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Tag: Master Bouck

Chambers Advocacy: Legal Authorities To Be Disclosed in Notice of Application

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 8, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.


One of the ongoing trends in civil litigation is a trend to greater pre-trial disclosure.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing this principle finding that caselaw should be disclosed ahead of Chambers Applications to avoid “chambers by ambush“.
Last week’s case (De Corde v. De Corde) involved a motor vehicle collision.  The Defendant brought a short notice application to compel the Plaintiff to be assessed by a psychiatrist.  The application was dismissed and in doing so Master Bouck provided the following feedback about case-law disclosure for Chambers applications:

[65] The defence took exception to plaintiff’s counsel relying on authorities that were not cited in the response to the notice of application. In fact, the plaintiff makes no reference to any case law in her response. In contrast, the defendants prepared a comprehensive notice of application – including a synopsis of the legal basis for the application with reference to all of the authorities presented in oral argument.

[66] The defence position is not without merit. Both the notice of application and response under the SCCR invite a party to provide a thoughtful written synopsis of legal argument. A properly prepared notice of application or response ensures that the opposing party knows the argument to be met. Thus, there should be no longer be occasion for “chambers by ambush”.

[67] Indeed, in my view, it should be only in the rare instance that a party will surprise the other by citing in oral argument authorities not mentioned in these forms.

[68] Nonetheless, an application brought on short notice would seem to me to be one of those rare instances. Plaintiff’s counsel should not be faulted for any apparent omission in a response necessarily prepared on the eve of the application.

More on the DME Prohibition of Bolstering Previous Opinions

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

While Plaintiff’s in personal injury lawsuits sometimes have to be subjected to multiple defence medical exams (DME) one well-settled principle is that subsequent exams to bolster a previous defence opinion are not permitted.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, demonstrating this principle in action.
In last week’s case (Dillon v. Montgomery) the Plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle collisions.  He sued for damages with both claims set for trial at the same time.   In the course of the lawsuit he agreed to attend a defence medical exam with an orthopaedic surgeon.  The examination included a neurological assessment.
The Defendant then applied for a second exam, this time with a neurologist, arguing this was necessary “to ensure reasonable equality between the parties in the preparation of a case for trial“.  Master Bouck disagreed finding a further exam was not necessary in the circumstances and amounted to an effort to “bolster” the previous opinion.  In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:

[17] Dr. McGraw reviews the findings contained in the neurological consult report in his own report. In additon, Dr. McGraw conducted a neurological examination.

[18] This expert’s opinion is that the plaintiff’s “back pain is of muscular origin and not related to intervertebral disc disease, arthritis of the apophyseal joints, or nerve root irritation”…

[28] In the case at bar, I determined that an examination by Dr. Moll is not necessary to put the parties on equal footing.

[29] First, there was nothing new in the medical evidence since the examination by Dr. McGraw that might justify an examination by a neurologist. The only alleged new information is the plaintiff’s ongoing complaints of tingling in his arms and legs. These complaints are of long standing and even pre-date the accidents.

[30] Second, a neurological opinion has been obtained [by the plaintiff] which negates any correlation between the plaintiff’s symptoms and the motor vehicle accidents. Indeed, Dr. Shtybel’s resident made no findings of neurological impairment whatsoever. In other words, the only purpose of an independent medical examination by a neurologist would be to prove a negative, or, perhaps bolster Dr. McGraw’s opinion. This circumstance is different than the one considered in Kim v. Lin where there had yet to be any medical opinions proferred to explain ongoing (and even worsening) accident related complaints.

[31] Finally, the fact that the plaintiff has ongoing complaints that may be considered neurological symptoms does not warrant this second examination. The defence is “not entitled to pursue every potential medical possibility” to address the plaintiff’s subjective complaints: Lowry v. Spencer, (10 December, 1990) Vancouver Registry No. B883909 as cited in Trahan v. West Coast Amusements Ltd., 2000 BCSC 691 at para. 49.

For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts summarizing the judicial application of Rule 7-6(2).

Fast Track Proceedings Mandatory Either by Length of Trial "OR" Quantum

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 15. 49 Comments on Fast Track Proceedings Mandatory Either by Length of Trial "OR" Quantum

For the past year there has been some debate amongst BC lawyers about the circumstances triggering Rule 15.  Useful reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, clarifying this debate.  In short the Court confirmed that where otherwise applicable, the fast track rule applies to cases worth below $100,000 regardless of length of trial and conversely to cases worth more than $100,000 where the length of trial is three days or less.
In today’s case (Hemani v. Hillard) the Plaintiff claimed damages for personal injury.  She sued pursuant to Rule 15.   She was seeking damages below $100,000 but the trial was expected to take 5 days.  The Defendant argued that in these circumstances fast track rule does not apply.  Master Bouck disagreed and provided the following helpful reasons:

[6] The plaintiff acknowledges that her claim is valued at $100,000 or less exclusive of interest and costs.

[7] The defendant submits that where the plaintiff estimates the trial will take more than three days, an action can no longer be continued in fast track….

[10] In contrast, the plaintiff points to the use of the word “or” (as opposed to “and”) under Rule 15-1(1) (a) through (d). The use of this disjunctive suggests that fast track can apply to a variety of scenarios. A party is not restricted to completing the action within three days; that is merely one criteria for conducting an action in fast track.

[11] The plaintiff further observes that under Rule 15-1(3), the court may award damages to a plaintiff for an amount in excess of $100,000 even though the action was commenced in fast track under the monetary criteria.

[12] The plaintiff accepts the risk that she may not recover costs for the additional two days of trial.

[13] While there may be no judicial consideration of this issue, there is a helpful analysis of Rule 15-1 in McLachlin & Taylor, British Columbia Practice (Third Edition), at pp. 15-1 to 15-3.

[14] The learned author states:

One could say that the 3-day trial limit is a condition subsequent to the continuing application of Rule 15-1, but the rules cited do not go that far. Put in other terms, it cannot be said that condition (c) is a true condition subsequent to the operation of Rule 15-1. Rather, if in the event it is not satisfied, that can result (depending on the stage of the proceeding when this is found to be the case) in the loss of a trial date or a denial of costs for the fourth and subsequent days of trial, but the action continues to be a fast track action until and unless the court, on its own motion or on the application of a party, so orders under Rule 15-1 (6).

[15] I agree with this analysis.

[16] There is no application before me to remove the action from fast track on any other grounds.

[17] Accordingly, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff’s position on the issue is correct.

The Examination For Discovery Time Limit: When Multiple Cases are Tried Together

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7. 47 Comments on The Examination For Discovery Time Limit: When Multiple Cases are Tried Together


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the time limit for examinations for discovery when two actions are set for trial at the same time.  In short the Court held that the Rules permit up to 14 hours of Plaintiff examination in these circumstances without the need for a Court Order.
In last week’s case (Campbell v. McDougall) the Plaintiff was involved in two separate motor vehicle collisions.  She sued for damages in both actions.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was examined for discovery which was discontinued after 3.5 hours due to the Plaintiff’s fatigue.  The discovery was reset and continued for a full day for a total of 10.5 hours of examination.
The Defendant wished to have 2.5 further hours of examination.    The Plaintiff opposed and a Court application was brought.  It appears the the parties worked out many of their differences prior to the hearing of the application but ultimately the Court ordered that the Plaintiff attend a further 2.5 hours.
In doing so Master Bouck provided the following comments with respect to the discovery ‘cap’ of 7 hours set out in Rule 7-2(2):





[32] In the end, the plaintiff could be required to undergo up to 14 hours of an examination under Rule 7-2 without the defence having to obtain leave of the court.

[33] In this case, the defence has chosen to have one counsel conduct an examination, but effectively with respect to both actions.

[34] There is a sound basis for requesting the “additional” examination time, particularly with respect to the plaintiff’s new employment status. While it seems unlikely that the court would grant leave to exceed the specified hour allotment simply when some new information comes to light, the plaintiff’s earning abilities and capacity forms a significant part of the overall claim. A very large monetary amount for that loss will probably be advanced. An additional 2½ hours (and still less than the allowable 14 hours) examination time is not out of proportion to the amount involved in this proceeding.





Defense Doctor Video Deposition Request Denied

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams. 55 Comments on Defense Doctor Video Deposition Request Denied


In  the course of a lawsuit it is not uncommon for expert witnesses to occasionally be unavailable for trial.  When this happens their evidence is often recorded by way of pre trial deposition.  If the parties don’t consent to this practice the party wishing to rely on the expert can seek a court order permitting a deposition.  Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing such an application.
In this week’s case (Campbell v. McDougall) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions.  In the course of her claim she attended a Defence Medical Exam with Dr. Maloon.   He produced a report which the Plaintiff intended to challenge by way of cross examination.  Dr. Maloon was scheduled to be out of the Country at the time of trial and the Defendants lawyer brought an application that his evidence be recorded by way of pre-trial deposition.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that if the physician was not available to testify in person at the very least he should testify live via video-conference.
Master Bouck agreed with the Plaintiff and dismissed the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following helpful reasons:

[47] The predecessor to Rule 7-8 was Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The language in these Rules mirror each other except for the new consideration of the possibility and desirability of having a witness testify by videoconferencing: Seder v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 823 at para. 4.

[48] The introduction of this factor reflects a recognition by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council that modern technology will allow a witness outside of the court’s jurisdiction to provide live and simultaneous evidence — in effect, to be in open court…

[55] In this case, Dr. Maloon is an important witness for the defence. From this observer’s perspective, there are several aspects of the report that invite careful and thorough cross-examination by plaintiff’s counsel.

[56] It is fairly easy to anticipate areas of cross-examination where objections might be raised by the defence. The court will then be asked to rule on the objections at trial in Dr. Maloon’s absence. The plaintiff will not have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Maloon on issues arising from evidence led at trial, or garnered through the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s own experts.

[57] The concerns raised by Mr. Justice Harris in Byer v. Mills are reasonably anticipated in this case. It is desirable that Dr. Maloon testify in open court; videoconferencing offers this opportunity.

[58] The defence has not provided any evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s evidence as to the availability of videoconferencing technology in southern Africa. How that videoconferencing will be set up is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, the criteria under Rule 7-8(1)(d) is the possibility of the use of videoconferencing.

[59] Another factor to consider here is that Dr. Maloon was aware of the trial date and the possibility of his sabbatical when he agreed to perform this independent medical examination. While the court would never discourage or be critical of the terms of the sabbatical taken by Dr. Maloon, the consequences of that sabbatical should not trump the objective of achieving a fair trial in this matter.

[60] Finally, it should be noted that the court’s order is simply to dismiss the application to have Dr. Maloon attend at a deposition on September 8, 2011. The order will not state that Dr. Maloon’s evidence must be provided by way of videoconferencing although that appears to be the parties’ intention as neither wishes to disrupt Dr. Maloon’s sabbatical by flying him to Victoria for a day or two of testimony: Rule 7-8(3)(e).

ICBC Ordered to Provide Particulars in Support of "Wilfully False Statement" Pleading

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 3, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on ICBC Ordered to Provide Particulars in Support of "Wilfully False Statement" Pleading

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, ordering ICBC to provide particulars in support of an allegation that the Plaintiff provided a wilfully false statement.
In last week’s case (Biedermann v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was sued for damages following three motor vehicle collisions.  ICBC refused to indemnify the Plaintiff arguing that he was in breach of his insurance by making a wilfully false statement.
The Plaintiff sued ICBC for coverage.  ICBC denied liability and repeated the ‘willfully false statement‘ allegation in their pleadings.  The Plaintiff asked for particulars of this allegation but ICBC refused to provide these.  Ultimately the Plaintiff brought a successful application to compel ICBC to provide particulars.  In making the order Master Bouck provided the following helpful reasons:








[16] The plaintiff relies on Rule 3-7(22) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules (“SCCR”) which provides that the court may order a party to serve further and better particulars of a matter stated in a pleading (my emphasis).

[17] In its response, the defendant helpfully outlines the legal principles relevant to the application and interpretation of this Rule.

[18] One of the stated purposes for ordering particulars is to ensure that the “real issues between the parties” are brought “fairly forward without surprise”: Cansulex Ltd. v. Perry, 1982 CarswellBC (C.A.) at para. 16. The six objectives of an order for particulars are said to be:

· to inform the other side of the nature of the case they have to meet as distinguished from the mode in which the case is to be proved;

· to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at trial;

· to enable the other side to know what evidence they ought to be prepared with and to prepare for trial;

· to limit the generality of the pleadings;

· to limit and decide the issues to be tried, and as to which discovery is required; and

· to tie the hands of the party so that he cannot without leave go into any matters not included.

Cansulex Ltd. v. Perry at para. 15

[19] These factors are consistent with the present objectives of the SCCR in having a matter determined in a proportionate, just, speedy and inexpensive manner: Rule 1-3…

[21] After reviewing the pleadings and relevant authorities, I have concluded that the Response to Civil Claim does not provide sufficient particularity to meet the objectives of both the SCCRand those outlined by the court in Cansulex.

[22] Neither the Response to Civil Claim nor the response to this application identify the nature of the “wilfully false statement”. The Response separately pleads (and the defendant discloses in its affidavit material) that the plaintiff may have failed to update both the territory and rating for the Volkswagen Golf and also misrepresented the principal operator. Those details provide some information to the plaintiff as to the basis for denying the sought after insurance coverage. However, it is not at all clear from the Response whether these documents represent the “wilfully false statement” or whether the defence is relying on some other written or oral statement or representation given by the plaintiff.

[23] Nor does the Response address in any particularity the basis on which coverage is denied for the July 2008 accident. The Response simply says that Mr. Biedermann was no longer the legal owner of the vehicle involved in the accident.

[24] What is being sought by the plaintiff is not so much evidence which might support a finding that Mr. Biedermann made a statement or statements which were  “wilfully false”, but rather identification of what that “statement or representation” might be. Is it an insurance application form; a post-accident statement or representation; or some other form of communication? Without these particulars, the plaintiff (and the court) is left to guess whether such a statement or representation even exists…

[26] The defence has separately pled s. 75 (a) (ii) with respect to the 2009 accidents. However, s. 75 (c) is so broadly worded that the plaintiff (and the court) is unable to identify the nature of the impugned statement of misrepresentation with respect to any of the accidents.

[27] Accordingly, the order sought by the plaintiff is granted. Costs of the application will be to the plaintiff in the cause.









Sexual Assault and Vicarious Liability Claims are not "Too Complex" For a Jury

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Sexual Assault Civil Cases, Uncategorized.

Useful reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing a jury strike application in a personal injury lawsuit for damages from sexual abuse.
In the recent case (JG v. Kolesar) the Plaintiff was sexually abused by her teacher.  He was criminally convicted for his acts.  The Plaintiff sued him and his employer for damages alleging negligence and vicarious liability on the part of the School District.  The matter was set for trial by jury.  The School District opposed this and brought an application to strike the Jury Notice under Rule 12-6(5) arguing that  “the law on the questions of causation (the concept of indivisible injury), vicarious liability, and assessment of damages is all too complex for a jury to understand”
Master Bouck disagreed and dismissed the School District’s jury strike application.  In doing so the Court provided the following helpful reasons:
[31]  On the question of causation, damages and the concept of indivisible injury, some authorities cited by (the School Board’s lawyer) have since been refined by the court of appeal’s decision in Bradley v. Groves, 2010 BCCA 361.  Notably, the appellate court has refined the method by which a finder of fact can determine causation and apportion damages where there are multiple tortfeasors contributing to the plaintiff’s injury and loss.
[32]  In my view, the step-by-step analysis set out in Bradley v. Groves can be nicely imported into a set of instruction and questions for the jury.
[33]  Accordingly, I am not at all pessimistic about the jury’s ability to decide the questions which the defence says are too complex in this litigation.  A trial judge will be perfectly capable of instructing a jury on the relevant legal concepts of causation, apportionment of damages, and vicarious liability…
[35]   Once properly instructed, the assessment of the plaintiff’s damages is most certainly not a question beyond the capability of a modern jury.  In my observation and experience, juries are often called upon to assess damages where there are multiple tort-feasors and pre-existing conditions.
Today’s case is unpublished however, as always, I’m happy to share a copy of the reasons for judgement with anyone who contacts me and requests a copy.

Getting to Peruvian Guano

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Uncategorized. 153 Comments on Getting to Peruvian Guano

Yesterday morning I was teaching as a guest instructor at PLTC (the BC Bar Exam Course) overseeing a Courtroom skills exercise.  During the mock court application I asked the soon to be lawyers under what circumstances the Pervuian Guano test applied for document production.  Little did I know my  question was being answered just across town by Master Bouck who released reasons for judgement addressing this topic at length.
As previously discussed, the New BC Supreme Court Rules replaced the Peruvian Guano test for document production with the narrower test of documents that “prove or disprove a material fact”.  However, the rules allow for the Peruvian Guano test to kick in through the second tier of document production set out in Rules 7-1(11),(12) and (13).  Master Bouck addressed exactly what’s necessary to get to the Peruvian Guano stage.
In yesterday’s case (Przybysz v. Crowe) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  ICBC’s lawyer brought an application for the production of various records.  The application was largely unsuccessful however before dismissing it the Court provided the following useful feedback about the requirements necessary to get to the Peruvian Guano stage of document disclosure:

[27] …this application is, in fact, brought pursuant to Rules 7-1(11), (12) and (13). Those Rules contemplate a broader scope of document disclosure than what is required under Rule 7-1(1)(a) Indeed, the two tier process of disclosure (if that label is apt), reflects the SSCR’s objective of proportionality. In order to meet that objective, the party at the first instance must put some thought into what documents falls within the definition of Rule 7-1(1)(a)(i) but is not obliged to make an exhaustive list of documents which in turn assists in the “train of inquiry” promoted in Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1882), 11 Q.B.D. 55 at pp. 62-63(Q.A.).

[28] Only after a demand is made under Rule 7-1(11) for documents that relate to any or all matters in question in the action and the demand for productions is resisted can a court order production under Rule 7-1(14). It should be noted that in this case, the demand (and indeed order sought) is for production of additional documents, not simply a listing of such documents: seeRules 7-1(1) (d), (e) and (f).

[29] The court retains the discretion under Rule 7-1(14) to order that the party not produce the requested list or documents. Again, the court must look to the objectives of the SCCR in exercising this discretion.

[30] As to the form and substance of the request, it has been suggested by Master Baker that:

… there is a higher duty on a party requesting documents under … Rule 7-1(11) … they must satisfy either the party being demanded or the court … with an explanation “with reasonable specificity that indicates the reason why such additional documents or classes of documents should be disclosed” …

Anderson v. Kauhane and Roome (unreported, February 22, 2011, Vancouver Registry No. M103201) at para. 4

[31] A similar higher duty or burden rests with the party rejecting the request under Rule 7-1(12): see Conduct of Civil Litigation in B.C (2nd edition), Fraser, Horn & Griffin @ p. 17-7. In my view, the burden is not met by stating that documents will not be produced simply because of the introduction of the SCCR.

[32] The objective of proportionality might also influence the timing of requests for broader document disclosure. The court has observed in More Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., 2011 BCSC 166, that under the SCCR:

… the duty to answer questions on discovery [is] apparently broader than the duty to disclose documents.

para. 7.

And further:

… if the court is to be persuaded that the broader document discovery made possible by rule 7-1(14) is appropriate in a particular case, some evidence of the existence and potential relevance of those additional documents will be required. The examination for discovery is the most likely source of such evidence.

para. 8.

[33] Nevertheless, neither the court nor the SCCR require that an examination for discovery precede an application under Rules 7-1(13) and (14). Depending on the case, proportionality and the existing evidence might support pre-examination document disclosure so that the examination can be conducted in an efficient and effective manner….

[40] It is suggested by the learned authors of Conduct of Civil Litigation in B.C. that authorities decided under former Rule 26(11) may be applicable to an application for broader disclosure of documents under Rules 7-1(11) – (14): p. 17-7. That suggestion is not inconsistent with Master Baker’s ruling. Again, the questions for the court will be what evidence is presented and does an order for production achieve the objective of proportionality?

Master Bouck also released a second set of reasons (Baldertson v. Aspin) with this further useful feedback of the intent of Rule 7-1(11):

[29] The intent of Rule 7-1(11) is to inform the opposing party of the basis for the broader disclosure request in sufficient particularity so that there can be a reasoned answer to the request. TheRule allows the parties to engage in debate or discussion and possibly resolve the issue before embarking on an expensive chambers application. Whether this debate or discussion was had verbally in this case is not clear on the record.

[30] Nor does it appear that any written request was made to the plaintiff to list documents relating to the 2001 motor vehicle accident. Again, the Rules appear to have been ignored as a matter of expediency.

[31] Nevertheless, the plaintiff did not seek an adjournment of the application so that the process under Rules 7-1(10), (11) and (12) could be followed. The parties proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff declined the defence’s requests for additional document disclosure and/or the listing of those additional documents. In this particular case, the objectives of the SCCR are met by dealing with the merits of the application rather than rejecting the application on procedural grounds.

Can ICBC Deny Fault For a Crash After Previously Admitting it?

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 6, BCSC Civil Rule 7, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 39 Comments on Can ICBC Deny Fault For a Crash After Previously Admitting it?


As with most areas of law, the short answer is ‘it depends‘.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, canvassing this area of law.
In today’s case (Hurn v. McLellan) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision.  It was a ‘t-bone‘ crash that occurred in a parking lot.  The Plaintiff started a lawsuit and ICBC admitted the issue of fault in the Pleadings on behalf of the other motorist.  As the lawsuit neared trial ICBC brought an application seeking permission to withdraw the admission of fault.  Master Bouck dismissed ICBC’s request finding it would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff’s interests.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful summary of the law:

[26] …There are similar and overlapping considerations for the court on these two types of applications. However, to adopt the submissions of plaintiff’s counsel, the “high bar” threshold to obtain leave to withdraw an admission must be met before the “low bar” threshold to obtain leave to amend a pleading will follow. Thus, the legal test to be met by the defence is with respect to the withdrawal of an admission.

[27] Rule 7-7(5) of the SCCR  provides that:

7-7(5)  A party is not entitled to withdraw

(a) an admission made in response to a notice to admit,

(b) a deemed admission under subrule (2), or

(c) an admission made in a pleading, petition or response to petition

except by consent or with leave of the court.

[28] The principles which govern an application to withdraw an admission of fact are as follows:

1.  Whether there is a triable issue which, in the interests of justice, should be determined on the merits and not disposed of by an admission of fact;

2.  In applying that test, all of the circumstances should be taken into account including whether:

(a) the admission has been made inadvertently, hastily or without knowledge;

(b) the fact admitted was not within the knowledge of the party making the admission

(c) the fact admitted is not true.

(d) the fact admitted is one of mixed fact and law

(e) the withdrawal of the admission would not prejudice a party

(f) there has been no delay in applying to withdraw the admission.

Hamilton v. Ahmed (1999), 28 C.P.C. (4th) 139 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 11, as approved in Munster & Sons Developments Ltd. v. Shaw, 2005 BCCA 564.

[29] More recently, the test has been articulated by the court in 374787 B.C. Ltd. v. Great West Management Corp., 2007 BCSC 582 at para. 27:

As a general rule, the Court must consider whether in the circumstances of the case the interests of justice justify the withdrawal of the admission. The following facts, which are not exhaustive are relevant: delay, loss of a trial date, a party is responsible for an erroneous admission, inadvertence in the making of an admission and estoppel …

[30] The question of fault for the accident is one of mixed fact and law: Bedwell v. McGill, 2008 BCCA 6 at paras. 33 to 34, foll’g Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at para. 27 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci and Major JJ.

[31] However, whether the admission sought to be withdrawn is one of fact, law or mixed law and fact, the same legal test applies: Nesbitt v. Miramar Mining Corp., 2000 BCSC 187 at para. 6.

[32] It is not enough to show that triable issue exists. The applicant must show that, in all of the circumstances, the interests of justice require the withdrawal of the admission: Rafter v. Paterson(November 7, 2007), Vancouver No. B924884.

[33] Moreover, even if a trial date is not imminent and the applicant gave early notice of the proposed withdrawal of the admission, delay in bringing an application for such relief might in itself be a “concern that cannot be overcome”: Sureus v. Leroux, 2010 BCSC 1344.

More on Responding Medical Reports and Physical Exams: Reconciling the Cases to Date

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


As previously discussed, a debate has arisen about if and when a Defendant is allowed to compel a Plaintiff to attend an ‘independent‘ medical exam in order to obtain a ‘responding‘ report under the BC Supreme Court Rules.  Very useful reasons were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing and reconciling the various authorities considering this issue to date.
In today’s case (Labrecque v. Tyler) the Plaintiff was involved in three separate collisions.  He sued for damages and all three claims were set for trial at the same time.   In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff obtained  a report from his GP and from a physiatrist.  The Plaintiff intended to rely on the physiatrist’s report at trial.  The Defendants intended to rely on the GP’s report at trial.  The Plaintiff never attended a defence medical exam in the course of the lawsuit and as the trial neared one of the Defendant’s brought an application to compel the Plaintiff to attend an examination in order to get a ‘responding’ report.
In support of the application the proposed examiner swore an affidavit explaining that he needs to ‘physically examine the plaintiff and ask him the questions a doctor would ask in order to elicit information upon which to ground my opinions‘.    The application was dismissed finding that this falls short of what is required in order for a physical exam to be ordered as part of a responding report.  In dismissing the application Master Bouck provided the following useful reasons reconciling the authorities addressing this issue to date:

[28] In Wright v. Bauer, the court recognized that Rule 11-6(4) “filled a lacuna” in the Rules governing civil procedure in this province: para. 12. Parties are now specifically governed by a Rule regarding delivery of responsive written expert evidence. Prior to this Rule’s enactment, the delivery of such evidence was governed by common law principles.

[29] In that case, the application for an independent medical examination was brought nearly one month before the defence would have been required to serve a responsive report.

[30] In dismissing the defendant’s application, the court found that the applicant had not met the necessary evidentiary threshold justifying an order under Rule 7-6: para. 21.

[31] The same result is found in Boudreau v. Logan and Crane v. Lee, supra.

[32] In contrast, the court in Luedecke v. Hillman was satisfied that an order should go requiring the plaintiff’s attendance at an examination…

[35] In my view, the principles enunciated in Luedecke and Wright are consistent and entirely reconcilable. The difference between the outcomes in these two cases lies in the facts.

[36] In both cases, the court concerned itself with the evidence presented to support the necessity of an examination as well as the question of prejudice.

[37] Here, the evidence from Dr. Piper as to the necessity for an examination is rather general in nature. Dr. Piper refers to the reports of both Dr. Grimwood and Dr. MacKean when in fact the responsive opinion would concern only the latter’s report. Unlike the evidence from the proposed examiner in Luedecke, Dr. Piper does not specifically identify the “medical evidence” (other than the reports themselves) that can only be addressed if a physical examination of the plaintiff occurs. Rather, Dr. Piper’s evidence suggests that an examination is necessary to respond generally to the subject matter of the plaintiff’s case and, as such, is no justification for the order sought: Luedecke at para. 52.