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Tag: Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie

$50,000 Damage Advance Ordered As Term of Adjournment of Personal Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, BCSC Civil Rule 13, ICBC Wrist Injury Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the Court’s power to order a damage advance to a Plaintiff as a term of an adjournment order.
In last week’s case (Wood Atkinson v. Murphy) the Plaintiff suffered bilateral wrist fractures in a 2006 collision.  The Defendant admitted full fault for the crash.  The matter was set for trial but ultimately had to be adjourned due to difficulties in obtaining the Plaintiff’s employment records.  As a term of adjournment the Court ordered that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff a $50,000 advance.  In doing so Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie provided the following reasons:

[42] Serban v. Casselman (1995), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 316 (C.A.) confirmed the jurisdiction of this Court to order advance payments on damages under former Rule 1(12) (now Rule 13-1(19)) as a term of an adjournment of a trial. The advance must be just in all of the circumstances, and the judge making the order must be completely satisfied that there is no possibility the final assessment of damages would be less than the amount of the advance payments. There is no requirement that the cause of the adjournment be the fault of one party, see Serban, at paras. 9-11.

[43] Further guidance is found in the following excerpt from Master Barber’s decision in Tieu v. Jaeger et al., 2003 BCSC 906, at para. 17:

With liability not being in issue, the plaintiff should be put in funds at the earliest possible time. That is a reasonable thing for the plaintiff to ask for. The only thing that is stopping her from getting this money is not a determination of whether she is entitled to it, but as to how much. When it has been conceded that the sum of $20,000 is probably going to be less than or at least one-half of what the future amount she will obtain of $40,000 plus is, I can see no reason not to give her at least $20,000 at this time. To keep her out of pocket means that, especially when need is shown, as it has been in her affidavit, would be a refusal of justice.

[44] In this case, liability has been admitted, and it will be almost seven years from the date of the accident to the conclusion of the trial. The plaintiff is employed, but has problems with chronic pain in her wrists. Counsel are in agreement that an advance is justified in these circumstances.  The remaining issue is the amount that would be just in the circumstances, ensuring that it not be in excess of the potential award for damages at trial.

[45] In my view, an advance of $50,000 is appropriate in all the circumstances.

"Ill-Conceived" Dismissal Application Leads To Special Costs Award

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, punishing a Defendant in a personal injury lawsuit with a special costs order for bringing an “ill-conceived” motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
In yesterday’s case (Wood Atkinson v. Murphy) the Plaintiff suffered a bilateral wrist injury in a 2006 collision.  She sued for damages and the Defendant admitted fault for the crash.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant requested employment records relating to the Plaintiff.   The Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to obtain these but the Plaintiff’s employer “mistakenly failed to provide counsel with the Plaintiff’s complete employment file“.  The Court found that this failure was due “to repeated errors or internal miscommunication on the part of (the employer)“.
The Defendant obtained two Court Orders addressing the production of the sought records.  The Defendant then brought an application seeking the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit for “material non-disclosure”.  In support of the application to dismiss the Defendant’s lawyer “swore an affidavit erroneously describing the orders“.
Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie dismissed the Defendant’s application and went on to award special costs for the “excessive and draconian” application.  In doing so the Court was critical of the Defendant’s erroneous summary of the disclosure court orders.   Madam Justice MacKenzie provided the following reasons:

[29] I have concluded in the circumstances that it is appropriate to award special costs to the plaintiff for the dismissal application.  It is the mechanism by which the Court expresses its disapproval of two aspects of defendants’ counsel’s conduct. The first aspect is his carelessness in erroneously deposing to the contents of the two orders in question and relying on them to make a very serious application to punish the plaintiff.  This error was a self-serving lack of attention to detail.

[30] Court orders are important. They give effect to the Rule of Law. Counsel cannot simply rely on their notes or fail to be accurate, especially after becoming aware of the disagreement or reservation of the other counsel. Although an application to the court is required to obtain a transcript of submissions at a CPC or TMC, the clerk’s notes are readily available. Indeed, plaintiff’s counsel obtained them to clarify the nature of the orders in question and provided them to defendants’ counsel.

[31] Secondly, it is clear that defendants’ counsel knew well before the hearing that the dismissal application was ill-conceived and was on notice that his version of the court orders was in question.  Nonetheless, he persisted with the application.

[32] An order dismissing a plaintiff’s claim for material non-disclosure is a very serious matter; the consequences for the plaintiff and her counsel would have been severe. This type of application requires a solid foundation of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, especially considering that the defendants had already admitted liability for her injuries.

[33] The fact the defendants may have become aware of the file and the correct nature of the orders after defendants’ counsel had sworn his September 14, 2011 affidavit (for his application to dismiss filed the next day) is of no moment because he became aware of these matters well before the start of the hearing on September 26, 2011.  He pursued the application in any event.

[34] It is no answer to say that outside counsel was required nonetheless in order to address inconsistencies in counsels’ version of Ms. Tsang’s statements as to whether she had provided the complete file. Those hearsay issues are quite minor in the circumstances of all CBSA’s errors or miscommunications. Plaintiff’s counsel was put to a clearly unnecessary expense in the requirement to retain outside counsel to speak to plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit. The application to dismiss the claim was misconceived and heavy handed.

[35] I have concluded it is appropriate to award the plaintiff special costs for the defendants’ application to dismiss her claim. The Court heard that application on the afternoon of September 26, 2011, the first of the three-day hearing. It is that day for which plaintiff’s counsel was obliged to retain outside counsel to speak to the affidavit that, amongst other things, corrected the errors in the defendants’ counsel’s version of the two orders.

More on the Scope of the Implied Undertaking of Confidentiality

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Uncategorized. 65 Comments on More on the Scope of the Implied Undertaking of Confidentiality


An important and developing area of law in BC relates to the implied undertaking of confidentiality.  When a lawsuit for damages is brought in the BC Supreme Court, the parties are required to make disclosure of certain relevant documents even if such disclosure is harmful to their interests.
In order to strike a balance between fulsome disclosure and privacy rights, the Courts have developed a rule known as the “implied undertaking of confidentiality” which prohibits a party who receives this forced disclosure from making use of the documents/information outside of the lawsuit without consent of the other parties or a court order.  Reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention (thanks to Dan Michaluk) clarifying that the implied undertaking even covers documents obtained from the Crown by a party charged with a criminal offence.
While the recent case (R. v. Basi) is a criminal case it is relevant for personal injury lawsuits.  Often times a Defendant in a civil lawsuit faces criminal consequences prior to a civil action.  In the course of the initial prosecution relevant documents are produced.  Many of these documents are equally relevant in a subsequent civil lawsuit.  In clarifying that the implied undertaking extends to these documents precluding their automatic use in subsequent civil proceedings Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie provided the following reasons:

[42] If Bennett J.’s statement left any doubt about the existence of an implied undertaking rule in British Columbia, I would affirm that an accused who receives disclosure material pursuant to the Crown’s Stinchcombe obligations, or to a court order, does so subject to an implied undertaking not to disclose its contents for any purpose other than making full answer and defence in the proceeding.

[43] The basis for this implied undertaking is in the sound policy reasons expressed in Wagg and Taylor and also discussed in the Martin report, all referred to above. As recognized in the civil context in Goodman v. Rossi (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 359 (C.A.) at 367-368 referring to Lindsey v. Le Suer (1913), 29 O.L.R. 648 (C.A.), the undertaking flows as a necessary implication from the limited purpose for which the recipient has been given access to the documents.

[44] I am aware that the Court in Wagg was reluctant to lay down a rule in the criminal context that could have significant consequences in other types of litigation. However, I am satisfied this concern does not present a barrier in British Columbia in light of the jurisprudence of this Court and the recognition by our Court of Appeal that the practice in this province is not make use ofStinchcombe material for collateral purposes.

[45] As a result, I am satisfied that because the proceeding is over for which the disclosure was provided, the respondents are not entitled to make any further use of the material that remains subject to the undertaking.

I am having a difficult time reconciling this decision with the recent case of Cochrane v. Heir which indicates that Rule 7-1(1)(a)(i) would automatically force a litigant to list relevant documents in a civil suit notwithstanding the implied undertaking of confidentiality.  I suspect the Court of Appeal will eventually be asked to weigh in on this issue.  In the meantime parties to a lawsuit can simply take a common sense approach in agreeing to consent orders to set aside the implied undertaking of confidentiality if it applies to otherwise relevant and clearly producible documents.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Shoulder Impingement in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on $50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Shoulder Impingement in ICBC Claim


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing damages for accident related soft tissue injuries and shoulder impingement.
In last week’s case (Dial v. Grewal) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 BC motor vehicle collision.   Fault for the crash was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.  The Plaintiff faced some credibility challenges at trial and the Court found that she “exaggerated” some of her testimony about the extent of her symptoms however Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie found that the plaintiff did suffer real injuries including traumatic right shoulder impingement.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 the Court made the following findings:
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find on the evidence as a whole that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $50,000 for the injuries the plaintiff sustained to her neck and right shoulder, the aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition and headaches, and more minor injuries to her ribs, and dizziness…
[190] The purpose of a non-pecuniary damage award is to compensate a plaintiff for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities. While each award must be made with reference to the particular facts of the case, other decisions may assist the court in arriving at an award that is fair to both parties: Smaill v. Williams, 2010 BCSC 73 at para. 78…

[194]     The plaintiff relies on the following cases in support of her submission that $80,000 is the appropriate quantum for non-pecuniary damages: Kasic v. Leyh, 2009 BCSC 649;Predinchuk v. Spencer, 2009 BCSC 1396; Thomas v. Bounds, 2009 BCSC 462; and Lee v. Metheral, 2006 BCSC 1841.

[195]     I find, conversely, that these cases support higher awards than is fair in this case because the defendants have no obligation to compensate the plaintiff for symptoms attributable to her pre-accident low back condition.  That said, I find that an award that is just and fair to both parties is $50,000.

[196]     As I have already discussed, the plaintiff’s testimony about her symptoms and pain was at times vague and at others, exaggerated. Nevertheless, I accept that she suffered substantial pain for months after the accident, as is supported by the medical evidence in this case. Her pain gradually improved, and she was able to substitute for her husband at work about 14 to 18 months after the accident, albeit primarily for a few hours at a time but also with a few full-time shifts. By that time, her neck and shoulder pain were manageable. The aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition had also resolved such that her back had returned to its pre-accident condition.

You can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC Court cases awarding non-pecuniary damages for shoulder injuries.