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Tag: independent medical exams

Court Ordered Defence Medical Exams and the Right to Take Notes

Written by admin on . Posted in independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on Court Ordered Defence Medical Exams and the Right to Take Notes


It is not uncommon for discrepancies to arise about the exact details of an appointment following Court ordered medical exams.  These exams can last from several minutes, to several hours, or even (in the case of Functional Capacity and Neuropsychological Exams) to several days.  If a discrepencey arises as to what was said by the Plaintiff a Trial Judge can face a he-said she-said situation.  This can lead to serious disputes because the outcome of a personal injury trial can turn largely on a Plaintiff’s reliability and consistency.
When such a dispute arises the examining physician often has access to his or her notes detailing the examination.  This can sometimes work to the doctor’s advantage when a Court is asked to decide what was actually said.   To remedy this can a Plaintiff take their own notes while attending an independent medical exam?  Reasons for judgement were recently published on the BC Supreme Court website addressing this issue..
In today’s case (Makowsky v. Jawandha) the Plaintiff was involved in two separate motor vehicle collisions. He alleged injury including brain damage and memory problems.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was ordered to attend an independent medical exam with a psychiatrist.   Given the Plaintiff’s poor memory the Court further ordered that “someone invited by the plaintiff could observe the examination“.
The Plaintiff attended the exam with a friend.  During the exam the friend took extensive notes detailing the discussion between the Plaintiff and the Physician.  The Physician claimed this was distracting and put an end to the exam believing the extensive note-taking violated the general BC prohibition on recoding Court ordered medical exams.  The parties put the matter before the Court.
Ultimately the Court held that the Plaintiff’s observer could take notes so long as doing so did not interfere with the examination.  Madam Justice Gray provided the following useful reasons:

[15] There is a right, in my view, for the observer to take notes, but not in a manner that slows or interferes with the examination.  For example, the observer cannot ask someone to pause in what they are saying, or say, “Just a minute, I’m taking a note,” or make noise or gesture in a way that creates a distraction. …

[17] The examination can proceed on the basis that the doctor agrees that there can be an observer present and that observer can take notes, but on the basis that the observer will take notes quietly and out of view of the doctor and patient.

I should point out that although this decision was recently published it was decided in 2008 under the former BC Supreme Court Rules.  There is, however, no reason that I’m aware of to conclude that the Court’s reasoning would not apply to the current Rules.

Defence Medical Exams and Cancellation Fees

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

Reason for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing cancellation fees charged by doctors when a Plaintiff fails to attend a previously agreed to independent medical exam.
In today’s case (Minhas v. Virk) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff alleged brain injury.  The Plaintiff attended two independent examinations with specialists of the Defendant’s choosing and agreed to attend a third appointment.  As the third exam date approached the Plaintiff ultimately reneged on his agreement by adding a condition that the Defence was not prepared to agree to.
The doctor’s office had a policy to charge $1,650 unless he was given 2 months notice of cancellation.  The Plaintiff did not comply with this policy and instead gave just over 2 working days of notice.
The Defendant brought a motion seeking to have the Plaintiff assessed by the doctor and to pay the cancellation fee.  Master Caldwell ruled that it was inappropriate for the Plaintiff to “unilaterally rewrite” the previous agreement to see the doctor and ordered the Plaintiff undergo the independent medical exam.  The Court refused, however, to order that the Plaintiff pay the cancellation fee finding 2 days notice was sufficient.  Master Caldwell provided the following useful reasons:
[15] The request that the plaintiff be required to pay the cancellation fee for the December 21 appointment is dismissed.  There is no evidence before me which indicates what, if any, efforts the doctor made to fill that appointment slot or to otherwise mitigate his loss.  In addition, I find Dr. Wong’s requirement of 2 months notice to be unreasonable, particularly in the absence of any explanation.  In this case the cancellation occurred on either the 15th or 16th of December (if not earlier) thus providing at least 2 full working days notice and probably more.  The material before me which simply states the doctor’s cancellation policy and nothing more, simply does not support the order sought.
The Court was also asked to order a further medical exam with a different specialist.  This application was dismissed with the Court noting that one of the purposes of the New Rules of Court is to “move toward a focusing and limiting of experts and expert opinion“.

More on The New Rules of Court, IME's and "Responding" Medical Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


Precedents addressing whether an independent medical exam can be ordered to permit a Defendant to obtain a ‘responding‘ report are still being worked out by the BC Supreme Court.  (You can click here to read my archived posts addressing this topic) Reasons for judgement were released today by the BCSC, Victoria Registry, further addressing this issue.
In today’s case (Hamilton v. Demandre) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate motor vehicle collisions.  She claimed she was injured in the first and that those injuries were aggravated in the second crash.  Both lawsuits were set for trial at the same time.   One of the alleged injuries was “visual vestibular mismatch with associated dizziness, motion sickness, balance problems and double vision“.
The Plaintiff submitted to medical exams with a neurologist and an orthopaedic surgeon at the request of the Defendant in the first crash.  The Plaintiff also attended an examination with a psychiatrist at the request of the Defendant in the second crash.
In support of her claim, the Plaintiff served reports from various experts including an ENT specialist.    These reports were served in compliance with the time lines set out in the Rules of Court.  The Defendant in the second crash then asked that the Plaintiff attend a further exam with an ENT of their choosing.  The examination was to take place less than 84 days before trial.
The Defendant argued that this exam was necessary in order to obtain a ‘responding‘ report.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing a further exam was not necessary.  Master Bouck agreed with the Plaintiff and dismissed the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons:

[33] In a nutshell, the defendant submits that an ENT examination is required to rebut the opinion that the plaintiff’s ocular vestibular problems have worsened as a result of the second accident.

[34] Dr. Longridge’s report predates the second accident; as such, it is not of assistance to the defendant’s argument. If anyone were to rely on this report to obtain a rebuttal examination, it would be the defendants in the First Action.

[35] In any event, the complaints of ocular vestibular problems are of longstanding. This is not a case of a new diagnosis or even a suggestion that a referral to such an ENT specialist is medically required. Dr. Ballard merely opines that a referral to such a specialist is a possibility if the plaintiff’s symptoms continue. Moreover, Dr. Moll, whose opinion was clearly available to the defendant for some time, discusses these symptoms in his report of January 21, 2009.

[36] As submitted by the plaintiff, the defendant chose to pursue a psychiatric, rather than ENT opinion, knowing that the ocular vestibular complaints formed a significant part of the plaintiff’s claim.

[37] As for the other opinions offered, the experts are in agreement that the plaintiff’s condition has worsened, but that treatment may yet alleviate or reduce those symptoms.

[38] The defence clearly has a theory:  the plaintiff is malingering and/or suffers a somatoform disorder. To have the plaintiff examined by an ENT specialist for an assessment that will either be diagnostic in nature and thus not true rebuttal; or merely to prove a negative, that is to confirm that there is no physiological cause for the balance and visual disturbances, would be inconsistent not only with the authorities cited to me, but also with the purposes of Rule 7?6 and 11?6 (4).

[39] On the material before me, I conclude that any report forthcoming from Dr. Bell would be fresh opinion evidence masquerading as answer to the plaintiff’s reports.

[40] In short, the defendant has failed to meet the necessary evidentiary threshold which might support an order for the examinations requested. The application is thus dismissed with costs in the cause.


Who's Paying The "Independent" Medical Examiner in Your Injury Claim?

Written by admin on . Posted in independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


I’ve written many times about the lucrative business of ‘independent‘ medical exams in the context of personal injury claims.  Since ICBC is a public institution they disclose annual financial statements documenting how much they have paid various doctors.  A review of these statements reveals that a handful of doctors get a lot of repeat business from ICBC and that some earn hundreds of thousands of dollars per year doing this work.
Another useful source of information is the Ministry of Health “Blue Book” which is published each year and reveals annual MSP “Payments to Practitioners“.
If you cross reference these two sources of information you can gain useful insight into some of the various streams of income of independent medical examiners.
One quick illustration are the reported ICBC and MSP billings of Dr. J. F. Schweigel.  If you look at his company’s ICBC billings for 2009 and contrast these with his MSP billings for the same year it becomes clear just how lucrative the independent medical examination business can be for a practicing doctor.
2009 ICBC Billings

2009 MSP Billings

If you’re interested in learning who’s paying your indepdendent medical examiner some quick homework can reveal very useful information.
(Note: it’s worth pointing out that MSP billings are not the only source of income for physicians’ clinical practices in BC.  One noteworthy example would be Health Authority Billings where  a doctor has hospital privileges.  When scrutinizing physician billings its good practice to get as much information as possible from all sources to get a fair and objective picture.)

BC Court of Appeal Discusses Independent Medical Exams Under the New Rules of Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on BC Court of Appeal Discusses Independent Medical Exams Under the New Rules of Court


Both the former and the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules provide parties to a lawsuit with an ability to request an independent medical exam of the opposing party  “If the physical or mental condition of a person is in issue in an action“.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal explaining exactly what “in issue” means.
In today’s case (Jones v. Donaghey) the Plaintiff was an infant.   He was removed from his home by the BC Ministry of Children and placed into foster care with the Defendants.  The Plaintiff alleged that while in foster care the foster parents intentionally assaulted him by “violently shaking the infant“.  The Plaintiff sued for damages.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant had anger management issues.  In order to explore these the Plaintiff obtained a Court Order requiring the Defendant to be examined by a physician under Rule 7-6(1).  The Defendant appealed the order.  The BC Court of Appeal set aside the order finding that the Defendant’s mental condition was not “in issue” therefore the Rules of Court did not allow this to be explored through the independent medical exam process.
The BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[14]         …since the purpose of pleadings is to define the “issues” of material or ultimate fact as between the parties, whether a proposition of fact is “in issue” for purposes of Rule 7-6(1) must be determined from an examination of the pleadings:  Astels v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 2006 BCCA 110 at para. 4, 23 C.P.C. (6th) 266.

[15]         “Relevant”, the term used by the chambers judge, belongs to the law of evidence.

[16]         The relationship between relevance and issues of material or ultimate fact was explained in R. v. Watson (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 161 at 172, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 310 (C.A.):

Relevance … requires a determination of whether as a matter of human experience and logic the existence of “Fact A” makes the existence or non-existence of “Fact B” more probable than it would be without the existence of “Fact A”.  If it does then “Fact A” is relevant to “Fact B”.  As long as “Fact B” is itself a material fact in issue or is relevant to a material fact in issue in the litigation then “Fact A” is relevant and prima facie admissible.

[17]         This concept is succinctly illustrated, albeit using different terminology, in R. v. White, [1926] 2 W.W.R. 481 at 485, 45 C.C.C. 328 (B.C.C.A.), where the Court adopted a passage from S. L. Phipson, ed., Best on Evidence, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1922) at 6 that included these words:

The fact sought to be proved is termed the “principal fact”; the fact which tends to establish it, “the evidentiary fact”.  When the chain consists of more than two parts, the intermediate links are principal facts with respect to those below, and evidentiary facts with respect to those above them.

[18]         Thus, a material fact is the ultimate fact, sometimes called “ultimate issue”, to the proof of which evidence is directed.  It is the last in a series or progression of facts.  It is the fact put “in issue” by the pleadings.  Facts that tend to prove the fact in issue, or to prove another fact that tends to prove the fact in issue, are evidentiary or “relevant” facts.  And, as Professor Thayer said at 197, “Issues are not taken upon evidential matter.”…

[29]         In my view, the chambers judge erred.  The test under Rule 7-6(1) is not whether the mental condition of a person is “relevant” to an issue; rather, it is whether the mental condition is itself “in issue”.  Moreover, Ms. Donaghey’s mental condition is not put “in issue” by the pleadings.

[30]         The issue raised by Ms. Donaghey’s denial of the allegation in paragraph 16 of the statement of claim is whether she intentionally assaulted the plaintiff by violently shaking him.  That Ms. Donaghey suffered from a personality disorder is not a material fact in respect of this issue, that is, proof that she suffered from a personality disorder would not in itself have legal consequences as between these parties.

[31]         The “issue” raised between the plaintiff and Ms. Donaghey in paragraph 27 is whether Ms. Donaghey breached her duty of care to the plaintiff in any one or more of the specified ways.  None of these allegations put Ms. Donaghey’s mental condition in issue.

[32]         The issues raised as between the plaintiff and Ms. King and as between the plaintiff and the Director respectively in paragraphs 28(d) and 29(n) of the statement of claim are whether these defendants breached their duty of care to the plaintiff by leaving him with Ms. Donaghey when they “knew or ought to have known” one or more of the particularized facts.  Thus, the issue in each case is the state of mind of these defendants.  Proof that Ms. Donaghey suffered from a personality disorder would not entitle the plaintiff to success on these issues.  Her mental condition is not a “definite proposition of … fact, asserted by [the plaintiff] and denied by [Ms. King/the Director], … which both agree to be the point which they wish to have decided”:  Odgers, supra, at para. 5.

[33]         Ms. Donaghey’s mental condition might be an evidentiary fact relevant to the issues raised in the paragraphs under discussion, as the chambers judge concluded.  However, as I have said, relevance of the mental condition of a person to an issue is not the test under Rule 7-6(1).  Rather, the person’s mental condition itself must be in issue to warrant an order pursuant to the rule and none of these allegations put Ms. Donaghey’s mental condition in issue.

[34]         This situation may be contrasted with the more common situation in which a plaintiff claims damages on the basis that a defendant has negligently caused him or her personal injury.  In such a case, the defendant’s denial puts the plaintiff’s condition, whether physical or mental or both, “in issue”.  The plaintiff’s injury is a material fact and the failure to prove it will be fatal to the action.  Accordingly, the defendant may be entitled to a medical examination pursuant to Rule 7-6(1) to obtain evidence of the plaintiff’s physical or mental condition.  However, as I have explained, this is not such a case.

[35]         For those reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the order that Ms. Donaghey attend for a psychiatric examination, and dismiss the plaintiff’s application.

Caselaw Update: Independent Medical Exams and Responding Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 48 Comments on Caselaw Update: Independent Medical Exams and Responding Reports


As previously discussed, Rule 11-6(3) of the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules requires expert reports to be served 84 days prior to trial.  Rule 11-6(4) requires “responding” reports to be served at least 42 days prior to trial.  The issue of whether a Defendant is able to force a plaintiff to attend an “independent medical exam” for the purpose of obtaining a responding report is currently being worked out by the BC Supreme Court.
Two further cases have been brought to my attention addressing this topic and with these the bulk of the judicial authorities to date demonstrate that it may be very difficult for a Defendant to force a late ‘independent‘ examination to obtain a responding report.
Both of the recent cases (Crane v. Lee and Boudreau v. Logan) involve ICBC injury claims.  In both the Plaintiff served expert reports discussing the extent of their accident related injuries.  The Defendants applied to compel the Plaintiff to attend an independent exam inside the 84 day deadline in order to obtain responding reports.  Master Caldwell presided over both applications and dismissed them both.  In doing so the Court relied on Mr. Justice Savage’s reasoning in Wright v. Brauer and ruled that that precedent was “on all fours” with the present applications.  Master Caldwell repeated the following reasons from Mr. Justice Savage:

[18]         However, at this point in time in the action, the defendants are limited to what Mr. Justice Williamson referred to in Kelly, supra, as “truly responsive rebuttal evidence”.  The application must be considered in that light; the question on this application is not one of notice, but whether the Examination should be ordered to enable the defendant to file responsive evidence.  The authorizing Rule, 7-6(1) uses the term “may”.

[19]         In Kroll v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (1995), 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 7, Sanders J., as she then was, noted that “true response evidence, does not permit fresh opinion evidence to masquerade as answer to the other side’s reports”.

[20]         In C.N. Railway v. H.M.T.Q. in Right of Canada, 2002 BCSC 1669, Henderson J. considered the admissability of “reply reports” holding that only the portions of the reports that provided a critical analysis of the methodology of the opposing expert were admissible as responsive evidence.  The portions of the reports describing the authors’ own opinions on the matters in issue were not admitted.

[21]         In this case, the defendants do not explain why an examination is required in these circumstances, other than a statement by a legal assistant that counsel says such is “necessary to properly defend this action and to respond to the reports of Dr. Weckworth and Dr. O’Connor”.  Master McCallum in White v. Gait, 2003 BCSC 2023 declined to order an examination where it had not been shown why such was required to produce a responsive report.

These cases, in total, seem to stand for the proposition that a Defendant needs to have sworn evidence from the proposed medical examiner explaining why physical examination is required in order to provide a responding report (which is what happened in Luedecke v. Hillman).  Absent this, late independent medical exam applications are being dismissed by the BC Supreme Court.

As of today’s date the Crane and Boudreau decisions are unpublished.  As always I’m happy to provide a copy of these cases to anyone who could benefit from them.  You can request a copy by filling out the form on this link.

Independent Medical Exams and Forced "Waivers"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 4 Comments on Independent Medical Exams and Forced "Waivers"


When Plaintiffs attend defence medical exams some doctors require patients to fill out questionnaires and waivers of liability.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing this area of law and concluding that Plaintiffs cannot be forced to sign waivers through the Court ordered independent medical exam process.
In today’s case (Mund v. Braun) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision and allegedly sustained some complex injuries.  In the lawsuit the Plaintiff agreed to attend a defence medical exam with a neurologist (Dr. Makin).  Dr. Makin requested that the Plaintiff sign a waiver form indicating that the Plaintiff “will not sue Dr. Makin outside of BC.”.  As previously discussed, BC law provides doctors with a strong immunity from lawsuits arising from carelessness in the independent medical examination process.  The reason for this waiver was to apparently protect the doctor against the remote chance that the Plaintiff could sue outside of BC.  The Plaintiff refused to sign the waiver.
The Defendant brought a motion and the BC Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Plaintiff could be forced to sign such a waiver.  Mr. Justice Brown dismissed this motion finding that unless the Court of Appeal rules otherwise the law is settled that BC Courts don’t have jurisdiction to force plaintiff’s to sign such waivers.  In addressing this point Mr.  Justice Brown held as follows:
[38] In any case, on the question of requiring the plaintiff to sign the Jurisdiction agreement, I am bound by Desjardins (Litigation guardian of) v. Huser, 2010 BCSC 977; Kobzos v. Dupuis, 2006 BCSC 2047; Stead v. Brown, 2010 BCSC 312; Peel Financial Holdings Ltd. v. Western Delta Lands, 2003 BCCA 180; Rafferty v. Power (1993), 15 C.P.C. (3d) 48 (BCSC); and Allan-Trensholme v. Simmie, [2006] B.C.J. No. 720 (BCCA). I do not have jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to sign the Jurisdiction Agreement. On the narrow point of whether jurisdiction remains with the court under the Civil Rules to require a party to sign an authorization for documents in the possession of a third party but over which the party has sufficient control, e.g. the party’s clinical records kept by their physician, that is governed by the cited cases until such time as the Court of Appeal specifically rules on that. For now, the general question appears settled; and as for the facts at bar, in my view, the consent in this case falls squarely within the ambit of the authorities cited.
This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of the extent of testing that can take place during a Court ordered exam.  Dr. Mund wished to conduct electro-diagnostic testing of the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff refused.  Mr. Justice Brown held that this test was permitted and in so finding stated as follows about doctors discretion during the testing process:
[16] I accept Dr. Makin’s explanation that electro-diagnostic studies are considered an extension of neurological examinations. I find the testing is minimally invasive, and would not invade the plaintiff’s privacy…

[19]         Given the variety of causes attributed to the plaintiff’s symptoms, which include thoracic outlet syndrome, myofascial factors, soft tissue pathology in the neck and right shoulder, cervical spine disc disease with a degenerative factor and even diabetes II, diagnosis is obviously a not straight forward exercise in this case.

[20]         I am satisfied nerve conductions studies are relevant to the issues raised and the pleadings and in the medical reports written for the plaintiff. The defendant submits there is at least a possibility the plaintiff’s tingling and numbness could result from degeneration in his cervical spine or unrelated nerve problems in his right arm; and the origin and causation of his neck, shoulder and arm symptoms are related to the pleadings.

[21]         I also agree that affording Dr. Makin leeway to conduct nerve conduction studies he sees as necessary is required in order to ensure reasonable equality between the parties. The studies will not necessarily duplicate earlier ones. An electro-diagnostic study is a reasonable extension of the clinical examination if the examining physician comes to judge it necessary to form, or confirm, their professional diagnostic opinion.

[22]         Therefore, the plaintiff will submit to electro-diagnostic testing by Dr. Makin if requested to do so.

We Don't Need Your Consent! – ICBC Claims and Medical Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 112 Comments on We Don't Need Your Consent! – ICBC Claims and Medical Reports


If you’re involved in a BC motor vehicle collision and have your injuries treated by a “medical practitioner” ICBC can compel the medical practitioner to provide them with a report documenting your injuries.  This is so even if you are not insured with ICBC and even if you don’t consent.  Reasons for judgement were published this week on the BC Supreme Court’s website discussing this area of law.
In today’s case (Pearlman v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in collision in 2004.  He was insured with a carrier from Washington State.  The other motorist was insured with ICBC.   The Plaintiff initially contacted ICBC and signed an authorization permitting ICBC to obtain medical information relating to his injuries.  About a year later the Plaintiff hired a lawyer and cancelled the authorization.  Despite this ICBC contacted a physician who treated the Plaintiff after the accident (Dr. Lubin) and requested “a narrative medical report“.
Ultimately the Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the other motorist was dismissed at trial.  The Plaintiff then sued Dr. Lubin arguing that the physician breached the Plaintiff’s confidence by providing ICBC a medical report when the Plaintiff withdrew his consent for ICBC to obtain his medical information.  The Plaintiff also sued ICBC directly arguing that ICBC improperly requested the medico-legal report.  Both of these lawsuits were dismissed with the BC Supreme Court finding that whether or not ICBC has written authority, section 28 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act permits ICBC to obtain reports from treating medical practitioners and that practitioners have “no legal choice” other than to comply with such requests.
In the claim against Dr. Lubin Madam Justice Morrison stated as follows about the mandatory nature of section 28 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act:
[] Dr. Lubin was obligated to provide ICBC with the report as requested.  Dr. Lubin had no legal choice other than to comply with the mandatory request to submit a medical legal report to ICBC.  This did not amount to a breach of confidentiality as alleged by the plaintiff.
In the claim against ICBC Mr. Justice Smith found that it would be an ‘abuse of process‘ to permit the Jury in that action to make findings contrary to Madam Justice Morrison’s previous decision.  Mr. Justice Smith held as follows:

[14]         The plaintiff also sued Dr. Lubin, alleging a number of causes of action, including negligence and breach of confidence.  That action went to trial before Madam Justice Morrison and was dismissed in reasons for judgment dated March 11, 2009.  Madam Justice Morrison held that when ICBC requested the report, Dr. Lubin was obliged to provide it.  She found that obligation arose out of s. 28 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, which reads:

If any of the following persons attends to, diagnoses, treats or is consulted by a person injured in a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia, he or she must, whenever the corporation requests, provide the corporation, as soon as reasonably practicable, with a report of the injuries and their diagnosis and treatment and a prognosis, in the form the corporation prescribes …

The persons then listed include a medical practitioner….

[20] Madam Justice Morrison’s findings regarding Dr. Lubin’s conduct were made on the same or very similar evidence that is before the Court in this case, and I conclude it would indeed be an abuse of process to invite this jury to make contrary findings.

The Plaintiff appealed Madam Justice Morrison’s decision.  In the course of the Appeal the Plaintiff was ordered to post security for costs in the event he lost the appeal.  In reviewing this decision the BC Court of Appeal made the following comments on the matter of ICBC ordering reports not in the ‘prescribed form‘:

[19] Even if Mr. Pearlman were to succeed in his argument that the judge erred in finding that Dr. Lubin was required to provide the report under statute – I note, in that regard, that the report was not prepared in form CL 19, which is ICBC’s prescribed form under s. 28 of theInsurance (Vehicle) Act) – it is difficult to see how his appeal could succeed given the trial judge’s clear finding that Dr. Lubin did not cause him any loss.

These decisions illustrate ICBC’s power to get medical reports even absent patient consent.  It can be argued that the Court of Appeal’s comments can leave individuals with little recourse if ICBC goes further than ordering a CL-19 and in fact obtains a full medico-legal report.  A solution, at least insofar as tort claims are concerned, is for plaintiffs to bring this power to the Courts attention when ICBC insured defendants try to obtain independent medical exams in order to ‘level the playing field‘ under the BC Supreme Court Rules.

The Debate Goes On… Independent Medical Exams and "Responsive" Expert Evidence

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on The Debate Goes On… Independent Medical Exams and "Responsive" Expert Evidence


Rule 11-6(3) of the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules requires expert reports to be served 84 days prior to trial.  Rule 11-6(4) requires “responding” reports to be served at least 42 days prior to trial.  The issue of whether a Defendant is able to force a plaintiff to attend an “independent medical exam” for the purpose of obtaining a responding report is currently being worked out by the BC Supreme Court.  Reasons for judgement were released last week demonstrating this matter remains a live issue.
Earlier this year, Mr. Justice Savage declined a defence motion to compel a Plaintiff to attend a doctor’s examination to obtain a responding report finding that an independent examination of a Plaintiff is not necessarily required since responding reports are to be strictly limited to “a critical analysis of the methodology of the opposing expert”
In a case released last week the Court reached a seemingly opposite result with a finding that an independent medical exam can be compelled to allow a Defendant to obtain a responding report in a personal injury claim.
In last week’s case (Luedecke v. Hillman) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC motor vehicle collision.  He served his expert reports in the timelines required by the Rules of Court.  The Defendant sought an order for an independent medical exam to obtain a responding opinion.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that a medical examination is not necessary to obtain a truly responding opinion.  Mr. Justice Cullen disagreed and upheld a Master’s order compelling the Plaintiff to see the Defendant’s doctor.  In doing so the Court noted as follows:

[49]        Although the plaintiff submits that Dr. Reebye should be limited in his report to “criticizing the methodology or the research or pointing out facts apparent from the records which the other examiners may have overlooked” based on Justice Savage’s apparent reliance on C.N. Rail, supra, I do not take from Savage J.’s judgment that responsive opinions are invariably limited to “a critical analysis of the methodology of the opposing expert.”

[50]        In C.N. Rail, supra, Henderson J. was dealing with rebuttal evidence in the classic sense described by Southin J.A. in Sterritt v. McLeod, supra, as simply evidence responsive to some point in the oral evidence of the witness called by the defendant.

[51]        What is at issue in the present case is a different form of responsive evidence, recognized in Stainer v. Plaza, supra, as distinct in paragraph 15, where Finch J.A. ( as he then was) noted:

The third condition in the order is directed to the third party calling an independent medical examiner “for rebuttal evidence” I understand from counsel that this refers not to rebuttal evidence as generally understood, but to evidence that is purely responsive to medical evidence which the plaintiff has led as part of her case.  It would not apply to opinion evidence offered by the third party on subject matters not adduced in the medical evidence adduced by the plaintiff. [underlining added]

[52]        I thus conclude that what is referred to in Rule 11-6(4) is not akin to rebuttal evidence such as that called by a plaintiff in response to a defendant’s case, with its consequent limitations.  Nor is it akin to expert evidence that responds generally to the subject matter of the plaintiff’s case.  Rather, it refers to evidence that is “purely responsive” to the medical evidence which the other party has called.

[53]        As such, it has inherent limitations, but not necessarily the same limitations that Henderson J imposed on the true rebuttal evidence he was dealing with in C.N. Rail, supra.

[54]        I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Justice Savage in Wright v. Brauer, supra, to the effect that there is an evidentiary threshold to be met before an order under Rule 7-6(1) should be made in contemplation of an expert’s report under Rule 11-6(4).  That threshold is different from that for ordering an expert’s report under Rule 11-6(3).  To reach the requisite threshold under Rule 11-6(4) the applicant must establish a basis of necessity for the examination to properly respond to the expert witness whose report is served under subrule (3) by the other party.  It is not simply a matter of demonstrating a need to respond to the subject matter of the plaintiff’s case.

[55]        Clearly, that threshold was not met in the case before Savage J.  In the case before me there is an affidavit from Dr. Reebye setting forth a basis for the examination sought, although ultimately what Dr. Reebye may regard as purely responsive may be different from that which the trial judge eventually concludes to be so.  That issue must await another day.  Here I am dealing with a more limited issue, and I am satisfied that on the basis of Dr. Reebye’s affidavit the evidentiary threshold is met and the order of Master Scarth should be upheld.

[56]        I am alive to the concern expressed by the plaintiff’s counsel that Rule 11-6(4) may be seen as a means for defendants to circumvent the more onerous notice provisions of 11-6(3) and routinely seek to obtain reports that more properly should be sought under that latter rule.  I conclude, however, that such a concern can be met as it was with the practice of having opinion evidence without notice under the old Rule 40A.  In that regard, the words of Williamson J. in Kelley v. Kelley (1995), 20 B.C.L.R. (3d) 232 (S.C.) are apt:

I would restrict, of course, as courts I think must, the practice of having opinion evidence without notice strictly to truly responsive rebuttal evidence, and I think if that rule is carefully observed, there should be no difficulties.

As with judicial precedents developed under the former rules, I expect there will be some seemingly inconsistent judgements dealing with the issue of independent medical exams under the current rules and eventually the BC Court of Appeal will likely weigh in on the issue to bring some clarity to the law.

Can A Litigation Guardian Be Ordered to Attend an Independent Medical Exam?

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 13, BCSC Civil Rule 20, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 100 Comments on Can A Litigation Guardian Be Ordered to Attend an Independent Medical Exam?


(UPDATE:  Please note Leave to Appeal the Below Decision was granted by the BCCA on January 25, 2011)
When a mentally incompetent person brings a lawsuit in BC they must do so through a litigation guardian or a committee.  Generally, when personal injuries are the subject of a lawsuit, the Defendant is entitled to have the Plaintiff attend an ‘independent’ medical exam.  What about the litigation guardian?  Can they be ordered to attend an independent medical exam?  The BC Supreme Court Civil Rules are silent on this point however, reasons for judgement were released today considering this question using the Court’s ‘inherent jurisdiction’.
In today’s case (Bishop v. Minichiello) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  He was an infant at the time and brought the lawsuit by way of litigation guardian.  The Plaintiff became an adult prior to the lawsuit resolving.  Normally, when this occurs, the Plaintiff files an affidavit and overtakes the lawsuit without the litigation guardian.  In today’s case the Plaintiff did not do this apparently because his injuries may have rendered him “unable to appreciate the extent of his own injuries and unable to effectively conduct the litigation on his own behalf.”.
The Defendant brought a motion that both the Plaintiff and his litigation guardian attend a series of medical exams.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that the Rule authorizing the Court to compel a Plaintiff to attend an Independent Medical Exam does not empower a Court to extend the order to a litigation guardian.  Mr. Justice McEwan noted that while this was true it could be remedied by resorting to the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.  In granting the application the Court noted as follows:
[12] The defendant submits that although Rule 7-6 (1)-(3) makes no specific provision for a person other than the party to be examined to attend and answer questions, Wong (guardian ad litem) v. Wong [2006] B.C.J. No. 3123 (C.A.) established that the court may, in the interests of justice make ancillary orders to give effect to the purpose of the Rules, found in Rule 1(5) [now Rule 1-3]. In Wong, the question was whether the court could order a plaintiff to video tape an examination…

[13]         Rule 20-2 reads:

(3)        Unless a rule otherwise provides, anything that is required or authorized by these Supreme Court Civil Rules to be done by or invoked against a party under disability must:

(b)        be invoked against the party by invoking the same against the party’s litigation guardian.

[14]         Rule 13-1 reads:

(19)      When making an order under these Supreme Court Civil Rules, the court may impose terms and conditions and give directions it considers will further the object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules.

[15]         On the question of inherent jurisdiction I think the characterization found in R & J Siever Holdings Ltd. v. Moldenhauer 2008 BCCA 59, is most apt:

In addition to the powers conferred by the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, as a superior court of record, has inherent jurisdiction to regulate its practice and procedures so as to prevent abuses of process and miscarriages of justice: see I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Current Leg. Prob. 23 at 23-25. As the author said, at 25,

The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case. The powers conferred by the Rules of Court are, generally speaking, additional to, and not in substitution of, powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The two heads of powers are generally cumulative, and not mutually exclusive, so that in any given case, the court is able to proceed under either or both heads of jurisdiction.

[16]         The Rules do not, properly speaking, confer jurisdiction. To the extent that they reflect a consensus of the Judiciary (and the Bar) as to the presumptions, or expectations, or shifts in onus that will contribute to the just and expedient conduct of litigation, they are useful in bringing predictability and stability to civil procedure. To the extent that they do not reflect such a consensus, they cannot be regarded as mandatory impediments to doing the right thing in any particular case.

[17]         The silence of Rule 7-6 on the question of ordering the litigation guardian to attend an independent medical examination, does not, in and of itself, preclude the making of such an order, if it otherwise makes sense to do so in order to advance the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the proceeding on its merits.

[18]         Whether such an order is appropriate requires the court to weigh the plaintiff’s objection against the defendant’s rationale for the request…

[20]         The plaintiff’s objection to the attendance of the litigation guardian is primarily that a conversation between the litigation guardian and the examining physician creates a form of statement that is not controlled within the process and that might well lead to conflict or confusion later, if the guardian and the Doctor do not agree as to what was said.

[21]         The defendant’s point is, primarily, that in a case where the defence is guessing as to the mental status of the plaintiff, it would be prudent to have the person who knows him best, and who is also the litigation guardian, available to answer questions about his condition, especially where it is suggested that, among the effects of the injuries suffered in the accident, is a lack of insight or appreciation on Brandon Bishop’s part of the harm that has occurred.

[22]         In Tsantilas (Litigation Guardian) v. Johnson, Cranbrook Registry #18128 (20100211) Melnick, J. made a similar order in a case involving both counsel who appear in this proceeding. In what I gather to be a case of an under-age person, the court ordered the attendance of the litigation guardian at an assessment…

[23]         I think that as long as the case continues to be conducted by Charlotte Bishop as litigation guardian, the implication that, for reasons related to his injuries Brandon Bishop is unable to conduct the litigation will remain, along with the implication that talking to him will not yield the whole story. The plaintiff’s concerns about possible confusion do not outweigh the defendant’s interest in the appointed examiners getting accurate and complete information. Accordingly, Charlotte Bishop, as litigation guardian, must attend and answer the questions posed by the examiners as they require.