Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dismissing a BC lawsuit on grounds that it had no jurisdiction over an Alberta based collision claim.
In today’s case (Brooks v. Leithoff) the Plaintiff was involved in a total of 5 collisions. Four of the five occured in BC. The third occured in Alberta. The Plaintiff sued the Alberta motorist in BC alleging the crashes all gave rise to a single indivisible injury.
The Defendant sought to have the claim dismissed on the basis that there was no connection to BC to the crash. The Court agreed with the Defendant and dismissed the lawsuit. In doing so and finding the claim should have been filed in Alberta Madam Justice Power provided the following reasons:
 When I consider the plaintiff’s arguments, I am not persuaded that the facts that the plaintiff points to are sufficient to displace what I view to be the clear weight of case law in British Columbia: neither the plaintiff’s residency in British Columbia, nor the fact of indivisible injuries, nor the fact that the plaintiff is suffering ongoing damages in British Columbia, are, by themselves, sufficient to establish a clear and substantial connection to British Columbia. When these three elements are combined, do these elements together then prove sufficient to ground jurisdiction? I cannot conclude that they do.
 During the course of argument, the plaintiff fairly conceded that some of the plaintiff’s arguments related to forums conveniens, which is not something I should take into account at this stage. The plaintiff may have to mount two separate trials on substantially the same evidence as a result of this ruling, but again, that is not a factor I should take into when determining whether jurisdiction has been established.
 During arguments, counsel for the plaintiff also suggested that if I did not accept that there was jurisdiction under s. 3(e) of the CJPTA, I could nevertheless exercise my residual discretion under s. 6 of the Act to find that this Court has jurisdiction.
 In my view, this argument must fail because the exercise of discretion under s. 6 requires that either a) there is no court outside British Columbia in which the plaintiff can commence the proceeding, or b) that the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside British Columbia cannot reasonably be required. The fact that the plaintiff has already commenced an action in Alberta leads me to conclude that it is open to the plaintiff to continue litigation of this matter in that jurisdiction.
 During the arguments before me, counsel for the plaintiff also pointed to concerns relating to fairness, and the practical difficulties that Ms. Brooks would face in bringing two separate but essentially identical claims in two separate jurisdictions. While I appreciate these practical difficulties, there are times when appeals to fairness in the law must yield to the demands for clarity and order in the law. The words of Mr. Justice La Forest in Tolofson v. Jensen,  3 S.C.R. 1022 at 1058, although made in a somewhat different context, are nevertheless applicable here:
While, no doubt … the underlying principles of private international law are order and fairness, order comes first. Order is a precondition to justice.
 Overall, it is my view that the weight of the case law clearly establishes that the facts here are not sufficient to establish a real and substantial connection to British Columbia.
 In the result, the defendant’s application to strike and dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for want of jurisdiction in British Columbia is granted.
Reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating the Court’s discretion for costs following trial where formal settlement offers were exchanged.
In today’s case (Bains v. Antle) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages. Prior to trial the Defendant presented a formal settlement offer of $185,000. The Court noted that “some of the plaintiff’s initial negotiating positions were clearly inflated” but ultimately it was reasonable for the Plaintiff to refuse the Defendant’s offer and proceed to trial in the face of medical evidence supporting her alleged claim of chronic pain and related disability.
The decision proved costly with a jury awarding the Plaintiff damages of $37,800. The Defendant asked to be awarded post offer costs and to strip the Plaintiff of her post offer costs. The Court refused noting the Plaintiff is of modest means and having her pay Defendant costs would reduce the verdict to a Pyrric victory. In awarding the Plaintiff costs Madam Justice Power provided the following reasons:
 It is my view that all of the financial evidence at trial supports the fact that the plaintiff was a person of modest means. Having already concluded that the settlement offer was not one which ought to have reasonably been accepted, it is evident that an order requiring the plaintiff to either pay the well-funded defendants’ costs, or in the alternative denying the plaintiff her costs, from September 20, 2016 onwards, would result in a pyrrhic victory and could have the effect of discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims.
 As a result, although not determinative, the relative financial circumstances of the plaintiff and the defendant insurer are a consideration that I have taken into account.
 I am not persuaded that in these circumstances the court should exercise the discretion afforded to it under Rule 9-1(4) and (5). Having considered all of the relevant factors, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to her costs at Scale B and disbursements, including the cost of this application. The defendants’ application is dismissed.
Adding to this site’s archives addressing bus driver liability for injuries to passengers, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with such an incident.
In this week’s case (Wong v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority) the 81 year old plaintiff boarded a bus and was on her way to her seat when “the driver pulled into traffic in an abrupt motion“. The Plaintiff fell and the driver then “abruptly braked“. The Plaintiff’s hip was fractured in the incident.
Madam Justice Power found the bus driver was negligent in failing to wait until the elderly plaintiff was seated before accelerating. In finding the driver partly liable for the incident the Court provided the following reasons:
 In cross-examination, Mr. Pinnell conceded that “it was surprising” that Ms. Wong fell one foot from the fare box and that in the time prior to the fall, he never saw anyone coming down the aisle. He acknowledged that if he had seen Ms. Wong, he would have told her to sit down. He agreed that there is a policy and procedures manual for bus drivers and that there is a policy to allow elderly people a chance to sit before moving from a stopped location. He acknowledged that at examination for discovery he did not think such a policy was in place…
 In all of the circumstances of the case at bar, I am of the view that Mr. Pinnell breached the standard of care of a reasonably prudent bus driver by entering traffic without warning Ms. Wong that he was about to enter traffic and without doing an adequate visual check to ensure that Ms. Wong had returned to her seat or was securely standing. In so doing he was also in breach of the Operators Policy and Procedures Manual, para 6.11.
The Plaintiff’s fractured hip required surgical intervention. Despite having an ‘uneventful’ recovery she was left with permanent restrictions in mobility. The Court went on -to assess non-pecuniary damages at $90,000 before slightly reducing these for contributory negligence.
An appeal of the below decision was dismissed by the BC Court of Appeal in February 2014
Adding to this sites database of ICBC soft tissue injury judgements, reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries with a guarded prognosis.
In the recent case (Clark v. Kouba) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 rear-end collision. Fault was admitted focussing the trial on assessing damages. The Plaintiff brought a claim “well in excess of one million dollars” while the Defendant argued the losses were minimal and that the Plaintiff was “feigning her injuries for financial gain“.
Madam Justice Power disagreed with the Defendant’s credibility attack but did award “a much more modest sum” than the plaintiff ultimately sought. The Court found that the crash caused soft tissue injuries that impacted “all aspects of the plaintiff’s life” and that the prognosis was guarded. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $85,000 the Court provided the following reasons:
 In this case, it is clear that the soft tissue injuries the plaintiff suffered have impacted all aspects of the plaintiff’s life. In addition to the physical symptoms I have detailed above, her injuries have impacted her personal relationships including her relationship with her husband and children. She has difficulty in performing some household chores, including making the beds and laundry and she has to call upon her husband and children to perform those tasks.
 The plaintiff has been dedicated to her own rehabilitation and such efforts in my view cannot be used to diminish the extent of her injury. In that sense she can be considered a stoic individual. Formerly she engaged in her recreational pursuits such as long distance running and yoga, for her own physical enjoyment. Now when she engages in them it is for an additional purpose, in order to assist in managing her chronic pain.
 I conclude that, as a result of the accident, Ms. Clark has suffered pain and loss of enjoyment of life, and her prognosis for the future is guarded. All of the authorities cited by both plaintiff’s counsel and the defence make it clear that each case is unique and must be determined on its own facts. This case is unusual, because the plaintiff is still able to participate in her recreational pursuits, including marathon running, and has completed a marathon in a second personal best time since the accident.
 Having considered the authorities cited and all of the circumstances in this case, it is my view that $85,000.00 is a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages.
As previously discussed, having the right of way is not determinative of fault for a collision. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, demonstrating this in the context of a pedestrian crash.
In last week’s case (Murdoch v. Biggers) the Plaintiff was crossing Blanshard Street in a marked cross-walk. She did so against a red light. There were 3 oncoming through lanes of travel. The vehicles in the first two lanes stopped for the jaywalking Plaintiff. The vehicle in the third lane did not stop in time and collided with the Plaintiff resulting in a broken right leg.
The Court found that while the motorist had the right of way they shouldered some of the blame for failing to keep a proper lookout. In assessing the Plaintiff 75% at fault and the Defendant 25% at fault Madam Justice Power provided the following reasons:
 In this case, I do not believe that the defendant exercised the appropriate standard of care to avoid breaching that duty. The drivers in vehicles in the two lanes to her right were able to observe and stop for the plaintiff, and a driver behind her (Ms. Larson) was able to see Ms. Murdoch. Mr. Lukinuk was able to observe that something was happening in his rear-view mirror. In the circumstances, I find that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout by failing to observe Ms. Murdoch’s entry into the crosswalk and by failing to observe that vehicles in the two lanes to her right had stopped for Ms. Murdoch. I find that if the defendant had in fact been keeping a sufficient look out, she would have been able to stop for Ms. Murdoch and avoid the collision…
 In all of the circumstances, I conclude that the 75% of the fault for the accident should be borne by the plaintiff and 25% by the defendant.
Plaintiffs should not be punished with reduced damages in a personal injury claim simply because they are stoic in dealing with their injuries. Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, discussing this in the context of a chronic soft tissue injury claim.
In yesterday’s case (Courtney v. Huthinson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 rear-end collision. The Defendant admitted fault for the crash. The Plaintiff, a 48 year old logger, suffered a chronic soft tissue injury to his neck which produced symptoms of pain and headaches. The symptoms continued on to the time of trial and were not expected to further recover.
Despite the chronic nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries he carried on with a stoic attitude minimizing his complaints. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Madam Justice Power made the following findings with respect the Plaintiff’s injuries and his stoicism:
 Dr. MacKean’s opinion was that Mr. Courtney had suffered a Grade two whiplash associated disorder to the cervical spine and upper back with persistent daily neck pain greater on the right than left side, and headaches. She is of the opinion that the ongoing persistent neck pain and headaches is due to injuries sustained in the accident.
 Of significance Dr. MacKean noted that:
He has most likely reached the point of maximal medical improvement. It has been almost 3 years following the date of motor vehicle accident and he has not seen significant improvement over the past two years with regards to improvement in his neck pain symptoms.
 Dr. MacKean in her report and in her evidence noted that the disc degeneration seen in the MRI was less likely the cause of the ongoing pain he was experiencing since it was asymptomatic prior to the accident…
 Mr. Courtney came across in his evidence as a quiet man who was committed to his personal health and fitness and who was conscientious and proactive about pursuing his treatment options. He did not appear to exaggerate or overstate his evidence. When he made errors in his evidence for example with respect to his work history, he acknowledged them and any errors appear to be reasonable based on the passage of time, and Mr. Courtney’s knowledge. He is clearly a hardworking man who has worked through pain caused by the accident in order to provide for his family. The ongoing pain is primarily neck pain which is aggravated by activities which require neck extension and occasional headaches. I do not have any difficulty in accepting the evidence of Mr. Courtney. Based on the evidence I would characterize Mr. Courtney as a stoic individual…
 I have already found Mr. Courtney to be a stoic individual who does not complain and indeed his return to work post-collision is consistent with the behaviour of a hardworking, stoic individual. As noted, he should not be penalized as a result of his stoicism.
 In all of the circumstances, I conclude that an appropriate sum under this head is $70,000.
Further to my dozens of previous posts discussing ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact (LVI) Defence to tort claims involving crashes with little vehicle damage, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, once again rejecting this defence.
Today’s case is a great example demonstrating that compensable injuries can be sustained even in true ‘low velocity impacts‘. In today’s case (De Leon v. Harold) the Plaintiff was involved in a two vehicle collision in 2007 in Vancouver, BC. The Defendant rear-ended the Plaintiff’s vehicle. Fault for the crash was admitted. The trial focussed on whether the Plaintiff sustained any injuries.
There was no dispute that the collision was minor. The Plaintiff described the impact as a “bump“. The Defendant testified that her car “tapped” the Plaintiff’s car. The modest impact resulted in $0 in vehicle damage.
Despite this the Plaintiff was injured. The injuries were, fortunatley, relatively modest and made a meaningful recovery within 6 months. ICBC defended the case based on the LVI program and argued that the Plaintiff was not injured in the collision. Madam Justice Power rejected this argument and in doing so repeated the following helpful reasons addressing the LVI defence:
 In Lubick v. Mei  B.C.C.A. No. 777, Macaulay J. stated at paragraph 5:
 The courts have long debunked the suggestion that low impact can be directly correlated with lack of compensable injury. In Gordon v. Palmer  B.C.J. No. 474 (S.C.), Thackeray J. as he then was, made the following comments that are still apposite today.
I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. This is the philosophy that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may follow, but it has no application in court. It is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have not heard it endorsed as a medical principle.
He goes on to point out that the presence and extent of injuries are determined on the evidence, not with “extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.” In particular he noted that there was no evidence to substantiate the defence theory in the case before him. . . .
 In Dao v. Vance 2008 BCSC 1092 Williams J. stated:
 This was undoubtedly a low-velocity collision where damage to the vehicle was so minimal as to be almost non-existent. All of the evidence supports that conclusion. In such instances, claims for compensation for injury are often resisted on the basis that there is reason to doubt their legitimacy. Furthermore, in this case, the principle evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim is subjective, that is, it is her self report. There is not a great deal of objective evidence to support her description of the injuries she claims to have suffered.
 In response to those concerns, I would observe that there is no principle of law which says that because damage to the vehicle is slight or non-detectable that it must follow that there is no injury. Certainly, as a matter of common sense, where the collision is of slight force, any injury is somewhat likely at least to be less severe than in a situation where the forces are greater, such as to result in significant physical damage to the automobiles. Nevertheless, I do not accept that there can be no injury where there is no physical damage to the vehicles.
Madam Justice Power assessed the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $12,000 and in doing so made the following findings about her injuries:
 I am satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged this burden and that soft-tissue injuries to her neck and back were suffered as the result of the accident. I am satisfied that the injuries were substantially resolved within two months of the accident as the result of the plaintiff’s active efforts in the first two months to attend chiropractic and massage therapy and that the injury was almost completely resolved within six months…
 Having regard to the fact that each award must be based on the unique circumstances of the case, and that the plaintiff’s stoicism is a factor that should not penalize the plaintiff (Giang v. Clayton 2005 B.C.J 163 2005, (B.C.C.A.)), I am of the view that an appropriate award for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages in this case is $12,000. The plaintiff will be awarded $1,200 for four days of lost work as the agreed-to amount of the parties for special damages.
 Therefore the total damage award is $13,200. Costs may be spoken to or written submissions may be made at the agreement of the parties.