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More on Intersection Crashes and the Issue of Fault – Left Turning Vehicles

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on More on Intersection Crashes and the Issue of Fault – Left Turning Vehicles


Further to last week’s post on this topic, reasons for judgment were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the issue of fault for intersection crashes.  This week’s case is of particular interest because a ‘dominant‘ driver was found completely at fault for striking a left hand turning vehicle at an intersection.
In today’s case (Kelly v. Yuen) the Plaintiff was attempting a left hand turn at a light controlled intersection in Vancouver, BC.   As she turned the Defendant, who was approaching from the opposite direction, entered the intersection resulting in a collision.  The Defendant was travelling in the curb lane which, at the time of the crash, was restricted to buses and bicycles.  The Defendant argued that he had a green light and the Plaintiff was fully at fault.  The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant should not have been in the restricted lane and was fully at fault.  Ultimately the Court sided with the Plaintiff and allocated 100% of the responsibility for the crash on the through-driver.  Mr. Justice MacKenzie provided the following summary of some legal principles at play in these types of cases:

[23]         The legal principles with regards to left turn situations have been addressed in many cases. In Pacheco (Guardian ad litem) v. Robinson (1993), 75 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.A.) at para. 15, Legg J. stated:

In my opinion, a driver who wishes to make a left hand turn at an intersection has an obligation not to proceed unless it can be done safely. Where each party’s vision of the other is blocked by traffic, the dominant driver who is proceeding through the intersection is generally entitled to continue and the servient left-turning driver must yield the right of way. The existence of a left-turning vehicle does not raise a presumption that something unexpected might happen and cast a duty on the dominant driver to take extra care. Where the defendant, as here, has totally failed to determine whether a turn can be made safely, the defendant should be held 100 percent at fault for a collision which occurs.

[24]         In Carich v. Cook (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 322 at 326 (B.C.C.A.), Lambert J.A. had this to say:

… The question as a driver turns left is whether there is any vehicle in any approaching lanes that constitutes an immediate hazard. If there is, the turn should not be made. If there is not, then the turn can be made and of course, care should be taken throughout the turn and as each new lane is entered to make sure that the situation as it was assessed when the turn started has not changed in the meantime. …

[25]         Of course, each case must be determined on its own particular facts. For example, in Uyeyama (Guardian ad litem of) v. Wittenberg, [1985] B.C.J. No. 1883 (C.A.), the BC Court of Appeal determined that a left-turning was not negligent for having entered an intersection, having failed to detect the excessive speed of the defendant’s vehicle. In addition, the left-turning driver was entitled to assume that the oncoming vehicle would stop at a red light and according to traffic law. The court concluded at para. 44 that the left turning driver had “exercised due care and commendable prudence in taking the action she did in attempting to make a difficult left turn.”

[26]         This case was cited with approval by the BC Court of Appeal in Kokkinis v. Hall (1996), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 273 (C.A.).

[27]         The court in Kokkinis considered other cases where the court held in favour of the servient driver. The court looked to Morgan v. Hauck (1988), 27 B.C.L.R. (2d) 118 (C.A.), a case where the BC Court of Appeal held that a dominant vehicle which had accelerated towards an intersection despite amber warning lights and then entered the intersection when the light was red could not rely on the relevant section of the Motor Vehicle Act to escape liability. In Kokkinis at para. 6, Newbury J.A. speaking for the court summarized the position taken in Morgan as follows:

… Esson, J.A. (as he then was), for example emphasised the “heavy onus which rests upon drivers approaching signals of this kind to make due allowance for the possibility that there will be a vehicle seeking to make a turn such as the plaintiff was making on this day. Their clear duty is to comply with the warning lights and to not ‘run the red’.”  But for the fact that appellate courts should, he said, vary apportionments of blame made by trial judges only in very rare circumstances, Esson, J.A. (with whom Macfarlane, J.A. concurred) would have considered setting aside even the 10 percent allocation of fault.

[28]         At para. 7 of Kokkinis, Newbury J.A. considered the Court of Appeal’s decision in Brucks v. Caslavsky, 45 B.C.A.C. 62, and stated the following:

A more recent case from this Court along similar lines is Brucks et al. v. Caslavsky et al. (19 April 1994) Vancouver Registry CA016390 (B.C.C.A.), which apparently was not cited to the trial judge. There, this Court rejected the argument that the onus placed by s. 176 of the Act is “absolute” and that in deciding whether an oncoming car constitutes an “immediate hazard”, a left-turning driver must consider the possibility that any oncoming motorist may intend to speed through an intersection and disobey the traffic signal. Taylor, J.A. for the Court quoted the well-known statement of principle of Lord Atkinson in Toronto Ry. Co. v. King et al. [1908] A.C. 260, at 269:


. . . traffic in the streets would be impossible if the driver of each vehicle did not proceed more or less on the assumption that the drivers of all other vehicles will do what it is their duty to do, namely, observe the rules regulating the traffic of the streets.

[29]         Even though Kokkinis and Morgan dealt with vehicles which approached an intersection and turned left on an amber light, the principles and observations stated in these decisions are helpful. At para. 10 of Kokkinis the court stated that the servient driver should not be faulted for having diverted her attention momentarily from oncoming traffic to check cross traffic. This is because servient drivers have “the duty to be aware not only of oncoming traffic, but also of cross traffic, pedestrians, and whatever else may be present in the intersection.”

[30]         At the same paragraph, the court added:

… To say that the plaintiff can be found at fault because she relied on the assumption that Mr. Hall would stop, and because she checked cross-traffic, would in my view subvert the duty on Mr. Hall to bring his vehicle to a safe stop at the amber light as the other traffic did. …

[31]         The authorities make it clear in my opinion that for liability to be found against the dominant driver in situations where the servient driver is making a left turn in front of stopped traffic, the evidence must establish that the dominant driver had a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident, of which a reasonably careful and skilful driver would have availed him or herself (Pacheco, para. 18).

In finding the Defendant fully at fault the Court reasoned as follows:

[59]         The circumstances here are significantly different. This is not a situation where the servient driver has disregarded her statutory duty. Here it is just the reverse. Mr. Yuen flagrantly ignored the restriction on travel in the curb lane in a clear attempt, in my opinion, to drive along the restricted lane in order to get to his destination earlier rather than wait like other responsible drivers who were complying with the curb lane restriction. As Esson J.A. said in Morgan, I am satisfied that Mr. Yuen should have made “due allowance for the possibility that there will be a vehicle seeking to make a turn such as the plaintiff was making on this day”.

[60]          As Ker J. said in Rothenbusch at para. 149, “Who has the statutory right of way is informative; however, it does not determine liability in an accident. Drivers with a statutory right of way must still exercise caution to avoid accidents where possible.”

[61]         In these circumstances, I am satisfied a reasonably careful and prudent driver would not have pulled into the restricted curb lane, as Mr. Yuen did with limited vision, and accelerate towards a backed up intersection at an excessive rate of speed. As the dominant driver, Mr. Yuen was not required to take “extraordinary steps to avoid an accident or to show exceptional proficiency in the operation of a motor vehicle.” (Salaam v. Abramovic, 2010 BCCA 212 at para. 25). However, I am satisfied a reasonably prudent driver, exercising reasonable caution, would have had a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident.

[62]         Furthermore, Ms. Kelly did not breach her statutory duty under s. 174 to yield the right of way. She took reasonable steps to determine she could make the left turn safely. The evidence which I have accepted establishes that when Ms. Kelly looked right and entered the curb lane, the Yuen vehicle was not “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard”.

[63]         As a result, I am satisfied that the accident was caused solely by the negligent driving of Mr. Yuen. The defence has not established any contributory negligence on the part of Ms. Kelly.

LVI Defence Rejected; $12,000 Awarded For Modest Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Further to my dozens of previous posts discussing ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact (LVI) Defence to tort claims involving crashes with little vehicle damage, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, once again rejecting this defence.
Today’s case is a great example demonstrating that compensable injuries can be sustained even in true ‘low velocity impacts‘.  In today’s case (De Leon v. Harold) the Plaintiff was involved in a two vehicle collision in 2007 in Vancouver, BC.  The Defendant rear-ended the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Fault for the crash was admitted.  The trial focussed on whether the Plaintiff sustained any injuries.
There was no dispute that the collision was minor.  The Plaintiff described the impact as a “bump“.  The Defendant testified that her car “tapped” the Plaintiff’s car.  The modest impact resulted in $0 in vehicle damage.
Despite this the Plaintiff was injured.  The injuries were, fortunatley, relatively modest and made a meaningful recovery within 6 months.  ICBC defended the case based on the LVI program and argued that the Plaintiff was not injured in the collision.  Madam Justice Power rejected this argument and in doing so repeated the following helpful reasons addressing the LVI defence:

[14]         In Lubick v. Mei [2008] B.C.C.A. No. 777, Macaulay J. stated at paragraph 5:

[5]        The courts have long debunked the suggestion that low impact can be directly correlated with lack of compensable injury. In Gordon v. Palmer [1993] B.C.J. No. 474 (S.C.), Thackeray J. as he then was, made the following comments that are still apposite today.

I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. This is the philosophy that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may follow, but it has no application in court. It is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have not heard it endorsed as a medical principle.

He goes on to point out that the presence and extent of injuries are determined on the evidence, not with “extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.”  In particular he noted that there was no evidence to substantiate the defence theory in the case before him. . . .

[15]         In Dao v. Vance 2008 BCSC 1092 Williams J. stated:

[18]      This was undoubtedly a low-velocity collision where damage to the vehicle was so minimal as to be almost non-existent. All of the evidence supports that conclusion. In such instances, claims for compensation for injury are often resisted on the basis that there is reason to doubt their legitimacy. Furthermore, in this case, the principle evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim is subjective, that is, it is her self report. There is not a great deal of objective evidence to support her description of the injuries she claims to have suffered.

[19]      In response to those concerns, I would observe that there is no principle of law which says that because damage to the vehicle is slight or non-detectable that it must follow that there is no injury. Certainly, as a matter of common sense, where the collision is of slight force, any injury is somewhat likely at least to be less severe than in a situation where the forces are greater, such as to result in significant physical damage to the automobiles. Nevertheless, I do not accept that there can be no injury where there is no physical damage to the vehicles.

Madam Justice Power assessed the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $12,000 and in doing so made the following findings about her injuries:

[19]         I am satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged this burden and that soft-tissue injuries to her neck and back were suffered as the result of the accident. I am satisfied that the injuries were substantially resolved within two months of the accident as the result of the plaintiff’s active efforts in the first two months to attend chiropractic and massage therapy and that the injury was almost completely resolved within six months…

[22]         Having regard to the fact that each award must be based on the unique circumstances of the case, and that the plaintiff’s stoicism is a factor that should not penalize the plaintiff (Giang v. Clayton 2005 B.C.J 163 2005, (B.C.C.A.)), I am of the view that an appropriate award for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages in this case is $12,000. The plaintiff will be awarded $1,200 for four days of lost work as the agreed-to amount of the parties for special damages.

[23]         Therefore the total damage award is $13,200. Costs may be spoken to or written submissions may be made at the agreement of the parties.

Motorist At Fault for Failing to Have Headlights On Prior to Sunset

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 44 Comments on Motorist At Fault for Failing to Have Headlights On Prior to Sunset


In British Columbia motorist’s obligations to turn headlights on are set out in section 4.01 of the Motor Vehicle Act Regulations.  This section state that :

4.01 A person who drives or operates a vehicle on a highway must illuminate the lamps required by this Division

(a)  from 1/2 hour after sunset to 1/2 hour before sunrise, and

(b)  at any other time when, due to insufficient light or unfavourable atmospheric conditions, objects on the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 150 m.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court considering this section and determining whether a motorist can be partially at fault for a crash for failing to have their lights on prior to sunset.

In today’s case (Schurmann v. Hoch) the Plaintiff was involved in a two vehicle collision.  He was leaving a stop sign and attempting to turn left at an intersection when the Defendant, approaching from the Plaintiff’s left, struck the Plaintiff’s vehicle.   The Defendant was the ‘dominant‘ driver and had the right of way.  The Plaintiff was found at fault for leaving a stop sign when it was unsafe to do so.  However the Court was also asked to determine if the Defendant was partially at fault.

At the time of the crash it was a few minutes prior to sunset.  The lighting conditions “posed visual problems for a person attempting to turn left“.  The Defendant was driving a dark pick-up truck and did not put on his vehicle’s running lights or headlights.   The Defendant was found 50% at fault for this failure.  In arriving at this decision Madam Justice Maisonville provided the following reasons:

[44]         I conclude, however, on the facts before the court that the defendant, driving a dark navy pickup truck without running lights or headlights in effect at approximately less than five minutes before sunset in conditions where there were clouds and it had commenced spitting and light raining, was negligent and failed to act reasonably in all of the circumstances by not putting on the running lights and headlights of his vehicle to make himself visible to other motorists.

[45]         I find that the defendant by failing to have his running lights on was negligent. His actions created an objectively unreasonable risk of harm. The defendant argues that he was in compliance with the statute insofar as it was not necessary to have the lights of his vehicle on as it was not yet sunset. I find however that section 4.01(a) of the Regulations speaks to ideal weather conditions, not conditions as they existed on the afternoon and early dusk of January 10, 2006. Those were cloudy conditions in circumstances where it had just begun to rain. Accordingly this situation was governed by s. 4.01(b) of the Regulations.

[46]         In considering the issue of the impact of breach of a statute, Dickson J., as he then was, held at page 225:

Breach of statute, where it has an effect upon civil liability, should be considered in the context of the general law of negligence. Negligence and its common law duty of care have become pervasive enough to serve the purpose invoked for the existence of the action for statutory breach: see Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205.

[47]         It must not be forgotten that the other elements of tortious responsibility equally apply to situations involving statutory breach, i.e. principles of causation and damages. To be relevant at all, the statutory breach must have caused the damage of which the plaintiff complains. Should this be so, the violation of the statute should be evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant (see Saskatchewan Wheat Pool).

[48]         The defendant submitted to the court that in order to find negligence one must first find a breach of the statute. I am mindful of the comments of Dickson J. Other elements of tortious responsibility equally apply – it is not necessary to find breach or for that matter compliance with a statute to find actions that created an objectively unreasonable risk of harm…

50] In this case, but for the defendant not having his running or head lights on, the plaintiff would have seen him, and would not have attempted the turn. The defendant thus breached the duty of care he owed to the plaintiff causing the plaintiff the unforeseen risk of injury ? and he did in fact suffer injury.

Landlord Liable for Guest's Fall From Balcony

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Pelvis Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, Occupier's liability claims, Uncategorized. 101 Comments on Landlord Liable for Guest's Fall From Balcony

(UPDATE November 18, 2011 – The case discussed below was upheld in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Court of Appeal.  These can be accessed here)

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Campbell River Registry, discussing the duties of landlords to take reasonable steps to make sure buildings they own are safe for tenants and guests.
In today’s case (Jack v. Tekavec) the Defendant owned an apartment in Gold River, BC.  He rented this out to a third party who invited the Plaintiff over.  While visiting the Plaintiff “leaned against a balcony railing which gave way.   (He) plummetted three stories to the ground and was badly injured“. The Plaintiff sued the building owner arguing he was careless for failing to keep the balcony railing in good repair.  Mr. Justice Savage agreed.  In finding the Defendant at fault for the Plaintiff’s injuries the Court stated as follows:

[38]         The evidence establishes that the defendant, as owner and operator of the apartment block, is a landlord pursuant to s. 1 of the RTA.  I find that the defendant is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the deck and owes a duty of care pursuant to s. 6 of the Act to the guests of his tenants including Jack.

[39]         That duty of care includes, in my opinion, a duty to inspect.  The duty to inspect is part of the duty of the landlord to take reasonable care in carrying out the responsibility for the repair of premises under the Act. ..

[44]         In this case the defendant knew of a problem with the balcony railing before the tenancy commenced.  The tenants requested that he repair the balcony railing but he chose not to do so.  The defendant was also aware that the tenant, through Billy, took it upon herself to effect a repair when he did not respond to the requests.  The defendant saw that the work done by the tenant was not done properly.

[45]         The defendant knew that Billy, who did the work, was not skilled.  Although this repair was his responsibility, as the landlord responsible for maintenance, and he knew the work was done wrongly, he chose not to fix it.  He was well aware of the danger of improper work on the balcony railing.

[46]         In my opinion Tekavec owed a duty of care to Mark and to Mark’s guests including Jack.  The standard of care required that he respond to requests of tenants to inspect the tenanted premises regarding the safety problems they raised.  The standard of care also required that, if a tenant did work on a balcony railing that he saw was wrongly done, that he inspect and repair or cause to have repaired the balcony railing himself.

[47]         By choosing inaction he breached the standard of care of a reasonable landlord responsible for such maintenance.  His breach of the standard of care was a direct cause of the accident and Jack’s injuries.

[48]         In the result, I find Tekavec liable to Jack for damages.

The Plaintiff’s damages included an award of $100,000 for non-pecuniary loss.  In arriving at this figure the Court noted the extent and severity of the injuries which were summarized as follows:

[15] Briefly, Jack’s multiple injuries included a broken pelvis, fractured ribs, fractured vertebrae, and internal injuries resulting in hernias.  While in hospital he developed pneumonia requiring a tracheotomy.  His pelvis fracture required a metal plate and screws.  He pelvis fracture healed but he has lost 2” in height.  He now weighs less than 200 lbs and walks with a slight limp.  After six months he returned to work but is now unable to do heavy lifting.  ..

[63]         I have earlier briefly described Jack’s injuries (paras. 13, 14, and 15).  I will not repeat that description here.  His diagnosis was as follows:

(a)        Vertically instable fracture of left side of pelvis involving fractures of the sacrum and symphyseal disruption;

(b)        Stable disruption of the right SI joint; bilateral transverse process fractures of L4 and 5 vertebra; left transverse process fractures of the Li and L2 vertebra;

(c)        Cecal volvulus resulting in right hemicolectomy; facial fractures not requiring intervention;

(d)        Post trauma aspiration pneumonia with respiratory compromise requiring tracheostomy;

(e)        Fracture of left 9th and 10th rib;

(f)         Post operative problems included mild infection of lower part of the abdominal incision; incisional hernia requiring surgery; mild malunion of let hemi pelvis resulting in 1 to 1.5 centimeter shortening of left leg; degenerative changes at the lumbar spine involving L4-5 and 12-S1 levels.

(g)        Pelvic x-rays revealed slight malunion with the left hemi-pelvis being approximately 1 to 1.5 centimeters higher than the right; posterior screw is slightly bent in keeping with this shift in position; hip joints are normal on x-ray; lumbar spine x-rays show degenerative changes at L4-5 level and L5-S1 level. …

[70] In my view, an appropriate award in these circumstances for past and future pain and suffering, loss of amenities and other non-pecuniary losses is $100,000.

Damages Reduced by $35,000 for Failure to Follow Exercise Program

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 78 Comments on Damages Reduced by $35,000 for Failure to Follow Exercise Program


As I’ve recently written, a Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate their losses after being injured otherwise the damages they are entitled to can be reduced.
The most common example of the ‘failure to mitigate’ defence comes up in personal injury claims where defence lawyers argue that a Plaintiff would have recovered more quickly and more completely had they followed through with the suggestions of their medical practitioners.  If evidence supporting such an argument is accepted then a Plaintiff’s award can be reduced.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this defence in action in an ICBC claim.
In today’s case (Cripps v. Overend) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 “t-bone” collision.  The Defendant came through a stop sign at high speed and was responsible for the crash.  Fault was admitted and the trial focused on the value of the claim.   The Plaintiff’s injuries totally disabled him for two months and continued to partially disable him by the time of trial.
Madam Justice Stromberg-Stein assessed the Plaintiff’s damages at just over $141,000 then reduced the award by 25% to account for the Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.  Specifically the Court found the Plaintiff unreasonably failed to follow his physician’s recommendation to undertake an exercise program and had he done so his injuries would have had a better course of recovery.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:

[96]         There is evidence to satisfy the onus in this case. Mr. Cripps failed in his duty to mitigate his loss by exercising consistently and getting active. Mr. Schneider provided exercises in 2006. He had abandoned these by the time he saw Dr. Adrian in 2007. Dr. Adrian recommended reconditioning in 2007. There is no proof of any impediment to exercise other than Mr. Cripps felt sorry for himself. Dr. Smith highly recommends vigorous exercise to elevate mood.

[97]         The court must reduce damages based on its assessment of the consequences that flow from the failure to mitigate: Tayler v. Loney, 2009 BCSC 742.

[98]         The defendants seek a significant reduction of damages in the range of 25% to 40%: Middleton v. Morcke, 2007 BCSC 804; Latuszek v. Bel-Air Taxi (1992), Limited 2009 BCSC 798.

[99]         The benefits of exercise were proven when Mr. Cripps began to go to the gym in 2009. Once Mr. Cripps started this exercise program he was a different person. Had Mr. Cripps started and maintained an exercise program as his doctors and physiotherapist urged him to do, it is probable his prognosis would be more favorable. The failure to mitigate implicates not only his physical injuries, but any emotional ones, including irritability that may have contributed to his marriage breakdown.

[100]     There will be a reduction of damages of 25% for failure to mitigate.

For more information about the law of mitigation in injury claims you can click here to access my archived posts.

Intersection Crashes and Legal Principles Determining Fault

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 61 Comments on Intersection Crashes and Legal Principles Determining Fault


Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, summarizing some useful legal principles Judges look at when deciding the issue of fault following intersection crashes.
In today’s case (Luvera v. Benedict) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  He was driving his motorcycle and entered an intersection with the lights “probably in the late amber phase“.  At the same time, the Defendant who was approaching from the opposite direction of travel, “attempted her left turn only when the light turned from green to amber…(and) did not see the oncoming motorcycles“.  The Plaintiff drove into the right rear quarter panel of the Defendant’s vehicle.
Mr. Justice Wong found that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were equally at fault for the crash.  Before reaching this conclusion the Court set out the following summary of principles of law:

[5]             In the March 2006 issue of the Verdict magazine, a publication of the B.C. Trial Lawyers Association, at page 40, there is a useful discussion of the jurisprudence in the article entitled, “Intersection/Right-of-Way Cases – Making Sense of the Law” authored by Barbara J. Flewelling.  At page 44, the author states:

There is a conflict in the cases about whether or not a left-turning driver must wait until all other vehicles have nearly or actually come to a stop before proceeding to make their turn.  Whereas the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Kokkinis v. Hall, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1560, has indicated that it is not necessary, in Mitchell v. ICBC, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1600, on a Rule 18A application, Mr. Justice Edwards was of the view that the interpretation of the obligations of a left-turning driver as set out in Kokkinis would invite left-turning drivers to assume rather than determine that oncoming through drivers will stop as the light turns yellow and requires through drivers to conduct themselves on the basis left-turning drivers will do so.  Edwards J. felt that due to the fact that many drivers regard an amber light as a signal to accelerate through an intersection, the Kokkinis principle seems to endorse a hazardous assumption of the part of the left-turning drivers.

In the Mitchell case, the left-turning plaintiff turned left on an amber light.  Mr. Justice Edwards found that the dominant through driver entered the intersection on an amber light, the collision occurred when the light was red, and that he was speeding.  Even though the judge said he could infer that the dominant driver would have had time to stop after the light turned yellow or could but was unable to stop due to speed, he still found that the left-turning servient driver had a duty to take account of manifest hazards and, by failing to see or react to the fact the van was approaching fast and not stopping, was negligent.  He apportioned liability equally relying on s. 1(2) of the Negligence Act as he was unable to determine different degrees of fault.

[6]             The author concludes in her summary at page 45 as follows:

Summary

Intersection/right-of-way cases are very fact dependent and it can be very difficult to assess liability with any precision.  However, there are some general principles that can be gleaned from the case law:

Although a driver who enjoys the right of way is entitled to assume that others will obey the law and the rules of the road, this is not absolute and if she is aware or ought to have been aware of the other driver’s disregard of the law and fails to take reasonable care to avoid a collision, she may be found partially or even wholly liable.

In determining if a dominant driver ought to have been aware of another’s disregard of the law, the courts seem to be taking a realistic approach to the exigencies of making rapid decisions in circumstances where a reasonable driver also has to check for cross-traffic and pedestrians.  The courts generally have recognized that at very busy intersections, there are times when the only way a driver can execute a left turn is on an amber light and a dominant driver may be found liable for failing to stop at an amber light.

The onus is on the servient driver to prove that the dominant driver was also negligent in that his or her negligence was a cause of the accident.

There is some conflict in the case law about whether a left-turning driver is obligated to wait until the oncoming traffic is nearly or completely stopped.  Some cases stand for the proposition that it is not necessary while others state that it is prudent to do so and that a left-turning driver who fails to do so will be found partially liable.

A servient left-turning driver has an obligation to take reasonable steps to determine if the dominant driver poses an immediate hazard.  The time this is determined is at the moment just before the turn is commenced.  There is some conflict in the law about whether that requires a servient driver to determine if the dominant driver is speeding and may not stop at the light.

[7]             Like my late colleague, Mr. Justice Edwards, factually I have also concluded that both parties were equally at fault.  Mr. Luvera should have approached the intersection with more caution in order to be able to stop safely.  Ms. Benedict failed to take into account the manifest hazards in this case of approaching motorcycles speeding towards her.

Recognizing the Real Financial Toll of Catastrophic Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in Cost of Future Care Cases, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on Recognizing the Real Financial Toll of Catastrophic Injuries


(UPDATE: February 3, 2012 – The below cost of care award was reduced somewhat in reasons for judgement released by the BC Court of Appeal)
Important reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, recognizing the real financial toll that catastrophic injuries can cause.
In today’s case (O’Connell v. Yung) the Plaintiff was seriously injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision.   Her car was struck by a tractor-trailer pinning her vehicle against the Massey Tunnel.  The injuries were extensive and these included traumatic brain injury, a cervical spine fracture, fractures to her right femur, ankle, tibia, fibula, toes, ribs, nose and sternum.  The Plaintiff also sustained injury to her spleen and liver. These left the Plaintiff with chronic pain and serious dysfunction requiring a high level of daily supervision and care.
The Plaintiff initially received such care from a ‘personal care worker’, however she was uncomfortable having strangers tend to her for prolonged periods and eventually her husband of many years took over the role as primary caregiver.  This amounted to full time work.
The biggest issue at trial was the Plaintiff’s accident related future care needs.  The Plaintiff sought compensation for the fair value of hiring individuals to provide her with the care she needed.  The Defendant argued that “any award for the future cost of personal care must be reduced to take into account the fact that Mr. O’Connell is present in the household to provide supervision and guidance and a contingency can be factored in to address the possibility that he will at some point be unable or unwilling to continue to provide this care“.
Madam Justice Fisher rejected this argument and went on to award the Plaintiff $2.25 million dollars to compensate her for her  future care needs.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons:

[124]     I do not accept the defendants’ submission that an award for the cost of future personal care must be reduced to take into account the role Mr. O’Connell plays in providing supervision and guidance to Ms. O’Connell.  Ms. O’Connell is entitled to be compensated for the cost of care that is medically required. As Groves J. held in Cojocaru, the law does not permit the defendants to pass off their responsibility to provide appropriate future care by suggesting that Ms. O’Connell can and should rely on her husband to take care of her.  A husband is not expected to care for his injured wife on a gratuitous basis: see Andrews at p. 243.

[125]     The same principle was expressed in Vana v. Tosta, [1968] S.C.R. 71, where one of the issues involved an award for the cost of future housekeeping services.  The majority of the court stated at p. 75:

It is trite law that a wrongdoer cannot claim the benefit of services donated to the injured party. In the present case it amounts in my judgment to conscripting the mother and mother-in-law to the services of the appellant and his children for the benefit of the tortfeasor and any reduction of the award on this basis is and was an error in principle.

[126]     In McTavish v. MacGillivray, 2000 BCCA 164, the court was also dealing with an award for the loss of housekeeping capacity, both past and future, and interpreting and applying the principles set out in Kroeker v. Jansen.  At para. 43, Huddart J.A. stated:

.. the majority in Kroeker quite clearly decided that a reasonable award for the loss of the capacity to do housework was appropriate whether that loss occurred before or after trial. It was, in my view, equally clear that it mattered not whether replacement services had been or would be hired.

[127]     While Kroeker was restricted to housekeeping services and, as Huddart J.A. noted, the court did not adopt the analogy with future care as a general rule, it is my opinion that the same principle can be applied in the circumstances of this case with respect to personal care services that may or may not be hired in the future.

Diminished Earning Capacity Awards Without Past Wage Loss

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized. 6 Comments on Diminished Earning Capacity Awards Without Past Wage Loss

(UPDATE February 9, 2012:  The Damages in the below case for Diminished Earning Capacity and Cost of Future Care were reduced somewhat by the BC Court of Appeal on February 9, 2012)

A common misconception is that a person cannot claim for diminished earning capacity (future wage loss) in an ICBC Claim when there has been no past wage loss.  As I’ve previously discussed, this simply is not true.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In last week’s case (Morlan v. Barrett) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate motor vehicle collisions.  Fault was admitted by the Defendants in both actions.  The Court found that both crashes caused a single indivisible injury (chronic widespread pain eventually diagnosed as fibromyalgia).
The Plaintiff’s injuries and limitations caused her to change employment to a job that was less physically demanding.  Fortunately, her new job paid a better salary and the Plaintiff had no past wage loss from the time of her first crash to the time of trial.  Her injuries, however, were expected to cause ongoing limitations and the Plaintiff claimed damages for diminished future earning capacity.  Mr. Justice Stewart agreed the Plaintiff was entitled to these damages and assessed the loss at $425,000.  In reaching this assessment Mr. Justice Stewart gave the following useful reasons:
[7] The plaintiff found work at the Electrical Industry Training Institution (EITI) in 2008 and is employed there as a Program Coodinator.  The job is far less demanding and the commute is only 20 minutes.  The job is also far less rewarding in terms of job satisfaction.  Having to change jobs was a huge blow and this will be reflected in the non-pecuniary damages I award later.  By happenstance the plaintiff’s salary actually went up when she switched jobs.  For that reason there is no claim for loss of earning capacity to the date of trial.  But there is a claim for loss of opportunity to earn income – including benefits – in the future…

[17]        Pure happenstance resulted in her suffering no loss of income to the date of trial, i.e., she got a less demanding job which happened to pay more than her job at the B.C. Fed.  But a reduction in her capacity to earn income has been made out.  Her having to give up her job at the B.C. Fed demonstrates that the circle of secretarial or administrative positions for which she could, if necessary, compete has been narrowed.  (Exhibit 6, a “Functional Capacity Evaluation” and Exhibit 5, the report of an “Occupational Health Physician” simply confirm the obvious.)  To put it in familiar terms:  she is less marketable as an employee; she is less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment; she has lost the ability to take advantage of all job opportunities which might otherwise have come her way; and she is less valuable to herself as a person capable of earning income in a competitive labour market (Rosvold v. Dunlop, 2001 BCCA 1 at paragraph 10).  The live issue is whether there is a real and substantial possibility that the reduction in her capacity to earn income will in fact result in lost income – including benefits – in the future (Sobolik v. Waters, 2010 BCCA 523, paragraphs 39-43).

[18]        As noted earlier, having considered the whole of the evidence placed before me I rely on the evidence of the plaintiff’s family physician, Dr. Beck, as I peer into my crystal ball and consider the plaintiff’s future.

[19]        The fact that the balance of the medical evidence does not replicate what Dr. Beck said at Exhibit 4 page 6 – that the plaintiff has “plateaued even slightly worsened over the past year” – and indeed the evidence of the rheumatologist, Dr. Shuckett is quite different – is neither here nor there as having considered the whole of it I say as the trier of fact that Dr. Beck was an impressive, thoughtful witness of great experience who offered up her opinion against a background of having dealt with the plaintiff for 25 years and, more particularly, having had close supervision of the plaintiff’s medical condition since January 6, 2007 and the advent of the motor vehicle accidents.  In saying that I have not lost sight of the fact that Dr. Beck has in fact retired.

[20]        Having considered the whole of the evidence together, I say that three real and substantial possibilities have been made out:  that the plaintiff’s condition will improve; that the plaintiff’s condition will remain as it is; and that the plaintiff’s condition will worsen.  In “giv[ing] weight according to their relative likelihood” to these three hypothetical events I find that the possibility of her condition improving barely rises above mere speculation and that the possibility of her remaining the same and the possibility of her condition worsening are both great (Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 at paragraph 27).

[21]        I find that there most certainly is a real and substantial possibility that the reduction in the plaintiff’s capacity to earn income will result in lost income – including benefits – in the future.  Beyond the fact that nothing in life is certain and that she may yet find herself on the job market there is the real and substantial possibility that even if she remains in her current job until the end of her working career, her working career will end earlier than it would otherwise have absent the effects on the plaintiff of the defendants’ negligence.  That is so because it is a real and substantial possibility that her fibromyalgia will remain as it is but common experience dictates that as one moves into one’s latter years the ability to work in spite of a condition that drains one’s energy diminishes.  Independently of that, it is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff’s fibromyalgia – and with it loss of energy – will worsen.  I make that finding having considered the whole of the evidence including that of the plaintiff as to her recent experience and of all of the doctors and concluded as the trier of fact that I rely most on the evidence of Dr. Beck.

[22]        I take into account factors beyond those that relate to the state of the health of the plaintiff and her ability to work.  The plaintiff has established a real and substantial possibility – not mere speculation – that had she not had to forfeit her job at the B.C. Fed she would have, within a few years of the date of the motor vehicle accidents, taken advantage of an opportunity to perhapsmove up in the hierarchy of the B.C. Fed to the point of becoming a Director and with that received an increase in salary and benefits.  That is the net effect of the evidence of the plaintiff and of Lynda Bueckert.  Moreover, as of January 6, 2007 the plaintiff had to assume that she would retire from the B.C. Fed when she turned 65.  After January 6, 2007 the law changed.  I find that the plaintiff’s love for her job at the B.C. Fed combines with my picture of what she was before January 6, 2007 and results in my accepting her evidence to the effect that it is a real and substantial possibility that absent the defendants’ negligence she would have continued to work at the B.C. Fed even after she had turned 65.  I have considered the positive and negative vagaries of life, i.e., the contingencies.  Having considered the whole of it I award the plaintiff $425,000.

Filling in the Gaps – Lack of Expert Evidence and Future Wage Loss Awards

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized.


Generally when a Plaintiff advances damages for diminished earning capacity (future wage loss) in a personal injury lawsuit expert evidence is called to address the long term prognosis and consequences of a Plaintiff’s injuries.  Interesting reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, making such an award despite the lack of medical opinion evidence addressing the issue.
In today’s case (Helgason v. Bosa) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 motor vehicle collision.  Her vehicle was t-boned by the Defendant.  Fault for the crash was admitted.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
In support of her case the Plaintiff attempted to introduce two medico-legal reports written by her GP.  The first report, dated May 11, 2009 stated that “You have asked me to comment with regard to [the plaintiff’s] loss of earning capacity.  I do not feel that [the plaintiff] is less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment and I do not feel she is less marketable or attractive as an employee to potential employers as a result of the motor vehicle accident.”
As time passed the doctor changed her mind and wrote a second report indicating that the Plaintiff’s injuries would cause a diminished earning capacity.  The Defendant argued that the second report did not comply with the Rules of Court and that it should be excluded from evidence.  Mr. Justice Silverman agreed.  This left the Court with only the doctor’s first report providing an opinion of the Plaintiff’s future earning capacity.
The Defendant’s lawyer then argued, given the first report, the Court should not make an award for diminished earning capacity.  Mr. Justice Silverman disagreed and filled in the gaps addressing this issue with factual evidence presented at trial.  The Court went on to award the Plaintiff $45,000 for this loss and in doing so provided the following helpful reasons:

[48]         It does not follow from my ruling that I must conclude that the doctor’s opinion as of May 11, 2009, was still her opinion at trial.  Clearly, it was not.  However, the most significant consequence of my ruling is that there is no expert opinion in evidence with respect to future issues to support the plaintiff’s argument that I should be awarding damages for various of the plaintiff’s future concerns.

[49]         It does not necessarily follow from that, that the plaintiff is unable to mount an argument that there is still a sufficient basis for me to make the findings that she argues are appropriate.  The plaintiff argues that there is still sufficient evidence for me to draw the inferences which she argues I should draw, even without the opinion expressed in the inadmissible report.  It is noteworthy, in that regard, that when the defendants argued for the ruling with respect to admissibility, one prong of its argument was that the non-compliant report was not “necessary” because there was already other evidence with respect to the various future issues.

[50]         I am satisfied that indeed there is other evidence from which various inferences about the future might be drawn.  That other evidence consists of the following:

1.       Comments in the admissible report that do make projections into the future which are consistent with the position that the plaintiff takes:

“I do not think that [the plaintiff] has reached maximum medical improvement and she will continue to improve over the next 18 – 24 months.”

“Her present employment as a yard planner has a potential to exacerbate her symptoms.”

“I am not advising that [the plaintiff] change her current employment, but I will agree that her current employment does exacerbate her symptoms to a moderate degree.”

2.       The plaintiff’s own evidence at trial of her ongoing difficulties.

3.       The doctor’s oral evidence about various visits of the plaintiff since May 11, 2009, and the observations which she made (although her opinion arising from those visits was not admissible)….

[52] I am satisfied from the foregoing that the injuries, and other difficulties caused by the MVA, are ongoing and will continue to be ongoing, and will negatively affect the plaintiff’s capabilities and abilities in the future.

More on the New Rules of Court and Proportionality: Withdrawing Deemed Admissions

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 7, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.


As previously discussed, the BC Supreme Court Rules permit parties to a lawsuit to ask the opposing side to make binding admissions through a “Notice to Admit”.  If the opposing side fails to respond to the Notice in the time lines required they are deemed to have made the sought admissions.  Once the admission is made it cannot be withdrawn except by consent of the parties or with the Court’s permission.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, considering the Court’s discretion to withdraw deemed admissions.
In today’s case (Piso v. Thompson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2003 collision.  She sued for damages alleging longstanding injuries as a result of this crash.  In the course of the lawsuit ICBC’s lawyer served the Plaintiff with a Notice to Admit claiming that the Plaintiff was fully recovered within two years, that there was no claim for past wage loss nor a claim for diminished earning capacity.  The Plaintiff’s lawyer neglected to respond to the Notice in the timelines required resulting in the admissions being inadvertently made.  ICBC then brought an application for summary judgement.
The Plaintiff brought an application asking for permission to withdraw the admissions.  ICBC opposed arguing there would be no prejudice to the Plaintiff if she was faced with these admissions as she could sue her own lawyer in negligence to make up for any damages the unwanted admissions caused.  Master Caldwell rejected this argument and permitted the Plaintiff to withdraw the admissions.  The Court cited the principle of ‘proportionality‘ in reaching judgement.  Master Caldwell provided the following useful reasons:

[20]         Rule 7-7 provides a mechanism to streamline and make more efficient the litigation process. It rewards efficiency and encourages a focus on issues which matter and which are truly in dispute. It provides penalties and disincentives for failure to admit that which should properly be admitted by way of cost sanctions. It certainly provides for much more extreme outcomes in appropriate circumstances but it also provides for judicial discretion in excusing or relieving from such extreme outcomes in appropriate circumstances.

[21]         In my respectful view Rule 7-7 does not, nor was it intended to, create a trap or add an inescapable obstacle to ensnare or trip up sloppy or inattentive counsel to the detriment of the parties to the litigation.

[22]         The current Rule 1-3(a) continues the long-standing object of the rules:

The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.

[23]         There is no question in my mind that the failure in this case was a sloppy, inadvertent and possibly even negligent failure on the part of former counsel for the plaintiff. I am satisfied that the plaintiff himself cannot be faulted in any way for the oversight; he had neither actual notice of the document in question from his lawyer nor an opportunity to provide a reasoned and considered response.

[24]         The refusal of leave to withdraw these admissions will deny the plaintiff his opportunity to have his claim heard on the merits. The argument that the plaintiff can have his relief by way of a professional negligence claim against his former counsel fails to recognize the further delay and expense of such a claim. In the context of proportionality such an option does not seem appropriate from a financial or court resource prospective.

[25]         In my view this is precisely the type of situation which warrants an order allowing the withdrawal of a deemed admission while providing for the other party in costs and other accommodations.

[26]         The plaintiff is granted leave to withdraw the admissions.