Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether parties to an action joining a matter already set for trial can elect the mode of trial.
In this week’s case (Catalano v. Ogloff) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions. The Plaintiff started an action for the first collision, set the matter for trial and filed a jury notice. The Defendant did not. A separate action was started for the second collision and all parties filed a consent order providing that the cases be head together on the date already scheduled. The Defendants in the second action then filed a jury notice. The Court found this was a nullity. In striking the Defendant’s jury notice Master MacNaughton provided the following reasons:
 For the following reasons, I have concluded that the defendant’s jury notice is a nullity.
 First, under Rule 12-6(3) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules it is clear that the election of a jury trial is a two-step process. The right is preserved by serving a jury notice but the matter will not be heard by a jury unless and until the jury fees are paid. A jury trial occurs only if both steps are completed. Thus, the defendant to the second action could not presume that the first action was proceeding to a jury trial. It is for that reason that all parties to an action independently preserve their election of a jury trial by serving their own jury notice.
 Second, the early cases which established the principal that it is only the first notice of trial which matters, with respect to the election of a jury, arose in the context of trial adjournments. However, that principal has been expanded. I agree with the conclusion of Master Groves (as he then was) in Bumen v. BC Transit, 2001 BCSC 443:
… when a notice of trial has previously been given in one action, without a jury notice being filed, a subsequent consent by the parties to having other actions tried at the same time ought to be treated as an election to have a trial by judge alone in all the actions. In other words, when parties consent to the consolidation of multiple actions they are bound by the mode of trial specified in the notice of trial filed with respect to the first action. …(para. 20)
Master Groves’ reasoning mirrors that of Master Barber in Wright v. Rose (1995), 32 C.P.C. (3d) 319 where he said:
…there is no valid jury notice issued in the first action…it could be argued that the jury notice is valid for the second and third action. Of course, when actions are tried at the same time they should either be all heard with a jury, or herd by a judge alone. In my opinion, when the defendants consented…to all three actions being tried at the same time, that was an election to have trial by judge alone. … (para 17)
 In my view, the fact that the plaintiff had delivered a jury notice in the first action does not change the result. The defendant in the second action could not rely on the plaintiff’s jury notice as that was merely the first stage of the election process and did not guarantee a jury trial (I note that it has since been withdrawn). The defendants to the first action had not delivered such a notice. To ensure his right to a jury trial, the defendant in the second action should have made it a term of his consent to having the matters tried together or, if no consent was forthcoming, he could have delivered a jury notice and then applied in chambers to have the matters heard together with a jury.
 By proceeding the way he did, the defendant to the second action was not at liberty to deliver the jury notice. It is a nullity.
Reasons for judgement were published last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that in the context of personal injury claims, the relevance of clinical records should be determined on an entry by entry basis.
In last week’s case (Hyvarinen v. Burdett) the Plaintiff claimed permanent physical disability as a result of a 2008 collision. In the course of the litigation the Defendant requested various records the Plaintiff refused to produce. A court application was brought resulting in mixed success with some of the withheld documents being ordered to be produced. In adjudicating the matter Master MacNaughton provided the following sensible reasons addressing the vetting of irrelevent medical records:
 While I accept that when a document is produced by a party, it should generally be produced in its entirety, the exception is where a party is able to establish a good reason for a document not to be produced. In North American Trust Co. v. Mercer International Inc. (2000) 71 B.C.L.R. (3d) 73 (BCSC), Justice Lowry, then of this court, reiterated the general principle but said:
…But where what is clearly not relevant is by its nature such that there is good reason why it should not be disclosed, a litigant may be excused from having to make a disclosure that will in no way serve to resolve the issues. In controlling its process, the court will not permit one party to take unfair advantage or to create undue embarrassment by requiring another to disclose part of a document that could cause considerable harm but serve no legitimate purposes in resolving the issues. (para. 13)
 In this case, there are two reasons why the general rule about redacted documents should not apply. The first is because the documents sought in unredacted form are not, although generally listed as such, single documents. Rather, they are a series of records compiled over time from a number of interactions with the plaintiff. These records should not be approached globally as if they were a single document. Each entry requires a separate analysis as to whether it may prove or disprove a material fact or relate to a matter in a question in this action.
 Second, and importantly in this case, the court must be careful not to unnecessarily infringe on the plaintiff’s privacy interests. Recently, in Kaladjian v. Jose, 2012 BCSC 357, Justice Davies reiterated the importance of a plaintiff’s privacy interests in a personal injury action. He said:
Every individual’s health and the medical treatment of it is a personal and private matter that should not be lightly interfered with. In today’s world of medical specialization, disclosure of even the name of a medical professional consulted by an individual for reasons wholly unrelated to a defence plea of a prior existing condition is an unwarranted and unnecessary invasion of privacy. (para. 75)
Earlier this month I discussed a case dismissing a defence application for an ‘independent’ medical exam where the Plaintiff already attended an ICBC arranged medical examination. Further reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, with the same disposition.
In this week’s case (Soczynski v. Cai) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. Both she and the Defendant were insured by ICBC. As is the usual practice in BC, the same ICBC adjuster was handling the Plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits and also her tort claim.
The adjuster arranged an independent medical exam with an orthopaedic surgeon. The Plaintiff attended. In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant brought a court motion to compel the Plaintiff to be examined by a second surgeon. The motion was dismissed, however, with the Court finding that the previous ICBC exam created a ‘level playing field’. Master McDiarmid provided the following useful reasons:
 In reviewing the facts in this case, and keeping in mind the main principle to be looked at here, the principle of keeping the parties on an equal footing, I find that in the circumstances of this case, and in particular, the fact that the ICBC adjuster was handling both the Part 7 and tort claims, and did not respond when she knew that the plaintiff’s position was that the examination in front of Dr. Bishop was to deal with both those claims, I find that the examination which took place at the behest of ICBC on January 27, 2009 by Dr. Paul Bishop constituted the first medical examination as contemplated by Rule 7-6(1). The defendants want a further examination by another medical practitioner who practices in the area of orthopaedics. The plaintiff is not relying on any orthopaedic specialists. Keeping in mind the “level playing field” principle, it is not appropriate to order a further examination of the plaintiff by a medical practitioner having expertise in the area of orthopaedics.
For an example of a recent case where an ICBC Part 7 exam which went beyond Part 7 matters did not prohibit a tort Defence Medical exam you can click here to read Master MacNaughton’s recent reasons for judgement in Assalone v. Le.