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Can A Litigation Guardian Be Ordered to Attend an Independent Medical Exam?

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 13, BCSC Civil Rule 20, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 100 Comments on Can A Litigation Guardian Be Ordered to Attend an Independent Medical Exam?


(UPDATE:  Please note Leave to Appeal the Below Decision was granted by the BCCA on January 25, 2011)
When a mentally incompetent person brings a lawsuit in BC they must do so through a litigation guardian or a committee.  Generally, when personal injuries are the subject of a lawsuit, the Defendant is entitled to have the Plaintiff attend an ‘independent’ medical exam.  What about the litigation guardian?  Can they be ordered to attend an independent medical exam?  The BC Supreme Court Civil Rules are silent on this point however, reasons for judgement were released today considering this question using the Court’s ‘inherent jurisdiction’.
In today’s case (Bishop v. Minichiello) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  He was an infant at the time and brought the lawsuit by way of litigation guardian.  The Plaintiff became an adult prior to the lawsuit resolving.  Normally, when this occurs, the Plaintiff files an affidavit and overtakes the lawsuit without the litigation guardian.  In today’s case the Plaintiff did not do this apparently because his injuries may have rendered him “unable to appreciate the extent of his own injuries and unable to effectively conduct the litigation on his own behalf.”.
The Defendant brought a motion that both the Plaintiff and his litigation guardian attend a series of medical exams.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that the Rule authorizing the Court to compel a Plaintiff to attend an Independent Medical Exam does not empower a Court to extend the order to a litigation guardian.  Mr. Justice McEwan noted that while this was true it could be remedied by resorting to the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.  In granting the application the Court noted as follows:
[12] The defendant submits that although Rule 7-6 (1)-(3) makes no specific provision for a person other than the party to be examined to attend and answer questions, Wong (guardian ad litem) v. Wong [2006] B.C.J. No. 3123 (C.A.) established that the court may, in the interests of justice make ancillary orders to give effect to the purpose of the Rules, found in Rule 1(5) [now Rule 1-3]. In Wong, the question was whether the court could order a plaintiff to video tape an examination…

[13]         Rule 20-2 reads:

(3)        Unless a rule otherwise provides, anything that is required or authorized by these Supreme Court Civil Rules to be done by or invoked against a party under disability must:

(b)        be invoked against the party by invoking the same against the party’s litigation guardian.

[14]         Rule 13-1 reads:

(19)      When making an order under these Supreme Court Civil Rules, the court may impose terms and conditions and give directions it considers will further the object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules.

[15]         On the question of inherent jurisdiction I think the characterization found in R & J Siever Holdings Ltd. v. Moldenhauer 2008 BCCA 59, is most apt:

In addition to the powers conferred by the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, as a superior court of record, has inherent jurisdiction to regulate its practice and procedures so as to prevent abuses of process and miscarriages of justice: see I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Current Leg. Prob. 23 at 23-25. As the author said, at 25,

The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case. The powers conferred by the Rules of Court are, generally speaking, additional to, and not in substitution of, powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The two heads of powers are generally cumulative, and not mutually exclusive, so that in any given case, the court is able to proceed under either or both heads of jurisdiction.

[16]         The Rules do not, properly speaking, confer jurisdiction. To the extent that they reflect a consensus of the Judiciary (and the Bar) as to the presumptions, or expectations, or shifts in onus that will contribute to the just and expedient conduct of litigation, they are useful in bringing predictability and stability to civil procedure. To the extent that they do not reflect such a consensus, they cannot be regarded as mandatory impediments to doing the right thing in any particular case.

[17]         The silence of Rule 7-6 on the question of ordering the litigation guardian to attend an independent medical examination, does not, in and of itself, preclude the making of such an order, if it otherwise makes sense to do so in order to advance the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the proceeding on its merits.

[18]         Whether such an order is appropriate requires the court to weigh the plaintiff’s objection against the defendant’s rationale for the request…

[20]         The plaintiff’s objection to the attendance of the litigation guardian is primarily that a conversation between the litigation guardian and the examining physician creates a form of statement that is not controlled within the process and that might well lead to conflict or confusion later, if the guardian and the Doctor do not agree as to what was said.

[21]         The defendant’s point is, primarily, that in a case where the defence is guessing as to the mental status of the plaintiff, it would be prudent to have the person who knows him best, and who is also the litigation guardian, available to answer questions about his condition, especially where it is suggested that, among the effects of the injuries suffered in the accident, is a lack of insight or appreciation on Brandon Bishop’s part of the harm that has occurred.

[22]         In Tsantilas (Litigation Guardian) v. Johnson, Cranbrook Registry #18128 (20100211) Melnick, J. made a similar order in a case involving both counsel who appear in this proceeding. In what I gather to be a case of an under-age person, the court ordered the attendance of the litigation guardian at an assessment…

[23]         I think that as long as the case continues to be conducted by Charlotte Bishop as litigation guardian, the implication that, for reasons related to his injuries Brandon Bishop is unable to conduct the litigation will remain, along with the implication that talking to him will not yield the whole story. The plaintiff’s concerns about possible confusion do not outweigh the defendant’s interest in the appointed examiners getting accurate and complete information. Accordingly, Charlotte Bishop, as litigation guardian, must attend and answer the questions posed by the examiners as they require.

Defendant Punished With Costs Award for Relying on "Advocate" Expert Witness

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.


Dr. Hymie Davis is a psychiatrist who has been frequently retained by ICBC to provide expert opinions as to the extent of Plaintiff’s accident related injuries.  (You can click here to access my previous posts setting out the billings of Dr. Davis and other experts often retained by ICBC).  In a judgement released last week, the BC Supreme Court harshly criticized Dr. Davis and took the unusual step of punishing the Defendant, (who was insured with ICBC), for relying on him at trial.
In last week’s case (Jayetileke v. Blake) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC motor vehicle collision.  She sued for damages.  Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $122,500.  The Plaintiff rejected this offer and went to trial.  She was ultimately awarded about $9,000 less than the settlement offer by the trial judge.
Normally, in these circumstances, ICBC would be entitled to their costs and possibly double costs from the time of their offer onward.  Mr. Justice Dley, however, refused to follow this usual course finding that not only should the Defendant not be awarded costs, but they should pay the Plaintiff costs.  The reason for this departure was a finding that Dr. Davis was “nothing more than an advocate thinly disguised in the cloak of an expert” and he should not have been relied on by the defence at trial.
Mr. Justice Dley provided the following damaging criticism of Dr. Davis as an expert witness and warning to lawyers who  intend to rely on experts who have a history of crossing the line into advocacy:

[35] Dr. Davis had a history before the courts where his evidence was rejected and his objectivity called into question: Grewal v. Brar et al, 2004 BCSC 1157, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1819; Gosal v. Singh, 2009 BCSC 1471, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2131; Kelly v. Sanmugathas, 2009 BCSC 958, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1413; and Smusz v. Wolfe Chevrolet, 2010 BCSC 82, [2010] B.C.J. No. 114.

[36] A witness may have a poor day in court – that does not mean the witness was dishonest or forever unreliable. However, Dr. Davis had displayed an alarming inability to appreciate his role as an expert and the accompanying privilege to provide opinion evidence.

[37] The defence was alive to his propensity to abuse the role of an expert. His reputation would have been known from the cited decisions. Plaintiff’s counsel succinctly set out the concerns about Dr. Davis in a letter dated January 29, 2010, which stated:

1.         Although he may have once been a qualified expert in psychiatry and able to give opinion evidence in court, we suggest he no longer is properly qualified to give opinion evidence. We will suggest that he is no longer aware of his duty to assist the court and in reality he is an advocate for ICBC. Additionally, we will submit that he has been so consistently discredited by the courts of this Province that he is incapable of being qualified as an expert;

2.         His report is replete with advocacy. The report is an attempt [to] neutralize any material/opinions which support the plaintiff’s claim rather than providing an objective medical opinion;

3.         His report contains many opinions and arguments that are beyond his expertise; and

4.         The information apparently gleaned from the plaintiff is inaccurate and incomplete and coloured to advance his position.

[38] In spite of the concerns that the Courts have expressed, the defence nonetheless proffered Dr. Davis as an expert in opposition to the plaintiff’s complaints of depression and anxiety. My assessment of Dr. Davis was as follows (oral reasons May 13, 2010):

[43]      Dr. Hymie Davis, a psychiatrist, examined Ms. Jayetileke on January 12, 2010 at the request of the defence. I find his evidence to be unreliable. I give it no weight for the following reasons.

[44]      Dr. Davis was an advocate. He was argumentative, defensive, non-responsive, and prone to rambling discourses that were not relevant to the questions posed in cross-examination.

[45]      Dr. Davis was asked to leave the courtroom so that counsel could argue about questions to be put to him. Dr. Davis was seen peeking into the courtroom and listening to the discussion. He was again asked to leave. In spite of these instructions given to him, Dr. Davis hovered within hearing distance and, on four occasions, stuck his head into the courtroom to hear what was occurring.

[46]      Dr. Davis conceded that without his notes, he would not be able to recall the discussion with Ms. Jayetileke. He relied on his notes to prepare his report.

[47] Dr. Davis had noted that Ms. Jayetileke awakened once or twice a week and that this was in some measure related to the accident-related symptoms. He was adamant Ms. Jayetileke had not said that she awakened once or twice a night. He said that his notes would reflect what Ms. Jayetileke had told him.

[48]      His notes referred to Ms. Jayetileke awakening once or twice but did not specify whether that was nightly or weekly. Nonetheless, Dr. Davis tried to point out other references in his notes that meant a weekly occurrence. Those references did not strengthen his evidence. They simply confirmed the unreliability of his testimony.

[49]      Dr. Smith had commented about how important it was for the history-taking to be done in a setting where the patient was comfortable and at ease with the interviewer. Dr. Davis’s demeanour would not lend itself to Ms. Jayetileke being at ease in his presence so that an effective and accurate history could have been taken. Ms. Jayetileke was under the impression that Dr. Davis did not take things seriously. I accept her view of the interview and prefer her evidence to that of Dr. Davis.

[39] For a trial to be fair, the Court must allow each party to put its best case forward. Where a party seeks to advance its position with reckless abandon seeking only the ultimate goal of victory and using questionable evidence along the way, that party risks sanctions in the form of costs penalties. Where the conduct is reprehensible and deserving of reproof and rebuke, the penalty is special costs. “Costs considerations are meant to guide counsel and litigants in the choices and strategies they pursue in litigation”: Karpodinis v. Kantas, 2006 BCCA 400, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2074 at para. 4.

[40] In this case and against the backdrop of previous judicial comment, the defence tendered Dr. Davis. He was nothing more than an advocate thinly disguised in the cloak of an expert. That is conduct deserving of rebuke and from which the Court disassociates itself.

[41] Dr. Davis attempted to inject levity to the proceedings when he was introduced to the Court – his reference to scotch can only be taken as an attempt to be humorous. However, these are serious and solemn proceedings and should be treated as such. His opening comments were unnecessary and unhelpful.

[42] Dr. Davis’ refusal to remove himself from earshot of the Court proceedings despite repeated requests was reprehensible. His conduct simply confirmed a lack of respect for Court proceedings.

[43] Under these circumstances, special costs are to be awarded against the defendant.

[44] The special costs will be the equivalent of the costs of the entire trial. The defendant will be deprived of any costs that it might otherwise have been entitled to as result of the offer to settle.

[45] The plaintiff is awarded costs as if there had been no offer to settle made. The defendant shall receive no costs.

[46] The plaintiff shall receive costs of this application.

Challenging Opposing Witnesses: The Rule in Browne v. Dunn

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 60 Comments on Challenging Opposing Witnesses: The Rule in Browne v. Dunn


(Update March 8, 2012 – The case discussed below was set for a new trial after the Court of Appeal found the trial judge made errors applying the law of mitigation, causation and credibility.  The Court of Appeal Judgement can be foud here)
Browne v. Dunn is an English case that’s almost 120 years old.  Despite it’s vintage its a case all British Columbian’s should be familiar with when going to trial.
The rule in Browne v. Dunn states that if you intend to contradict an opposing witness on a significant matter you must put the contradictory version of events to the witness on cross examination.  Failure to do so permits the Court to prefer the witness’ version over the contradictory version.  In practice, failure to follow the rule of Browne v. Dunn can prove damaging to a case and this was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Wahl v. Sidhu) the Plaintiff was involved in a significant collision in Surrey, BC in 2006.  The Plaintiff sustained various injuries.  At trial he sought over $1.1 million dollars.  Much of his claim was dismissed but damages of $165,000 were assessed to compensate him for physical and psychological injuries from the crash.
During the course of the trial the Defence lawyer argued that the Plaintiff was not credible and was exaggerating his claim.   The lawyer relied on evidence from various treating medical practitioners who had negative opinions about the Plaintiff’s efforts and argued that “the plaintiff is intentionally faking symptoms“.   The Defence lawyer did not, however, cross examine the Plaintiff with respect to these witnesses allegations.  Mr. Justice Chamberlist relied on the rule in Browne v. Dunn and refused to place any weight on these challenges to the Plaintiff’s credibility.  Specifically the Court provided the following useful comments:
[213] … I wish to comment on what occurred and what did not occur with respect to the evidence of Mr. Wahl at trial.  My notes of his evidence, particularly his evidence given under cross-examination, indicate that negative comments made by the various treators and Mary Richardson and Gerard Kerr were not put to him under cross-examination so that he would have an ability to deal with that evidence.  It is my view that the witness must be confronted with these opinions before the opinion can be properly dealt with (Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R. 67 (H.L.)).  This is especially required in a case such as this where the defence submits that the plaintiff, in this case, is not motivated to get better and that the credibility of the plaintiff is at issue.
[217] The defence, in this case, called Dr. Bishop as a witness. …As indicated earlier Dr. Bishop was originally retained by the plaintiff but did not call Dr. Bishop at trial.  The defence made a point of filing Dr. Bishop’s reports and defence called her evidence as part of its case.  In the defence written submissions, the defence maintains that “her evidence makes it clear that she is of the opinion that the plaintiff is intentionally faking symptoms”….

[219]     It is important to note the first lines of the evaluation of effort where Dr. Bishop said, and I repeat:

. . . Although effort testing of itself cannot determine motivation as submaximal effort may be multifactorial in origin (e.g. fear of pain, anxiety with regard to performance, perception of dysfunction, need to demonstrate distress, etc) . . .

That finding cannot be relied upon, in my opinion, by the defence when the particulars of those conclusions were not put to the plaintiff when he was on the stand….

New Rules of Court Update: Discontinued Lawsuits and Third Party Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 58 Comments on New Rules of Court Update: Discontinued Lawsuits and Third Party Costs


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, interpreting and applying Rule 9-8(5) for what I believe is the first time.  (It’s worth pointing out, however, that this rule reads almost identically to the former Rule 36(5)).  This rule deals with the entitlement of a Third Party to costs when a Plaintiff discontinues a lawsuit.
In today’s case (Patterson v. Williams) the Plaintiff sued two Defendants for personal injuries sustained when a dog knocked her over.  The Defendants denied fault and issued Third Party Proceedings against another dog walker seeking contribution and indemnity.
Ultimately the Plaintiff settled the claim, signed a release in favour of the Defendants and discontinued the lawsuit.  The Third Party then brought a motion asking that the Defendants pay the Third Party’s costs.  The Third Party relied on Rule 9-8(5) which reads as follows:
(5)  If a plaintiff discontinues the whole or any part of an action in which a person has been joined as a third party, the third party, if the discontinuance disposes of the claim against the third party, is entitled to costs and may apply to the court for a direction as to who should pay them.
Mr. Justice Sigurdson dismissed the motion finding that a discontinued lawsuit does not automatically dispose of Defendant claims against a Third Party.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[11]         The third party says that the notice of discontinuance disposes of the third party claim, as it was for contribution and indemnity only and did not include an independent claim. This was so, in the third party’s submission, because the specific wording of the third party notice made the third party claim conditional both on the plaintiff not being contributorily negligent and on the defendant being found liable. According to the third party, these conditions cannot now be satisfied because of the discontinuance.  Mr. Nossal also argues that there is no ongoing claim against the third party because the terms of the Release are on so-called “B.C. Ferry Agreement terms” (British Columbia Ferry Corp. et. al. v. T&N plc. et .al. (1993), 86 B.C.L.R. (2d) 353 (S.C.); (1995), 16 B.C.L.R. (3d) 115 (C.A.)) that prevent recovery from a third party.

[12]         I think that this application for costs must fail.  While the Release may limit the liability of the defendants and prevent successful third party proceedings against them, the notice of discontinuance itself does not prevent the defendants from continuing third party proceedings against Ms. Parker.

[13]         I do not think it can be said that the filing of the notice of discontinuance by the plaintiff disposes of the claim against the third party by the defendants.

[14]         The claim for contribution is a substantive right that continues to exist notwithstanding a settlement: see A.R. (Al) Smith Ltd. v. Turner, [1984] B.C.J. No. 3107, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 424 (B.C. Co. Ct.), and Canada v. Foundation Co. of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695.

[15]         Moreover, I do not think that the precise terms of the third party notice can be determinative of this application, as the defendants are at liberty to apply to amend the terms of the third party notice.

[16]         Even if the terms of the Release do prevent the defendant from continuing third party proceedings against the third party, which I question, that is a matter of the interpretation of the Release, not something that flows from the filing by the plaintiff of the notice of discontinuance itself.

[17]         Accordingly, the application by the third party for costs is dismissed, with costs.

BC Injury Claims, Pre-Trial Discovery and "Mental Incompetence"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Civil Procedure, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 119 Comments on BC Injury Claims, Pre-Trial Discovery and "Mental Incompetence"


When suing for damages as a result of personal injuries the BC Supreme Court Rules generally permit Defendants to compel Plaintiffs to participate in pre-trial examinations for discovery.  There are a few exceptions to this and one of these relates to mentally incompetent Plaintiffs.  If a Plaintiff is mentally incompetent they can only be examined with permission from the Court.  Reasons for judgement were released earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In this week’s case (DeMerchant v. Chow) the Plaintiff sustained a serious brain injury during a fall from a ladder in 2007.  The Plaintiff started a lawsuit in the BC Supreme Court through a litigation guardian.  During the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff refused to participate in a discovery.  The Defendant brought a motion seeking an order that he be forced to participate.  The Plaintiff opposed this and relied on medical evidence which opined that the Plaintiff “could not reliably answer questions put to him” and that he “does not have the capacity to give testimony in court“.
Ultimately Master Taylor dismissed the motion and refused to grant the defendant permission to examine the Plaintiff.  This is the first case I’m aware of applying the new BC Supreme Court Rule 7-2(9) which deals with discovery of mentally incompetent parties.  Master Taylor provided the following reasons in dismissing the application:

[2]             The application is made pursuant to Rule 7-2(9) of the new Rules which was formerly Rule 27(11) of the old Rules.  The wording of both rules is similar, but the new Rule has changed the wording somewhat.  The new Rule provides:

7-2(9) If a party to be examined for discovery is a mentally incompetent person, his or her litigation guardian and his or her committee may be examined for discovery, but the mentally incompetent person must not be examined without leave of the court.

…

[34]         The question to be determined, therefore, is whether the evidence before me is sufficient to find that court approval should be granted to allow the plaintiff to be examined for discovery.

[35]         In Penn v. Secord (1979), 16 B.C.L.R. 48, [1980] 1 W.W.R. 464, 106 D.L.R.(3d) 9 Ruttan, J. said the onus for showing that a party is competent to be examined rests on the party seeking his examination. In the case at bar, the onus rests on the defendants.

[36]         The Rule in question uses the term, “a mentally incompetent person”.

[37]         It has been assumed up to now that Mr. DeMerchant is a mentally incompetent person because he has a trustee and a litigation guardian.  As well, the very nature of the application assumes the plaintiff is a mentally incompetent person since the application seeks leave of the court to examine him.

[38]         According to section 29 of the Interpretation Act, a “mentally incompetent person” is a “person with a mental disorder as defined in section 1 of the Mental Health Act”.

[39]         Reference to the Mental Health Act reveals the definition of a “person with a mental disorder” as “a person who has a disorder of the mind that requires treatment and seriously impairs the person’s ability (a) to react appropriately to the person’s environment, or (b) to associate with others”…

[45]         In the case at bar, there is medical evidence which conflicts, however I am satisfied that Drs. Bogod and  Lu have provided sufficient medical evidence  to suggest that the plaintiff does confabulate and would be unreliable as a witness.

[46]         I am also satisfied that the evidence of Drs. Bogod and Lu establish that the plaintiff meets both tests set out in the definition of a person with a mental disorder.

[47]         Accordingly, I determine that the applicants have not met the onus imposed upon them in seeking an order that the defendants be granted leave to examine the plaintiff at discovery.  It should also go without saying that I do not find the plaintiff to be competent to give evidence on his own behalf in these proceedings.

[48]           Consequently, I dismiss the defendants’ applications with costs to the plaintiff in any event of the cause.

More on ICBC Claims and Accelerated Vehicle Depreciation

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 57 Comments on More on ICBC Claims and Accelerated Vehicle Depreciation


As I’ve previously written, when a vehicle is involved in a crash and is then repaired it is generally worth less than it would be had it not been in the crash.  The reason for this is quite simple, when a buyer is looking to purchase a vehicle, those that have previously been damaged and repaired carry a stigma.  This stigma generally results in a lower resale value.
The law recognizes this lost value.  If your vehicle was damaged due the the actions of others you can sue to recover your damages for “accelerated depreciation“.  Reasons for judgement were released today discussing this area of law.
In today’s case (Signorello v. Khan) the Plaintiff owned at Mercedez-Benz SL65 AMG.  The vehicle cost $210,000.   On route to a business trip in 2007 he left the vehicle with a valet service.  The valet crashed the vehicle causing $26,000 of damage which was ultimately repaired.
The Plaintiff then claimed damages for accelerated depreciation.  The Defendant argued that the vehicle was repaired properly and to the highest standard therefore there was no accelerated depreciation.  Mr. Justice Grauer disagreed and found that, despite the sufficient repairs, the vehicle was now left with a reduced value and awarded the Plaintiff $16,000 for this loss.  In reaching this verdict Mr. Justice Grauer gave the following reasons:

[11]         In British Columbia, a person wishing to sell a used motor vehicle that has sustained damage in an accident costing $2,000 or more to repair must declare that to any potential buyer.  Other matters that must be declared include whether the vehicle has been leased or rented, whether it has been used as an emergency vehicle, and whether it has been registered out of province.

[12]         Since any person considering the purchase of Mr. Signorello’s Mercedes would presumably investigate further and thereby become aware of its history and the cost of its repairs, Mr. Signorello maintained that the market value of his vehicle has been reduced, a phenomenon known as accelerated depreciation.

[13]         The plaintiff’s claim under this heading was supported by expert evidence from Mr. Garry Cogbill of C/S Automotive Appraisals.  It was his conclusion that the loss amounted to 15% of the vehicle’s value at the time of the collision, varying between $12,500 and $18,000 depending upon whether one takes wholesale or retail.

[14]         The defendants’ contention that the plaintiff has suffered no loss in this regard was supported by expert evidence from Mr. Tom Cino of T.C. Consultants.  Mr. Cino expressed the view that so long as a vehicle damaged in an accident has been repaired properly, as this one clearly was, then there is no loss due to accelerated depreciation regardless of the amount of the damage.

[15]         Having read their reports and listened to the evidence of both experts, I find that I prefer the evidence of Mr. Cogbill to that of Mr. Cino…

[19]         The issue is whether, in the marketplace, people prepared to pay a six-figure sum for an exotic performance motorcar such as Mr. Signorello’s are likely to pay less for one that they learn has sustained $26,000 worth of damage, then they would for one that had never been in an accident, all else being equal.

[20]         The thrust of Mr. Cino’s opinion seems to be that a reasonable person who is as knowledgeable about motor vehicles as he most certainly is, would not think that a car that had been properly repaired is worth less than a like vehicle that has never been damaged.  That does not answer the question of what is likely to happen to this car in the marketplace, where reason does not necessarily prevail, and where few have his depth of knowledge.

[21]         Mr. Cino further based his opinion in part on the proposition that the majority of the repair work performed on Mr. Signorello’s Mercedes was to repair cosmetic damage rather than mechanical damage or damage to the frame.  He included in his description of “cosmetic damage” damage that could be repaired by the removal and replacement of the damaged part.  Mr. Cogbill, on the other hand, described most of the damage as other than cosmetic.  I prefer Mr. Cogbill’s approach.

[22]         To my mind, to be of significance in this context, cosmetic damage must mean damage that pertains only to the vehicle’s appearance, and need not be repaired in order for the vehicle to operate properly.  On that basis, I can well imagine that a potential buyer’s approach to a vehicle that had suffered $20,000 worth of cosmetic damage would be different from his approach to a vehicle that had suffered $20,000 worth of damage of a type that had to be repaired in order for the vehicle to be operable.  In this case, it is clear that the majority of the damage to the SL 65 was of the latter type, even if it consisted largely of the removal and replacement of mechanical parts.  I therefore found Mr. Cino’s approach in this regard to be less than convincing.

[23]         Finally, Mr. Cino sought to support his opinion by making a comparison to people purchasing very expensive vintage collector car, such as a 1967 Plymouth Barracuda, that has had all kinds of work put into it to restore what was a rusted hulk to like-new status.  With the greatest respect, that is not an apt comparison to a discriminating purchaser considering a near-new exotic luxury sports car….

[29] The law does not require that the plaintiff demonstrate the loss precisely by having sold the vehicle.  It is enough for him to establish, as I find that he has, a reduction in its value:  seeCummings v. 565204 B.C. Ltd., 2009 BCSC 1009.  I accept Mr. Cogbill’s conclusion in that regard, and doing the best that I can with his figures, I assess the reduction at $16,000.

Another interesting part of this judgement was the Court’s award of costs.  Usually when a Plaintiff is awarded less than $25,000 they are deprived their costs because they could have sued in Small Claims Court.  Despite this usual result, Mr. Justice Grauer awarded the Plaintiff costs finding it is reasonable to bring accelerated depreciation lawsuits in the BC Supreme Court even if the claim is worth below $25,000.  The Court provided the following useful reasons:

[52] On the matter of costs I am satisfied, in all of the circumstances of this case, that it was appropriate to commence this action in Supreme Court.  It was subject to former Rule 66, indicating an attempt to reduce expense.  It concerned an area that is not well traversed in fact or in law, particularly given the rarity and unusual nature of this motor vehicle.  Therefore, I find that the plaintiff is not limited to disbursements only, as though the action should have been brought in Provincial Court.  He is entitled to costs in the ordinary way under the Supreme Court Rules.

ICBC Claims and Default Judgement – A Seldom Pursued Remedy

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 3, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on ICBC Claims and Default Judgement – A Seldom Pursued Remedy


Default Judgement is a step under Rule 3-8 of the BC Supreme Court Rules which lets a Plaintiff win their lawsuit if a Defendant fails to file a response in the time-lines set out in Rule 3-3.
Default judgement, however, is not a remedy that’s typically used in ICBC claims.  The reason being that in addition to serving the Notice of Civil Claim on Defendants personally, Section 22 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act requires that “Every person commencing an action for damages caused by a vehicle in BC must serve (ICBC) with a copy of the originating process….and file proof of the service in the court in which the action is pending…A further step in the action must not be taken until the expiration of 8 days after the filing“.
What this means is that if a Defendant fails to respond to a BC motor vehicle collision lawsuit in time you cannot successfully obtain default judgement unless you also served ICBC with the documents and they failed to respond.
Even if you’ve taken the above steps Default Judgement is not granted automatically and this was demonstrated in reasons for judgement published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Sandhu v. ICBC) the Plaintiff sued for injuries apparently sustained in a 2002 motor vehicle collision.  He filed and served the documents to start a lawsuit but ICBC did not file a defence in the time required by the Rules of Court.  The Plaintiff then brought an applicaiton for judgment.  Mr. Justice Voith refused to grant default judgement and noted that the Court had discretion with respect to these applicasitons.  Specifically the Court held as follows:

9]             I am advised by Mr. Schroeder, though there are no materials before me, that the plaintiff was injured in a car accident in the late 1990s and that his claim was settled in January of 2002. Furthermore and importantly, Mr. Schroeder confirms that because of the passage of time, his file has been destroyed, and that he has made inquiries with ICBC whose own file in relation to the matter has also, for the most part, been destroyed.

[10]         Mr. Schroeder requires these materials to properly respond to Mr. Sandhu’s claims.

[11]         I am not going to issue judgment. What I am going to do is adjourn the matter because of the following series of factors.

[12]         First, the primary focus of Mr. Sandhu’s application is one that deals with Mr. Schroeder’s lack of compliance with time requirements. I have some flexibility or discretion with respect to such issues and, under the circumstances where Mr. Schroeder was endeavouring to ascertain what had happened in the past and to retrieve relevant file materials, I would be hesitant to award judgment.

While delay is rarely welcome in Injury Lawsuits sometimes it is part of the process.  Very few ICBC claims are won by default judgment.  It is always preferable for claims to be dealt with by their merits.

As a courtesy most plaintiff lawyers grant ICBC defense lawyers a little extra time if necessary to put in their formal defense.  If you’re faced with this situation you’ll want to consider whether an application for default judgement has a meaningful chance of success prior to spending time and effort on a seldom used motion.

New Rules of Court Update – The Transition Rule

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 24, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today interpreting and applying Rule 24 (the transition rule).
In today’s case (Willard v. Mitchell) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  The Defendant brought a motion to compel the Plaintiff to produce various medical and business records.  The lawsuit was commenced under the former rules of court.  The motion for production was also filed under the former rules but judgement was not delivered until October, 2010.
Mr. Justice Brooke ordered production of the documents the Defendant requested.  Prior to doing so the Court stated that the former Rules of Court applied to applications filed prior to July 1, 2010.  Specifically Mr. Justice Brooke held as follows:

[24]         Both the present action and application were filed before July 1, 2010, when the new Supreme Court Rules came into effect. Rule 24?1 of the new civil rules provides that a proceeding started before that date will proceed under the new rules, with this exception:

Step in ongoing proceeding

(14)  If a step in a proceeding is taken before July 1, 2010, the former Supreme Court Rules apply to any right or obligation arising out of or relating to that step if and to the extent that that right or obligation is to have effect before September 1, 2010.

[25]         In my view, the defendant’s application for discovery of documents constitutes a step in a proceeding that was taken before July 1, 2010, and the right or obligation will have effect before September 1, 2010. Accordingly, the former Supreme Court Rules, and specifically Rule 26 governing the discovery and inspection of documents, continue to apply to this application.

A Suggested Change at ICBC To Benefit British Columbians

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Tort Reform, Uncategorized. 71 Comments on A Suggested Change at ICBC To Benefit British Columbians


Whether you are a plaintiff lawyer, a defence lawyer, an adjuster or someone insured with ICBC I think we can all agree that there is one ICBC practice that could change to better serve British Columbians.  I’m talking about the practice of assigning the same adjuster to deal with Tort and No-Fault Benefit claims.
As I’ve previously discussed, ICBC usually fulfills two roles in the context of injury claims.  The first is that they insure people for “no-fault” benefits.  If you are insured, whether or not you are at fault for a collision ICBC provides some basic coverage for medical/rehabilitation expenses and a modest wage loss benefit in the event of total disability.  If you are seeking coverage ICBC assigns an adjuster to process your claim no-fault benefits.
At the same time ICBC usually provides coverage to the at fault party for any claims made against them.  When a faultless party is injured and wishes to be compensated for the full extent of their damages they make a tort claim.  ICBC assigns an adjuster to process these tort claims.  The difficulty, however, is that ICBC typically assigns the same adjuster to deal with the faultless parties claims for no-fault benefits and to process the tort claim made against the at fault party.
As a business decision ICBC’s policy makes sense.  Why assign two people to look after various claims being advanced as a result of a single event?  It is more cost effective to get one adjuster to learn about the crash, the parties involved, the various injuries and the claims being advanced.  As a practical matter, however, one person cannot fulfill both these roles in a completely impartial way.
In reality adjusters processing a no-fault benefits claim have a very different duty compared to an adjuster processing a tort claim.  In a no-fault benefits claim the adjuster owes a duty to the injured party to provide them with their insurance benefits.  If therapies are required these should be covered.  If disability occurs wage loss benefits should be provided.
In tort claims, however, the adjuster owes a duty to the at fault party.  If claims are being advanced the at fault party will want those settled for as little as possible as the funds are paid from their coverage.  It is difficult to imagine how one adjuster can fulfill these competing duties fairly and impartially.  The conflicting duties create an inherent conflict of interest.  (You can click here to read an article providing a real world example of how this conflict can play out to harm the interests of a person injured through no fault of their own).
After reading this you may be asking yourself whether ICBC’s practice is lawful.  Unfortunately, the answer is yes.  This practice has been brought before the Courts and is tolerated.
However, just because a practice is accepted does not make it right.  Since the Courts are not able to correct this practice the ability to change is in the hands of ICBC.
The solution is simple.  ICBC can assign separate adjusters to deal with tort and no-fault claims.  Once done ICBC can set up internal ‘walls’ to prevent the adjusters from accessing each others files.  This would add more fairness to the application process for no-fault benefits.  This would also help ensure that information shared by a party with their insurer to receive medical treatment is not automatically disclosed to the agent of the person responsible for causing the injuries.  This is a proposed change, I hope, we could all agree on.
As always, feedback is welcome on this forum and I’d appreciate views from others about this topic, particularly views from people who feel these proposed changes would not be beneficial.

Conflicting Duties? Treating Doctors Duties to Their Patients and to the Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


As previously discussed, one of the biggest changes in the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules is an overhaul to the requirements for admissibility of expert opinions.  These changes have created some tension in personal injury claims.
In no area of law are expert opinions used more frequently than in personal injury lawsuits.   The opinions of treating physicians are often crucial in the success of a personal injury claim.  In fact, if a plaintiff fails to call their own doctor in support of their case the Court could draw an ‘adverse inference‘ and assume the doctor will say something negative.
One of the changes imposed by the New Rules is a requirement that experts certify that their duty is to “assist the court and not to be an advocate for any party“.  In reality, this requirement always existed although it was not specifically spelled out in the former rules.   Despite this, some treating physicians have been concerned with this new explicit requirement and refuse to provide expert opinions on the basis that they feel they are ethically required to be advocates for their patients.
Fortunately, the BC College of Physicians and Surgeons has squarely addressed this concern and informed their members that the New Rules of Court are not inconsistent with doctors duties to their patients.  Specifically, in the September 2010 issue of the College’s quarterly publication physicians were advised as follows:
The College does not view the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules to be in conflict with the Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics, including the fundamental responsibility to consider first the well being of the patient.  With respect to the duty imposed under Rule 11-2 the College has always expected physicians providing expert reports to be fair, objective, and provide opinions that are supported by available information.
This expectation applies equally to physicians whether they are appointed by the plaintiff, defence, jointly or by the Court.  Additionally, whether physicians are acting as experts in the capacity of treating physicians or independent medical experts, they still must provide balanced and objective reports.   The College does recommend that, when asked to provide an expert opinion, treating physicians discuss with their patients the physician’s duty to assist the court and not be an advocate for any party.
The truth of the matter is that treating doctors should be advocates for their patients health.  They should not be advocates for their patients personal injury claims or other legal matters.  The above clarification will hopefully assist physicians who have felt conflicted from providing opinions under the New Rules of Court.