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ICBC Asks Court of Appeal to Address "Costs" Awards In Cases Worth Under $25,000

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized. 68 Comments on ICBC Asks Court of Appeal to Address "Costs" Awards In Cases Worth Under $25,000

I’ve written many times about the fact that the BC Supreme Court Rules give trial judges a discretion to award a successful plaintiff Court Costs even if the amount awarded falls in the Small Claims Court’s Jurisdiction.
Two recent cases were released today by the BC Court of Appeal demonstrating that ICBC is interested in having the circumstances in which these awards are made limited.
In the first case (Morales v. Neilson) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC Car Crash and sued for damages.  At trial he was awarded just over $12,000.  The trial judge went on to award the Plaintiff costs despite the fact that the judgement was for an amount within the small claims courts financial jurisdiction.  ICBC asked permission to appeal but this was refused with the BC High Court holding that the Judge appropriately applied the test for discretionary costs.
The second case, however, had the BC Court of Appeal more interested.  In this case (Gradek v. DaimlerChyrster Financial Services Canada Inc.) the trial judge awarded a Plaintiff under $10,000 in total compensation as a result of a BC collision.  The Court went on to award the Plaintiff costs.  (You can click here to read my summary of the trial decision regarding costs).  ICBC asked the Court of Appeal to intervene arguing that the trial judge was wrong in considering the ‘procedural advantages‘ available in the BCSC as factors which give a plaintiff ‘sufficient reason‘ to sue in that Court when the case is worth clearly less than $25,000.  The Court of Appeal agreed to hear the case noting that this is an important issue for ICBC. Specifically the BC High Court held as follows:

[7] The issue on which the appeal is sought to be brought is a pure issue of law. It is one of statutory construction, the question being the meaning of the words “sufficient reason” in the context of Rule 57(10). The language of Rule 57(10) does not, on its face, limit “sufficient reason” to a consideration of the anticipated quantum of damages.  Even so, while I would not describe the appellant’s case as a very strong one, it does seem to me that it is arguable that “sufficient reason” contemplates jurisdictional questions (particularly the quantum of damages), and not procedural advantages.  In my view, there is sufficient merit in the appeal to warrant a hearing before a division of the Court.

[8] The issue of how the Supreme Court is to determine whether a matter is brought in that court for “sufficient reason” is a matter of general importance in litigation, particularly given that the monetary limit for Small Claims Court has expanded to $25,000. There will now be a sizable number of cases that fall below the Small Claims limit.

[9] The case is of significance to the defendant in this matter; from a practical standpoint, it is an institutional defendant involved in many cases. The case is, however, of limited significance to the plaintiff.  While the costs award is a significant proportion of the entire award received by the plaintiff, the costs of defending the appeal may significantly exceed the amount in issue.

[10] This concern is mitigated, however, by the fact that the appellant is prepared to abide by an order that it will pay the respondent’s costs on Scale 1 in any event of the appeal (it is acknowledged that the respondent would be free to argue before the Court that a higher level indemnity should be awarded).

[11] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that leave ought to be grant and that a division of the Court should hear this matter. Leave is granted. The appellant will be responsible for the respondent’s costs in any event of the appeal.

I will be sure to write about the BC Court of Appeals decision in this case once it is released.

More on Court Costs and "Sufficient Reason" For Suing in the BC Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Settlement Law, Uncategorized. 50 Comments on More on Court Costs and "Sufficient Reason" For Suing in the BC Supreme Court

Further to my previous posts on this topic, if a Plaintiff successfully sues in the BC Supreme Court but receives damages below $25,000 they may be deprived of their court ‘costs’ unless they had ‘sufficient reason’ for choosing the Supreme Court over small claims court.
Two judgements were released this week by the BC Supreme Court discussing this area of law.  In this weeks cases (Spencer v. Popham and Spencer v. Horton) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate  BC car crashes.  She started separate lawsuits in the BC Supreme Court but settled her cases before they went to trial.  Both claims settled form amounts below $25,000 (the current financial limit of BC’s small claims court).  The Plaintiff and ICBC could not agree on the issue of costs.
ICBC argued that since both cases were in the small claims courts jurisdiction the Plaintiff did not have sufficient reason for suing in the Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice Punnett disagreed and awarded the Plaintiff costs in both claims.  In doing so he provided the following useful and through summary of this area of the law:

[8] Rule 57(10) of the Rules of Court states:

A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.

[9] This rule encourages persons to bring actions in Small Claims Court when a claim falls within that court’s monetary jurisdiction. It is an example of “proportionality”; the judicial process should match the amount in dispute. However, the court must also respect a party’s “legitimate choice” of forum: Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 286 D.L.R. (4th) 330 at para. 35.

[10] The burden is on claimants to evaluate their claims prior to commencement and to justify their decision if they recover less than the Small Claims Court limit, currently $25,000:Reimann at para. 38. If plaintiffs fail to sufficiently investigate and assess their claims prior to commencement, they risk not recovering costs. In a personal injury action this may require plaintiffs to obtain medical records and medical reports, to gather evidence to support claims for loss of earnings and earning capacity, and to assess the evidence in support of the claims being advanced before commencing the action.

[11] However, as noted by Justice Savage in Gradek v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Canada Inc, 2010 BCSC 356 at para. 19, R. 57(10) contemplates the possibility that factors other than quantum must be considered:

[19]      The proviso in Rule 57(10) is “unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in Supreme Court and so orders”. The Rule does not define “sufficient reason”. There is nothing in the Rule that limits the extension of the term “sufficient reason” to matters relating to the quantum of the claim.

[12] Factors that can give rise to “sufficient reason” were set out in Kuehne v. Probstl, 2004 BCSC 865 at para. 22, and accepted in Icecorp International Cargo Express Corp. v. Nicolaus, 2007 BCCA 97, 38 C.P.C. (6th) 26 at para. 27. They include:

i. the legal or factual complexity of the case;

ii. the need for discovery of documents and examinations for discovery;

iii. the need for a judgment enforceable outside of British Columbia;

iv. a bona fide preference for a jury trial; and

v. access to the summary trial procedure available in Supreme Court.

Other factors can be the need for the plaintiff to have legal counsel (Faedo v. Dowell, 2007 BCSC 1985 at para. 36; Ostovic v. Foggin, 2009 BCSC 58 at para. 42; Gradek at para. 43), and the defendant’s denial of liability, causation, and injury or loss and allegations of contributory negligence, pre-existing conditions, previous causes and a failure to mitigate (Ostovic at paras. 39-40; Gradek at para. 35).

[13] Therefore, a plaintiff’s evaluation of his or her claim, can also involve an assessment of these factors. Even if the plaintiff assesses the claim to be within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the plaintiff can rely on these other reasons to commence the action in Supreme Court: Johannson v. National Car Rental (Canada) Inc., 2009 BCSC 1284 at para. 5.

[14] In my opinion, a plaintiff’s simple desire to retain counsel is not in and of itself a sufficient reason for commencing the action in Supreme Court. Other factors, such as those noted above, determine whether retaining counsel is justified.

[15] In Faedo, the plaintiff was in a low impact collision and suffered a soft tissue injury to her neck and back. Justice Vickers found that the case was not that complex and plaintiff’s counsel could not have considered ICBC’s original dispute of liability a serious threat to recovery. However, Justice Vickers concluded that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have brought her claim in Supreme Court for two reasons: (1) when the action was commenced, the plaintiff believed she was suffering from the accident and her pleadings included a claim for loss of earning capacity and disruption of the ability to earn income; and (2) ICBC put her credibility seriously in issue when it took the position that she had not suffered from any injury or any significant injury. Justice Vickers continued at para. 36:

[36]      … I observed this plaintiff to be very nervous in court. She had no previous experience in court and in my opinion when she was confronted with a case where the defendant represented by counsel was suggesting that she hadn’t been injured at all and this was a low impact accident in which it was suggested she wouldn’t be injured, that the plaintiff reasonably required counsel to represent her and reasonably started an action in the Supreme Court where she could hope to recover some of the cost of retaining that counsel which was necessary for her to properly put her case to get the compensation I have found her entitled to. Furthermore, an offer to settle such as the plaintiff made in this case puts very little pressure upon a defendant to settle where there is no exposure to costs.

[16] In Ostovic, another case arising out of a low impact accident, Justice Savage noted that because the defendant denied liability, causation and special damages, the plaintiff had to prove these issues in court. Because of this, the plaintiff needed to avail himself of pre-trial discovery, which provided important evidence of the speed of impact, the consequences of impact and concern over the plaintiff’s condition. In addition, Justice Savage found at para. 42:

[42]      There is the additional factor that, as in Faedo and Kanani [v. Misiurna, 2008 BCSC 1274], the Plaintiff faced an institutional defendant which, in the ordinary course, has counsel. To obtain any recovery the Plaintiff is forced to go to court, where he is facing counsel and counsel is reasonably required, but in Provincial Court there is no way of recovering the costs of counsel.

[17] In Gradek, before the issuance of the writ, the defendants’ insurers had informed the plaintiffs that their position was the accident did not result in any compensable injury. In their pleadings, the defendants denied liability and injury or loss and alleged contributory negligence, the existence of a pre-existing injury and previous causes, and a failure to mitigate. There was a broad range of findings possible respecting liability. The plaintiff, Henryk Gradek, was a Polish immigrant who spoke halting English. Justice Savage found at para. 42 that “he would have had extraordinary difficulty presenting a case on his own” and would have been “out-matched” by either a lawyer or an ICBC adjustor. The plaintiff needed counsel to obtain a just result and, therefore, had sufficient reason to begin the action in Supreme Court.

[18] Plaintiffs do not have an ongoing duty to reassess their claims as the matter proceeds: Reimann at para. 44. Thus, the court must assess whether a plaintiff had “sufficient reason” to bring the action in Supreme Court when the plaintiff started the action: Ostovic at para. 35. This analysis is necessarily done with the benefit of hindsight since it only occurs after trial or settlement, but the court must be careful not to use that hindsight in deciding what was reasonable: Faedo at para. 28.

[19] It also must be remembered R. 57(10) “does not involve an exercise of discretion.” Rather, “the court must make a finding that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court” (emphasis added): Reimann at para. 13.

In my continued effort to cross reference the current Supreme Court rules with the new Rules of Court that come into force on July 1, 2010 I will note that the Current Rule 57(10) will become Rule 14-1(10) and it reads identical to the current rule so the precedents developed under Rule 57(10) regarding costs should continue to assist litigants under our new rules.

Protection of the Public – Holding a Lawyer Personally Liable for Unnecessary Court Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on Protection of the Public – Holding a Lawyer Personally Liable for Unnecessary Court Costs


Can a lawyer be held personally liable to his client or to the opposing party for Court Costs incurred because of unreasonable steps taken in a lawsuit?  The answer is yes and today the BC Court of Appeal provided lengthy reasons addressing this important issue.
In today’s case (Nazmdeh v. Spraggs) the lawyer represented a client in a personal injury lawsuit.  A number of pre-trial applications for discovery were brought by the defence lawyer and these were resolved through Chambers Hearings.   One of the applications was for interrogatories and another demanded particulars.  The Court granted these motions and held that the lawyer for the Plaintiff “failed to comply with his independent obligations as counsel in response to the interrogatories and demand for particulars…..the lawyer had failed to take positive steps to meet his obligations“.
As a result the lawyer was ordered to personally pay costs to the Defendant.  This order was made under Rule 57(37) which holds as follows:

(37)  Where the court considers that a solicitor for a party has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause, or has caused costs to be wasted through delay, neglect or some other fault, the court may do any one or more of the following:

(a)        disallow any fees and disbursements between the solicitor and the solicitor’s client or, where those fees or disbursements have been paid, order that the solicitor repay some or all of them to the client;

(b)        order that the solicitor indemnify his or her client for all or part of any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to another party;

(c)        order that the solicitor be personally liable for all or part of any costs that his or her client has been ordered to pay to another party;

(d)        make any other order that the court considers appropriate.

The Plaintiff’s lawyer challenged this finding and the case was brought before the BC Court of Appeal.  He argued that a lawyer should only face such punishment if his/her conduct was “reprehensible“.
The case was argued before a 5 member panel of the BC High Court and even the Law Society of BC intervened arguing that the Chambers Judge was wrong in making such an order and that it would have a “chilling effect on litigation and on advocacy…and ultimately undermine collegiality“.
The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.  In doing so the BC High Court provided the following instructive reasons on when a lawyer can be personally responsible for Court Costs under Rule 57(37) for steps taken in a BC Supreme Court Lawsuit:

[101] Prior to the enactment of the Rules, the Supreme Court of British Columbia had power to make orders against lawyers to pay costs personally under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.  Such orders were generally made only in cases of “serious misconduct”. The Rules, particularly Rule 57(30) and its successor Rule 57(37), have, however, expanded the scope of conduct which might support costs orders against lawyers. The Court now has a discretion to order a lawyer to pay costs where he has “caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause, or has caused costs to be wasted through delay, neglect or some other fault”.

[102] Under Rule 57(37), mere delay and mere neglect may, in some circumstances, be sufficient for such an order against a lawyer. Under the Rule there is no requirement for “serious misconduct”, the standard required under the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The requirement in Young and in Kent of “reprehensible” conduct applies only in cases of orders against a lawyer for special costs. Young and Kent are not authority for requiring such a standard when making an order for party and party costs against a lawyer. In such circumstances, the lower standard mandated by the Rule is sufficient.

[103] The power to make an order for costs against a lawyer personally is discretionary. As the plain meaning of the Rule and the case law indicate, the power can be exercised on the judge’s own volition, at the instigation of the client, or at the instigation of the opposing party. However, while the discretion is broad, it is, as it has always been, a power to be exercised with restraint. All cases are consistent in holding that the power, whatever its source, is to be used sparingly and only in rare or exceptional cases.

[104] The restraint required in the exercise of the court’s discretion is not to be confused with the standard of conduct which may support its use. Care and restraint are called for because whether the unsuccessful party or his lawyer caused the costs to be wasted may not always be clear, and lawyer and client privilege is always deserving of a high degree of protection.

[105] Nothing in these reasons is a comment upon the immunity of barristers for their conduct in court. This case is not about contempt, abuse of process or similar egregious conduct. It concerns only what a lawyer did or did not do in response to interrogatories and a demand for particulars.

[106] In my respectful view, the learned chambers judge did not err in interpreting the rule according to the plain meaning of its words.

Now to Cross-Reference:  Do the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules which come into force change this judgment?  Probably not.  Rule 57(37) is reproduced with almost identical language and can be found at Rule 14-1(33) of the New Rules.

The ability of parties to use interrogatories as a means of pre-trial discovery has been restricted under the New Rules so this triggering event is unlikely to give rise to costs consequences however the test set out by the BC Court of Appeal will likely remain good law after the new Rules come into force.

More on BC Supreme Court Trials and Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized.

I’ve previously posted that when a Plaintiff in a BC Supreme Court Lawsuit is awarded damages in the Small Claims Court Jurisdiction ($25,000 or less) the Plaintiff is usually not permitted to court ‘costs’.
This is so because Rule 57(10) of the Supreme Court Rules holds that:
A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there is sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.
Today, reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court dealing with this section and the issue of when there is ‘sufficient reason for bringing a proceeding in the Supreme Court.’
In today’s case (Munro v. Thompson) the Plaintiff was awarded just over $12,000 for injuries sustained in a 2006 BC Car Crash.  The Defendant was apparently insured by ICBC and subject to ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact Defence.
The Plaintiff brought application seeking court ‘costs’.  He argued as follows:

[7]             The plaintiff says that “sufficient reason” is to be considered as at the time of commencement of proceedings: Riemann v. Aziz [2009] BCCA 448.

[8]             He says that at the date of commencement of the action, he had in hand the reports of two medical experts.  The conclusion arising from those is that it was a moderate/severe whiplash injury impacting on his future vocational capabilities, indicating a loss of capacity claim.

[9]             In these circumstances, counsel for the plaintiff contends there was good reason to bring his action in this court as opposed to the Small Claims division of the Provincial Court.

The defence lawyer argued that the Plaintiff should be deprived of ‘costs’ because the Plaintiff only recovered half of what could have been awarded in Small Claims Court therefore the Plaintiff should have started the lawsuit there.
In accepting the Plaintiff’s position Mr. Justice Williams applied the law as follows:

[22]         In order to determine the merit of the plaintiff’s claim for costs, it is necessary to examine whether he has shown that there was sufficient reason to have justified the decision to commence the proceeding in the Supreme Court.

[23]         Both parties accept that to be the correct analysis.  As well, both agree that the point in time at which the assessment is to be made is when the action in initiated.

[24]         In this case, plaintiff’s counsel had in hand the reports of two medical practitioners when he commenced the proceeding.  The report of Dr. Paterson, a treating chiropractor, concluded that the plaintiff’s symptoms of neck pain and stiffness, headaches, left shoulder pain and weakness are the result of a Grade III whiplash (moderate/severe) that he sustained in his July 6, 2006 motor vehicle accident. …

[25] There was also a medical-legal opinion from Dr. Condon….

26] Based on those opinions, it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff’s counsel to conclude that the action should be commenced in the Supreme Court.  The evidence indicated the likelihood of a viable claim for loss of future earning capacity as well as a not-insignificant claim for general damages.  Taking that into account, I am not prepared to find that his decision to bring the claim as he did was improper:  he had sufficient reason to proceed as he did when the writ was filed….

32] In the result, there is no basis to find that he deliberately misrepresented his situation to the doctors.  I stand by my conclusion that there was sufficient reason for bringing this proceeding in the Supreme Court, and reject the argument that he should be disentitled to the benefit of that finding because of his own conduct.

On another note, I posted yesterday about the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules which come into force next year.   I have referenced these and it appears that the law as set out in Rule 57(10) of the current rules remains in place in the New Rules.  The relevant provision is set out in Rule 14-1(10) of the new Civil Rules.  The language there is identical to the current Rule 57(10) so precedents such as this case should remain good law after the new rules take effect.

ICBC Claims, Pre-Trial Costs and Rule 66

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure. 74 Comments on ICBC Claims, Pre-Trial Costs and Rule 66

If you are involved in an ICBC claim under the fast track rule in BC Supreme Court (Rule 66) and settle your claim prior to trial how much are you entitled to for pre-trial Tarriff Costs?
Rule 66(29) governs and reads as follows:

Costs

(29)  Unless the court orders otherwise or the parties consent, and subject to Rule 57 (10), the amount of costs, exclusive of disbursements, to which a party is entitled is as follows:

(a) if the time spent on the hearing of the trial is one day or less, $5 000;

(b) if the time spent on the hearing of the trial is more than one day, $6 600

On the face of it, it appears that when a case settles pre trial up to $5,000 in costs could be included. However, recent court cases have applied a restrictive interpretation to this rule limiting the amount of pre-trial costs available in a Rule 66 action.   These cases have limited the amount of pre-trial costs available to $3,400.  Today, a case from the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, was released confirming this restrictive interpretation.

In today’s case (Cathcart v. Olsen) the Plaintiff settled her claim pre trial for an amount plus Tarriff costs.  At issue was how much should be paid for pre-trial Tarriff Costs.  Registrar Sainty of the BC Supreme Court,  in finding that the plaintiff was entitled to $2,890 in tarriff costs summarized the law and reasoned as follows:

[12]        The defendants argue that costs ought to be assessed as a proportion of the maximum allowable for pre-trial preparation under Rule 66, being $3,400. That proportion they say ought to depend on at what the stage in the proceedings the matter settled and how much pre-trial work remained to be done had the matter not settled. This, the defendants argue, is the required result applying the decision of Pittfield, J in Bowen v. Martinec, 2008 BCSC 104. In that case His Lordship was asked to answer the following question:

Where a formal offer to settle made under Rule 37 of the Rules and in Form 64 is accepted before trial in an action to which Rule 66 of the Rules applies, are the costs in the action assessed by reference to the fixed scale of costs under Rule 66(29) of the Rules or by reference to Appendix B to the Rules?

[13]        In answering the question put to him, His Lordship reviewed the law including the decisions of Macaulay, J in Duang and the Court of Appeal in Anderson (both supra) and held:

[21       In my opinion, the principles that can be derived from Duong and Anderson should be applied in the determination of costs in circumstances where an offer has been accepted before the commencement of trial. It is evident from Rule 66 that a cap has been imposed upon the recovery of costs in an action to which the Rule applies. It is also clear that the court can give effect to Rule 37 offers to settle. I am unable to identify any reason why the Rule 66 regime should apply in respect of the determination of costs following a trial where offers to settle have been made and rejected, but those situations where an offer is made and accepted before trial should justify taxation under Appendix B.

[22]      I adopt the view expressed by Macaulay J. which is that the amount of recoverable costs stipulated in Rule 66 should be allocated in part to trial and in part to pre-trial preparation. The part allocable to trial should be determined by deducting the global costs contemplated in respect of a one-day trial from the global costs contemplated in respect of a two-day trial. The costs for pre-trial preparation in either case should be determined as the difference between the global cost amount for a one-day trial and the daily trial costs. As the Rule presently stands, the recoverable costs per day of trial are $1,600, and the recoverable costs attributable to pre-trial preparation, $3,400.

[14]        His Lordship then stated:

[24]      It will be incumbent upon the parties to agree on the proportion of the pre-trial preparation which had been undertaken by the plaintiff to the date of the defendant’s offer to settle. In the absence of an agreement, the parties may resolve differences on taxation, whereupon the court will exercise the discretion conferred upon it by Rule 66(29.1).

[25]      It follows that the answer to the stated case is that costs in an action subject to Rule 66, settled before trial pursuant to an offer of settlement must be assessed by reference to the fixed scale of costs under Rule 66(29), and not by reference to Appendix B to the Rules of Court.

[15]        Essentially Pitfield J’s decision mandates that, where a formal offer to settle has been made in accordance with the Rules, pre-trial costs are to be based on the proportion of pre-trial preparation that has been undertaken up to the date of the offer to settle and the party to whom costs are to be paid is entitled to its proportionate share of the $3,400 cap. Mr. Chaudhary, for the defendants, argues that the same principles ought to apply in these circumstances where, although no formal offer to settle was made, an informal settlement was reached. He submits that I ought not to deviate from the methodology proposed by Pitfield, J. in Bowen (supra).

[16]        Mr. Harbut, for the plaintiff, suggests however that Pitfield, J’s decision in Bowen cannot be reconciled with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Anderson.  He submits Anderson should be read to say that, while there is a ceiling in the amount of costs that a successful litigant may be awarded, where a Rule 66 action has been settled, provided the party whose costs are being assessed can satisfy the assessing officer that that party would be entitled, under Appendix B of the Rules, to at least the amount of the ceiling ($3,400) in tariff items then that party is entitled to be awarded the full amount of that ceiling. I cannot agree with this latter submission. In my view, I am bound to employ the same reasoning as that employed by Pitfield, J in Bowen to these circumstances; i.e. award the plaintiff his proportionate share of the cap, based on the stage of preparation reached as at the date of the offer to settle.

[17]        That being said, there is one additional issue which must be considered. In Anderson, the Court of Appeal states (at ¶47):

I also agree with Macaulay, J that the intent of the rule [Rule 66] was to avoid the necessity of a taxation and that it would frustrate that intent to order a taxation of costs under the rule…

[18]        Accordingly, the Court of Appeal has endorsed the presumption that the intent of Rule 66 is to avoid the necessity of an appearance before the registrar to assess costs. Pitfield, J’s method – to determine costs dependant on the stage of the pre-trial preparation – seems to me to invite assessments, rather than reduce them. I say this as, in instances where the parties cannot agree on the proportion of work undertaken at the time of settlement, taxation becomes the likely, rather than the unlikely, course.

[19]        To counterbalance this, however, I believe that the Court of Appeal in Anderson has also endorsed a somewhat “rough and ready” manner of assessing the consequences of accepting an offer to settle when the provisions of Rule 66 apply (see paragraph 49). The Court of Appeal suggests that an assessing officer, on an assessment of costs in similar circumstances, should use a rough and ready approach to establish what stage the proceeds were at when settlement was reached in deciding what proportion of the “cap” ought to be paid. That rough and ready approach (and the one I will employ here), in my view includes both a consideration of the work done to the date of settlement by the party to whom the costs are to be paid as well as a consideration of what costs the payee might be entitled to under the tariff if costs were awarded under Appendix B of the Rules.

[20]        Mr. Harbut stated that his pre-trial preparation had progressed to a great extent when the offer was accepted. He confirmed that the items that had been undertaken included commencing the action, discovery of documents, some examinations for discovery, settlement negotiations and production of expert reports. He argued that, with the exception of the actual trial, most of the trial preparation had been completed. Thus the plaintiff should be awarded substantially all of the amount of the cap.

[21]        Mr. Chaudhary in his submissions set out a number of items that remained to be done (additional document discovery, witness preparation, further expert’s reports, to name a few) and argued that as this action settled some four months before trial a substantial amount of work remained to be done and the proportion awarded should reflect that.

[22]        Here, I am satisfied that some 85% of the work required to prepare for trial had been done up to the date that the offer was accepted. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to $2,890 in “tariff” costs plus applicable taxes, together with such disbursements as have been agreed between the parties. In my view a substantial amount of work had been done to prepare for the trial. In addition, had the costs been awarded under Appendix B of the tariff the plaintiff would likely have received at least 10 units under item 1B, 2 to 3 units under item 3, 2 to 3 units each under items 7 and 8, 4.5 units under items 14 and 15, 2 or 3 units under each of Items 13A and 13B, plus 5 units for item 34 resulting in, on a rough and ready calculation, of some 31 to 35 units, well within or certainly more than I am awarding in these circumstances.

[23]        If the parties require a certificate they may prepare it, each sign it and forward it to me for my signature.

ICBC Claims and Court 'Costs'

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

One important difference between the BC Supreme Court and BC Small Claims Court is the availability of court ‘costs’ to the winning litigant.
A winning party in the Provincial Court is usually awarded their disbursements, that is, the money it cost to bring the legal proceedings such as court filing fees, the cost of producing medical evidence etc.  The winner cannot, however, be awarded Tariff Costs (money to compensate the party for the various steps they took in the lawsuit).  This can be contrasted with the Supreme Court where a winning party can be awarded Costs and Disbursements.   This can make a big difference as a ‘costs’ award after a Supreme Court trial could easily exceed $10,000.
What if you bring your ICBC injury claim in Supreme Court but are awarded an amount of money in the Small Claims Court’s jurisdiction (currently up to $25,000).  Could you still get awarded Tariff Costs?  The answer is sometimes and the starting point is to look at Rule 57(10) which states:
(10)  A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.
So, the question is when is there sufficient reason for bringing an ICBC injury claim in Supreme Court when the claim ends up being worth less than $25,000?  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court addressing exactly this question.
In today’s case the Plaintiff was awarded $20,000 in damages as a result of a 2005 BC motor vehicle collision.  In deciding that the Plaintiff is entitled to costs Mr. Justice Truscott summarized and applied the law with the following reasons for judgment:

[17]            The plaintiff Truong relies upon a decision of this court in Caldwell v. Maga [1997] B.C.J. No. 2166 (BCSC) where there were two plaintiffs, one being awarded $5,500 for damages and the other $4,500 for damages, both involved in a rear end accident.  This was at a time when the limit in small claims actions was $10,000.

[18]            Mr. Justice Drost referred to a previous decision of Mr. Justice Drake where he also dealt with two plaintiffs, who were each awarded under $10,000, and said in awarding them costs that the totality of the two judgments amounted to more than the small claims limit and they were entitled to costs.

[19]            Mr. Justice Drost determined to follow the reasoning of Mr. Justice Drake in that decision (Phosy & White v. Island Pacific Transport Ltd. [1996] B.C.J. No. 1037, (2 May 1996), Victoria Registry No. 95/1123).

[20]            I question the correctness of these two decisions as I tend to agree with defence counsel that taken to its logical conclusion that reasoning would mean that 26 claimants each with $1,000 claims would be entitled to sue in Supreme Court in one writ because the total would exceed $25,000, the present limit of small claims jurisdiction.

[21]            I consider it far more likely that the $25,000 limit of small claims jurisdiction should apply to each claim of each plaintiff no matter how many plaintiffs there might be.

[22]            However, I am obliged to follow the previous decisions of this Court which would probably entitle the two plaintiffs to sue in Supreme Court.

[23]            Apart from this, at the best of times I consider it difficult for any plaintiff’s counsel to estimate the appropriate range involved for personal injury claims of his clients at the initiation of the action.  The medical conditions of many plaintiffs continue to change following the initiation of the action as they continue to recover from their injuries or continue to suffer.

[24]            Here, even after Dr. Yong’s optimistic report of March 14, 2006, by January 26, 2008 he was still saying that it was likely that the plaintiff Truong would continue to suffer some degree of left shoulder pain probably for another one or two years.

[25]            The award to the plaintiff Truong of $20,000 is by itself less than the limit of jurisdiction in small claims of $25,000, but is not less by any large amount, and with the difficulty facing counsel of accurately estimating the range for a personal injury for his client at the initiation of litigation, knowing that if action is commenced in small claims his client will be limited to $25,000 no matter that the assessment might be in excess of $25,000, I am satisfied this plaintiff did have sufficient reason for bringing her claim in Supreme Court.

[26]            The plaintiff Truong will therefore have her costs of her claim at Scale B, only attributable to her claim.

A Busy Day – 3 Car Crash Cases Released by BC Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Head Injury Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

There is a lot to blog about today so I will have to keep these case summaries short.  The BC Supreme Court released 3 cases today that may be of interest to people advancing ICBC claims.
The first deals with the choice of forum of where to sue.  The Plaintiff was in a collision with a tractor trailer in 2007.  The crash happened in Alberta.  The Plaintiff lived in BC and the owner of the tractor trailer had a registered business office in BC.  The Plaintiff started the lawsuit in BC and the Defendant brought a motion that the case should be dismissed or stayed because the lawsuit should have been started in Alberta.
After summarizing the applicable law the court sided largely with the Defendants finding that:

[27] The purpose of this statement is encapsulated in British Columbia in s. 11(2)(f) of the CJPTA.

[28] I do not consider that as between British Columbia and Alberta there is no one forum that is not clearly more appropriate than the other. I am satisfied that, while there may be some advantage to the plaintiff in pursuing his claim in British Columbia, Alberta is the forum with the closest connection to the subject matter of the proposed litigation and that the facts upon which the proceeding against the non-resident defendant is based arise in that jurisdiction. I conclude that Alberta is clearly the more appropriate forum in which to litigate the proposed action.

[29] I was advised by counsel for the plaintiff that as yet there have been no proceedings commenced in Alberta. Neither counsel were able to advise me whether the plaintiff faced any statutory defences, such as a limitation defence, in Alberta. As there may be defences against the plaintiff’s claim in Alberta if proceedings are brought there which would not be available in British Columbia, I am not prepared to dismiss the plaintiff’s action in this jurisdiction.

[30] In the result, I will, however, direct that the plaintiff’s action in British Columbia be stayed, pending further order of this Court, should an action in Alberta be met with defences that are not available in British Columbia, or in the event that the plaintiff’s claim is resolved in Alberta.

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The second case released today dealt with Court Costs.  Typically when a case succeeds in Supreme Court the winner is entitled to court ‘costs’.  In theory this is to compensate the winner for having to trigger the judicial process to get whats fair.
After an 11 day trial as a result of a car accident the Plaintiff was awarded $81,694 in damages for injuries and loss.  In the trial the Plaintiff’s claim for past wage loss and cost of future care were dismissed.
The Defendant brought a motion asking the court to award the defendant ‘costs and disbursements for that portion of the proceedings ralted to the cloaims fr past income loss and cost of future care’ amongst other relief.  The motion was brought further to Rules 57(9) which states

Subject to subrule (12), costs of and incidental to a proceeding shall follow the event unless the court otherwise orders.

And rule 57(15) which states

The court may award costs that relate to some particular issue or part of the proceeding or may award costs except so far as they relate to some particular issue or part of the proceeding.

The court granted the motion stating that:

Analysis and Decision

[22] After analyzing the submissions of the plaintiff and the defendant, I reiterate that the plaintiff’s claims in this action were very exaggerated.  I am satisfied that the defendant has established that there are discrete issues upon which he succeeded at trial.  I agree that the defendant should receive his costs and disbursements related to the issues of past wage loss and the cost of future care and, conversely, that the plaintiff should be denied her costs and disbursements related to those issues.

[23] I also agree with the defendant that many of the witnesses testified entirely, or primarily, in relation to the two issues on which the plaintiff was unsuccessful.  I agree that the evidence of Mr. Scott, Mr. Parcher and Ms. Keller all concerned the issue of past wage loss.  In addition, much of Mr. Johnson’s evidence concerned an alleged lost employment opportunity.  I also agree, based on the clerk’s notes, that these witnesses accounted for approximately one day of trial.  In addition, I agree that half of the evidence of Mr. McNeil and the two reports submitted by Mr. Carson related to the claim for cost of future care, and that Mr. McNeil testified for more than one day and Mr. Carson for 45 minutes.

[24] Lastly, I am of the view that there was divided success in this action and I find that the apportionment of costs would therefore produce a just result.

Conclusion

[25] On the basis of the foregoing, I order that the plaintiff be denied her costs associated with two days of trial, and her disbursements associated with the issues of past wage loss and cost of future care, including the cost of care reports of Mr. McNeil and Mr. Carson.  In addition, the defendant is awarded his costs and disbursements for two days of trial.

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The third case of interest released today dealt with a car accident from 2003 which allegedly caused severe psychological injuries.
The crash occurred at an intersection in Surrey.  The Plaintiff was turning left on a green light.  The defendant entered the intersection approaching from the Plaintiff’s left.  The Defendant had a red light.  The accident then occurred.  The Defendant was found 90% at fault and the Plaintiff was found 10% at fault for failing the see the defendant’s vehicle which was ‘there to be seen’
The most contentious alleged injuries were brain injury and Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID).  The plaintiff did seem to suffer from DID, the question was whether the car crash caused this.
The court made the following findings with respect to injuries:

[159] The accident caused the plaintiff’s PTSD, various soft tissue injuries, a pain disorder, depression, tinnitus, and a visual vestibular mismatch which results in dizziness.  The accident dramatically reduced her enjoyment of life and caused the loss of various amenities of life.  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was a highly functional mother of three with an apparently limitless future.  In the aftermath of the accident, her life has been devastated.  She can no longer look after herself or her children.  She lives in an assisted living facility.  She is separated from her husband. Her future prospects are grim.

[160] While some of the plaintiff’s loss arises from her DID and is not subject to compensation, I find the plaintiff has suffered grievously as a direct result of the accident.  The accident clearly terrified her.  Much of her loss of enjoyment of life has been caused by her levels of anxiety and depression as she focused on what she could no longer do.  She was told that she had suffered a serious brain injury.  This led her to believe there was nothing she could do to improve her condition and contributed to her downward spiral.  Her tinnitus and dizziness are likely permanent.  The prognoses for her TMJ problems are guarded.  There is some optimism that her pain disorder will improve given her recent change in medication.  Similarly, over time her depression should respond to treatment.  Her PTSD, although serious in years immediately subsequent to the accident, now appears to be in partial remission.  Absent her DID, the plaintiff would now be on the road to recovery.  DID plays a major role in her present situation and limits, at least for the next few years, her future opportunities.

$150,000 was awarded for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life)

Supreme Court of BC and Trial Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized. 103 Comments on Supreme Court of BC and Trial Costs

Today I’m blogging from sunny Kamloops from my colleague Peter Jensen’s office.  Clients are coming soon so I have to keep this short.
The Supreme Court of BC has an unlimited monetary jurisdiction whereas BC small claims court currently has a jurisdiction of $25,000 or less.  When suing for damages as a result of a BC car accident you have to decide which court you will sue in.
When involved in an ICBC tort claim in the BC Supreme Court the winner can be awarded Costs, whereas in Small Claims Court the winner can only be awarded disbursements as opposed to Tariff Costs.
When you bring an ICBC claim in Supreme Court and are awarded less than $25,000 can you still be awarded your court tariff Costs?  The answer is sometimes.
Rule 57(10) of the BC Supreme Court rules states that
A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.
The question then is, did you have a good reason to sue in Supreme Court when you started the lawsuit?
Reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff Costs even though the ultimate award was below $25,000.  At Paragraphs 7-10, the trial judge (Madam Justice Humphries) explained why in this case the Plaintiff had ‘sufficient reason’ to bring the suit is Supreme Court holding that:

[7] The relevant time at which the value of (the Plaintiff’s) claim should be assessed, then, is when the action was commenced.  At that time, (the Plaintiff) still had some residual effects from the accident and was missing the occasional day of work.  I found this evidence credible, and noted that she still had occasional flare-ups, with decreasing frequency.  Her voluntary retirement worked to the benefit of the defendant in that any potential ongoing wage loss from these flare-ups would not be claimed against him.  (the Plaintiff) was careful to ensure that only those days attributable to the effects of the accident were claimed for.  She asserted a claim for loss of earning capacity, but decided not to pursue it by the time of trial.  Although such an award would not have been large, if any at all were established, it is difficult to say, in hindsight, that the entire claim would obviously have come under the Small Claims limit of $25,000 at the time the action was commenced.  Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently came to assess the claim with the advantage of all the information available by the time of trial and to put forward a realistic and sustainable range of damages in his final submissions, but that is not, according to Reimann, relevant to the present issue.

[8] In Faedo v. Dowell and Wachter, M064051 (October 19, 2007) Vancouver, Curtis J. held that in a situation where the defendant put the plaintiff to the proof of having suffered any injury at all, thus making her credibility a crucial issue at trial, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to require the assistance of counsel.  She was therefore justified in commencing the action in Supreme Court where she could hope to recover some of the costs it was necessary for her to expend in retaining counsel to recover the compensation to which she was found to be entitled.  This reasoning has application here as well.

[9] In the result, the plaintiff has advanced sufficient reason for having commenced her action in this court and is entitled to her costs pursuant to Rule 66.

This is a good judgement for Plaintiffs bringing ICBC claims, particularly those involved in Low Velocity Impacts (LVI’s) where ICBC denies that injury occurred.  It recognizes the fact that ICBC often tells people that they aren’t injured at all and this brings their credibility into play.   Here the court realized that in such circumstances it is appropriate to hire a personal injury lawyer and try to offset some of these costs by suing in Supreme Court even though the Small Claims Court has sufficient monetary jursidiction to deal with the tort claim.

More on Court Costs, Settlement Offers, and Your ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 103 Comments on More on Court Costs, Settlement Offers, and Your ICBC Claim

If you are advancing and ICBC injury claim in BC Supreme Court, whether or not you are represented by an ICBC Claims Lawyer, you need to know something about Formal Settlement Offers. These settlement offers bring potential consequences if they are not accepted and these need to be considered when deciding whether an ICBC settlement offer is fair.
Rule 37 of the BC Supreme Court Rules permits parties to a lawsuit to make a Formal Settlement Offer and if the claim goes to trial and the settlement offer is beaten there can be significant Costs consequences (where the losing side has to pay the winning side tarriff court costs and disbursements which can easily exceed $10,000).
If you think of taking an ICBC claim to trial and winning I imagine you think of proving the other driver is at fault and being awarded money for your injuries. With formal settlement offers, winning is not quite that simple. If ICBC makes a formal settlement offer under Rule 37 and the judge or jury awards you less this can be considered a loss. Rule 37(24) sets out the consequences to a Plaintiff for failing to accept a Defendant offer to settle and ‘losing’ at trial, the subrule reads as follows:

Consequences of failure to accept defendant’s offer for monetary relief

(24) If the defendant has made an offer to settle a claim for money and the offer has not expired or been withdrawn or been accepted,

(a) if the plaintiff obtains judgment for the amount of money specified in the offer or a lesser amount, the plaintiff is entitled to costs assessed to the date the offer was delivered and the defendant is entitled to costs assessed from that date, or

(b) if the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed, the defendant is entitled to costs assessed to the date the offer was delivered and to double costs assessed from that date.

On the other side of the coin, there can be more than one way of winning. If you make a formal offer to settle your ICBC claim in compliance with Rule 37 and the judge or jury award you more money, Rule 37(23) sets out the consequences to the Defendant. The subrule reads as follows:

Consequences of failure to accept plaintiff’s offer to settle a monetary claim

(23) If the plaintiff has made an offer to settle a claim for money, and it has not expired or been withdrawn or been accepted, and if the plaintiff obtains a judgment for the amount of money specified in the offer or a greater amount, the plaintiff is entitled to costs assessed to the date the offer was delivered and to double costs assessed from that date.

Now, after absorbing all of the above you need to know that RULE 37 and 37A are being repealed as of July 2, 2008 and being replaced with Rule 37(B)!

That does not mean that you just wasted your time learning the above. If a formal offer to settle an ICBC injury claim is made before July 2, 2008 it needs to comply with Rule 37 or Rule 37A to trigger ‘costs consequences’.

To trigger costs consequences in an ICBC claim that goes to trial any offer made after July 2, 2008 has to comply with Rule 37B. To do so the offer must

1. be made in writing

2. be delivered to all parties of record, and

3. contain the following sentence “the [name of party making the offer] reserves the right to bring this offer to the attention of the court for consideration in relation to costs after the court has rendered judgement on all other issues in this proceeding”.

It seems that the purpose of Rule 37B) is to simplify the process of making formal settlement offers. The consequences of taking ICBC claims to court and beating (or not beating) a formal settlement offer seem to be less certain under this new rule. Rule 37B(4) sets out the consequences as follows: “The court may consider an offer to settle when exercising the court’s discretion in relation to costs”.

The options given to the court are set out in subrule 5 which states:

In a proceeding in which an offer to settle has been made, the court may do one or both of the following:

(a) deprive a party, in whole or in part, of costs to which the party would otherwise be entitled in respect of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of the delivery of the offer to settle;

(b) award double costs of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of the delivery of the offer to settle.

Subrule 6 sets out the factors a court may consider in exercising its costs discretion where a formal offer was made stating:

In making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the following:

(a) whether the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or on an later date

(b) the relationship between the terms of the settlement offered and the final judgment of the court;

(c) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;

(d) any other factor the court considers appropriate

I for one welcome Rule 37B. One of the biggest criticisms made by plaintiff ICBC injury claims lawyers was that the old Rule 37 was unfair to plaintiffs as a person injured in a car accident was always in a worse financial position to face the consequences of losing at trial than ICBC. This lopsided reality created a lot of pressure on people advancing ICBC injury claims in BC Supreme Court to consider settlement when faced with a Rule 37 formal settlement offer.

It will be interesting to see if our BC courts, when considering “the relative financial circumstances of the parties” will consider ICBC a party to the lawsuit of an ICBC injury claim. Typically, ICBC is not named as a defendant to a ICBC Injury tort Claim, instead those at fault for the collision are named and often they simply happen to be insured by ICBC. So ICBC is not formally a ‘party’ to most ICBC injury tort claims.

If the court is willing to consider the fact that the Defendant is insured when weighing the ‘relative financial circumstances of the parties‘ then this Rule is a welcome change for anyone advancing an ICBC injury claim. If not, perhaps the court is willing to consider this under “any other factor the court considers appropriate“.

Do you have questions about an ICBC settlement offer or the Rules of Court governing settlement offers in BC Supreme Court? If so click here to arrange a free consultation with ICBC Injury Claims lawyer Erik Magraken.

 

Court "Costs" and Your ICBC Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgment were released by the BC Supreme Court yesterday awarding a Plaintiff in a BC personal injury claim “costs” despite the fact that the Plaintiff’s award was within the small claims court jurisdiction.
This case gave me a good opportunity to write a little bit about the “costs’ consequences of bringing ICBC claims to trial and I intend to make this the first of several blog entries on this topic.
If you make an ICBC claim in BC Supreme Court and win (winning meaning you obtain a judgment in your favour greater than an ICBC formal settlement offer) you are generally entitled to ‘costs’ in addition to your award of damages.
For example, if a plaintiff with soft tissue injuries brings an ICBC claim to trial and is awarded $30,000 and ICBC’s formal settlement offer was $10,000, the Plaintiff would be entitled to “Costs” in addition to the $30,000 (barring any unusual developments at trial).
The purpose of awarding the winner Costs is to compensate them for having to go through the formal court process to get what is fair. This recognzes the fact that there are legal fees involved in bringing most ICBC claims to trial and one of the purposes of Costs is to off-set these to an extent.
Costs cover 2 different items, the first being disbursements (meaning the actual out of pocket costs of preparing a lawsuit for trial such as court filing fees and doctor’s fees in preparing medical reports) and the second being Tarriff costs – meaning compensation for many of the acutal steps in bringing a lawsuit in BC Supreme Court.
The Costs consequences after a BC Supreme Court Trial could easily be in the tens of thousands of dollars and this is often the case in many ICBC claims.
Costs are discussed in Rule 57 of the BC Supreme Court Rules and this rule is worth reviewing for anyone bringing an ICBC claim to trial in the BC Supreme Court. The winner does not always get their costs, however. One of the situations when a winner may not get their costs is when they are awarded an amount of money that was in the small claims court jurisdiction ($25,000 or less).
Rule 57(10) states that “A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.”
As a result of this sub-rule, people who bring an ICBC claim to trial in BC Supreme Court and are awarded less than $25,000, may be disentitled to their Tariff Costs unless they can show ‘sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court.”
In this weeks judgement the court agreed that despite the fact that the Plaintiff was awarded $12,290 in damages (an award well within the small claims court jurisdiction), the Plaintiff did have sufficient reason to bring the proceedings in Supreme Court.
In reaching this decision the court referred to a leading BC Court of Appeal Case where it was held that “a Plaintiff does not have an on-going obligation to assess the quantum (value) of a claim and that the point in time for a consideration of whether a plaintiff had a sufficient reason for bringing a proceeding in the Supreme Court is the time of the initiation of the action.”
The lawyer for the Plaintiff argued that when the lawsuit was started they were not in a position to finalize their valuation of this claim becase they did nothave a final medical report commenting on the plaintiff’s injuries. Also that since the Defendant took an LVI (low velocity impact) position it was important to sue in Supreme Court to have an examination for discovery of the Defendant (a procedure not available in small claims court).
For those and other reasons the court agreed and awarded the Plaintiff her Tariff Costs.
Do you have questions about an ICBC Claim, or BC Court Costs that you wish to discuss with an ICBC claims lawyer? If so click here to arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC Claims Lawyer Erik Magraken.