whether “the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (“ICBC”), which, by operation of statute, had conduct of the defence of each of the Earlier Actions and has conduct of the Current Action, can list the documents it obtained from the plaintiff in the Earlier Actions without first obtaining the plaintiff’s consent or leave of the court.”
In answering this question Mr. Justice Voith summarized the law behind the “implied undertaking of confidentiality” and set out the limits of ICBC’s use of records in subsequent claims.  The highlights of the decisions are set out below:

[25] A party who has documents from earlier litigation that are impressed with the implied undertaking simply cannot make use of those documents without the concurrence of the party from whom they were obtained or leave of the court. The implied undertaking protects documents or oral discovery obtained in earlier litigation from being used for any purpose “collateral” to that litigation. Thus, the documents cannot be used for internal strategic review in subsequent litigation. They cannot be used for the purposes of drafting pleadings. They cannot be sent to counsel for the purposes of obtaining an opinion in new litigation. All of these obligations bound the named defendants in the Current Action as well as ICBC in its conduct of that litigation.

[39] Once one recognizes that a central focus of the implied undertaking rule is to prevent the use of documents in subsequent litigation without consent or leave of the court, it is not sound to assert that Rule 26 displaces the application of the implied undertaking rule. Rule 26 is a rule of broad application and it governs virtually all civil actions. There are like provisions in most other jurisdictions. The result advanced by the defendants would significantly curtail the efficacy and ambit of the rule.

[40] The submission of the defendants would also significantly erode both policy objectives underlying the rule. It would impair the privacy interests of the party to the earlier action who made disclosure and gave discovery evidence. It would also subvert the policy objective of encouraging parties to “provide a more complete and candid discovery” referred to inJuman at para. 26.

[41] The intended purview of the “statutory exceptions” rule which is referenced by the Court in Juman, is limited to specific legislation which compels disclosure and which expressly overrides the privilege and/or confidentiality concerns of the holder of the information. Rule 26 does not achieve these objects. Though it requires disclosure from parties to litigation, both Rule 26(2) and the structure of Form 93 recognize the ongoing entitlement of a party to maintain a claim for privilege. While documents covered by an implied undertaking are not, strictly speaking, privileged, I believe that it would be appropriate for a party, from whom document disclosure is sought, to list those documents in its possession which are subject to an implied undertaking under part 3 of its list of documents.

This case also addressed the remedies available when there is a breach of an implied undertaking and these are worth reviewing for anyone interested in BC Privacy Law.