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$135,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic, Partly Disabling Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries caused in a motor vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Slater v. Gorden) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2014 rear-end collision.  The Defendant accepted fault.  The crash caused various soft tissue injuries which turned into a chronic problem.  The Plaintiff’s injuries disabled her from her general duties as a police officer and limited her to administrative work.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $135,000 Madam Justice Forth provided the following reasons:

[84]         As stated earlier, Ms. Slater suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, left shoulder, lower back and left hip area. She continues to suffer from daily pain and stiffness primarily in her low back and left hip area.

[85]         Ms. Slater presented as someone who likes to be in control, and it appears that the ongoing symptoms and their lack of resolution have been particularly difficult for her to adjust to. She testified as to the impact that the accident has had on her life, in that she feels she has lost everything that she worked “super hard” to achieve: her career, her personal life, and her physical well-being.

[86]         With respect to her career, she has lost the ability to perform the type of police work that provided her the greatest enjoyment, that is, general duty police work out on the road. The accident has caused a significant change to Ms. Slater’s ability to undertake general police duties. She has not been medically cleared to work, and the medical opinion supports that Ms. Slater currently cannot return to general police duty. Further, it appears unlikely that she will be able to do so in the future. She has been able to remain an RCMP officer but on administrative duties only.

[87]         She is concerned that she will not have the same opportunity for advancement. She does not find her job in the Serious Crime Unit as enjoyable as her previous role, and she finds it more depressing and mentally draining as she has to deal with serious files for extended periods. Her current role mainly involves computer work in the office, which she finds far less stimulating than the general duty work.

[88]         Ms. Slater has become more withdrawn from her work colleagues, family and friends; her relationship with her common-law husband has ended; and she has not been able to participate in her children’s activities to the same extent. Her sleep is affected and she frequently wakes up at night.

…

[92]         I have reviewed the various cases provided, and in assessing the particular circumstances of Ms. Slater, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $135,000.

Defense Doctor Opinion Rejected After Finding He Acted As "Advocate"

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Adding to this site’s archived judgments of judicial criticism of expert witness ‘advocacy’, reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, rejecting the testimony of a defense hired expert.
In today’s case (Nagra v. Stapleton) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2014 collision that the Defendant admitted responsibility for.  Despite voicing some concerns about the Plaintiff’s credibility the Court accepted his medical evidence that he suffered injuries to his neck and low back as a result of the crash.
In the course of the trial the Defendants called a physician they hired who provided an opinion minimizing the collision’s connection to the injuries.  In rejecting this evidence Mr. Justice Cole found this expert “seemed to be more of an advocate” and provided the following critical comments:

[40]         Dr. Laidlow, called on behalf of the defendant, also confirms that movement of the neck noted during joint examination did seem to be consistent with what was observed spontaneously. Dr. Laidlow also found restrictive range of motion in the plaintiff’s neck but was of the view that his physical symptoms are at the same level or consistent with the plaintiff’s physical symptoms as a result of the 2012 motor vehicle accident.

[41]         I have difficulty with Dr. Laidlow’s evidence as he seemed to be more of an advocate, he was argumentative, and based his report, in part at least, on the fact that because there was no record of neck pain prior to his examination of the plaintiff, that the neck pain had been resolved to the state it was prior to the motor vehicle accident.

[42]         Dr. Laidlow’s opinion is based on the assumption that the neck pain that the plaintiff reported at the end of June 2013, continued on through 2013 and 2014, since the plaintiff was still experiencing neck pain when the June 2014 accident occurred. This assumption was made despite the fact that the plaintiff provided no information to suggest he was experiencing these pain symptoms in 2014 at the time of the accident. Dr. Laidlow admitted that he found no clinical records between 2014 and the date of the accident where the plaintiff reported ongoing neck pain or headaches. Dr. Laidlow reviewed the report of the plaintiff’s family doctor to indicate that there were no reports in his records of pain symptoms similar to those sustained in the accident. Instead, Dr. Laidlow relied on a report by Dr. Novak from June 16, where he indicated that the plaintiff was suffering from chronic neck pain “likely since 2012”.

[43]         I prefer the evidence of Drs. Watson and Waseem, however, the weight to be given to their evidence is diminished because I do not find the plaintiff to be a credible witness.

BC Supreme Court Discusses When Short Leave Applications Should Be Granted

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 8, Civil Procedure.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, providing a general overview of when a short-leave applications should be granted and criticizing the frequency with which such applications are brought by defence lawyers in personal injury lawsuits.
In today’s case (O’Callaghan v. Hengsbach) the plaintiff claimed physical and psychiatric injuries from a collision and sued for damages.  The Defendant had the plaintiff assessed by a neurologist.  After the time limit for delivery of expert reports the Defendant brought sought to have the Plaintiff examined by a psychiatrist and requested short leave to bring the application.  The Court dismissed the request and in doing so Master Baker provided the following reasons of the protocol that should be followed when seeking short leave –

[16]         The Masters in chambers, almost daily, are asked to give short leave under Rule 8-5(1). I have heard three of these applications in 1 ½ days of chambers; in one application, plaintiff’s counsel told the court that it was the third short leave application by the defence in that case since October 17. Interestingly, on a quick search I found no authorities to guide the court in granting or refusing applications for short leave. The rule itself offers little guidance, other than an application may be made in circumstances of “urgency”.

[17]         Such applications should be restricted to emergent circumstances and should not reward inefficiency, inattention to a particular case, or a lack of oversight. To abridge the time limits imposed by the Supreme Court Civil Rules is, presumably, to prejudice the other party who is, naturally, entitled to rely on timelines imposed by the Rules and to expect the opposing party to do likewise.

[18]         In the absence of guiding authorities, I suggest the following considerations, non-exclusive, should guide the parties and the court in considering short leave applications:

  1. a)       The application, of course, is to be made by Requisition, usually without affidavits, and may be made before a Registrar, Master, or Judge.
  2. b)       While undue formality in the application is discouraged, the application should be made in court, on the record (even if by video or telephone) and not online as an e-filed application.
  3. c)       Applicant’s counsel should notify the opposing counsel or party of an intention to apply for short leave so that counsel can appear. At the very least applicant’s counsel should canvass with his or her friend their availability on the proposed chambers date and whether he or she is opposed to the short leave.
  4. d)       The applicant should be prepared to give a full accounting of the facts, circumstances, context, and chronology leading to the application for short leave, all of which should establish that the applicant has been affected or surprised by events or developments not reasonably foreseeable.
  5. e)       If opposing counsel is not present should, as in the case of without notice applications, be prepared to give both favourable and unfavourable details.
  6. f)        If any important or pivotal fact or element is disputed by opposing counsel the applicant should be prepared to offer affidavit evidence on the point and, as always, counsel should not speak to his or her own affidavit if the matter is contested.
  7. g)       Busy schedules for the applicant counsel will usually not be sufficient reason for short leave; in that case counsel should arrange for a colleague or agent to speak to the chambers application on the usual notice required by the rules.

[19]         Ultimately, taking these points into consideration, the court will balance the prejudice both to the other party by potentially disrupting their schedules and trial preparations as well as service to other clients and to the applicant by virtue of reasonably unforeseen facts, circumstances, or developments that have inhibited the applicant’s preparation in the normal chronology that the rules contemplate and mandate.

[20]         Some areas of the law tend to offer more emergencies or crises than others; family law would likely fall in this category. Despite this, however, of late more applications for short leave seem to arise from personal injury/motor vehicle accident cases than in any other. And most of those applications for short leave seem to be on behalf of the defence, seeking short leave to bring an application for an IME close to trial. In that respect, this case is completely typical of that growing practise.

[21]         In many cases, the applicant can point to genuine circumstances giving rise to surprise or the advent of claims or circumstances the applicant could not have reasonably anticipated. This, and many similar applications, is not in that category. In too many cases, in my view, the defence, either assuming that settlement is likely or simply by applying triage or prioritizing in busy offices with large caseloads, have not given due attention and focus in a timely way to the possible claims and damages of the plaintiff. Lawyers are extremely busy professionals. They have many cases other than the one specifically before the court. Every master and judge knows that. Still, that cannot be permitted to affect the other party’s right to due process and adherence to the rules unless clearly justified; it is the court’s function to prevent that.

[22]         I have opined often, from the bench, about the template nature of pleadings in personal injury cases[3]. Often, it seems, the only change to pleadings are the names of the parties and the date and location of the accident. The damages claimed and particulars of alleged negligence are almost rote. Still, when a party specifies concussion, cognitive impairment, nightmares, sleep disruption, and driving related anxiety (which, to be fair, not all plaintiffs claim), it should be an obvious announcement to the defence that psychiatric enquiry is justified.

[23]         With the advent of standardized pleadings, an obvious problem for the defence arises: what really are the damages (if any) to this particular plaintiff?  It is my conclusion that very often the true issues in the claim are not established until expert medical (and sometimes economic) reports are delivered. And, yes, very often these reports are delivered at or very near the 84-day deadline. I do understand the defence dilemma in that, but even when faced with standardized pleadings, nothing prevents the defence from, as here, conducting the usual steps for disclosure and discovery. The chronology or timing of that is very much for the defence to decide and control.

[24]         In this particular case, Ms. Stewart is right; there were multiple indications to the defence that Ms. O’Callaghan was not only making a claim for psychiatric injuries, but that she was firm in her allegation and that in her view the damages were significant and long-lasting. Both the clinical records and her discovery evidence should have reinforced that assertion. Her denial of the facts contained in the defence notice to admit was a further obvious sign. But preceding all of those indicators was the NOCC which, despite my complaints of template pleadings in general, was clear in alleging specific psychiatric or psychological injuries and consequences of the accident.

Motorist Found Fully At Fault For Clipping Cyclist While Attempting to Pass

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, assessing fault for a collision involving a cyclist and a motorist.
In this week’s case (McGavin v. Talbot) the Plaintiff had merged onto the roadway where a bike lane ended.  Shortly thereafter the Defendant, proceeding in the same direction of travel, clipped the Plaintiff’s bike while a vehicle attempting to pass causing him to lose control and crash.  The motorist denied fault.  Mr. Justice Masuhara found fault rested fully with the motorist in these circumstances and provided the following reasons:

[20]         I find that Mr. McGavin had merged on the roadway at the end of the bike lane.  Mr. McGavin estimates he was riding at about 20-25 kmph which I accept.  I also find based on the testimony of Ms. Talbot, that Mr. McGavin was ahead of the Mr. Talbot’s pickup when the bike lane ended.  In my view, Mr. McGavin had the dominant position on the roadway beyond the end of the bike lane, and Mr. Talbot passed Mr. McGavin when there was not a safe distance between his pickup and Mr. McGavin to do so.  Mr. Talbot did not pass at a safe distance. 

[21]         I find the passing occurred before the X in the lane and before the start of guard rails for the Colquitz Bridge (Exhibit 1, Tab 4) and that the rear of the pickup driven by Mr. Talbot struck or clipped the handle bar of the bicycle ridden by the plaintiff causing the plaintiff to fall at about the start of the guard rails by the Colquitz Bridge. 

[22]         As a result, it is my determination that Mr. Talbot is entirely at fault for Mr. McGavin’s fall. 

[23]         My finding here is made on the bases that:

(a)            A cyclist has the same rights and duties of a driver of a vehicle pursuant to s. 183(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, s. 318;

(b)            A driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle must cause its vehicle to pass to the left of the other vehicle at a safe distance and must not cause or permit the vehicle to return to the right side of the highway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle pursuant to s. 157(1); and 

(c)             A driver of a vehicle must drive with due care and attention and must have reasonable consideration for other drivers pursuant to s. 144.

$100,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Thoracic Outlet Syndrome

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Thoracic Outlet Syndrome Cases.

Adding to this site’s archived damage assessments for thoracic outlet syndrome, reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for such an injury.
In today’s case (Sharma v. MacDonald) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2013 collision that the Defendant accepted fault for.  The Plaintiff suffered a variety of injuries the most serious of which was thoracic outlet syndrome.  The symptoms lingered to trial and were expected to cause some ongoing limitations.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 Madam Justice Maisonville provided the following reasons:

[198]     …I find that the defendants are responsible for the plaintiff’s neck, back, and arm issues.  In my view, the plaintiff has established on a balance of probabilities that she suffers from thoracic outlet syndrome, as concluded by Dr. Hawkeswood, and that this injury was caused by the defendants’ negligence.

[199]     With respect to anxiety, I accept that the plaintiff suffers from anxiety in relation to driving…

[203]     Regarding non-pecuniary damages, I find that the plaintiff enjoyed a full life before the Accident and had no issues with respect to her neck and back.  Nor did she have a tingling feeling in her arm or numbness of her right arm.

[204]     I find that, as she testified, the plaintiff did not have to rest after having performed her regular activities. I also find that she did not experience headaches or low mood symptoms prior to the Accident.

[205]     I do find, however, that the plaintiff has been steadily improving.  I note that she enjoys playing basketball.  I note that she now works without significant limitations.  I note that she has gone back to a number of her pre-Accident activities.  She is not as socially isolated now that she has returned home from Edmonton.

[206]     I accept that the plaintiff still suffers from numbness and tingling feelings in her right arm, and from some neck and back pain.  However, the pain she has now is not like the pain immediately following the Accident.  The plaintiff is able to work to the extent she testified to.  While I appreciate that she must rest afterward, she is not disabled from working.

[217]     In all of the circumstances, I award the plaintiff $100,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

$95,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Wrist and Thumb Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Hand Injury Cases, ICBC Wrist Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a chronic hand injury caused by a vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Burke v. Schwetje) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision caused by the Defendant.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The collision caused a hand and thumb injury resulting in permanent partial disability.   The Plaintiff did, however, have a number of pre-existing issues which likely would have led to some overlapping disability described as “a number of quiescent but present conditions in his hands and wrists that would likely have become increasingly symptomatic over time in any event of the Collision.”
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $95,000 Madam Justice Russell provided the following reasons:

[117]     I am aware that the plaintiff has not been able to continue as a commercial fisherman since 2013 and before that, had some serious functional limitations on his abilities. His culture, his friendships and his livelihood have all changed substantially since the Collision and because of the Collision.

[118]     The plaintiff’s right wrist symptoms were aggravated significantly by the Collision and he has had continuing pain in his thumb and his wrist for which he takes OTC medications and may choose to have one or possibly two surgeries.

[119]     As a man of 67 at the time of the Collision, his career has been shortened by the aggravation of his previously only mildly symptomatic arthritis.

…

[122]     Given the agreement of the defendants with the quantum of non-pecuniary damages which the plaintiff seeks and my finding that that amount is appropriate in the circumstances, I award him $95,000.

[123]     The award of damages under this head includes an amount for loss of housekeeping or gardening capacity

Potentially "Harsh" Result No Reason To Strike Jury in Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12.

Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a plaintiff request to strike a jury notice in an ICBC injury claim.
In the recent case (Froese v. Wilson) the 17 year old Plaintiff who “became severely intoxicated at a house party” left riding in the cargo box of a pickup truck which then moved and “caused him to fall out of the truck.”.
The Plaintiff sued for damages and the matter was set down for a 20 day trial with the Defendant electing trial by jury.  The Plaintiff objected noting that a total of 19 expert witnesses would likely testify, the matter was too complex for a jury and the jury “may take a harsher view of the plaintiff’s conduct than would a judge in assessing liability“.  The court noted that while this may be true it is no reason to strip a party’s right to trial by jury.  In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:

[17]         This trial is set for 20 days—a length no longer unusual for a jury trial. Although there is a multiplicity of expert evidence, it comes from experts in fields that are commonly at issue in personal injury cases and there appears to be a great deal of common ground as to the nature of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the motor vehicle accident. As said above, the main areas of disagreement relate to the long-term impact of those injuries and the cause of the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms. I am not persuaded that those areas of disagreement are so complex that they cannot be considered by a properly instructed jury on the basis of properly presented and explained expert evidence.

[18]         Counsel for the plaintiff also alluded to a concern that a jury may take a harsher view of the plaintiff’s conduct than would a judge in assessing liability. That is entirely speculative and I presume jurors will be attentive to whatever instructions the trial judge gives them on how they are to go about assessing the relative blameworthiness of both parties. However, the possibility that a jury verdict may reflect community attitudes that differ from those of judges is one of the frequent justifications for retaining the jury system.

[19]         Counsel also argues that the outcome of this trial may determine the course of the rest of the plaintiff’s life and subjecting him to the uncertainties inherent in a jury trial is inconsistent with the object of a just determination on the merits set out in R. 1-3.

[20]         Although I have a certain sympathy with the plaintiff’s concern about the risks and uncertainties in a jury trial, the fact remains that R. 12-6 continues to give either party the right to unilaterally select trial by jury. Unless the party who does not want a jury trial can meet the onus of showing that it is not appropriate in a particular case and the presumptive right to a jury trial should be denied, a jury trial and verdict must be considered to come within the “just determination” envisioned by R. 1-3.

[21]         The plaintiff has failed to meet the onus in this case and the application to strike the jury notice must be dismissed.

BC Court of Appeal Upholds Across The Board Mitigation of Damages Reduction

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were published this week upholding a trial judge’s 50% reduction of damages in a personal injury lawsuit for failure to mitigate.
In the recent case (Mullens v. Toor) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2012 collision caused by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff suffered physical and psychological injuries and the Court concluded the Plaintiff’s recovery could have been improved had she more diligently followed medical advice.  As a result the Plaintiff’s assessed non-pecuniary damages, loss of earning capacity, loss of pension and deferred profit sharing were reduced by 50% and the future cost of care by 10%.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing the failure to mitigate reduction should only apply to her non-pecuniary damages.  The BC Court of Appeal disagreed.  In upholding the trial result the Court provided the following reasons:

[54]         Failure to mitigate is a positive allegation that should be pleaded and argued at trial:  Hosking v. Mahoney, 2010 BCCA 465 at para. 34.  Ms. Mullens thus submits that the judge erred in deciding issues on a basis that was not specifically pleaded or argued before him and properly should have invited counsel to address the claim: see e.g., Carmel Pharmacy Ltd. v. Tri City Contracting (B.C.) Ltd., 2014 BCSC 337 at para. 2.

[55]         In their response to civil claim the respondents pleaded as follows:

The Plaintiff has failed to follow medical advice with respect to treatment or exercise.

…

The Plaintiff could, by the exercise of due diligence, have reduced the amount of any alleged injury, loss, damage or expense, and the Defendants say that the Plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages.

[56]         The respondents say it is a mischaracterization to say that they did not argue for a reduction across all heads of damages because of a failure to mitigate.  A fair reading of the written submissions and the evidence as presented at trial is that mitigation was a key issue for all of Ms. Mullens’ claims.

[57]         In my view, the respondents’ pleading is clearly not deficient.  In Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28 at paras. 10‑12, Brown J., for the Court, found that a claim for “general damages for pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity past, present and future, loss of opportunity, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of physical heath…” was sufficiently broad to put the opposing party on notice that the claim encompassed mental injury.  Here the pleading is explicit.

[58]         Much of the evidence at trial, both in direct and cross-examination, concerned matters related to the mitigation issue pleaded: the appellant’s failure to return to work, her delay in taking medication, not seeking psychiatric treatment, not having consistent treatment, and the delay in obtaining recommended treatment being a negative factor in her prognosis.  These issues were canvassed by both the expert witnesses (Dr. Zoffman, Dr. Finlayson, Dr. Robertson, Dr. Maloon) and lay witnesses (Mr. Gill, Ms. Macpherson, Ms. Percy and Mr. Towsley).

[59]         The issue of mitigation was both specifically pleaded and extensively explored at trial.  Experts testified to the mental health benefits of returning to work and the benefits of comprehensive psychiatric treatment.  Counsel raised a failure to mitigate in general terms during closing submissions, and made specific reference to the benefits of returning to work, such as improved mental heath.  The specific arguments made with respect to a failure to mitigate past loss of income were logically connected to the other heads of damage claimed.

[60]         In my view, it cannot fairly be said that mitigation was not an issue properly before the court with respect to all of Ms. Mullens’ claims for damages.  I see no merit to this ground of appeal.

BC Court of Appeal – Medico-Legal Reports Are Not Mandatory for Injury Claim to Succeed

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

In what is one of the longest running personal injury claims I have come across, reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Court of Appeal finalizing a lawsuit started over 20 years ago.
In today’s case (Jalava v. Webster) the Plaintiff was tackled and badly injured by the Defendant who was “under the mistaken impression that Mr. Jalava had left the café without paying his bill“.
The Plaintiff started a lawsuit in 1996.  He was self represented.  He obtained an order that the Defendant pay him damages to be assessed.  The claim dragged on for years without an assessment taking place and a Chambers Judge eventually dismissed the claim noting that “ it was legally impermissible for the Court to assess damages for personal injuries without a medical-legal report“.
The Plaintiff appealed and BC’s highest court overturned the result noting that a medico-legal report was not a required part of a personal injury prosecution.
The court did, however, in the absence of medical evidence assess a token judgment of $100 noting “this matter has dragged on long enough“.
In commenting on the need of medico-legal reports in personal injury lawsuits the Court noted as follows:

[11]         First, there is no legal rule to the effect that in order to have damages for personal injury assessed, a plaintiff must adduce a medical-legal report into evidence: see Reible v. Hughes [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880. There is no doubt that such reports are very helpful and that without one, it is difficult for a judge to assess damages. In this case, for example, Mr. Jalava told the Court that he had suffered a broken clavicle and a “banged up knee” as a result of the assault, but had no details of the injuries or the financial consequences he had suffered. At this point in time, several years after the assault, it would appear no further information is likely to be brought forward.

[12]         However, since the plaintiff obtained judgment for assault, an intentional tort, it was open to the Court to award a nominal sum. Even if the tort had been negligence, the Court could have given an award of damages that would at least give some recognition of Mr. Jalava’s injuries.

[13]         I also agree with counsel that the chambers judge should not have dismissed Mr. Jalava’s claim on his own motion and without prior notice to Mr. Jalava. The plaintiff was taken by surprise and, being unrepresented, was not able to make a meaningful attempt to forestall such an order. Finally, since Mr. Jalava had already obtained judgments against the defendants, it was simply not possible to dismiss “the claim”. The claims had been reduced to judgments years ago and those judgments could not be reversed or nullified except under Rule 3-8 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules or by this court on appeal.

[14]         In all the circumstances, then, the appeal must be allowed and the chambers judge’s order set aside. Since this matter has dragged on long enough, I would also assess Mr. Jalava’s damages at $100.

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic, Non-Debilitating Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries following a vehicle collision.
In the recent case (Dosangh v. Xie) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in 2013.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The crash caused soft-tissue injuries which lingered to the time of trial and had a guarded prognosis for full recovery.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:

[96]         I accept that the plaintiff continues to suffer the consequences of the Accident and that her condition has developed into one of chronic pain, the severity of which depends on her level of activity, particularly at work and at home. The more active she is and the more she pushes herself, the more significant her pain.

[97]         But, I also find that the plaintiff is moving in a positive direction in terms of her recovery despite her daughter’s and Ms. Hundal’s evidence to the contrary. My assessment is that they were both doing their best to help the plaintiff’s case and were perhaps not as objective as they could have been…

[101]     I accept that the plaintiff received soft tissue type injuries in the Accident that have not resolved. I accept that she continues to be in pain, although not the type of pain that is debilitating. The plaintiff is able to function at work and at home, but with ongoing limitations. She can perform the duties she did before the Accident, but in pain, some days worse than others.

[102]     The fact that the pain moves around her body depending on what she is doing, for example from the left shoulder to the right shoulder and back depending on if she is over-using an area, is, in my view, not overly significant. That is the nature of chronic pain, which could be non-organic and psychologically based.

[103]     I accept that the past four years since the Accident have taken a toll on the plaintiff. She struck me as somewhat of a perfectionist at work and at home and she has been unable to meet her own expectations. Her energy is reduced. That has no doubt affected her psychologically resulting in her depressed mood…

[108]     In the end, the assessment of general damages is based on the individual plaintiff and how the injuries have affected him or her physically, psychologically, vocationally, socially and recreationally. I have considered the plaintiff’s particular circumstances here, the fact the Accident occurred over 4 years ago, my assessment of the plaintiff as a witness, the chronicity of her pain together with the fact that she is improving but with a somewhat guarded prognosis. I am satisfied that with the continued counselling and therapies that I am ordering, she will continue to improve, will continue to function, but will experience ongoing pain to some degree.

[109]     I assess general damages at $70,000.