Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing the effects of a formal settlement offer made on the eve of trial.
In last week’s case (J.D. v. Chandra) the Plaintiff was injured in two motor vehicle collisions. At trial she was awarded just over $500,000 in damages. On the last business day before trial the Plaintiff made a formal offer to settle for $200,000. The Plaintiff sought double costs for the trial arguing the offer should have been accepted. The Defendant argued the offer was made too late in the process to trigger such consequences. In rejecting this position Madam Justice Griffin provided the following reasons: [16] One of the defendants’ arguments is that the offer was delivered too close to the start of trial. The offer was delivered at the end of the day on Friday, January 31, 2014, and counsel for the defendants submits that he did not see it until the next day, Saturday, February 1, 2014. The trial was set to and did commence the following Monday, February 3, 2014. [17] The shortness of time to consider the offer does give me pause. However, counsel for the plaintiff has pointed out case authorities where ICBC has taken the position that offers it has delivered to plaintiffs on the eve of trial ought to be considered by the court in depriving the plaintiff of costs. These arguments have been accepted in some cases, for example, see Bevacqua v. Yaworski, 2013 BCSC 29. [18] As noted by Mr. Justice Voith in Brewster v. Li, 2014 BCSC 463, there is currently no requirement in the Rules that an offer be made within a specific time from the start of trial. The question of what is a reasonable time to consider an offer is “largely driven and governed by context” (para. 26). [19] Here, the context was that counsel for the defendants had delivered an offer to settle on January 21, 2014; the parties had attended a Judicial Settlement Conference on January 29, 2014, and the defendants had delivered an additional offer to settle on January 30, 2014. This context suggests that the defendants were in a position where they were well able to analyze the risks of going to trial and the relative merits of each side’s position. [20] There was nothing complicated about the offers to settle which required lengthy analysis. The parties were just exchanging dollar amounts. There was no revealing new analysis of the issues or last minute disclosure of material information. [21] The plaintiff’s form of offer to settle adopted a form similar to that of the defendants. [22] The defendants were represented by experienced counsel for ICBC. I find that the defendants were in a good position to be able to analyze and respond to the offer within hours, if not minutes. I find that the defendants had sufficient time to assess the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s offer to settle.
Adding to this site’s archived database of judgments addressing adverse inferences in personal injury lawsuits, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, drawing such an inference.
In today’s case (Rogalsky v. Harrett) the Plaintiff was involved in a relatively modest collision in 2010. Fault was admitted. The Plaintiff suffered a variety of injuries. In support of her claim the Plaintiff tendered “a somewhat dated” report from an independent medical practitioner. The Plaintiff did not produce evidence from her GP despite seeing him shortly before trial for the purposes of a medical-legal assessment. In finding an adverse inference appropriate in these circumstances Mr. Justice Verhoeven provided the following reasons: [44] I am very troubled by her decision to not call evidence from her doctor. As noted, she confirmed that she saw him on February 26, 2014, for examination in relation to a medical legal report. His report is not in evidence, nor are his prior reports. The plaintiff denied seeing the recent report or being aware of its contents. I do not accept that part of her evidence. I cannot accept that the plaintiff had no input into the decision not to adduce the report. At a minimum, she must be aware of the optimistic opinion Dr. Burns set out in an earlier report dated April 5, 2011, also not adduced in evidence, the contents of which are referred to in Ms. Hunt’s report, which the plaintiff acknowledged reading. In her evidence the plaintiff downplayed the efficacy of the treatment provided by Dr. Burns and in effect his opinions by stating that her appointments with him are rushed and he does not seem appropriately focussed on her concerns. In my view the plaintiff has simply chosen to suppress and downplay Dr. Burns’ evidence because it is not helpful to her case. This adversely affects her credibility as a witness. [45] Moreover, in the circumstances of this case I consider it appropriate to draw an inference that Dr. Burns’ evidence would not have been favourable to her case. [46] Dr. Koo was not asked to provide an updated report based upon a further more recent examination of the plaintiff. Thus his report is somewhat dated. In addition the weight I can give to the report depends upon the weight I can give to the evidence of the plaintiff herself, in respect of which I have some reservations, as indicated.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing the practice of cyclists passing vehicles on the right finding, absent limited circumstances, that it is negligent to do so.
In today’s case (Ormiston v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 cycling collision. As he proceeded down hill a vehicle ahead of him in his lane of travel “was almost stopped at the centre line”. The Plaintiff had room on the right side of the vehicle and attempted to pass. As the Plaintiff did so the motorist veered to the right causing the Plaintiff to lose control.
The motorist left the scene and remained unidentified. The reason for the sudden veering motion remained unknown. The Plaintiff sued ICBC pursuant to section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. ICBC admitted that the collision occurred and involved an unidentified motorist, however, ICBC argued the Plaintiff was fully responsible. At trial both the cyclist and motorist were found partly to blame. The BC Court of Appeal overturned this result finding the cyclist was full to blame for passing a vehicle on the right. In reaching conclusion the Court provided the following reasons: [23] Under the Motor Vehicle Act a cyclist is required to ride as near as practicable to the right side of the highway (s. 183(2)(c)). “Highway” is broadly defined to include any right of way designed to be used by the public for the passage of vehicles (s. 1). That, it is said, includes the shoulder such that sometimes cyclists must ride on it to be as near as practicable to the right side of the highway. Vehicles are required to travel on the right-hand half of the roadway (s. 150(1)). “Roadway” is defined as the improved portion of a highway designed for use by vehicular traffic but does not include any shoulder (s. 119). Vehicles cannot travel on the shoulder. [24] The contention is that because cyclists must sometimes ride on the shoulder while vehicles cannot travel on that part of a highway, the shoulder must, where practicable, be a lane for cyclists within the meaning of s. 158(1)(b) such that, when riding on the shoulder, they are able to take advantage of the exception it provides and pass vehicles on a roadway on their right. It does appear that what may be practicable could vary considerably having regard for the differing widths of the shoulder over any given stretch of a highway, or from one highway to the next, as well as the condition of the surface. One cyclist may have a much different view than another as to what is practicable in any given instance. [25] While I doubt the legislative intention was to create by this somewhat convoluted statutory route what would be thousands of miles of unmarked and ill-defined bicycle lanes across the province, I do not consider s. 158 (1)(b) constitutes an applicable exception to the prohibition against passing on the right in any event. As defined, the exception applies to a laned roadway being a roadway divided into marked lanes for vehicles travelling in the same direction. The markings divide the roadway; the lanes marked are on the roadway. A roadway does not include the shoulder. The shoulder could not be an unobstructed lane on a laned roadway. The “laned roadway” exception has, as the judge said, no application here. It does not permit cyclists to pass vehicles on the right by riding on the shoulder. It must follow the driver of the vehicle would have had no reason to expect a cyclist like Ormiston would attempt to pass on the right by riding on the shoulder. That must be particularly so here when the shoulder was not fit for a bicycle because it was strewn with gravel and Ormiston was riding as far to the right of the highway as he considered practicable. [26] Ormiston did a foolish thing. Rather than wait until the driver’s intentions were clear, he decided to do what the Motor Vehicle Act prohibits – pass on the right. He decided to take a chance and he was injured. Had he waited, even a few seconds, there would of course have been no accident because the vehicle drove on after it had moved to the right of its lane. [27] I conclude Dixon Ormiston was the sole author of his misfortune. I do not consider there to be any basis in law to hold the driver of the vehicle liable in negligence.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, assessing damages for a skin burn which required surgical intervention.
In today’s case (Nogueira v. O. Alasaly Pharmacy) the Plaintiff purchased a medicated patch from the Defendant pharmacy to treat muscle soreness in her thigh. The patch was found to be defective and it caused a burn which required a surgical skin graft for correction. The Defendant was found at fault for selling the defective product. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $25,000 Madam Justice Funt provided the following reasons: [16] In the late evening of November 12, 2011, the plaintiff was in significant pain and went to the emergency room of her local hospital for further treatment. She was treated with burn cream and further dressings were applied to the wound. [17] On December 13, 2011, Dr. Naysmith, a plastic surgeon with Royal Jubilee Hospital, operated on the burn area using a skin graft technique. Dr. Naysmith excised the burn, harvested the skin to be grafted, grafted the skin, dressed the donor and burn sites, and stapled burn gauze into position. [18] The plaintiff testified that during the month before surgery she had the wound dressing changed every day. During that period she was “very uncomfortable” when she drove or sat. [19] The plaintiff testified that the wound took “a good month” to heal from the surgery. She says she still experiences tingling in the burn area. The burn does not affect her mobility. [20] On December 4, 2014, Dr. D. Classen, a plastic surgeon, conducted an independent medical examination and prepared a report in contemplation of trial. The plaintiff entered Dr. Classen’s report, dated March 6, 2014, into evidence. In his report, Dr. Classen describes the plaintiff’s wound following surgery: Examination of the left thigh demonstrates a residual scar on the left anterior mid-thigh, 17 centimeters above the knee. The scar is 7 centimetres in vertical length by 4 centimeters in width. It is mildly noticeable, as it is hypopigmented compared to the surrounding skin. It has a slight meshed type appearance to the scar. The contour is depressed by approximately 1 millimeter compared to the surrounding skin. I could palpate the area with complaint of some mild discomfort and a feeling of numbness described. The skin graft scar is providing durable skin coverage. There is no skin breakdown or ulcerations present. The split thickness skin graft donor site scar is adjacent to this skin graft scar. The donor site is barely noticeable, there is no contour abnormality. There is no significant skin discoloration. It is virtually similar to the surrounding skin appearance. [21] Dr. Classen did not testify. He was not asked to provide an opinion as to whether the plaintiff’s skin was particularly sensitive or was in any way abnormal such that a medicated patch would burn her skin. This possibility was not suggested in the cross-examination of the plaintiff. [22] The plaintiff describes the sight of her thigh now as “disgusting”, “ugly”, “a big splotch”, and feels it is “degrading”. She does not wear many types of clothes she used to wear. [23] From the plaintiff’s presence in the witness box, it was readily apparent to the Court that the plaintiff believed her description of the affected area and was not trying to exaggerate or mislead the Court… [39] Section 56(2) of the Sale of Goods Act provides the measure of damages. Section 56(2) reads: The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty. [40] It is foreseeable that in the ordinary course of events a defective medical analgesic patch (whether defective as a consequence of manufacturing, storage or some other cause) could injure the skin. It is also foreseeable that a person may be proud of or may be self-conscious as to his or her physical appearance… [43] No two cases regarding physical injury will ever be identical. With respect to a scar, the size, severity and location of the scar are some of the particular factors. The injured party’s perception of the injury is also an important factor. In determining the appropriate award, the Court has considered the plaintiff’s anxiety with respect to the scar. The Court has also included as a factor the tingling she experiences at the site of the scar. The Court awards $25,000 as non-pecuniary damages.
The BC Court of Appeal published reasons for judgement today confirming that it is entirely appropriate for an economist to rely on statistical census data in discussing average earnings.
In today’s case (Smith v. Fremlin) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. She was a recent law school graduate who just started her career. The collision caused injuries which limited her capacity to work. At trial the Court relied on an economists report which discussed average earnings for legal professionals in helping assess the Plaintiff’s diminished earning capacity. The Defendant objected arguing the report relied on inadmissible hearsay, namely statistical census data. The trial judge found the defendant’s objections to be ‘nonsensical’. Despite this the Defendant appealed. The BC Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal fining statistical evidence is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons: [18] The appellants say the Wickson report ought not to have been admitted into evidence at trial. They do not object to the qualification of Mr. Wickson as an expert but say his report is defective and inadmissible in two respects. First, it is said to be based upon evidence that is hearsay. Second, it is said to be irrelevant because it measures the income earning capacity of a group to which Ms. Smith does not belong. [19] The first of these objections, the hearsay objection, is unfounded. Mr. Wickson expressly describes the source of the data used in the preparation of his report. In addition to relying on published census data, he obtained a special tabulation providing education-specific 5-year age group income data from Statistics Canada. In my view, this data falls squarely within the admissible class of evidence described by Sopinka J. inR. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852; it is information derived from enquiries that are an accepted means of arriving at an opinion within an economist’s expertise. The reliability of the data is supported by strong circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. It is, in words cited with approval in Lavallee, evidence of a “general nature which is widely used and acknowledged as reliable by experts in that field.” [20] Such was the opinion of this Court in Reilly. There, the Court noted that while hearsay evidence cannot generally be introduced through the admission of expert reports into evidence: [114] It is otherwise…with respect to the opinions of … economic experts based on the census data, which are routinely used by experts in their field … [21] In my view, the words of Smith J.A. in Jones v. Zimmer GMBH, 2013 BCCA 21, are a complete response to the appellant’s objection to the Wickson report and support and justification for the judge’s decision to admit it: [50] … Proponents of expert opinions cannot be expected to prove independently the truth of what the experts were taught by others during their education, training, and experience or the truth of second-hand information of a type customarily and reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Accordingly, the degree to which an expert opinion is based on hearsay evidence is a matter to be considered in assessing the weight to be given the opinion: R. v. Wilband, [1967] S.C.R. 14 at 21, [1967] 2 C.C.C. 6; R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 at 896, 899-900, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 97. [22] The second objection, that the Wickson report is inadmissible, as “wholly or largely irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s circumstances,” is equally unfounded. The appellants say the weight of the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that Ms. Smith would likely work within a limited range of the occupations open to a qualified lawyer. They say it was not helpful to receive and not appropriate for the court to rely upon a report describing the earning potential of all female lawyers in British Columbia (rather than, for instance, female lawyers in British Columbia practicing environmental or Aboriginal law in a not-for-profit setting). [23] This objection should be considered in light of the generally accepted approach to assessment of claims for loss of income earning capacity, which is, first, to set the parameters of the claim by referring to statistical evidence with respect to the class of individuals to which the plaintiff belongs, and then to adjust the resulting preliminary measure of damages to take into account contingencies that are particular to the plaintiff. [24] Average earnings were found to be the proper starting point for the assessment of damages under this head in Reilly, even though there was some evidence of the plaintiff’s specific professional interests. This Court observed: [122] The trial judge should have considered the possibility that the respondent might not have realized his professional goals or might have changed his goals. Qualifying as a lawyer opens up a number of career possibilities. It is reasonable to assume that the respondent would have remained in the profession. But he might not have developed the professional skills to achieve above-average earnings. He might have decided that he did not want to make the personal sacrifices often required to compete professionally at that level. Other interests, of which he had many before his head injury, or future family commitments, might have persuaded him to alter his goals. He might have chosen other disciplines within the profession with lower remuneration, such as prosecuting, working in the civil litigation departments of the federal or provincial government, or becoming in-house counsel in the private sector. It is well known that in the legal profession interests change and there is great mobility. In addition, there are many above-average lawyers with below-average incomes. [123] As well, the possibility that the respondent might have earned more money than predicted should be considered, although we consider that the chance of this happening was relatively low given the evidence of the small numbers of lawyers in Vancouver who have achieved outstanding financial success. This award is intended to cover the respondent’s working life to age 70, a period of approximately 36 years from the date of trial. Many things can change during such a long period of time and present-day assumptions are far from immutable. [25] Evidence of the earnings of the class of workers to which the plaintiff belongs is clearly relevant to the assessment of a loss of earning capacity. At some point, the evidence may be so general or vague as to be of little assistance but, in my view, that cannot be said of the statistical evidence used in this case. Evidence of the lifetime earning capacity of female lawyers in British Columbia, according to Mr. Wickson’s testimony in cross-examination, was the most specific data available. No further breakdown of incomes of female lawyers in this province by areas of practice is available. The Wickson report therefore was the best available evidence of what has been recognized as the starting point of the assessment of the loss of income earning capacity. It was properly admitted by the judge.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, criticizing an expert report characterizing it as ‘analytically weak’.
In the recent case (Anderson v. Kozniuk) the Plaintiff was involved in a pedestrian/vehicle collision. Both parties were found partially at fault. The Plaintiff suffered some orthopaedic injuries and also alleged the collision caused a traumatic brain injury. The Court heard competing evidence regarding this and ultimately concluded that no brain injury occurred as a result of the crash. In rejecting the Plaintiff’s evidence the Court provided the following critical comments about the expert evidence in support of the claim: [128] Dr. Ancill greatly diminished or completely ignored clinical records, such as the ambulance Crew Report and Royal Columbian Hospital clinical records. His explanation for doing so was the people filling those forms probably asked the wrong question of Mr. Anderson (“what happened?” instead of “what do you remember?”). Dr. Ancill does not know and did not enquire what questions were asked by the people who completed the clinical records. He simply assumed the wrong question was asked and ignored their observations. In my view, Dr. Ancill has exaggerated the importance of which question is asked, especially when interviewing a patient years after the Accident. [129] Dr. Ancill took all of Mr. Anderson’s and his mother’s description of Mr. Anderson’s changed behaviours at face value. Obviously, psychiatric assessment relies heavily on patient’s self-report. But it is expected that psychiatrists will exercise their skills and knowledge to assess the subject’s mood and behaviour in light of all circumstances, especially medically significant factors, in order to reach an accurate diagnosis. In my view, Dr. Ancill did not do that. I find that he summarily dismissed or greatly diminished the importance of objective evidence recorded close in time to the Accident and recorded by people trained to assess patients’ conditions for injury (the clinical records). This treatment of the clinical records is, in my view, highly problematic… [131] It is curious that Dr. Ancill suggested that even a “brief” loss of consciousness (in this case he assumed as little as 30 seconds) was medically significant. This was expressly contradicted by Drs. Siu, Prout and O’Shaughnessy who stated a “brief” period of loss of consciousness or disorientation that typically accompanies a mild traumatic brain injury would be about between 15 and 30 minutes. There is simply no evidence that Mr. Anderson was either unconscious or disorientated within the 30 minutes following the Accident, or at all. [132] Dr. Ancill also ignored or gave little relevance to factors that may very well have impacted his opinion, such as Mr. Anderson’s anxiety and his history of alcohol use. [133] Dr. Ancill provided a rebuttal report. Rather than respond to Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s criticisms of his methodology and conclusions, Dr. Ancill merely provides a clarification of his earlier report. In my view, the second report does not clarify the first report, and it is unhelpful. I place no weight on it… [135] Overall, I find Dr. Ancill’s evidence unreliable for all the reasons above. I also find his expert report analytically weak. Many conclusions are stated with little reasoning. His rebuttal report in particular is akin to an argument justifying his earlier conclusions rather than a response to Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s significant criticisms of his methodology and medical reliability. I place minimal weight on Dr. Ancill’s evidence.
The BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgment today providing a concise summary of what is needed to succeed in asserting a litigation privilege claim.
In today’s case (Gichuru v. British Columbia) the Court was asked to address whether various documents were properly withheld due to claims of litigation privilege. The BC Court of Appeal noted that the following test must be met to justify such a claim: Madam Justice Gray then proceeded at para. 94, and following, to usefully describe the type of information necessary to sustain a claim of privilege. (Keefer Laundry concerns discovery of documents in a civil suit but the principles discussed by Gray J. are equally applicable to s. 14, the issue under consideration here.) I would adopt her comments as follows: [96] Litigation Privilege must be established document by document. To invoke the privilege, counsel must establish two facts for each document over which the privilege is claimed: 1. that litigation was ongoing or was reasonably contemplated at the time the document was created; and 2. that the dominant purpose of creating the document was to prepare for that litigation. (Dos Santos (Committee of) v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (2005), 40 B.C.L.R. (4th) 245, 2005 BCCA 4 at paras. 43-44.) [97] The first requirement will not usually be difficult to meet. Litigation can be said to be reasonably contemplated when a reasonable person, with the same knowledge of the situation as one or both of the parties, would find it unlikely that the dispute will be resolved without it. (Hamalainen v. Sippola [(1991), 62 B.C.L.R. (2d) 254]) [98] To establish “dominant purpose”, the party asserting the privilege will have to present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the communication or document in question, including evidence with respect to when it was created, who created it, who authorized it, and what use was or could be made of it. Care must be taken to limit the extent of the information that is revealed in the process of establishing “dominant purpose” to avoid accidental or implied waiver of the privilege that is being claimed. [99] The focus of the enquiry is on the time and purpose for which the document was created. Whether or not a document is actually used in ensuing litigation is a matter of strategy and does not affect the document’s privileged status. A document created for the dominant purpose of litigation remains privileged throughout that litigation even if it is never used in evidence. [33] In Stone v. Ellerman, 2009 BCCA 294, Chief Justice Finch speaking for the Court, suggested that where the claim is litigation privilege rather than solicitor-client privilege, the description necessary to validate the claim to privilege must be more detailed. At para. 27 he held: [27] Some authority supports the proposition that where the privilege claimed is not solicitor-client privilege but rather litigation privilege, as in this case, the premium placed on protecting the information is lower and the description must be more detailed to facilitate challenge. In Hetherington v. Loo, 2007 BCSC 129, Master Caldwell distinguished Leung v. Hanna [(1999), 68 B.C.L.R. (3d) 360 (S.C.)] on the basis that it dealt exclusively with solicitor-client privilege. He reasoned as follows: [8] …The present case deals with a claim of privilege based upon the “dominant purpose of litigation” test and protection. While information such as the date and author’s identity may well be protected from disclosure under a claim of solicitor-client privilege, such protection is not necessarily afforded claims of privilege based upon the dominant purpose test. The latter protection is less absolute, more fact driven and subject to challenge. In the recent case of Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] S.C.J. No. 39, Fish J. said at [paragraph] 60: the litigation privilege should be viewed as a limited exception to the principle of full disclosure and not as an equal partner of the broadly interpreted solicitor-client privilege. The dominant purpose test is more compatible with the contemporary trend favouring increased disclosure. [9] And at [paragraph] 61: While the solicitor-client privilege has been strengthened, reaffirmed and elevated in recent years, the litigation privilege has had, on the contrary, to weather the trend toward mutual and reciprocal disclosure which is the hallmark of the judicial process. [10] In order that proper assessment may be made as to the propriety of a claim of litigation or dominant purpose privilege it is necessary that sufficient particulars of the documents be given. In most cases dealing with documents involving adjusters files and certainly in this case, particulars as to date and author must be provided. When dealing with interview notes, transcripts, and statements, it may also be necessary to identify if not the actual subject, at least the category of subject (e.g. eyewitnesses, home-care worker, etc.) involved. [Emphasis added by Finch C.J.B.C.]
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries following multiple collisions.
In today’s case (Jiwani v. Borodi) the Plaintiff was involved in four collisions. He was not at fault for any of these. The initial collision caused soft tissue injuries to his neck and back. The back injury was aggravated by some of the subsequent collisions and his symptoms lingered to the time of trial. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $65,000 Mr. Justice Sigurdson provided the following reasons: [45] I conclude that the neck problems and the headaches resolved within about six months of the first accident, and that the back pain continues to some degree now five years after the first and most significant accident. [46] I find that the back pain is soft-tissue related and has affected the plaintiff’s mood, his ability to sleep, and to some degree, his disposition and in turn his relationship with his family and friends, including his nephew. I think that the accident has had an impact on the plaintiff’s family and social life and restricted the pleasure he had received from his friends and family in the past. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the extent of his injuries. While I am persuaded that the plaintiff still has lower back pain, I am not satisfied that he is as seriously injured as he contends. The plaintiff’s soft tissue injury to his lower back has persisted but I find that in due course any back pain will improve and if it persists will be of a type that causes modest discomfort and requires him to change positions and not sit for too long. [47] That said, I am not persuaded that the plaintiff is completely pain free. I think that the plaintiff would benefit, as suggested by Dr. Grypma, from an active rehabilitation program. .. 52] Given my findings and after considering the authorities relied upon by the parties and the factors mentioned in Stapley, the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $65,000 for non- pecuniary damages.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the Court’s discretion to allow a party to conduct an examination for discovery beyond the 2 hour cap called for in Fast Track proceedings.
In today’s case (Henneberry v. Humber) the Plaintiff sued for damages following a collision. The Plaintiff was examined for discovery for the full two hours allowed under the fast track. The Defendant brought an application for further time but the court dismissed this finding the examination that was conduced pursued “unproductive trains of inquiry“. In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Romilly provided the following reasons: [3] Counsel for the defendant in this particular case indicates there are many reasons for that. It is a complicated case, liability is in issue, and the plaintiff refused to sign a notice to admit certain facts which could have shortened the length of this examination for discovery. [4] Counsel for the plaintiff has taken me through the examination for discovery and pointed out many instances where counsel for the defendant has squandered the opportunity to fully take advantage of this two-hour limit that was placed upon these proceedings. [5] Two of the leading members of our court, if I could say that, in civil matters, Madam Justice Susan Griffin and Mr. Justice N. Smith, have both written judgments on these new rules. In one case, the case ofMore Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., 2011 BCSC 166, Mr. Justice N. Smith, says this at paras. 12-13: [12] The new Rules also impose limitations on oral examination for discovery, but do so through a different mechanism. Rule 7-2 (2) now limits an examination for discovery to seven hours or to any longer period to which the person being examined consents. Although the test for relevance of a particular question or group of questions remains very broad, examining parties who ask too many questions about marginally relevant matters, who spend too much time pursuing unproductive trains of inquiry or who elicit too much evidence that will not be admissible at trial risk leaving themselves with insufficient time for obtaining more important evidence and admissions. [13] As Griffin J. said in Kendall, the time limit imposes a “self-policing incentive” on the party conducting the examination: at para. 14. At the same time, the existence of the time limit creates a greater obligation on counsel for the party being examined to avoid unduly objecting or interfering in a way that wastes the time available. This interplay was described in Kendall at para. 18: A largely “hands off” approach to examinations for discovery, except in the clearest of circumstances, is in accord with the object of the Rules of Court, particularly the newly stated object of proportionality, effective July 1, 2010. Allowing wide-ranging cross-examination on examination for discovery is far more cost-effective than a practice that encourages objections, which will undoubtedly result in subsequent chambers applications to require judges or masters to rule on the objections. It is far more efficient for counsel for the examinee to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence at trial, rather than on examination for discovery. [6] In this particular case, counsel for the plaintiff has taken me to the transcript and I am satisfied that there was far too much time spent pursuing unproductive trains of inquiry. As a result, the two-hour limitation passed by without counsel for the defendant being able to deal with all the issues with which they wanted to deal. [7] I am not satisfied that this is a case where I should exercise my discretion to give any further time for further examinations for discovery. The application will be dismissed. Thank you.
Courts in British Columbia frown on the practice of having witnesses commit their evidence in affidavit form before trial. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing this practice and explaining the Courts concerns with it.
In this week’s case (Staaf v. ICBC) three witnesses testified on behalf of ICBC. Prior to doing so all provided sworn statements authenticating various business records. The Plaintiff argued that less weight should be given to these witnesses evidence because of this practice.
The Court agreed that the practice is to be discouraged, however went on to note that in the circumstances of this case no lesser weight should be attached to these witnesses. In discouraging the practice of having witnesses swear pre-trial affidavits Mr. Justice Burnyeat provided the following comments: [6] The question which arises is the propriety of recording statements of witnesses in sworn form before trial. Statements in sworn form should not be taken. The consciences of witnesses at a trial are fettered by committing them in advance to a story which is favourable to the client of the lawyer preparing the affidavit. To obtain a sworn affidavit or a statutory declaration not only influences the evidence that a witness may give under oath at a trial but also compromises accurate and truthful evidence at trial because a previous statement may compromise the interest of the witness who wishes to testify truthfully but the truth may be in conflict with the previously sworn statement. Before trial, the acceptable practice is to take statements from witnesses but not arrange for those witnesses to swear affidavits or to make statutory declarations. [7] If testimony is to be given by affidavit, an application should be made pursuant to Rule 12‑5(59) of the Rules of Court. Subject to the order of the Court to the contrary, that affidavit must be served at least 28 days prior to such an application being heard by the Court. No such application was made relating to the evidence of these three affiants… [9] Under the circumstances, it would have been appropriate for counsel for the Defendants to apply for an order pursuant to Rule 12‑5(59) and, if that order had been granted, for counsel for the Plaintiff to require those witnesses to be called for cross-examination at trial pursuant to Rule 12‑5(61). That was not done. [10] When it became apparent that three Affidavits had been sworn, counsel for the Defendants was urged by me to make an application that the evidence of the three be given by affidavit and counsel for the Plaintiff was urged to make a subsequent application that the three witnesses be called to the Trial for cross-examination. That is what occurred and those orders were made. [11] In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the sworn testimony of the three witnesses were in no way compromised by the assumption that the truth of what they were saying was in conflict with the affidavits that they had sworn. First, the affidavits were sworn in order to place before the Court the business records that would be relied upon by the Defendants. Second, the affidavits were prepared and sworn on the assumption that it would then not be necessary for the three affiants to appear at the Trial. Third, the three witnesses were merely attaching business records and were not providing direct observations that they had made relating to the accident. Fourth, the affidavits did not concern controversial matters. [12] In the circumstances of this case, I attach no lesser weight to the testimony at Trial of the three witnesses by virtue of the fact that they had all sworn affidavits prior to testifying. Because of the two Orders made and in view of the nature of what was set out in their Affidavits, I am satisfied that it is not appropriate to disregard the whole of their testimony.