Skip to main content

Tag: icbc injury claims

Non-Pecuniary Damages for Fibromylagia Assessed at $110,000 in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, Uncategorized.

(Update March 19, 2012 – The Below Decision was modestly modified by the BC Court of Appeal in reasons for judgement released today, reducing the claim for future care by $32,115.  The other trial findings were left intact)
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding just over $1.4 million in total damages for injuries and loss suffered as a result of a BC car crash.
In today’s case (Shapiro v. Dailey) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 intersection crash.  The Defendant driver had been drinking earlier in the day and was operating the vehicle without permission of its owner.  Fault was not admitted but the Defendant driver was ultimately found 100% responsible for the crash.
The Plaintiff was 23 years old at the time of the crash and 29 by the time of trial.  The Court heard from a variety of expert physicians who all agreed the Plaintiff suffered “serious injuries“.  The Court concluded that the Plaintiff did indeed suffer serious and permanent injureis and would struggle to earn a competitive living throughout her career.  Mr. Justice Grauer awarded $110,000 for non-pecuniary damages and $900,000 for diminished earning capacity.  In reaching the award for non-pecuniary damages the Mr. Justice Grauer made the following findings:

[58]         On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that, as a result of the motor vehicle collision that is the subject of this action, Ms. Shapiro suffered soft tissue injuries to her cervical, lumbar and sacral spine that, through no fault of her own, have left her with:

·                 disabling cervicogenic headaches, and periodic headaches of a migraine nature;

·                 chronic pain disorder, manifesting itself as myofascial pain syndrome and post-traumatic fibromyalgia syndrome;

·                 depressive symptoms falling short of depressive disorder;

·                 mood disorder including resolving post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder and panic attacks;

·                 mild, but not insignificant, cognitive difficulties in concentration and memory.

[59]         Whether some of these diagnoses overlap in terms of their symptomatology matters not.  What is clear is that Ms. Shapiro genuinely suffers from the symptoms, and that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  This has wrought a profound change in every aspect of her life, from interpersonal relationships with her family, friends and partner to her ability to love, work, play, exercise, relax, sleep, and her ability to move forward with her life.  I find that her prognosis is not hopeless, but is extremely guarded.  Although Ms. Shapiro is the type of person who will work hard to achieve as much improvement as is possible, I am satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, nothing more than a modest improvement can reasonably be expected.  Accordingly, at the age of 29, Ms. Shapiro faces a lifetime of struggling with pain and fatigue in everything she does.

[60]         I have considered the authorities to which counsel referred me, including Dikey v. Samieian, 2008 BCSC 604; Alden v. Spooner, 2002 BCCA 592, 6 B.C.L.R. (4th) 308;Prince-Wright v. Copeman, 2005 BCSC 1306; La France v. Natt, 2009 BCSC 1147; Pelkinen v. Unrau, 2008 BCSC 375; Whyte v. Morin, 2007 BCSC 1329; Niloufari v. Coumont, 2008 BCSC 816, varied 2009 BCCA 517; and Unger v. Singh, 2000 BCCA 94.

[61]         Each case must, of course, be assessed on its own facts.  Considering all of the circumstances, including her age at the time of the accident (23), the toll her injuries have taken on her, and her prospects for the future, I consider Ms. Shapiro’s plight to be considerably worse than that of, for instance, the older plaintiff in the recent decision of La France($80,000) and worse than the older plaintiff in Prince-Wright ($100,000).  I have considered as well the very recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Poirier v. Aubrey, 2010 BCCA 266, where the 38-year-old plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages were increased to $100,000.  I assess Ms. Shapiro’s non-pecuniary damages at $110,000.

This decision also has a useful discussion of the law of ‘diminished earning capacity‘ and ‘failure to mitigate’ and is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s comments on these areas of law.

If you’re researching the non-pecuniary value of post traumatic fibromyalgia cases you can click here to access my recent archived posts.

ICBC Injury Claims and Witness Statements; Getting Proper Disclosure

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

Further to my recent post on this topic, often after serious motor vehicle collisions ICBC sends adjusters out to collect statements from the parties and known witnesses to the event.
When a lawsuit for compensation is brought by an injured party ICBC sometimes does not disclose the witness statements to the Plaintiff on the basis of ‘litigation privilege‘.   Being a monopoly insurer, ICBC investigates claims and our Courts have consistently held that if the statements were obtained during the ‘investigation‘ stage ICBC’s claim of ‘litigation privilege‘ will fail and the documents will have to be disclosed.  Reasons for judgement were released this week with helpful comments addressing this area of the law.
In this week’s case (Sauve v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in 2008 motor vehicle collision.   After the collision ICBC hired an independent adjuster who obtained witness statements and also provided ICBC a report in which she sized up the various witnesses.  In describing the report the adjuster deposed that she “used my expertise and experience as an Insurance Adjuster to describe each of the Witnesses, including their physical appearance, demeanor and presentation. I also provided an analysis as to the likely performance of each witness in court. I further provided analysis of the commonalities between various witness accounts for the purpose of assessing credibility and preparing the case of the Defendant, ICBC should litigation occur”
ICBC provided the Plaintiff with the witness statements but refused to provide the report claiming the protection of litigation privilege.  The Plaintiff brought a motion to force disclosure.  Ultimately Mr. Justice Joyce held that the reports were privileged and ICBC did not have to disclose them to the Plaintiff.  Before reaching this conclusion the Court provided helpful reasons addressing the difficulty ICBC may face in claiming privilege over witness statements obtained in the immediate aftermath of a collision.  Mr. Justice Joyce reasoned as follows:

[34] I turn to the second part of the test: were the documents created for the dominant purpose of assisting the defendant in the conduct of the anticipated litigation by Ms. Sauvé?

[35] Once again in answering that question, it is important to focus on when the reports were created and to consider them separate from any consideration of whether the witness statements and photographs would meet the dominant purpose test. I can certainly accept that the witness statements and photographs may well have come into existence for two purposes:

(1)       to investigate the circumstances of the accident, and

(2)       to assist in the conduct of litigation.

[36] Therefore, whether those documents would satisfy the second part of the test might have been a difficult question to answer. The defendant might not have been able to meet the test for the first group of documents on a balance of probabilities, but that is not the question that I have to decide.

[37] In my view, when deciding whether the reports were prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation I have to consider not only what was known by Mr. Taylor and communicated to Ms. Webber; I also have to consider what Ms. Webber knew when she prepared the reports, as well as the nature of the reports. Ms. Webber has deposed that when she prepared the reports, she believed that the dominant purpose for their creation was litigation. She came to that conclusion being aware of the information that the witnesses could give with respect to the circumstances of the accident. According to Ms. Webber, the reports consist of her descriptions of the witness, her impressions or opinions concerning their credibility and her own analysis of how the evidence of the various witnesses matched or conflicted. While it might be possible that such information might assist ICBC at the investigation stage, I am of the view that any such use of the documents would clearly be secondary to their use in assisting counsel in the conduct of the action. I am, therefore, satisfied that the reports were created for the dominant purpose of litigation and attracted litigation privilege.

In addition to the above this case contains a useful analysis of the law of waiver of privilege and ‘common interest’ privilege and is worth reviewing in full for anyone interested in these topics.

Jury Delivers "Shockingly Unreasonable" Award in BC Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 2 Comments on Jury Delivers "Shockingly Unreasonable" Award in BC Injury Claim


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, in what the trial judge described as a ‘shockingly unreasonable‘ verdict by a Jury.
In today’s case (Evans v. Metcalfe) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC motor vehicle collision.  Fault was admitted by the other motorist.  The case went to trial before a Jury with Mr. Justice Romilly presiding as the trial judge.
The Plaintiff led evidence that, as a result of her accident related injuries, she was disabled from working and sought damages accordingly.  The Plaintiff’s out of pocket expenses for alleged accident related treatments exceeded $25,000.
The Jury largely rejected the Plaintiff’s claim and assessed total damages at $17,300 which included $1,000 for pain and suffering, $6,000 for special damages and $10,300 for past loss of income.  The Jury then reduced this award by 15% for ‘failure to mitigate‘ for a total award of $14,705.
The Defendant asked the Judge to enter Judgement based on the Jury’s award.  The Plaintiff argued that the Jury’s award was “unreasonable” and that the verdict should be set aside with a new trial ordered.
Mr. Justice Romilly agreed that the Jury was wrong in reducing the damages by 15% for failure to mitigate but concluded that other than increasing the judgement to the original $17,300 any changes to the Verdict should be left to the Court of Appeal.
Jury’s in BC do not give any reasons for their award and they cannot be contacted after they are discharged to gain insight into their deliberations.  Accordingly it difficult for the Court of Appeal to know how a Jury reaches a particular verdict and feedback from the trial judge is welcome.  Anticipating that this matter would be appealed Mr. Justice Romilly voiced disagreement with the Jury’s findings and provided the following criticism:

[51]        Although it has not been specifically requested of me, I feel it necessary to comment on the reasonableness of the jury’s verdict.  In doing so I am taking in mind both the utility of such comments expressed by Southin J.A. in Johnson, and the limits to them as stated by Garson J.A. in Boota.

[52]        In my opinion, as a long-time member of the bench, the jury’s award in this case has surpassed the level of “shockingly unreasonable”.  The amount of damages awarded for non-pecuniary damages represents a fraction of what was sought.  Whatever the reason, the jury felt the need to punish Ms. Evans in a way that does not accord with the law.  In my judgment I have already discussed some failures of the jury to appropriately apply the law to the actual evidence; I believe that these failures (and more) are further manifest in their wholly disproportionate award.  No jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached the verdict issued in these proceedings; the evidence cannot support the verdict.

BC Court of Appeal Discusses Pain and Suffering Damages for Fibromyalgia; Overturns Trial Award

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, Uncategorized. 62 Comments on BC Court of Appeal Discusses Pain and Suffering Damages for Fibromyalgia; Overturns Trial Award

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal discussing an appropriate amount for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for accident related Fibromyalgia.
In today’s case (Poirer v. Aubrey) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 rear-end car crash in BC.  She suffered injuries which resulted in chronic pain.  There was evidence that some of the effects of her injuries were likely permanent.  At trial the Plaintiff was awarded just over $220,000 in total damages for her injuries and loss (click here to read my summary of the trial judgement).
The Plaintiff appealed arguing that the damage award was low and the trial judge made an error in finding that there was a ‘real and substantial possibility…that (the Plaintiff’s) pain and discomfort will be relieved and her functioning improved“.  The BC High Court agreed that the evidence did not support such a finding and that the trial award was low.  The Court substituted an award of $528,503 which included an increase in the non-pecuniary damages award of $60,000 to $100,000.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss for chronic pain from soft tissue injuries at $100,000 the BC Court of Appeal noted as follows:

[25]         I consider the evidence establishes that, as the judge said, there is a “real and substantial possibility” Ms. Poirier’s injury will prove to be permanent.  There is no cure.  There is treatment for her condition, but the prospect of her pain being relieved to a significant degree is indeed guarded.  She is unlikely to ever be pain free and can at best hope that, with continued treatment, she may in time achieve a sufficient reduction in her pain and increase in her functioning that would permit her to regain some of the enjoyment of her life she has lost and to undertake part time employment.

[26]         Ms. Poirier cites three awards in particular that she says reflect what plaintiffs who have suffered somewhat comparable non-pecuniary losses to hers have been awarded: Hooper v. Nair, 2009 BCSC 862; Barnes v. Richardson, 2008 BCSC 1349, aff’d 2010 BCCA 116; and Djukic v. Hahn, 2006 BCSC 154, aff’d 2007 BCCA 203.  The respondents cite Heartt v. Royal, 2000 BCSC 1122; Mowat v. Orza, 2003 BCSC 373; and Esau v. Myles, 2010 BCSC 43.  These awards reflect a broad range: those cited by the respondents are $50,000 to $70,000; those cited by Ms. Poirier are $85,000 to $125,000.  I consider Ms. Poirier’s loss to be more consistent with the losses in the awards she cites.  Of particular significance is the permanent nature of her injury that causes her ongoing debilitating pain, the effect it has had and will continue to have on the enjoyment of her life, and the uncertainty there is that her condition will in time improve even to the point of permitting her to return to work part time.

[27]         I would set aside the judge’s award of $60,000 for non-pecuniary loss and substitute an award of $100,000.

More on Circumstantial Evidence and Your ICBC Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 53 Comments on More on Circumstantial Evidence and Your ICBC Injury Claim


Further to my previous post on this topic, historic reasons for judgement were released today on the BC Supreme Court website demonstrating that circumstantial evidence can be enough for a Plaintiff to win their ICBC injury claim.
In today’s case (Tweedie v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured while out for a morning jog in 1999.  There were no witnesses to the incident that injured the Plaintiff.  The result of the Plaintiff’s trauma was such that she could not remember how she was injured.   In her dazed state of mind she initially thought she tripped while jogging however, on learning about how serious her injuries were (these included several broken ribs, multiple fractured bones in her foot and a fractured fibula) the Plaintiff assumed she must have been struck by a vehicle.
The Plaintiff sued ICBC directly for compensation under s. 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act (the section dealing with unidentified motorist claims).  ICBC denied liability arguing there was no proof that a motor vehicle collision caused the injuries and that even if the injuries were caused by a vehicle there was no proof that the driver of the vehicle was negligent.  Mr. Justice Wilson disagreed and found that ICBC is liable for the Plaintiff’s injuries as a result of the collision.  In reaching this verdict the Court relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence.  Mr. Justice Wilson provide the following useful summary of the law regarding finding fault in an injury claim based wholly on circumstantial evidence:

[3]           The principles are well-established for assessing liability where the evidence is circumstantial, but it is still useful to refer to them.  In the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways Company v. Leveille, [1933] S.C.R. 456, the Court considered the claim of injury, a deformity to an unborn child alleged to have been brought about as a result of the child’s mother falling while on the tramway.  At p. 466, Mr. Justice Lamont considered the issue of whether there was evidence on which the jury could reasonably find the existence of a causal relationship between the accident to the mother and the deformity of the child’s feet, and said this:

The general principle in accordance with which in cases like the present the sufficiency of the evidence is to be determined was stated by Lord Chancellor Loreburn inRichard Evans & Co., Limited v. Astley, [1911] A.C. 678 as follows:

It is, of course, impossible to lay down in words any scale or standard by which you can measure the degree of proof which will suffice to support a particular conclusion of fact.  The applicant must prove his case.  This does not mean that he must demonstrate his case.  If the more probable conclusion is that for which he contends, and there is anything pointing to it, then there is evidence for a court to act upon.  Any conclusion short of certainty may be miscalled conjecture or surmise but courts, like individuals, habitually act upon a balance of probabilities.

There was undoubtedly evidence to go to the jury that the mother’s accident was caused by the fault of the Company, and the jury’s finding on that point cannot be disturbed.  That such fault caused the deformity of the child cannot, from the nature of things, be established by direct evidence.  It may, however, be established by a presumption or inference drawn from facts proved to the satisfaction of the jury.  These facts must be consistent one with the other and must furnish data from which the presumption can be reasonably drawn.  It is not sufficient that the evidence affords material for a conjecture that the child’s deformity may have been due to the consequences

of the mother’s accident.  It must go further and be sufficient to justify a reasonable man in concluding, not as a mere guess or conjecture, but as a deduction from the evidence, that there is a reasonable probability that the deformity was due to such accident.

At p. 469, he referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Jones v. G.W. Rly. Co. (1930), 47 T.L.R. 39, in which the Court had to consider whether there was evidence on which a jury could properly find negligence on the part of the defendant’s servants which caused or contributed to the death of a husband of the first plaintiff.  He quoted from the decision of Lord MacMillan:

The dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw.  A conjecture may be plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that it is a mere guess.  An inference in the legal sense, on the other hand, is a deduction from the evidence and if it is a reasonable deduction, it may have the validity of legal proof.  The attribution of an occurrence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference.  The cogency of a legal inference of causation may vary in degree between practical certainty and reasonable probability.  Where the coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual observation there is necessarily a hiatus in the direct evidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an inference from the facts actually observed and proved.

And then, on p. 474, after considering the difference in the jurisprudence in Quebec under the Civil Code and in the rest of Canada under the common law, he said:

… under either the French or English jurisprudence, the presumptions or inferences to be receivable as proof must be a deduction from established facts which produce a reasonable conviction in the mind that the allegation of which proof is required is probably true.  That conviction may vary in degree between “practical certainty” and “reasonable probability”….

The question, however, is whether he instructed the jury sufficiently?  In a case such as this it is, in my opinion, essential that the judge should instruct the jury that the presumption which they are entitled to admit as proof must not be a mere guess on their part, but must be a reasonable deduction from such facts as they shall find to be established by the evidence.

That is the standard which must be met here, where I am the trier of fact.

[4]           In a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Plett v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1987), 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) 336, under the heading “Circumstantial evidence”, at p. 341, Mr. Justice Wallace said this:

In cases such as this, in which the evidence is circumstantial, inferences of negligence cannot be drawn unless there are positive proven facts from which such inferences can be made.

In Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 152, [1939] All E.R. 722 (H.L.) a case concerning an industrial accident to a workman, Lord Wright stated at pp. 169-170 what is, in my respectful opinion, the correct approach to a case which turns solely on circumstantial evidence:

My Lords, the precise manner in which the accident occurred cannot be ascertained as the unfortunate young man was alone when he was killed.  The Court therefore is left to inference or circumstantial evidence.  Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation.  There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish.  In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had actually been observed.  In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability.  But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture.

In the present case there are, I think, certain known facts which enable some inferences to be drawn.  Beyond that point the method of inference stops and what is suggested is conjecture.  It is not necessary to recapitulate the facts which have been fully stated by my noble and learned friend, Lord Atkin.  I shall be content to state what I regard as proved by the method of inference, and reject what appears to be made to be a matter merely of conjecture.

Plaintiff Awarded Double Costs for Beating Pre Trial Formal Settlement Offer; Relevance of ICBC Insurance Considered

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Settlement Law, Uncategorized.


In my continued efforts to track the judicial development of Rule 37B, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff double costs for the trial of her ICBC claim.  The contentious issue of the existence of Insurance as a potentially relevant factor was also considered.
In today’s case (Pham-Fraser v. Smith) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC motor vehicle collision.  Before trial the Defendant (insured with ICBC) offered to settle under Rule 37B for $115,000.  The Plaintiff responded with a formal settlement offer of $149,000.  Neither party accepted the respective offers and proceeded to trial where the Court awarded just over $400,000 in total damages (click here to read my previous post discussing the trial judgement).
The Plaintiff, having comfortably beat her formal offer, asked the Court to award double costs under Rule 37B.  In granting the motion Mr. Justice Greyell held as follows:

[24] The second factor referred to in Rule 37B(6) also operates in the plaintiff’s favour.  There is a wide difference between the offer to settle and the final judgment.  The judgment is almost three times the amount offered.  The plaintiff’s offer was made because she wished to avoid court and having to give her evidence.  Some of her evidence was of a private nature relating to matters she did not wish to talk about in the public forum of a court of law (that is, how the accident affected her work and home life, her marital relationship with her husband after the accident, and the fact she suffered from incontinence).

[25] It is not necessary to consider factors set out in Rule 37B(6)(c) and (d).  I do not accept the plaintiff’s submission I ought to consider that the defendants, being represented by ICBC, are in a “sophisticated” position in terms of providing settlement instructions and that this is a factor to be taken into account and operate in the plaintiff’s favour in exercising my discretion under the rule.   The plaintiff’s argument seems to me to simply be another way of putting a “deep pockets” argument forward: an argument the courts have thus far rejected as being a factor to be considered in determining whether to award costs under Rule 37B.

[26] After considering the factors which I do consider relevant under Rule 37B, I conclude the plaintiff is entitled to an award of double costs.

As previously discussed, the BC Supreme Court is inconsistent on whether a Defendant being insured is a relevant factor under Rule 37B and clarity from the Court of Appeal would be welcome.  While more cases than not have held that insurance is not a relevant consideration it is not yet clear that this is correct.  If the law was settled it would assist lawyers in advising their clients of the potential risks and benefits of trial.

In my continued efforts to get us all prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I will again point out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.

More on Court Costs and "Sufficient Reason" For Suing in the BC Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Settlement Law, Uncategorized. 50 Comments on More on Court Costs and "Sufficient Reason" For Suing in the BC Supreme Court

Further to my previous posts on this topic, if a Plaintiff successfully sues in the BC Supreme Court but receives damages below $25,000 they may be deprived of their court ‘costs’ unless they had ‘sufficient reason’ for choosing the Supreme Court over small claims court.
Two judgements were released this week by the BC Supreme Court discussing this area of law.  In this weeks cases (Spencer v. Popham and Spencer v. Horton) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate  BC car crashes.  She started separate lawsuits in the BC Supreme Court but settled her cases before they went to trial.  Both claims settled form amounts below $25,000 (the current financial limit of BC’s small claims court).  The Plaintiff and ICBC could not agree on the issue of costs.
ICBC argued that since both cases were in the small claims courts jurisdiction the Plaintiff did not have sufficient reason for suing in the Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice Punnett disagreed and awarded the Plaintiff costs in both claims.  In doing so he provided the following useful and through summary of this area of the law:

[8] Rule 57(10) of the Rules of Court states:

A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.

[9] This rule encourages persons to bring actions in Small Claims Court when a claim falls within that court’s monetary jurisdiction. It is an example of “proportionality”; the judicial process should match the amount in dispute. However, the court must also respect a party’s “legitimate choice” of forum: Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 286 D.L.R. (4th) 330 at para. 35.

[10] The burden is on claimants to evaluate their claims prior to commencement and to justify their decision if they recover less than the Small Claims Court limit, currently $25,000:Reimann at para. 38. If plaintiffs fail to sufficiently investigate and assess their claims prior to commencement, they risk not recovering costs. In a personal injury action this may require plaintiffs to obtain medical records and medical reports, to gather evidence to support claims for loss of earnings and earning capacity, and to assess the evidence in support of the claims being advanced before commencing the action.

[11] However, as noted by Justice Savage in Gradek v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Canada Inc, 2010 BCSC 356 at para. 19, R. 57(10) contemplates the possibility that factors other than quantum must be considered:

[19]      The proviso in Rule 57(10) is “unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in Supreme Court and so orders”. The Rule does not define “sufficient reason”. There is nothing in the Rule that limits the extension of the term “sufficient reason” to matters relating to the quantum of the claim.

[12] Factors that can give rise to “sufficient reason” were set out in Kuehne v. Probstl, 2004 BCSC 865 at para. 22, and accepted in Icecorp International Cargo Express Corp. v. Nicolaus, 2007 BCCA 97, 38 C.P.C. (6th) 26 at para. 27. They include:

i. the legal or factual complexity of the case;

ii. the need for discovery of documents and examinations for discovery;

iii. the need for a judgment enforceable outside of British Columbia;

iv. a bona fide preference for a jury trial; and

v. access to the summary trial procedure available in Supreme Court.

Other factors can be the need for the plaintiff to have legal counsel (Faedo v. Dowell, 2007 BCSC 1985 at para. 36; Ostovic v. Foggin, 2009 BCSC 58 at para. 42; Gradek at para. 43), and the defendant’s denial of liability, causation, and injury or loss and allegations of contributory negligence, pre-existing conditions, previous causes and a failure to mitigate (Ostovic at paras. 39-40; Gradek at para. 35).

[13] Therefore, a plaintiff’s evaluation of his or her claim, can also involve an assessment of these factors. Even if the plaintiff assesses the claim to be within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the plaintiff can rely on these other reasons to commence the action in Supreme Court: Johannson v. National Car Rental (Canada) Inc., 2009 BCSC 1284 at para. 5.

[14] In my opinion, a plaintiff’s simple desire to retain counsel is not in and of itself a sufficient reason for commencing the action in Supreme Court. Other factors, such as those noted above, determine whether retaining counsel is justified.

[15] In Faedo, the plaintiff was in a low impact collision and suffered a soft tissue injury to her neck and back. Justice Vickers found that the case was not that complex and plaintiff’s counsel could not have considered ICBC’s original dispute of liability a serious threat to recovery. However, Justice Vickers concluded that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have brought her claim in Supreme Court for two reasons: (1) when the action was commenced, the plaintiff believed she was suffering from the accident and her pleadings included a claim for loss of earning capacity and disruption of the ability to earn income; and (2) ICBC put her credibility seriously in issue when it took the position that she had not suffered from any injury or any significant injury. Justice Vickers continued at para. 36:

[36]      … I observed this plaintiff to be very nervous in court. She had no previous experience in court and in my opinion when she was confronted with a case where the defendant represented by counsel was suggesting that she hadn’t been injured at all and this was a low impact accident in which it was suggested she wouldn’t be injured, that the plaintiff reasonably required counsel to represent her and reasonably started an action in the Supreme Court where she could hope to recover some of the cost of retaining that counsel which was necessary for her to properly put her case to get the compensation I have found her entitled to. Furthermore, an offer to settle such as the plaintiff made in this case puts very little pressure upon a defendant to settle where there is no exposure to costs.

[16] In Ostovic, another case arising out of a low impact accident, Justice Savage noted that because the defendant denied liability, causation and special damages, the plaintiff had to prove these issues in court. Because of this, the plaintiff needed to avail himself of pre-trial discovery, which provided important evidence of the speed of impact, the consequences of impact and concern over the plaintiff’s condition. In addition, Justice Savage found at para. 42:

[42]      There is the additional factor that, as in Faedo and Kanani [v. Misiurna, 2008 BCSC 1274], the Plaintiff faced an institutional defendant which, in the ordinary course, has counsel. To obtain any recovery the Plaintiff is forced to go to court, where he is facing counsel and counsel is reasonably required, but in Provincial Court there is no way of recovering the costs of counsel.

[17] In Gradek, before the issuance of the writ, the defendants’ insurers had informed the plaintiffs that their position was the accident did not result in any compensable injury. In their pleadings, the defendants denied liability and injury or loss and alleged contributory negligence, the existence of a pre-existing injury and previous causes, and a failure to mitigate. There was a broad range of findings possible respecting liability. The plaintiff, Henryk Gradek, was a Polish immigrant who spoke halting English. Justice Savage found at para. 42 that “he would have had extraordinary difficulty presenting a case on his own” and would have been “out-matched” by either a lawyer or an ICBC adjustor. The plaintiff needed counsel to obtain a just result and, therefore, had sufficient reason to begin the action in Supreme Court.

[18] Plaintiffs do not have an ongoing duty to reassess their claims as the matter proceeds: Reimann at para. 44. Thus, the court must assess whether a plaintiff had “sufficient reason” to bring the action in Supreme Court when the plaintiff started the action: Ostovic at para. 35. This analysis is necessarily done with the benefit of hindsight since it only occurs after trial or settlement, but the court must be careful not to use that hindsight in deciding what was reasonable: Faedo at para. 28.

[19] It also must be remembered R. 57(10) “does not involve an exercise of discretion.” Rather, “the court must make a finding that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court” (emphasis added): Reimann at para. 13.

In my continued effort to cross reference the current Supreme Court rules with the new Rules of Court that come into force on July 1, 2010 I will note that the Current Rule 57(10) will become Rule 14-1(10) and it reads identical to the current rule so the precedents developed under Rule 57(10) regarding costs should continue to assist litigants under our new rules.

Setting Aside an Unfair Settlement in an ICBC Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in Settlement Law, Uncategorized. 58 Comments on Setting Aside an Unfair Settlement in an ICBC Injury Claim


As I’ve previously written, typically when an ICBC claim is settled and a “full and final release” is signed the agreement is binding and can’t be undone.
BC Courts can, however, set aside ‘grossly unfair‘ agreements.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dealing with this area of the law.
In today’s case (McIsaac v. McIsaac) the Plaintiff was injured in a single vehicle car crash.  Her husband was driving and was the at fault party.   The Plaintiff’s injuries were serious enough to require hospitalization.
In the months that followed the collision ICBC approached the Plaintiff on a number of occasions and eventually a settlement was reached to resolve her claims for $22,000.  The agreement was ‘somewhat low‘ given the severity of her injuries.  She regretted finalizing her claim and retained a lawyer.   She commenced a lawsuit and asked the settlement to be set aside.  ICBC argued that it was a binding contract and should not be undone.  Mr. Justice Wong agreed with ICBC but before dismissing the lawsuit the Court set out the following useful summary of the law:

[17] I agree with defendant’s counsel’s submission that there are two alternative tests to assess the validity of the settlement.  Also, to have a settlement set aside or voided, the insured must have been unfairly induced to accept the settlement or release, and that the settlement or release must also be grossly unfair or grossly inadequate.  Settlement and release of a claim may not be set aside where the parties are not on equal footing if the insurer can demonstrate that the settlement is fair and reasonable.

[18] There are two alternative tests to determine the validity of a settlement.  Whether, when the settlement is looked at in the light of the knowledge of the adjuster at the time the settlement was entered into, the bargain was fair, just and reasonable, and whether the transaction seen as a whole is not sufficiently divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it should be rescinded.  See McCullogh v. Hilton (1998) 63 B.C.L.R. (3d) 272 (B.C.C.A.) and see also Gindis v. Brisbourne (2000) 72 B.C.L.R. (3d) 19 (B.C.C.A.), particularly at paragraphs 42 to 44.

[19] A settlement with an unrepresented claimant will not necessarily be invalid simply because all of the symptoms stemming from any injuries have not been fully resolved.  Again, see McCullogh.

[20] There is no evidence that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were, at the time of settlement, any worse than what was understood by the plaintiff and the adjuster, nor is there any evidence that the plaintiff’s injuries have become any worse since the settlement was entered into.

[21] Quite apart from any alleged inequality of bargaining power, the plaintiff and the adjuster had a complete picture of the plaintiff’s medical condition at the time of the settlement directly from the plaintiff’s medical caregivers.

[22] Clearly on the evidence, the plaintiff relied on and trusted the ICBC adjuster and their bargaining power were unequal, but the ultimate question is whether viewed objectively, the agreement was unconscionable and offended applicable standards of commercial morality.

[23] I am satisfied on the evidence that it cannot be said that the plaintiff was taken advantage of by ICBC.  The plaintiff, upon receiving the offer to settle at $22,000, could have consulted with a lawyer before accepting the offer, but for reasons of her own chose not to.

[24] Counsel for the plaintiff now submits the adjuster relied on outdated 12 to 18 year case law authorities as guidance on damage quantum range, and did not make any adjustment for interim inflation.  Be that as it may, the amount offered likely also factored in some discount for contributory negligence by the plaintiff in not being seat belted at the time of the accident.

[25] I might consider the amount settled by the parties in this case to be somewhat low, but taking into account all of the outlined factors related earlier, I cannot say the bargain struck was grossly unfair and unconscionable.  In order to maintain consistency and predictability in commercial transactions, public policy requires court enforcement of contracts not found to be unconscionable.

ICBC Injury Claims and Formal Settlement Offers; What You Need to Know

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, Settlement Law, Uncategorized.

When taking an ICBC or other BC personal injury claim to trial in the Supreme Court it is vital to understand the financial consequences that can be triggered when formal settlement offers are made. I have written dozens of articles on this topic and you can access these here.
Below is a brief video discussing some of the key factors you need to consider when reviewing ICBC’s formal settlement offer under the BC Supreme Court Rules and further the issues you should consider when making your own formal settlement offer. I hope this information is of assistance.

More on ICBC Injury Claims, Lawyers and Binding Settlements

Written by admin on . Posted in Settlement Law, Uncategorized. 63 Comments on More on ICBC Injury Claims, Lawyers and Binding Settlements


Further to my previous post on this topic, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal discussing the principles behind binding settlement agreements in ICBC injury claims when lawyers accept an offer on their client’s behalf.
As I wrote earlier:
Lawyers act as agents for their clients.  Lawyers can, therefore, bind their clients to a settlement.   Typically a client will give a lawyer authority to settle their claim for X dollars and the lawyer will attempt to get that amount or more.  If a lawyer accepts an ICBC settlement offer on behalf of their client the client is typically bound to the settlement, even if the client later wishes to get out of the settlement by not signing ICBC’s full and final release.
Today’s case (Lacroix v. Loewen) demonstrated this principle.  In Lacroix, the Plaintiff gave her lawyer instructions to accept a settlement offer.  The lawyer then did accept ICBC’s settlement offer.  The client, after speaking with some friends, decided not to proceed with the settlement and did not sign ICBC’s settlement contract.  The client proceeded with her Injury Claim and ICBC brought an application to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that it was already settled.  The Chamber’s judge ruled that the case was not settled because ICBC insisted on a term beyond the scope of the initial settlement agreement thus ‘repudiating‘ the contract.  ICBC appealed and succeeded.  In setting aside the lower court’s judgement the BC Court of Appeal found there was no repudiation and set out the following principles:
25] The chambers judge held that there was a settlement and that ICBC then repudiated the agreement by insisting upon terms that were not agreed upon….

[38] Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the communications between Mr. Mickelson and the adjuster, Mr. Per, objectively indicate that there was an enforceable settlement including both tort and Part 7 claims. Looking at all the material facts, the reasonable objective bystander would conclude that the parties intended to make a final settlement of both tort and Part 7 claims.

[39] At the time of the discussions between Mr. Mickelson and Mr. Per, there was no outstanding action for either tort damages or Part 7 benefits. There was simply a “file” which included both tort and Part 7 claims. When Mr. Mickelson and Mr. Per spoke, the evidence indicates that their discussions concerned the “file” as a whole, and the “merits” of her claims. No differentiation was made between tort and Part 7. Their discussions about “settlement” were directed to settling the “file”/“matter”. This is clear from Mr. Per’s affidavit, which states:

3.   On March 11, 2004, I received a telephone call from John Mickelson with respect to special expenses which he wanted covered. After a discussion of the merits of the file I offered to settle the matter for $5,500.00. John Mickelson stated that he would speak to his client and get back to me…

9.   On March 16, 2004, I spoke to John Mickelson by telephone with respect to the returned cheque and release. I specifically asked Mr. Mickelson if he had instructions from Ms. Lacroix to settle the matter at the time that the counter offer was made and accepted by myself. He told me that he did have such instructions.

[40] The judge correctly noted at para. 30 of his reasons that, “There was no mention of the fate of any subsequent Part 7 claims until the release was forwarded to counsel for the plaintiff”. However, the trial judge failed to acknowledge that there was little or no specific mention of individual aspects of any claims, tort or Part 7. The objective observer would conclude that was so because Mr. Mickelson and Mr. Per’s discussions were directed to a settlement of the “file” or “matter” as a whole. Both sides understood the benefits and advantages of settling early, and concluding the matter in its entirety. To an objective observer, they did so.

[41] While the above conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the repudiation issue, a word or two is warranted. While the chambers judge cited proper authority in Fieguth in relation to repudiation, he incorrectly applied that authority. The judge concluded that the mere tendering of documents with terms that have not been agreed upon can constitute repudiation. That is an error. As set out above, in Fieguth Chief Justice McEachern said at p. 70:

…One can tender whatever documents he thinks appropriate without rescinding the settlement agreement. If such documents are accepted and executed and returned then the contract, which has been executory, becomes executed. If the documents are not accepted then there must be further discussion but neither party is released or discharged unless the other party has demonstrated an unwillingness to be bound by the agreement by insisting upon terms or conditions which have not been agreed upon or are not reasonably implied in the circumstances.

[42] This passage continues to be a correct statement of the law and to accord with sound practice.

I repeat my advice that the lesson in this case is to make sure that when you give your lawyer settlement instructions understand that he/she can make a binding commitment on your behalf based on these instructions.  Better yet, if you don’t know your lawyers negotiation tactics consider asking him or her to negotiate on a non-binding basis giving you, the client, the final say when the claim settlement paperwork is presented to you.