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BC Supreme Court Confirms No Tax Deductions For Depleted Sick Bank Damages

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Wage Loss. 50 Comments on BC Supreme Court Confirms No Tax Deductions For Depleted Sick Bank Damages

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that where a Plaintiff proves damages for used up sick bank hours due to a collision related injury, the recovered damages will not be subject to income tax deductions (as is done with past wage loss awards).
In the recent case (Gormick v. Amenta) Mr. Justice Sigurdson made it clear that such damages will not be subject to income tax deductions and Plaintiff’s are entitled to recover damages on a gross basis.  In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons:
[5]             The authorities support awarding the gross amount for loss of sick bank credits…
[9]             As is evident from DeGuzman, treating loss of sick bank entitlement as past wage loss undercompensates the plaintiff because deductions could be taken from him or her twice.  This is consistent with Ballance J.’s characterization of loss of sick bank entitlement as a “potential future loss” not in the “character of past wage loss”.
[10]         In addition, the following cases have adopted Bjarnason without further comment in awarding the gross amount for loss of sick bank entitlement:
·                 Chingcuangoco v. Herback, 2013 BCSC 268 at paras. 128-133;
·                 Kilian v. Valentin, 2012 BCSC 1434 at paras. 125-127;
·                 Chalmers v. Russell, 2010 BCSC 1662 at para. 86;
·                 Pham-Fraser v. Smith, 2010 BCSC 322 at para. 90; and
·                 Rizzolo v. Brett, 2009 BCSC 732 at para. 67.
[11]         Contrastingly, the defendant in the instant case relies on Redl v. Sellin, 2013 BCSC 581, in which the court awarded the net and not the gross amount in respect of damages for lost benefits (including paid sick days, paid time off work for medical appointments and lost vacation credits).
[12]         In Redl, the court rejected the plaintiff’s position that “as full repayment of benefits to her employers appears to be required, the net loss calculation should not be applied to the total subrogated portions of the income loss claim” (at para. 33).  In this regard, the court said, at para. 34:
It is clear under the Insurance (Vehicle) Act that the defendant’s liability for all income losses – regardless of whether a subrogated interest is claimed by an employer or an insurer – is for the net amount only.  The rights of an insurer or employer claiming a subrogated interest in an employee’s damages claim are no greater than those of the employee.  The entire gross amount of Ms. Redl’s past income loss of $37,360.05 is subject to a deduction for taxes.  How this impacts Ms. Redl’s repayment obligations is a matter between her and her employers.
[13]         However, Redl make no note of Bjarnason or the other cases following that decision.  It appears that those cases were not brought to the attention of the judge deciding Redl. 
[14]         Further, the proposition which the defendant in the instant case extracts from Redl – namely, that “[t]he rights of an … employer claiming a subrogated interest in an employee’s damages claim are no greater than those of the employee” – is not inconsistent with Bjarnason.  Bjarnason holds that an employee has the right to the gross amount of damages in respect of loss of sick bank entitlement.  Accordingly, the employer claiming a subrogated interest in the gross amount of those damages is not claiming a greater right than that of the employee.
 

Video Surveillance Influences Chronic Soft Tissue Injury Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating the influential use of surveillance footage in a personal injury claim.
In last week’s case (Hollows v. Wood) the Plaintiff was injured in a “serious” collision in 2009.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The Plaintiff suffered a variety of soft tissue injuries which caused a degree of chronic pain.  The Court found that the plaintiff was “decent and genuine” but that the degree of the Plaintiff’s disability was not as great as subjectively perceived.  In reaching this decision the Court was influenced by video surveillance evidence.  In commenting on this Mr. Justice McEwan provided the following reasons:
[24]         The court has had the advantage of a DVD recording of an exercise class and some other activity the plaintiff engaged in, particularly a scene in a parking lot at a shopping venue. It is very difficult to regard the person depicted in the DVD as in any significant sense, disabled, or to accept the distinctions offered by those who treated the plaintiff as convincing. Dr. Adrian’s suggestion that, for instance, a person with the ability to twist and move vigorously through a very large number of aerobic exercises, executed rapidly and repetitively, could find it hard to vacuum or to lift light loads is difficult to credit. He explained that the difference between the strenuous exercises the plaintiff is able to perform and ordinary household tasks was that when the plaintiff exercises she uses “biomechanically correct posture”, while the activities of ordinary life are unpredictable. He also noted that a gym environment does not involve prolonged standing or sitting. The evidence shows, however, that the plaintiff’s daily routine does not require either. She works from home and is quite free to move about.
[25]         Dr. Surgenor, the plaintiff’s family physician, testified to similar effect, distinguishing between the exercises in the video and household where the positions required to do household tasks could cause discomfort.
[26]         Again, the distinction seems rather forced. The plaintiff’s exercise program was clearly designed to address many different muscles and movements and it is difficult to imagine any ordinary activity that did not have a correlative exercise in the varied routines shown to the court. It must be said, as well, that the plaintiff is clearly a highly capable member of the class. She does not lag the instructor and she gives the full measure of effort the instructor demonstrates.
[27]         The evidence of Dr. Miki is, I think, central to the assessment of the plaintiff’s condition. I largely accept what he had to say about the plaintiff’s reaction to the accident, which had the twin features of immediate anxiety about the whereabouts and safety of her daughter initially, and a more prolonged period of anxiety when it was not clear whether or not her unborn son had survived or suffered serious harm. I accept that the event was traumatic and that the plaintiff has had a prolonged reaction. It has manifested in a sense of vulnerability and in a lack of trust in others, exemplified in her refusal to allow others to drive her children anywhere.
[28]         The plaintiff is hyper-vigilant and hyper-aware. I think this extends to her own assessment of her condition and leads to a belief in a pre-accident world of perfect health and fitness that effectively amplifies her present experience of muscle pain and fatigue. I fully accept the plaintiff’s evidence, and that of her husband, that she is less cheerful and easygoing than she was in the past, but, given her obvious physical capacity, I am of the view that this is largely a product of anxiety and does not reflect anything that could be called a disabling condition, or one that significantly interferes with her activities…
[35]         As I have said, I accept Dr. Miki’s analysis as descriptive of the plaintiff’s psychological condition, and think it may account, in part, for the plaintiff’s heightened awareness and descriptiveness of her pain and suffering. I accept that she suffered significant soft tissue injuries that have left her with some residual, nagging pain from time to time, but pain that is clearly not seriously inhibiting.

Coughing Rib Injury Case Not "Too Complex" For Jury Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Jury Trials.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, addressing whether a unique causation issue in a personal injury claim was too complex for a jury.
In today’s case (Jackson v. Yusishen) the Plaintiff was rear-ended by the defendant’s truck in 2009.  The Plaintiff sustained some injuries and sued for damages.   Some 6 months following the crash the plaintiff “coughed and the pain in his chest and back suddenly increased in intensity“.  He was ultimately diagnosed with “one or two fractured ribs…hernias of the intercostal area and of the diaphragm“.  He had multiple surgeries to correct these complications that had not been successful.  The biggest issue for trial was for the jury to decide whether the ribs were compromised in the collision and whether the collision caused or contributed to the ultimate complications the Plaintiff was diagnosed with.
The Defendant elected trial by Jury.  The Plaintiff argued the matter was too complex for a jury to decide.  Mr. Justice Rogers disagreed and held that a jury could address this issue.  In upholding the jury election the Court provided the following reasons:
[23]         It is possible that the jury may find that the accident weakened the plaintiff’s ribs such that the later coughing episode caused them to fracture. In that event, the standard language of an Athey instruction will suffice to guide the jury’s deliberations. Again, juries are regularly instructed on similar Athey issues – this case would not present any greater complication on that issue than any other.
[24]         Once the jury has determined whether the accident caused rib fractures or a weakening of the ribs that later turned into fractures, the rest of the jury’s duties will be relatively straight forward. If their answer to that question is yes, then they will have to assess the degree to which the injuries have impaired the plaintiff’s function and award damages accordingly. For that task, they will have the assistance of expert reports of the type that are conventionally adduced in personal injury cases. Those reports include a functional capacity evaluation, a vocational assessment, a cost of future care report, and an economist’s assessment of the present value of various loss scenarios. Again, in serious personal injury cases, juries are routinely asked to consider such reports. There is nothing about the content of the reports in this case that suggest that a jury would not be able to conveniently consider their content and render a verdict accordingly.
[25]         If the jury’s answer to the causation question is no, then their task will become very nearly trivial.
[26]         Although there are a number of expert reports that will go into evidence in this case, the reality is that the jury will likely not be required to scour each and every word in each and every report. For example, the plaintiff’s economist’s reports may be useful to the jury should it wish to award future losses to the plaintiff, but it is unlikely that the jury will need to go beyond picking what appears to it to be the appropriate multiplier for a given loss and a given set of positive and negative contingencies.
[27]         In my opinion, the jury’s task of hearing, examining, and considering the evidence in this case will not exceed the bounds of convenience. The jury will be asked to conduct a scientific inquiry into what the radiographs could and did show of the plaintiff’s rib structure, but that will be a relatively narrow and focused inquiry. The jury will be guided by the opinions of qualified medical practitioners and by counsel’s submissions. It is not every contest of medical opinion that will disqualify a jury from trying a personal injury claim, and in my view, the scientific inquiry that the jury will make on this issue will be within its capacity.
[28]         Once the jury gets past the issue of causation, this case will become a relatively straightforward assessment of personal injury damages. The evidence on quantum issues is entirely conventional and is of the sort that juries are often asked to consider and assess. The jury may have to make some difficult decisions, but the path to those decisions will not, in my view, be so intricate or complex as to overwhelm the jury’s capacity to arrive at a just and proper judgment.
[29]         For these reasons, I have concluded that the plaintiff’s application to strike the jury notice must be dismissed.
 

Previous Admissions of Potential Violence Ordered Disclosed in Personal Injury Claim Against Security Guard

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing the scope of document production in a case alleging injury caused by a security guard.
In today’s case (Ash v. Zellars Inc.) the defendant security guard “arrested the plaintiff for theft“.  In the course of restraining the 16 year old girl the Defendant “used his legs as a lever to get the plaintiff to the ground”.  The plaintiff’s head struck the floor.  She lost consciousness and allegedly suffered a fractured skull.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff learned that the Defendant unsuccessfully applied to become a police officer with the RCMP, the Vancouver PD, and the Transit Police.  The Plaintiff sought the applications to be disclosed but the Defendant refused.  The Court held that while the full applications were not relevant, portions were, and ordered that the portions questioning about past violent altercations to be disclosed.  In ordering partial production Master Taylor provided the following reasons:
[14]         Plaintiff’s counsel maintains that the application forms are important due to questions asked about the applicant’s propensity for violence, propensity for inappropriate sexual behaviours and propensity for dishonesty. These questions are located at page 16 of the application form under the heading, Personal Relationships. There are thirteen questions under this heading and I set them out below with the question number from the application form:
58.       Provide details on all physical altercations you have had with a spouse or partner, or anyone associated to you in a domestic or family relationship.
59.       What is the worst emotional experience you have ever had?
60.       provide details on when you have used, or threatened to use, physical violence toward any adult person. (Sports or otherwise) (their emphasis)
61.       Provide details where you have used physical force toward a child.
62.       Provide details of the time/s where you may have paid, or been paid, for sexual activities.
63.       Have you ever sexually forced yourself on another?  Have you ever been accused of forcing yourself on another?
64.       Have you ever been involved in the sex trade industry in any capacity (i.e.) driver, receptionist, answering phones, street worker, etc)?
65.       Tell us about any time you may have retained, or been involved with the service of an escort agency, massage parlour, prostitutes (i.e. cruising for prostitutes, buying for friends, etc.)
66.       Have you ever had any sexual involvement with anyone without his or her consent?
67.       Has anyone had any sexual involvement with you without your consent?  If yes, provide details.
68.       Have you ever been involved in a sexual manner with a child (under the age of 16) regardless of your age?  If yes, provide details of all incidents. (Include ages of participants)
69.       Give the circumstances of your involvement in a sexual act that if you were caught, you may have been prosecuted. Provide details of all incidents. (i.e. sexual contact with an animal, exposing yourself in public, incest (sexual relations with a family member), sexually explicit anonymous phone calls, or peeked into someone’s window for sexual purposes etc.
70.       Provide details of your use of pornography.
[15]         The defendants submit that the information sought about an applicant for employment by the Transit Police force deals with a wide range of sensitive and intensely personal topics. As well, the application form also seeks to elicit identifying information about the applicant’s entire family members, including in-laws, former spouses, deceased parents, as well as character references. One can only imagine that the other two police forces likely seek answers to similar questions…
[17]         The defendants maintain that in order to succeed in her application, the plaintiff must first satisfy the court that the documents sought contain information which may relate to a matter in issue, and that the application is not in the nature of a fishing expedition, citing Gorse v. Straker, 2010 BCSC 119 at paragraph 16. As Macaulay J. said in Gorse, the formulation of this test stems from the well-known decision ofPeruvian Guano (1882), 11 Q.B.D. 55 at pp. 62-63 (C.A.) and permits access to documents that relate to a matter in issue indirectly as well as directly…
[20]         Taking into account that I have determined the documents sought relate only to a matter indirectly in issue, I have to now decide whether any of the information from the application forms is to be provided to the plaintiff.
[21]         In my view, questions 58 and 60 from the employment application form for the Metro Vancouver Transit Police, as set out above, and their answers are such as was discussed in Przybysz v. Crowe, 2011 BCSC 731 at paragraphs 27 -28, as those documents which assist in a train of enquiry as contemplated in Peruvian Guano. The others, in my view, are merely in the nature of a fishing expedition.
[22]         Accordingly, I order that the defendants provide to the plaintiff copies of the personal defendant’s applications to the three stated police forces with all answers completely redacted but for questions 58 and 60 and the answers thereto as provided by Magdaluyo, or similar equivalents in the application forms for employment by the Vancouver Police Department and the RCMP.

$150,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Spine Fusion Leading To Chronic Complications

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released this week demonstrating that not only is an at-fault motorist responsible for the injuries they cause but also for any complications that result in the course of the Plaintiff’s reasonable treatment of these.
In this week’s case (Cebula v. Smith) the Plaintiff was involved in a head on collision.  Despite denying fault the Court found there was “overwhelming and uncontradicted” evidence that the Defendant was to blame.  The crash caused multiple injuries including a fractured neck which required the removal of two discs and a fusion from C5-C7.  Following this surgery the Plaintiff experienced a bone infection in her hip and further experienced long term difficulty swallowing as a complication of the surgery.  In finding the Defendant at fault for all of these consequences and assessing non-pecuniary damages at $150,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:
[297]     On the basis of the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff has established that the injuries she sustained to her neck, shoulders and upper back, right knee and right ankle, as well as her PTSD, sleep disturbances and anxiety were caused by the Accident.  I also find that the plaintiff’s swallowing difficulties, dizziness and voice problems were the result of her neck surgery that was itself necessitated by the Accident.  The infection in her hip at the site of her bone graft was also the result of her neck surgery.  Her headaches have been aggravated by the Accident.  It is more probable than not that these injuries and other conditions would not have occurred but for the Accident….
[301]     As a result of the Accident, the plaintiff’s life changed permanently and dramatically.  The various surgeries she underwent, the chronic pain and headaches, the long period of only partial recovery, the limitations on her mobility and her inability to continue in her teaching position has had a significant effect on both her physical and psychological wellbeing.  She has withdrawn from her social network and previous social activities.  She is short-tempered and not as much fun to be around.  Driving has become stressful and anxious for her.  It is worse when she is a passenger.  The dizziness and choking that began after her November 2007 neck surgery continue to this day.  She is unable to take care of her home and garden except for minor housekeeping tasks.
[302]     The plaintiff has become anxious and has lost confidence in her ability to be an effective teacher.  Teaching is no longer the joy that it was for her prior to the Accident.  Although psychological treatment and other encouragement enabled her to gradually return to work, she is only able to teach in the classroom one day per week.  That one day takes a toll on her such that she requires the remainder of the week to recuperate and prepare for the next work day.
[303]     The plaintiff was in obvious pain and discomfort while she was testifying.  It is clear to me that the Accident has caused her significant stress and anxiety and significantly affected her ability to function and cope with daily life, a marked change from her life prior to the Accident…

 [321]     Having considered the principles set out in Stapley and the cases relied upon by counsel, I find that an award of $150,000 for non-pecuniary damages is appropriate.

$35,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Aggravation of Pre-Existing "Significant" Muskuloskeletal Issues

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, assessing damages for an aggravation of pre-existing injuries.
In today’s case (Johal v. Conron) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision.  The Defendant admitted fault.  At the time of the accident the plaintiff had significant pre-existing issues including bilateral rotator cuff tendinitis, complex regional pain syndrome and underlying degenerative arthritis.  The collision caused soft tissue injuries which aggravated these conditions.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $35,000 Madam Justice Donegan provided the following reasons:
[79]         In his July 26, 2011 report, Dr. Wade opined:
The global clinical picture of Mrs. Surinder Johal is complex. It would be my opinion that she had significant musculoskeletal complaints prior to a motor vehicle accident of June 10, 2009. As a result of the accident of June 10, 2009 she had an aggravation of neck and back complaints likely because of a mild soft tissue injury of the cervical and lumbar spine. Over time she has had persistent and increasing problems in a number of areas.
…
It is unclear to me whether her right shoulder pathology [tear] is any way directly related to the motor vehicle accident of June 10, 2009; however her global pre-existing musculoskeletal complaints have been aggravated by the soft tissue injury of the cervical and lumbar spine as a result of the accident of June 10, 2009.
[80]         Dr. Wade fairly conceded that it is difficult to sort out the symptoms that pre-dated the accident and those that could be directly attributed to the accident. In this regard, he wrote:
In my opinion it would be a blend of both pre-accident and accident type problems that have resulted in her current state of pain and disability.
[81]         He further opined that if she would not have had the accident of June 10, 2009, and had been treated with appropriate aggressive physiotherapy to her right shoulder and upper extremity, that Mrs. Johal would have likely improved over time. I accept this opinion.
[82]         Accepting Dr. Wade’s evidence as I do, I am satisfied that Mrs. Johal has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s negligence caused mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her cervical and lumbar spine. These injuries caused aggravation of her pre-existing conditions and caused new conditions in her lumbar spine and lower body…
[92]         I find she would have been disabled to some extent by her right shoulder and upper extremity problems if the accident had not occurred. However, the injuries from the accident have made her symptoms worse, slower to recover and have had a more significant impact on her life. In the unique circumstances of this case, I find that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $35,000.00.

Court Criticizes ICBC's "Disappointing" Take On Diminished Earning Capacity Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized.

The factors to be considered when assessing damages for ‘diminished earning capacity’ are well established in law.  Reasons for judgement were released today  by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, addressing this and criticizing ICBC’s approach when valuing this loss.
In this week’s case (Tarasevich v.Samsam) the “plaintiff’s hips and sacrum were seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident“.  The injury was expected to pose long term problems requiring serial surgeries to address these issues in the future.   The injury caused chronic pain and impacted the Plaintiff’s working tolerance.   Despite this, ICBC argued that the long term injury will only have  a modest impact on the Plaintiff’s earning capacity because “the plaintiff was bound to become a sedentary office worker in any event and that because her physiatrist has said that despite her injuries she can engage in a full-time sedentary occupation, she will therefore not suffer a significant loss of future income“.
Mr. Justice Rogers rejected ICBC’s position and provided the following criticism:
[52]         To repeat: the defence’s approach to this head of damages is to assert that the plaintiff was going to be a sedentary office worker in any event and that because the evidence shows that she is likely to now follow that career path, she cannot be said to have suffered a loss. The defence asserts this proposition notwithstanding the uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiff’s hip and lower back injuries markedly limit her ability to do the kind of work that she actually did, and did well, before her injury.
[53]         It is disappointing that in this day and age, nearly 30 years after Brown v. Golaiy, a defendant would cleave to such a wrong-headed approach to a claim for reduction of earning capacity…
[56]         The plaintiff was a young person when she was injured. It is possible that she would have enjoyed sufficient success in retail sales and management that she would not have gone on to work in an office environment. It is equally possible that she would have taken office administration courses while still working full or part‑time and would have gone on to find employment in an office. The plaintiff’s history in the labour force was too brief to support a confident prediction of the direction her future would take. One cannot, therefore, say that the plaintiff’s loss may be calculated by measuring the delta between pre- and post-injury income streams. For that reason, I find that assessment is the appropriate methodology for this case.
[57]         The plaintiff has made a genuine effort to engage in work. She has tried and failed to work as housecleaner. She has tried and failed to work full-time in the same type of sales job she did before the accident. If the plaintiff does not pursue sedentary work but continues to work in sales or some other occupation that requires her to be on her feet for the majority of the day, I find that her stated preference for part-time work is reasonable given her symptoms and limitations. If she works part-time in a sales position, she will likely have more energy to look after her household and to participate in social activities and such recreational pursuits as she can still do. Working part-time will allow her to achieve some reasonable degree of balance between earning a living and having a life to live.
[58]         On the other hand, I find that as a result of her injuries the plaintiff’s best course of action will be to earn a Grade 12 diploma or its equivalent and then to enroll in a course of post-secondary that will qualify her for employment in an office environment. Even in an office environment, the plaintiff will be a generally less desirable employee than her able-bodied colleagues. In order to work full-time, the plaintiff will need a sympathetic employer who is willing to accommodate her limitations.
[59]         In either case, the plaintiff’s participation in the labour force will be interrupted by serial hip replacement surgeries.
[60]         For these reasons, I have concluded that the proper award for reduction of the plaintiff’s earning capacity is $250,000.

Costs for Fast Track Trials Exceeding 3 Days Discussed

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 15. 57 Comments on Costs for Fast Track Trials Exceeding 3 Days Discussed

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing assesable costs when a fast track trial exceeds 3 days.
In today’s case (Peacock v. Paul) the plaintiff was involved in two collisions.  Although only one of the cases was put into the fast track the Court deemed that Rule 15 applied to both actions.  The trial took a total of 5 days.   ICBC argued that costs should be capped at $11,000 but Mr. Justice Affleck declined to do so and used his discretion to increase costs by $1,500 for each additional day of trial.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[20]         Madam Justice Neilson held that the formula set out in Anderson v. Routbard, 2007 BCCA 193 should be applied to determine what amount should be awarded. This formula involves first determining what portion of the lump sum provided for in the Rule is for pre-trial and trial costs. Madam Justice Neilson calculated this by taking the amount enumerated for a one day or less trial and subtracting it from the amount allowed for a two day or more trial. The difference is then multiplied by the number of days that the trial went over (paras. 31, 39). She concluded:
39        I would therefore allow the appeal, and calculate costs under R. 66(29) as follows. Under the present limits of $5,000 and $6,600 I take the pre-trial portion of costs to be $3,400, and $1,600 as representative of each day of trial. The plaintiff’s offer to settle was delivered only six days before trial. Thus, she is not entitled to double costs for trial preparation. She is, however, entitled to double costs for three and a half days of trial, calculated at $3,200 per day. Total costs are thus $14,600 ($3,400 plus $11,200) before disbursements and taxes.
[21]         Similarly, this approach was used in Lam v. Chui, 2013 BCSC 1281 where the court considered the appropriate costs award in a fast track action where the trial took 13.5 days. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs for 11.5 days after it deducted 2 days representing time wasted as a result of an error made by the parties concerning the date of the loan in question. Calculating the cost of a trial day at $1, 500 using the formula from Majewska, the court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to $23, 750 in costs ($11,000 for the first three days of trial and $1,500 per day for 8.5 days). The same approach was used inShiekh v. Struys, 2013 BCSC 1148.
[22]         In Coutakis v. Lean, 2012 BCSC 1447, the court considered a successful plaintiff’s claim for costs in a fast track action. The trial took five days including one day where trial did not proceed due to illness of the judge. The court held:
10        Under subrule 15-1(15), the court is given a wide discretion to order an amount of costs other than the fixed amounts set out therein. In my view, this is a case which clearly calls for the exercise of that discretion, in favour of the plaintiff. That the hearing of the evidence took three days, rather than two, was largely as a result of the defence’s cross-examination of four of the plaintiff’s treating physicians, and the defence’s tendering as opinion evidence of the consultation report of a neurosurgeon. Hearing the evidence of all of these physicians took more than three hours, and, as I stated in my judgment, all of it was ineffectual. Further time was spent hearing irrelevant evidence from the defendant.
…
13        Using the amounts prescribed in the subrule as reference points, I award the plaintiff base costs of $14,000, plus disbursements.
[23]         In the case at bar, the trial took two days longer than contemplated by R. 15-1(15)(c). Applying the authorities discussed above, in my view, the costs award should exceed $11,000 by adding a further $1,500 for each of the additional days of trial for a total costs award of $14,000 not including disbursements.

$85,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Dental Misalignment Coupled With Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Dental Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing damages for dental injuries sustained in a vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Latek v. Krol) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2011 collision for which the Defendant accepted responsibility.  The Plaintiff suffered a jaw injury resulting in misaligned teeth and various soft tissue injuries.  He was an active individual and suffered a variety of soft tissue injuries which impacted his physical lifestyle.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $85,000  Mr. Justice Sewell provided the following reasons:
[6]             Mr. Latek was seen by his family doctor, Dr. Ostapkowicz, on May 25, 2011. At that time he was moving with difficulty and could hardly talk. His jaw was swollen and he was unable to chew. He complained of head and teeth ache, maxilla and jaw pain, difficulty in opening his mouth, neck pain, right and left shoulder pain, right lower back, hip and knee pain, as well as left foot pain.
[7]             Mr. Latek was examined by his family dentist, Dr. Gill, on May 25, 2011. At that time he was able to open his mouth only ten millimetres wide, as compared to a normal opening of 40-45 millimetres. Dr. Gill noted that 16 of Mr. Latek’s front teeth were loosened and significantly mobile. On a later examination on July 25, 2011, Dr. Gill observed that two of Mr. Latek’s teeth were misaligned inwardly.
[8]             Mr. Latek remains under the care of Dr. Gill for treatment of the injuries to his teeth. He currently wears braces to correct the misalignment of his teeth suffered in the accident. Once the orthodontic treatment is completed there is a possibility that Mr. Latek may require further treatment to his jaw but Mr. Latek’s prognosis is generally favourable.
[9]             Over time many of Mr. Latek’s symptoms resolved. His last recorded visit to Dr. Ostapkowicz was on December 11, 2012. On January 31, 2013, Mr. Latek attended an independent medical examination by Dr. Hirsch, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation. By that time, Mr. Latek’s injuries were largely resolved except for pain in the low back, left hip and buttock and left knee. Dr. Hirsch’s opinion was that Mr. Latek’s injuries were soft tissue in nature. He found no evidence of any structural or ligamentous damage or any indication of structural injury to the spine. Dr. Hirsch characterized Mr. Latek’s lower back pain as mechanical, or pain that is exacerbated by activities and postures that stress or load the back…
[27]         Mr. Latek’s injuries, though extensive, were not severe or life threatening. He did not suffer an inordinate amount of pain from them. Most of his injuries resolved within about a year after the accident.
[28]         However, the impact of the injuries on Mr. Latek has been much more serious than they might have been on a more sedentary plaintiff. I am satisfied that much of Mr. Latek’s self-esteem and enjoyment of life were based on his physical prowess and his ability to engage in activities requiring a high level of physical fitness, endurance and strength.  Mr. Latek gave priority to those activities over the pursuit of a career in the two years before the accident.
[29]         I am satisfied that Mr. Latek’s inability to pursue his pre-accident activities is attributable to the injuries he suffered in the accident. In my view that loss has had a profound effect on Mr. Latek’s enjoyment of the amenities of life. While there is no expert medical evidence about the physiological and mental health impact of the loss of the ability to do what he did before the accident, I conclude that that loss together with his pain symptoms caused the personality changes exhibited by Mr. Latek since the accident…
[34]         Taking Mr. Latek’s injuries into account in the context of the authorities, and giving particular weight to the impact the injuries have had on Mr. Latek’s quality of life, I assess non-pecuniary damages at $85,000.

A Draw is a Loss in the World of Tort Litigation

Written by admin on . Posted in Sexual Assault Civil Cases, Uncategorized. 58 Comments on A Draw is a Loss in the World of Tort Litigation

When suing for damages for harm caused by others a Court needs to be satisfied that the allgations fueling the lawsuit took place.  In the case of opposing versions of events if a Court can not pick one over the other the claim will be dismissed.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, with such an outcome.
In this week’s case (Fergusson v. Eyrl) the Plaintiff alleged “that he was sexually assaulted on numerous occasions” by the Defendant.  The Defendant denied the allegations in their entirety.  Ultimately the Court concluded that both parties versions of events were plausible and given that one could not be preferred over the other the claim was dismissed.  In dismissing the claim Mr. Justice Melnick provided the following reasons:
[50]         In sum, there is compelling evidence to suggest both that the assaults alleged occurred and that they did not. But, at its best, the case of Mr. Fergusson is evenly balanced with that of Mr. Eyrl. I am not satisfied that it is more probable than not that the claims of Mr. Fergusson against Mr. Eyrl have been made out.