Skip to main content

Tag: bc injury law

New Rules of Court Update: No Document Disclosure Obligations for Petitions

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, addressing whether the new Civil Rules require Petitioners to disclose and produce documents.
In today’s case (Fern Castle Holdings Corp. v. Stonebridge Village Residence Ltd.) the Petitioner sought relief arguing that the Respondents took action that was ‘oppressive to the petitioner‘.  In the course of the proceeding the Petitioner sought an order requiring the Respondents to produce a List of Documents pursuant to Rule 7-1.  The Respondents opposed arguing that this requirement does not apply to Petitions but only to “an action“.  Master Bouck agreed and dismissed the motion.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons with respect to the application of Rule 7-1:

[9]             Rule 7-1(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules provides as follows:

7-1(1) Unless all parties of record consent or the court otherwise orders, each party of record to an action must, within 35 days after the end of the pleading period,

(a) prepare a list of documents in Form 22 that lists

(i) all documents that are or have been in the party’s possession or control and that could, if available, be used by any party of record at trial to prove or disprove a material fact, and

(ii) all other documents to which the party intends to refer at trial, and

(b) serve the list on all parties of record.

(my emphasis)

[10]         While this Rule has changed the scope of document disclosure, it has not changed the general rule that such disclosure is not required on a proceeding brought by petition.

[11]         On a plain reading of Rule 7-1(1), it is impossible to import or apply document disclosure processes to this proceeding, even with the parties consent. The Rule can only apply to an “action” which is defined as a “proceeding started by a notice of civil claim”: Rule 1-1. Furthermore, the reference to the use of documents at trial confirms that the Rule does not apply to petitions.

[12]         The Application Respondents suggest that the relief sought on this application can only be pursued when or if the petition is converted to an action. I agree. However, the petitioner did not specifically seek that relief in its application and I am reluctant to make an order converting the petition on my own motion.

Damages for Violations of Privacy in BC

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 128 Comments on Damages for Violations of Privacy in BC

(Update: The below decision was upheld by the BC Court of Appeal in December, 2011)

As I’ve previously written, the BC Privacy Act allows individuals to sue where their privacy is violated “wilfully and without a claim of right” by another person.  This powerful law permits such lawsuits to succeed even where a Plaintiff cannot prove actual damages.
Despite the strength of the BC Privacy Act, relatively few reported decisions have been released applying this law in the years that it has been on the books.  Useful reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, applying this law in combination with a claim for damages for defamation.
In today’s case (Nesbitt v. Neufeld) the Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in “protracted family litigation” During the course of that litigation one of the parties “resorted to out-of-court publications that are plainly private to the litigants“.  The reasons for judgement are worth reviewing in full for the details but these apparently included “private communications…released to third parties and made available to the public (including)…a YouTube video…a website…a Facebook Page…(and) a letter to the Ministry of Child and Family Development”
The victim sued arguing she was defamed and further that her privacy rights were unreasonably violated.  Mr. Justice Crawford agreed and awarded the Plaintiff $40,000 in damages.   In reaching this award the Court provided the following reasons:

[89]         The B.C. Court of Appeal in Davis v. McArthur (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 760, [1970] B.C.J. No. 664 (QL) (C.A.), said this in the course of its judgment at para. 9 of QL:

To constitute the tort [of violation of privacy] the violation must be committed “wilfully and without a claim of right”. The nature and degree of privacy to which the person is entitled in any situation or in relation to any matter is fully set out in s-s (2) [now ss. 1(2) and 1(3)] and, in my opinion, no useful purpose would be served in attempting to elaborate upon the words contained therein. Regard must be had to the provisions of the subsection as a whole. It is plain that whether there has been a violation of privacy of another must be decided on the particular facts of each case. As the learned Judge below said in his reasons for judgment [10 D.L.R. (3d) 250 at p. 255, 72 W.W.R. 69]: “It is necessary to consider all of the circumstances before determining ‘The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled,’ s. 2(2) [now ss. 1(2) and 1(3)].

[90]         In Hollinsworth v. BCTV, a division of Westcom T.V. Group Ltd. (1999), 59 B.C.L.R. (3d) 121, 113 B.C.A.C. 304, the Court of Appeal defined the term “wilfully” to mean “an intention to do an act which the person doing the act knew or should have known would violate the privacy of another person” (at para. 29 of B.C.L.R.).

[91]         Dr. Nesbitt’s use of the private correspondence between Ms. Neufeld and Ms. X was a deliberate act that violated Ms. Neufeld’s privacy. The communications were extremely personal…

[96] Had Dr. Nesbitt restricted his communications within the confines of the family court litigation where he had counsel to advise him of the bounds of legitimate expression of his opinions, the issues before me in this proceeding might not have arisen. I say “might” because I note that certain publications of Dr. Nesbitt prompted an application to the family court that resulted in a consent order made on September 8, 2008 before Master Caldwell restraining Dr. Nesbitt from making further improper communications…

[102] The reality is that Dr. Nesbitt has taken his battle with Ms. Neufeld over custody and access far outside the ordinary confines of the family court litigation. Even worse his lack of appreciation for the proper boundaries of communication of his opinions has spread to besmirch persons that are friends of Ms. Neufeld.

[103] Dr. Nesbitt disclosed matters private to the parties in a manner that defamed Ms. Neufeld; he is the publisher of the defamatory materials at issue.

[104] For breach of privacy and the defamation aspects of the defendant’s claim, I set that amount at $40,000.

[105] I only limit the defamation damages due to the fact that while it is plainly publication to the world in the sense the defamatory materials were put on the Internet, Ms. Neufeld indicated there has been little personal or professional backlash. Indeed, if I read between the lines, the communications to the Rotary Club, the Ministry and the Child’s doctor were treated with the disdain they deserved.

The Court went on to award the victim ‘special costs’ in order to rebuke the other parties ‘reprehensible conduct‘.  The ease created by social media platforms in allowing individuals to quickly publish material to the Internet will likely make claims such as these more prevalent in the years to come.  With this, damage awards for privacy violations will hopefully be shaped into predictable ranges.

"Prior Consistent Statements" and ICBC Unidentified Motorist Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.


Generally speaking a person is not allowed to call evidence of ‘prior consistent statements‘ at trial.  The reason is because this offends the rule against hearsay and is an improper attempt to bolster witness credibility.  There is a powerful exception to this general rule, however, and this relates to allegations that a witness is fabricating their court-room evidence.   This exception was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a hit and run accident.
As I’ve previously written, injury victims have the right to sue ICBC for damages when involved in hit and run accidents in BC.  These are commonly referred to as section 24 claims because injury victims involved in unidentified motorist claims gain the right to sue ICBC directly through section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.
ICBC often defends section 24 claims by denying the existence of the unidentified motorist and blaming the Plaintiff for their own injuries.  When this happens the ‘recent fabrication‘ exception is triggered in effect opening the floodgates for corroborating evidence at trial.
In today’s case (Jennings v. Doe) the Plaintiff was injured when a tractor trailer cut him off and forced his vehicle off the road.  The Driver of the tractor-trailer left the scene and the Plaintiff could not identify him.  The Plaintiff sued ICBC directly for his injuries.  ICBC defended the claim denying the existence of the tractor trailer.  The Plaintiff attempted to call evidence of prior consistent statements corroborating his courtroom evidence.  ICBC objected arguing this was not permissible.  Madam Justice Baker disagreed and allowed the evidence in.  In doing so the Court gave the following very useful reasons:

[52]         Counsel for the defendants objected to the admission of the testimony of Mr. Simon and Mr. Jennings, Sr., and various documents indicating that Mr. Jennings did, at the earliest opportunity, and consistently since that time, claim that the accident had been caused by the actions of the driver of a tractor-trailer unit.  Counsel submitted, correctly, that previous “consistent” statements of a witness are normally not admissible for the truth of their contents, or to buttress the credibility of a trial witness’ testimony.  The defendants say they are not asserting a “recent” fabrication, although by implication they are asserting that Mr. Jennings has fabricated a story about how the accident happened.

[53]         In my view, earlier decisions of this court establish that in circumstances such as these, the previous out-of-court statements are admissible and relevant not for proof of the truth of the out-of-court statements but to rebut any inference that a claimant is lying because he failed to assert his present version of events at the first and any subsequent opportunity when it would be reasonable to expect him to do so, or had made inconsistent claims in the past about the circumstances of the accident.

[54]         In Vanderbyl v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, (1993) 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) (S.C.), at paras. 37 and 38, Mr. Justice Trainor, an experienced trial judge, set out a list of elements to be considered in assessing the credibility of a plaintiff in cases such as these.  Among the elements identified by Justice Trainor were the following:

1.  Whether the plaintiff reported the existence of the unidentified vehicle as soon as reasonably possible to the police or other persons in authority and to I.C.B.C.

2.  Whether the description of the unidentified motor vehicle given by the plaintiff was as specific as might reasonably be expected from the particular plaintiff in the circumstances.

3.  Whether the plaintiff’s testimony at trial is consistent with statements given to the police, doctors or medical attendants, family members, associated or other witnesses or to I.C.B.C.

4.  Whether the plaintiff has called witnesses to testify to whom statements were made or who might testify about the plaintiff’s actions after the incident.

…

8.  Whether the plaintiff’s actions following the accident are consistent with those one might reasonably expect of a person in similar circumstances.

[55]         In this case, Mr. Jennings reported the existence of the unidentified vehicle as soon as reasonably possible to the police and to the Insurer.  Mr. Jennings told drivers who stopped at the scene and the ambulance attendant ? Mr. Simon ? that a tractor-trailer unit had been involved and he attempted to make a report to police at the scene, but was prevented from doing so by the ambulance personnel who were concerned about his physical injuries.  Mr. Jennings Sr. reported the involvement of a second vehicle to the Boston Bar RCMP Detachment on the day of the accident.  Mr. Jennings Sr. reported the circumstances to the dial-a-claim adjuster by telephone and Mr. Jennings made a statement in person and in writing to an adjuster a few days after the accident.  The evidence of Mr. Simon about Mr. Jennings’ anger and his physical condition when assessed at the accident scene is consistent with what one might reasonably expect of a person in similar circumstances.   I believe Mr. Jennings, and I accept his testimony about how the accident happened.

When advancing a hit and run ICBC claim it is good practice to review hospital, ambulance, police and other records to look for ‘prior consistent statements’ in the event ICBC alleges recent fabrication at trial.

The Price of Passing the Buck: Dismissed Third Party Claims and Costs Consequences

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized. 46 Comments on The Price of Passing the Buck: Dismissed Third Party Claims and Costs Consequences


As previously discussed, when Plaintiffs lose a lawsuit in the BC Supreme Court the Defendants are typically each entitled to recover their ‘costs‘.   For this reason Plaintiffs need to take care in selecting the Defendants to their lawsuit.  The same principle holds true for Defendants who don’t accept blame for their actions and unsuccessfully try to pass the buck by dragging a ‘Third Party’ into a lawsuit.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, demonstrating this general principle.
In this week’s case (Vedan v. Stevens) the Plaintiff sued the Defendant for personal injuries.  The Defendant denied fault and blamed the Plaintiff.  The Defendant also filed a “Third Party” claim against two individuals arguing they may be at fault and brought them into the lawsuit.  Ultimately Madam Justice Beames found that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were at fault for the Plaintiff’s injuries but that the Third Parties were faultless.
The Third Party brought a motion seeking an order requiring the Defendants to pay their costs.  The Defendant argued that these should be the Plaintiff’s responsibility.  Madam Justice Beames disagreed and ordered that the Defendant pay the Third Party’s costs.  In reaching this typical result the Court provided the following reasons:

[7]             With respect to who ought to pay the third parties’ costs, the general rule is that a defendant who has unsuccessfully brought third party proceedings should be responsible for the third parties’ costs: Wilson v. INA Insurance Co. of Canada, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2174 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 37; Milina v. Bartsch, [1985] B.C.J. No. 2789 (S.C.) at para. 4.

[8]             As McLachlin J. (as she then was) said in Milina:

[5]        There may be situations where, on the peculiar facts of the case, fairness requires that an unsuccessful plaintiff bear a successful third party’s costs. Courts have held that such an order may be appropriate where one or more of the following situations was present:

1.         Where the main issue litigated was between the plaintiff and the third party…

2.         Where the third party was brought or kept in the matter by reason of the act or neglect of the plaintiff…

3.         Where the case involves a string of contracts in substantially the same terms for the sale of goods…

4.         Where the third party proceedings follow naturally and inevitably upon the institution of plaintiff’s action, in the sense that the defendant had no real alternative but to join the third party…

[9]             The defendant argues that this situation is very similar to that of Norman (Guardian ad litem of) v. McMillan, 2004 BCSC 384 in which the court found that the defendant fell within the exceptions in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Milina. In my view, the decision in Norman is distinguishable. There, the defendant was found completely blameless for the accident, which had initially been commenced when the plaintiff’s mother was his guardian ad litem. It had been her decision to commence the unsuccessful action against the defendant in the first instance. Certain steps that were taken in the action led the trial judge to conclude that defence counsel had a proper basis for alleging negligence on the part of the third party and the trial judge accepted that the third party, or her counsel, had employed tactics amounting to an attempt to make an end run around the defendant.

[10]         I am not satisfied that there is anything in this case which takes it out of the general rule. Consequently, the defendant will bear the third parties’ costs as assessed.

More on the New Rules, Formal Settlement Offers and Timelines for Acceptance

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized. 68 Comments on More on the New Rules, Formal Settlement Offers and Timelines for Acceptance


As I’ve previously written, the new formal settlement offer rule (Rule 9) reads almost identically to the former Rule 37B.   Under the former rules BC Courts were reluctant to have formal settlement offers trigger costs consequences following trial where the offer was open for acceptance for a short period of time.  Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, reaching a similar result under Rule 9.
In today’s case (Hunter v. Anderson) the Plaintiff sued for injuries as a result of a slip and fall incident.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant made a formal settlement offer for $25,000.  This offer was made one week before trial and was left open for acceptance for only 3 days.  The Plaintiff declined the offer and proceeded to trial.  After trial the Defendant was found 25% at fault for the fall and the Plaintiff was awarded just over $9,000 in damages.
The Defendant asked to be awarded their costs from the time of the offer onward.  Mr. Justice Cullen refused to do so finding that the offer was not alive for a reasonable period of time and split the costs the parties were entitled to.   In reaching this verdict the Court provided the following reasons:
[14] In dealing with the first issue under Rule 9-1(6), whether the offer was one that might reasonably have been accepted “the analysis is not one of hindsight, once the final result is known”.  See A.E. v. D.W.J. 2009 BCSC 505; Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372.  In the present case, the operative offer of the defendant was made relatively late in the day and was essentially premised on the defendant having no potential liability, but simply to offset the costs of a potential trial…

[15]         In my view, on balance, in the circumstances, despite the ultimate result, given the short duration of the offer, the fact that it was not based on an assessment of the liability of the defendant, it could not be characterized as one which ought reasonably to have been accepted.  I note that on March 9, 2010, when the offer was made, the defendant had not yet provided her fourth and final list of documents which was provided on March 10th.  As well, there was ongoing disclosure of the plaintiff’s documents.

[16]         In addition I note that in Bailey v. Jang, supra, Hinkson J. (as he then was) considered a seven day period “a reasonable time after which the plaintiff could consider (the defendant’s) offer” for purposes of awarding double costs under the old Rule 37B(6) after the expiry of that period…

Although the defendant tendered her offer on March 9th, six days before trial, it was in the context of ongoing disclosure and was left open, effectively, for only three days.  The plaintiff did not have the benefit of a great deal of time to assess the defendant’s offer.  In the context of Bailey v. Jang, Hinkson J. considered a seven day period “a reasonable period of time after which the plaintiff could consider their offer”.  I conclude a similar period is appropriate to impute in the circumstances of this case where the plaintiff was deprived of the ability to accept the defendant’s offer after only three days effectively commencing March 10th.  In light of that factor and the others I have set forth, I award the plaintiff, as indicated, the costs and disbursements up to and including the first two days of trial, and the defendants their costs and disbursements for the six days comprising the balance of the trial.

The Standard of Care For Drivers Approaching Flashing Green Lights

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing the issue of fault for intersection crashes governed by a flashing green light.
In today’s case (Nonis v. Granata) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision with the Defendant’s vehicle.  The crash happened at a busy intersection in Burnaby, BC.  The Plaintiff approached an intersection which was governed by a stop sign in his direction of travel.  He left the stop sign and attempted to drive through the intersection which consisted of 6 lanes of travel.  Vehicles were stopped in the first 5 lanes.  As the Plaintiff entered the 6th lane the Plaintiff failed to see the Defendant’s oncoming vehicle and the collision occurred.
The Defendant was not speeding.  He was faced with a flashing green light as he approached the intersection and had the right of way.   Despite this the Defendant was found 25% at fault for the crash for not taking appropriate care in all of the circumstances.  In reaching this verdict Madam Justice Fisher provided the following reasons addressing motorists responsibility when approaching a flashing green light:

[12] A driver approaching a flashing traffic signal also has a duty to proceed with caution.  Section 131(5) provides that when a flashing green light is exhibited by a traffic control signal at an intersection,

(a) the driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection or signal and facing the signal must cause it to approach the intersection or signal in such a manner that he or she is able to cause the vehicle to stop before reaching the signal or any crosswalk in the vicinity of the signal if a stop should become necessary, and must yield the right of way to pedestrians lawfully in a crosswalk in the vicinity of the signal or in the intersection …

[13]         Although this section has been held to advantage pedestrians, the presence of a flashing green light may be considered in assessing the potential liability of a dominant driver involved in a collision with another vehicle: Gautreau v. Hollige, 2000 BCCA 390.  Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, I am entitled to consider the flashing green light as a factor in assessing the driving of the defendant and his obligation to respond to the danger that was presented by the plaintiff…

[28] The defendant, while the dominant driver, proceeded toward an intersection with a flashing green light in circumstances where the traffic in the immediate two lanes to his left had either stopped or was barely moving.  In my view, he had a duty – consistent with s. 131(5) of the Act – to slow down sufficiently to be able to cause his vehicle to stop should this become necessary.  This he did not do.  His evidence was that he was driving at approximately 40 kilometres per hour.  Had he slowed down, he would have had a sufficient opportunity to avoid the collision, as he would have been in the same position as the vehicles to his left.  His failure to keep a proper lookout contributed to the accident….

[33] For all of these reasons, it is my view that both parties were at fault for this collision.  Because the defendant was the dominant driver, I consider him to be less at fault.  Although he failed to slow down, he was not speeding, as were the defendants in both Andrews and Hynna. Under the Negligence Act, I find the plaintiff 75% at fault and the defendant 25% at fault.

Rules of Court Update: Video-Conference Evidence and "Proportionality"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 2 Comments on Rules of Court Update: Video-Conference Evidence and "Proportionality"


As I’ve previously written, the BC Evidence Act permits, in certain circumstances, witnesses to give evidence via video-conference instead of appearing live in Court.  This can result in great savings of time and money to parties involved in a lawsuit.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, demonstrating that orders allowing video-conference evidence at trial may become more common place given the New BC Supreme Court Rules focus on “proportionality”.
In today’s case (Slaughter v. Sluys) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle collision in Vernon, BC.  The case was set for trial for April, 2011.  Many of the Plaintiff’s witnesses were from Ontario and the Plaintiff wished to have them testify via video-conference.  If the Plaintiff was granted this order he estimated the savings at $50,000.   The Defendant objected arguing that the video-conference rule “is intended to apply in relatively rare circumstances, and to individual or a limited number of witnesses. He says that there is no authority for what the plaintiff proposes, namely to call 11 of his 28 witnesses via videoconference, over an estimated 22 hours…It is the defendant’s position that the cost of having the witnesses attend in Vernon for the trial pales in comparison to the multi?million dollar claim being advanced by the plaintiff. It is his position that it would be fundamentally unfair to limit the defendant’s counsel’s ability to have a full and complete cross-examination of the witnesses, which he says can only occur if the witnesses are physically present in the courtroom.”
Madam Justice Beames rejected these arguments and largely granted the Plaintiff’s motion.  In doing so the BC Supreme Court gave the following reasons explaining the vital role of the ‘proportionality‘ principle in having cost effective trials:

[9]             There is no question that the Rules of this province, enacted in 2010, have a new or at least renewed, emphasis on the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of a proceeding on its merits, which involves a consideration of proportionality. There is also no question that various forms of technology have been employed on a more frequent basis recently, in all court proceedings, including trials. Advances have been made in the quality of communication via videoconferencing, which has all but eliminated the problems often associated with videoconferencing in the early days of its use, which involved time delays in the transmission and which in turn frequently resulted in counsel and witnesses talking over each other and which made for a less than satisfactory method of conducting both direct or cross examination. I have, in the recent past, found videoconferencing to be an acceptable and satisfactory method of receiving evidence from a witness, which has not inhibited assessment of credibility or the finding of facts. Although at first blush 22 hours worth of evidence via videoconference seems to be a significant amount of time, it must be borne in mind that this trial is scheduled to last for six weeks, and the proposed videoconferencing would consume but four days of the trial.

[10]         I am not convinced, as submitted, that it would be “fundamentally unfair to the defendant to deprive him of the opportunity to have witnesses properly cross examined” in person in the courtroom. Proper and full cross examination can take place even when witnesses are appearing via videoconferencing. In my view, this is particularly so where the witnesses are experts and where credibility per se is not in issue and it is also the case where the evidence a witness may give is not overly contentious. On the other hand, the plaintiff cannot, alone, determine which witnesses are “important” and therefore should attend in person, and which witnesses are “not so important” and therefore should be permitted to testify via videoconferencing.

[11]         I am also mindful of the submission that cross examination of the experts will be difficult if conducted via videoconferencing, as a result of the number of documents each witness may be asked to review. However, videoconferencing can be accompanied by equipment at each end of the transmission that allows both the expert and the examiner to view the same document. Further, the experts’ files are required, under the new Rules, to be produced for review by opposing parties, on request, at least 14 days before trial. File contents may be organized and numbered in such a way as to minimize any concerns with respect to the use of documents during direct or cross-examination via videoconferencing. I am satisfied that any need to refer experts to documents can be satisfactorily accommodated and does not mean that experts should not be permitted to testify via videoconferencing.

[12]         Bearing all of the evidence and submissions of counsel in mind, and attempting to balance the interests of the parties, I have concluded that the following witnesses should be permitted to testify by videoconference: Mike Willems, Frank Durant, Dr. Marshall, Dr. Stimac, Dr. Berry, Dr. Scher, and Dr. Travlos. With respect to the remaining witnesses, each, as I understand the submissions, has something to say about the plaintiff’s most significant claim, his loss of opportunity to earn income, in that each either works with or supervises the plaintiff in his current employment. Given their relationships to the plaintiff, the possibility that their evidence will be very contentious, and that none of them have provided the court with any indication that they will be personally inconvenienced or suffer hardship as a result of testifying in person in Vernon, they will be required to testify in person if the plaintiff does indeed call their evidence at trial.

MPIC No-Fault Benefits Not Available to British Columbians Injured in BC By MPIC Insured Drivers

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released today deciding the extent of no-fault benefits the Manitoba Public Insurance Company (MPIC) has to pay when a driver insured by them injures a person in British Columbia.
In today’s case (Schuk v. York Fire & Casualty Insurance Company) the Plaintiff was considered a pedestrian and was struck by a tractor trailer driven by an individual insured with MPIC.  The collision occurred in British Columbia.  The Plaintiff was severely injured but ICBC and MPIC did not agree as to who had to provide coverage.
Ultimately a lawsuit was brought and Mr. Justice Meyers ordered that both MPIC and ICBC had to provide the Plaintiff with benefits with MPIC being the primary insurer.  (You can click here to read my former post summarizing this previous decision)
Unfortunately the legal positioning did not end there.  Manitoba is a true no-fault jurisdiction meaning that people injured in Manitoba motor vehicle collisions have had their rights to sue for damages severely restricted.  As a trade off they have a relatively generous scheme of no-fault insurance benefits.  In today’s case the Plaintiff argued that MPIC had to provide the Plaintiff with the more robust MPIC benefits.  MPIC disagreed arguing that their obligation to pay no-fault benefits is governed by the lesser BC limits.  Ultimately Madam Justice Brown sided with MPIC and ruled that a British Columbian injured in BC by an MPIC insured driver is not entitled to claim the more generous MPIC no-fault benefits.  Madam Justice Brown provided the following reasons:

[16]         The issue before me turns on the proper interpretation of the Power of Attorney and Undertaking filed by the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation.  In this case, the relevant provisions of the undertaking provide that the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation undertakes to:

A. … appear in any action … against it or its insured …

C. … not to set up any defence to any claim … which might not be set up if the contract had been entered into in accordance with the laws relating to motor vehicle liability insurance contracts or plan of automobile insurance in the Province … and to satisfy in a final judgment rendered against it or its insured by a court … in respect of any kind or class of coverage … up to the greater of

(a) the amounts and limits for that kind or class of coverage … provided in the contract or plan, or

(b) the minimum for that kind or class of coverage … required by law in such province ….

[17]         There is no issue that the coverage for the kind or class of insurance, being no-fault benefits is greater in Manitoba.  The question is whether its undertaking makes MPIC liable to pay that amount to Ms. Schuk.  In my view, it does not.  The undertaking provides that MPIC will satisfy any final judgment rendered against it “in respect of any kind or class of coverage provided under the contract or plan”, and “in respect of any kind or class of coverage required by law to be provided under a plan” in British Columbia.

[18]         In this case, there is no coverage provided under the contract or plan to Ms. Schuk for no-fault benefits under Part 2 of the Manitoba Act.  To qualify for that coverage, a person must be a Manitoba resident or injured in an accident in Manitoba (s. 74).  As MPIC argues, the Manitoba standard automobile policy does not incorporate PIPP benefits.  PIPP benefits are available based upon statutory entitlement.

[19]         Here, Section B of the contract provided accident benefits “as required by law”.  The Manitoba legislation provides PIPP benefits only to those resident in or injured in Manitoba.  Those benefits are not “required by law” for one, like Ms. Schuk, who is not a resident of Manitoba and not injured in Manitoba.  The driver of a Manitoba licensed vehicle is not required to carry PIPP coverage.  The Section B endorsement carried a charge of $950 for “accident benefits coverage for those drivers not eligible for Personal Injury Protection Plan (PIPP)”.  I accept the submissions of Manitoba Public Insurance that this would be drivers who were not Manitoba residents and were not injured in Manitoba.

[20]         Ms. Schuk did not have PIPP benefits coverage under either the contract or the plan.

[21]         The other portion of MPIC’s undertaking, that is not to set up any defence which might not be set up if the contract had been entered into in the Province of British Columbia, also does not assist the plaintiff.  ICBC could certainly have set up the defence that it does not provide benefits under the Manitoba legislation; that Ms. Schuk does not qualify for PIPP benefits.

The New Rules of Court and Examinations for Discovery

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Uncategorized. 47 Comments on The New Rules of Court and Examinations for Discovery


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing the scope of permissible questions at examinations for discovery under the new Civil Rules.  In short, the Court noted that although the New Rules contain some changes with respect to the time permitted for discovery, precedents developed under the former rules remain good law with respect to permissible questions.  The court also addressed the factors that can be considered in extending an examination for discovery.
In today’s case (Kendall v. Sun Life Assurance Company) the Plaintiff had disability insurance with the Defendant.  The Plaintiff sued claiming the Defendant improperly denied her insurance benefits.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff examined a representative of Sun Life for discovery.  During the course of discovery Sun Life’s lawyer caused “so much disruption” with interfering objections that Plaintiff’s counsel terminated the examination prematurely and walked out.
The Plaintiff brought a motion compelling the representative to attend discovery again to complete the examination, to answer the questions that were objected to and to extend the time of discovery beyond the permitted 7 hours.  Madam Justice Griffin granted the motion and in doing so made the following comments about the scope of permissible discovery questions under the new rules:

[6]             Rule 7-2(18)(a) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009 [Rules of Court] sets out the scope of examination as follows:

(18)      Unless the court otherwise orders, a person being examined for discovery

(a)        must answer any question within his or her knowledge or means of knowledge regarding any matter, not privileged, relating to a matter in question in the action, …

[7]             Despite a variety of substantive changes to the Rules of Court enacted effective July 1, 2010, the scope of examination for discovery has remained unchanged and is very broad….

[13]         While the scope of examination for discovery has not changed with the new Rules of Court brought into force on July 1, 2010, the length of examination for discovery is now limited to seven hours or any greater period to which the person to be examined consents: Rule 7-2(2).

[14]          The newly imposed time limit on discovery makes it all the more important that the courts enforce the principle that counsel for the examined party must not unduly interfere or intervene during the examination for discovery.  The time limit imposes a self-policing incentive on the examining counsel to be focused and to not waste time on questions that will not advance the purpose of investigating the case or obtaining admissions for use at trial.

[15]         While the time limit on examination for discovery creates an incentive on the examining party to be efficient, it unfortunately also creates a risk that counsel for the examinee will be inefficient by unduly objecting and interfering on the discovery, for the purpose of wasting the limited time available.  If that party is economically stronger than the examining party, it also can strategically increase the costs of litigation this way, by burdening the financially disadvantaged party with having to bring a court application to obtain a proper discovery.

[16]         The proper conduct of an examination for discovery within the spirit of the Rules thus relies on the professionalism of counsel for the party being examined.

[17]         As held by the Ontario Superior Court in Iroquois Falls Power Corp. v. Jacobs Canada Inc. (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 438 at para. 4:

Improper interference by counsel in the other party’s discovery undermines the purposes of discovery, prolongs it, fosters professional mistrust and generally offends the overall purpose of the Rules….

[18]         A largely “hands off” approach to examinations for discovery, except in the clearest of circumstances, is in accord with the object of the Rules of Court, particularly the newly stated object of proportionality, effective July 1, 2010.  Allowing wide-ranging cross-examination on examination for discovery is far more cost-effective than a practice that encourages objections, which will undoubtedly result in subsequent chambers applications to require judges or masters to rule on the objections.  It is far more efficient for counsel for the examinee to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence at trial, rather than on examination for discovery. ..

[52] In summary, the majority of objections made were not valid. The objections were undue interference in the flow of the examination for discovery.  It may or may not be the case that some of the questions were worded awkwardly and may have been seeking evidence of marginal relevance.  The examining party who frames questions badly runs the risk that the evidence obtained will end up being of no value.  Nevertheless, considerable respect ought to be shown for the professional judgment of counsel for the examining party on how to best approach an examination for discovery.  It is not up to counsel for the party being examined to dictate the opposing side’s decisions on which relevant areas of questioning should be the focus of the discovery.  It is also not in accord with the object of proportionality to make it the function of the court to become involved in micro-managing examination for discovery questions.

In addition to the above this case is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s discussion of the many specific objections that were raised.  In particular, the Court held that it is permissible in lawsuits for denied insurance benefits to ask the insurer’s representative about their general practices.

No Rush Folks, The Call is Free!

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 61 Comments on No Rush Folks, The Call is Free!


Over the past few years I’ve received plenty of e-mails and calls to discuss topics covered on my blog, radio interviews and other media participation.  Often people are looking for general legal information, other times they are seeking claim specific legal advice.
Every now and then a caller is hesitant to take up my time and rushes the conversation.  When I ask why they tell me they don’t want to be charged too much for the call.  This always catches me off guard because I don’t charge at all for these calls.
A recent such call prompted this short post.  I’d like to make it clear that inquiries are always welcome.  Time permitting I very much enjoy speaking with others about personal injury related matters.  If you call there is no need to rush, my initial consultations are always free of charge.  I only charge for my services when I’ve been formally retained with a written and signed agreement.
So, if you have a question about your claim or about BC Injury Law in general please don’t hesitate to contact me.  Thanks folks!