Skip to main content

$90,000 For Lingering Soft Tissue Injuries Leading to Chronic Pain Disorder

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Adding to this site’s archived cases addressing non-pecuniary damages for chronic pain, reasons for judgement were released today dealing with such a condition following a motor vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Roth v. Hes) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2011 collision.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries which led to a chronic pain condition.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $90,000 Mr. Justice Bowden provided the following reasons:

[82]         The plaintiff is a 40-year-old woman and suffered soft tissue injuries primarily in her back and shoulder area. She continues to suffer from chronic pain disorder and experiences sleeping difficulties. She has a pre-accident history of lower back and right knee pain complaints which would likely have continued even if the accident had not occurred.

[83]         The plaintiff’s lifestyle has suffered as a result of the accident. While I consider her to be far from totally disabled, she has lost the enjoyment of working on her and her husband’s hobby farm and the lifestyle that it provided to her. To some extent, as stated by Dr. Laidlow, this has resulted from the plaintiff becoming overly protective in relation to her injuries. With continuing appropriate rehabilitation and treatment I expect that the plaintiff’s condition will improve and she will gradually return to some of her hobbies around her property.

[84]         I do not accept the plaintiff’s argument that the garden and animals cared for by her and her husband were more than a hobby. It matters not that the garden and animals provided some food for them. The use of their property by the plaintiff and her husband was simply a hobby and I so find.

[85]         Before the accident the plaintiff enjoyed a number of outdoor activities. Since the accident she has not been able to participate in physically demanding activities like motorcycle riding, archery and hiking. There is the prospect that she may find less physically demanding but enjoyable hobbies.

[86]         The plaintiff has been unable to perform a number of household chores that she could before the accident. Her social life has been impacted by the accident as she has been unable to entertain guests for dinner parties as she did in the past. She and her husband have also not enjoyed the intimacy they experienced before the accident.

[87]         Both parties provided me with a number of cases dealing with similar facts that supported the amount of damages that they consider to be appropriate. In the end however, each case must be decided on its own facts.

[88]         Considering the factors enumerated in Stapley, I find $90,000 to be an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages.

Defence Doctor's "Bald Proposition" Minimizing Collision Related Injuries Rejected

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, rejecting defense expert evidence minimizing the connection of chronic pain issues to a motor vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Worobetz v. Fooks) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2010 collision and continued to experience symptoms at the time of trial.  The defendant admitted fault but denied the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries.  In support of his case the Defendant retained a physician who gave evidence that the Plaintiff’s lingering symptoms were likely related to deconditioning and being overweight. In rejecting this evidence Mr. Justice Joyce provided the following critical comments:

[91]         Dr. Grypma’s opinion appears to be based substantially on two things: first, the lack of evidence of any structural injury; and second, her lack of conditioning and mild obesity. Dr. Grypma suggests that if Ms. Worobetz had suffered an injury other than a mild soft tissue injury, she would have experienced immediate pain of such intensity that she would have sought out immediate attention at an emergency room. I am not persuaded, however, that a person need sustain a serious structural injury in order to develop serious and chronic pain following a trauma such as an Accident. There are simply too many cases where persons have been found to have developed chronic back pain following a motor vehicle accident in the absence of objective evidence of structural damage to accept Dr. Grypma’s bald proposition.

[92]         Dr. Grypma’s opinion that Ms. Worobetz suffered only a mild injury that would have healed completely within a few months is contradicted by the evidence of Ms. Worobetz concerning her symptoms and how they affected her functioning, which is supported by the evidence of a number of other specialists who have treated Ms. Worobetz and followed her progress over a long period of time.

[93]         In my opinion, it is a relevant factor that Ms. Worobetz developed her pain complaints very soon after the Accident and that they progressed, with little change, until the present time. I accept that a mere temporal connection between an accident and the development of pain is not determinative by itself that the Accident caused the pain, but it is, nonetheless, a relevant factor. I also accept that the court must be cautious in relying on the subjective complaints of a patient, where there is no other objective evidence to support those complaints.

[94]         However, in this case, there is more evidence than simply subjective complaints and a temporal connection between those complaints and the Accident. I accept that Ms. Worobetz’s symptoms of pain are real and honestly felt. The manner in which they have impacted her functioning is supported by evidence of her husband, mother, co-worker and the woman for whom Ms. Worobetz acts as a support teacher. There is a strong body of expert opinion evidence in this case from specialists in a number of fields to support a finding that Ms. Worobetz’s ongoing pain was caused by the Accident. Those specialists have spent a great deal of time examining Ms. Worobetz, investigating her complaints and providing treatment. In my respectful view, their evidence is to be preferred over that of Dr. Grypma, who conducted a single, rather brief examination and a review of her medical records.

[95]         Dr. MacInnes, in particular, puts forward an explanation as to how Ms. Worobetz could have developed the pain at various sites in her body as a result of a rather modest soft tissue injury that one would ordinarily think would resolve quite quickly: central sensitization. Dr. Grypma admits that he is not qualified to comment on that topic, so he is not able to agree or disagree that it is a reasonable explanation for Ms. Worobetz’s continuing symptoms.

[96]         In summary, I find that but for the Accident, Ms. Worobetz would not be suffering the ongoing symptoms that she feels and her daily activities of life and ability to work would not be affected the way they are. She is less able to enjoy the social and recreational pursuits that she used to enjoy. She is less able to carry out the functions of a mother and wife, compared to her life before the Accident. She no longer has the same ability to work at her chosen career as a teacher because of the Accident.

BC Court of Appeal Criticizes Consultation Reports Being Shoehorned As Expert Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, Civil Procedure. 112 Comments on BC Court of Appeal Criticizes Consultation Reports Being Shoehorned As Expert Reports

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Court of Appeal criticizing and restricting the practice of shoehorning physicians consultation reports into evidence as expert opinion.
In today’s case (Healey v. Chung) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 pedestrian/vehicle collision.  At trial he Plaintiff claimed it was a ‘catastrophic accident’ and sought damages between $485,000 and $1,037,000.  The trial judge rejected much of the Plaintiff’s evidence and awarded damages of just over $50,000.
In the course of the trial the Defendant introduced consultation reports of treating medical practitioners into evidence.  These did not meet the strict requirements of Rule 11-6.  The Plaintiff objected but the trial judge allowed the reports to be entered.  In finding this was improper and ordering a new trial the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[19]         It is well established that clinical consulting reports, without more, may not be admitted for the validity of opinions expressed in them…

[21]         It is true, as the respondent contends, that Seaman and F.(K.E.) are cases in which the opinion sought to be adduced was found in clinical records that were voluminous, but I do not consider that circumstance detracts from the principle that a clinical record containing an opinion, such as these consulting reports, must substantially comply with the requirements of the Rules in order to attract the exception to the usual rule for examination of witnesses spoken of by Mr. Justice Hutcheon.

[22]         The respondent contends that she gave notice to Mr. Healey of her intention to use the letters, that Dr. Kuo knew of the qualifications of the two doctors, and that other deficiencies were “minor”. She says Mr. Healey was obliged to express his objections as required by R. 11-6(10) and (11).

[23]         Forthrightness between counsel is favoured and is to be expected in litigation. Yet I cannot say there was anything to which we have been referred that put the positive legal duty on Mr. Healey to object under those Rules for the reason that the consulting reports sent to Dr. Kuo and disclosed as part of her clinical records were simply not ‘expert reports’ as regulated by the Rules. While they may be professional opinions from one doctor to another in the course of treatment, the impugned documents do not comply with R. 11-2; I do not consider they carry the basic hallmark of an ‘expert report’, being an opinion intended by the author, at some point, to be presented for the assistance of the court. Significantly, they contain none of the information that is essential to qualification of the author as an expert, nor the information reviewed by the author by which the court may assess the cogency of the opinion.

[24]         As I do not consider that these clinical records can be considered to be ‘expert reports’ as that term is used in the Rules, entitled to the privileged treatment for receipt of hearsay evidence discussed by Mr. Justice Hutcheon, I conclude that R. 11-6(10) and (11) did not require a notice of objection.

[25]         In the alternative to the two documents coming within R. 11-6, Ms. Chung says the judge could have exercised his discretion and admitted the documents as opinions under R. 11-7. Rule 11-7 provides latitude to a judge to receive opinion evidence that is not included in an expert report:

(1)   Unless the court otherwise orders, opinion evidence of an expert, other than an expert appointed by the court under Rule 11-5, must not be tendered at trial unless

(a) that evidence is included in a report of that expert that has been prepared and served in accordance with Rule 11-6, and

(b) any supplementary reports required under Rule 11-5 (11) or 11-6 (5) or (6) have been prepared and served in accordance with Rule 11-6 (5) to (7).

…

(6)   At trial, the court may allow an expert to provide evidence, on terms and conditions, if any, even though one or more of the requirements of this Part have not been complied with, if

(a) facts have come to the knowledge of one or more of the parties and those facts could not, with due diligence, have been learned in time to be included in a report or supplementary report and served within the time required by this Part,

(b) the non-compliance is unlikely to cause prejudice

(i)    by reason of an inability to prepare for cross-examination, or

(ii)   by depriving the party against whom the evidence is tendered of a reasonable opportunity to tender evidence in response, or

(c) the interests of justice require it.

                                                                        [Emphasis added.]

[26]         Ms. Chung does not contend the judge exercised his discretion under R. 11-7(1). Her approach is consistent with the record that shows the judge was not asked to exercise his discretion, and it is consistent with Ms. Chung’s submission at trial which approached the question as one of compliance with R. 11-6. We are invited, however, to approach these documents as admissible in the exercise of discretion.

[27]         I do not consider that this is an appropriate case for us to engage for the first time in a full analysis of discretion, so as to draw our own conclusions. At trial the judge did not consider his R. 11-7 discretion and accordingly the possibility of exercising discretion is without his expansion. In XY, LLC v. Zhu, 2013 BCCA 352, 366 D.L.R. (4th) 443, Madam Justice Newbury for the Court adopted this description from Perry v. Vargas, 2012 BCSC 1537 at para. 22:

In my view the discretion provided for in R.11-7(6)(c) must be exercised sparingly, with appropriate caution, and in a disciplined way given the express requirements contained in Rules 11-6 and 11-7. That is, the “interests of justice” are not a reason to simply excuse or ignore the requirements of the other Rules. There must be some compelling analysis why the interests of justice require in a particular case the extraordinary step of abrogating the other requirements of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. None was provided.

[28]         Adopting that approach, in my view this is not a case for us to exercise the discretion that was available to the judge under R. 11-7.  There was ample medical evidence before the court, absent the opinions from these documents, to guide the trial judge in findings of fact. Further, it was open to the defendant to develop her own body of medical opinion and to advance it in proper form, including as to the required description of qualifications and experience and listing of opinion sought and matters considered. I see no compelling reason to derogate from the requirements of either R. 11-2 or R. 11-6 in this case. To do so, in my view, would admit into evidence opinions that were not crafted for that purpose and that are without the necessary information to permit consideration of their substance and effect in the context of the issues before the court.

[29]         Last, Ms. Chung contends that the two documents, in any event, were inconsequential in the judge’s reasons, and thus the admission of these documents had little impact on the outcome of the case.

[30]         One of the issues at trial was the assertion by Mr. Healey that he suffered from depression caused by the accident. This allegation bore upon the assessment of damages. To support this allegation was an expert report from Dr. O’Shaughnessy. Based upon the medical records and his interview with Mr. Healey, Dr. O’Shaughnessy diagnosed Mr. Healey as having an Adjustment Disorder with anxiety and an Adjustment Disorder with depressed mood. Yet the judge rejected all allegations of depression and instead relied upon the two consulting reports, saying:

[58]      Mr. Healey stated that he suffered from depression because of the accident. Depression was not reported in his post-accident symptomatology until 2008. Dr. Kuo’s records do show that in 2003 she concluded that Mr. Healey had symptoms consistent with depression. This reporting, however, preceded the accident, and according to the psychiatric specialists Dr. Kuo referred Mr. Healey to in 2009 and 2010, no evidence supported any Axis 1 diagnosis in the DSM-IV, and no symptoms met the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder.

[31]         I would first observe that Dr. Truong’s report cryptically states “Axis 1: Adjustment d/o with depressive symptoms – in remission” and by so saying Dr. Truong’s report appears to be inconsistent with the judge’s statement: “according to the psychiatric specialists [Dr. To and Dr. Truong] no evidence supported any Axis 1 diagnosis”. Perhaps this exemplifies the effect of non-compliance with the requirements for expert reports, as the judge drew from the report a categorical absence of any Axis 1 diagnosis which appears to be inconsistent with Dr. Truong’s report. Setting that discrepancy between the judge’s assertion and the notation in Dr. Truong’s report aside, it is clear from the judge’s para. 58 that he put weight on the consulting reports and drew conclusions from them adverse to Mr. Healey. In other words, they were consequential in the judge’s reasoning; one cannot say the reports had little bearing on the outcome, in my view.

 

$40,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Neck and Shoulder Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic and plateaued soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Mothe v. Silva) the Plaintiff was rear-ended by a tractor-trailer operated by the Defendant.  Fault was admitted.  The Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck and shoulder and his symptoms persisted to the time of trial and were expected to continue.  The Plaintiff suffered other symptoms which cased some hardship in his life but the court found these were unrelated to the collision.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $40,000 Madam Justice Ross provided the following reasons:

[106]     I agree with the submission of the defendants that the functional limitations described in Mr. Shew’s analysis are either in whole or in large part the consequence of the chronic left wrist problems stemming from the Workplace Injury or the consequence of the C7 radiculopathy. I have found that the motor vehicle accident did not cause or contribute to this condition. However, Mr. Mothe does suffer neck and shoulder pain and headaches as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident. With respect to these injuries, his recovery has plateaued and the condition is chronic. These injuries have not, with the modest exception discussed below, prevented Mr. Mothe from working but he does so in pain. These injuries have contributed to fatigue and a discouraged, pessimistic outlook. They have reduced his enjoyment of recreational activities and his family life.

[107]     In all of the circumstances, I award $40,000 for non-pecuniary loss.

$90,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Myofascial Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for partly disabling chronic myofascial pain symptoms following a collision.
In today’s case (Camilleri v. Bergen) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2011 collision.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The Plaintiff suffered from chronic myofascial pain symptoms which were not expected to improve.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $90,000 Madam Justice Loo provided the following reasons:

[74]        As discussed above, Ms. Camilleri now suffers from chronic myofascial pain as a result of the accident. She is unlikely to recover and, at best, she may mitigate some of her symptoms. I can do no better than to summarize her symptoms as set out in Dr. Dost’s report. She complains of:

1.   Constant cervical or neck pain that radiates to the interscapular region, left shoulder and diffusely down her arm to her third and fifth fingers;

2.   Constant thoracolumbar or back pain, without radicular symptoms, but with numbness and tingling;

3.   Headaches almost daily. About four days a week she has a dull headache, occipital pressure, and some nausea. Three days a week her headaches are quite severe and radiate to her left eye with pressure, pounding, nausea, and light and noise sensitivity;

4.   Sleep disruption secondary to pain;

5.   Altered mood;

6.   Light-headedness (a faint-like sensation that occurs early in the morning);

7.   Increased tinnitus;

8.   Increased blurred vision requiring stronger prescription glasses; and

9.   Difficulties with memory, processing speed, multitasking, attention and recall.

[75]        Her symptoms are not likely to improve. The evidence suggests that she can only learn to cope with her symptoms with psychiatric or psychological counselling, a physiatrist to deal with the physical complaints, and possibly a pain clinic to help her deal with her pain.

[76]        Ms. Camilleri’s life has been affected dramatically and profoundly by the accident. Her symptoms have been a tremendous challenge for her both emotionally and physically. She was a very high energy person who was fully committed to her family and to her work. She was a leader in her field. I could not help but have the impression that Ms. Camilleri was so committed to her work and patients at the eating disorder clinic that she was more concerned about helping the patients and the community rather than making money. She could easily have made more money in private practice but she was committed to helping those who could not afford private care. She was so committed to her work that she increased her hours of work after the accident so that her patients would continue to have treatment despite the toll it has taken on her physical and emotional health.

[77]        Ms. Camilleri said that it has been emotionally challenging for her to be forced to step back into what she considers a lesser role in the treatment of the eating disordered. She enjoyed her volunteer positions, she enjoyed teaching, she enjoyed the continuing education opportunities with other health professionals, and she enjoyed research. Those are things she can no longer enjoy.

[78]        She was also a physically active person who enjoying skiing with her family, running, cycling, water-skiing, gardening, and she enjoyed sharing many of those activities with her husband and daughters. Those are things she can no longer enjoy. She no longer even travels.

[79]        I have no reason to doubt Ms. Camilleri’s evidence. There is no suggestion that she is anything other than a credible, straightforward witness who keeps doing her best in situations where others likely would have given up. But she has been forced to give up many of the things in life that she enjoyed…

[88]        I conclude that an appropriate award in this case for non-pecuniary damages is $90,000.

Impact of Life Expectancy On Non-Pecuniary Damages?

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Elbow Injury Cases. 48 Comments on Impact of Life Expectancy On Non-Pecuniary Damages?

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing whether a Plaintiff’s life expectancy should influence the non-pecuniary damages awarded in a personal injury claim.
In today’s case (Mathroo v. Edge-Partington) the Plaintiff pedestrian was injured when struck by the Defendant’s vehicle.  The Defendant was found wholly at fault.  The Plaintiff suffered “a fracture to his right elbow, which required surgery to insert a plate and screws into his arm.“.  He had ongoing issues at the time of trial.
The Plaintiff was 83 years old and argued that the ‘golden years’ doctrine should apply in assessing damages.  The Defendant argued the opposite noting “that the limited remaining life expectancy of a person in Mr. Mathroo’s situation justifies a lower award than would otherwise result.“.
The Court was not comfortable with the Defendant’s submission and noted the following:

[95]         The golden years doctrine has some limited applicability here, in that Mr. Mathroo has experienced a decrease in his willingness to walk because of the effect of his injuries on his perceptions of his physical condition and his feelings of safety when walking, but I take the point made by Mr. Edge-Partington’s counsel that he was not involved in that many activities beforehand, other than going to the temple and gardening, so the curtailment of them has been more limited than in other cases cited on his behalf.

[96]         I do not feel comfortable relying on Olesik to reduce the non-pecuniary damages on the basis of Mr. Mathroo’s limited remaining life expectancy, as urged by Mr. Edge-Partington’s counsel. Its applicability on that issue has been questioned by other decisions of this Court. In Giles v. Attorney General of Canada, [1994] B.C.J. No. 3212 (S.C.) varied on other grounds (1996) 71 B.C.A.C. 319, Mr. Justice Fraser held that the principle described in Olesik and the golden years doctrine essentially balanced each other out, so that advanced age should not be a factor either way in arriving at an appropriate award. This view was adopted more recently inDuifhuis v. Bloom, 2013 BCSC 1180.

[98]         In all the circumstances, before dealing with whether an amount should be added to reflect a loss of Mr. Mathroo’s housekeeping capacity, I would make an award of non-pecuniary damages of $60,000.

 

It Is Not Open For a Trial Judge To Award a Defendant Double Costs Where a Plaintiff Obtains Judgement

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9. 49 Comments on It Is Not Open For a Trial Judge To Award a Defendant Double Costs Where a Plaintiff Obtains Judgement

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal (C.P. v. RBC Life Insurance Company) confirming that a trial judge does not have the option of awarding a Defendant double costs in circumstances where a Plaintiff obtains a judgement at a quantum below a Defendant’s formal offer to settle.  In noting this restriction in judicial costs options the Court provided the following reasons:

[90]         Neither the trial judge nor the judge at Minhas made reference to the decision in Gulbrandsen v. Mohr, 2013 BCSC 1481. In Gulbrandsen the trial judge, in reasons indexed at 2013 BCSC 959, initially awarded the plaintiff costs up to the date of the defendant’s offer to settle, and double costs to the defendant thereafter. He then reconsidered the double cost award. After reviewing numerous authorities including A.E., A.E. Appeal,Ward v. Klaus, 2011 BCSC 99 and Currie v. McKinnon, 2012 BCSC 1165, he concluded that it was not appropriate to make an award of double costs to a defendant where the plaintiff had obtained a judgment.

[91]         I am of the same opinion. I do not believe that R. 37B intended to change the long-standing practice concerning the circumstances when double costs could be awarded. A plaintiff who obtains a judgment for less than an offer to settle is already subject to sanctions: R. 9-1(6)(a) allows the court to deprive the successful plaintiff of costs to which it would otherwise be entitled. Rule 9-1(5)(d) provides an even more punishing outcome as the plaintiff is not only deprived of costs he or she would otherwise receive, but must also pay the defendant’s costs subsequent to the offer to settle. To also allow a defendant double costs would skew the procedure in favour of defendants and unfairly penalize and pressure plaintiffs. I would adopt in that regard the comments of Madam Justice Adair in Currie:

[18]      I think it certainly can be argued that if a defendant who has made an offer to settle in an amount higher than the amount awarded to the plaintiff at trial (and that is what has been done in this case) was then awarded double costs, this would skew the procedure in favour of defendants and unfairly penalize and pressure plaintiffs.  This is because a plaintiff who rejected an offer to settle would potentially risk a triple cost penalty if he or she were to win at trial an amount less than the offer.  The plaintiff would suffer loss of the costs that he or she would normally receive on obtaining judgment at trial, and face double costs payable to the defendant.

[19]      In my view, there is a good reason to apply Rule 9-1 in a way that is even-handed, or more even-handed, as between plaintiffs and defendants.  I would say for this reason one would expect to see double costs awarded to a defendant, using the offer to settle procedure, in exceptional circumstances only, such as a situation where the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed all together after a plaintiff rejected an offer to settle.

[92]         In the result, I find that it was not open for the trial judge to award double costs to the defendant. It was an error in principle to do so. The decision in Minhas which made a similar order was also wrongly decided and should not be followed.

$80,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Knee Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Knee Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a chronic knee injury caused by a collision.
In today’s case (Reddy v. Staples) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision that the Defendant accepted responsibility for.  The Plaintiff had pre-existing knee problems but the collision caused new injuries which aggravated his limitations.  The Court found the collision caused chondral injuries and these were responsible for 85% of the Plaintiff’s ongoing knee problems.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $80,000 Mr. Justice Blok provided the following reasons:

[115]     It is difficult to assess the contribution of each condition to the plaintiff’s current knee symptoms because the experts addressed this issue only in general, sometimes vague, terms.  It is reasonably clear that the meniscus damage that was already present at the time of the accident would have caused problems for the plaintiff, even absent the accident, until it was repaired in October 2009, and it might have continued to cause problems after that.  As Dr. Calvert said, “the majority of patients with an isolated meniscal injury do recover a good portion of their function post surgery”, thus suggesting that some do not.  Dr. Calvert said that even with just the meniscal damage and removal he would have counselled, post-surgery, against activities that involved repetitive impacts.  It is also clear from the evidence, however, that the chondral injuries to his patella and medial femoral condyle are more significant than was the pre-existing meniscal damage.  I also conclude that the risk of degenerative arthritis associated with just the meniscal injury was and is materially lower, and with a longer time frame, than it is with the chondral injuries, where osteoarthritis is already present.

[116]     Doing the best I can on an assessment of the whole of the evidence I would apportion the source of Mr. Reddy’s current and probable future knee problems as follows: 85% to the chondral injuries caused by the accident and 15% to his pre-existing meniscus damage…

[118]     I am satisfied that Mr. Reddy, 31 years old at the time of the accident, suffered a significant injury to his knee (the chondral injuries) as a result of the accident.  In addition, he had pain and stiffness in his back, neck and shoulder areas for a period of about four or five months.  His knee condition generally (that is, involving both pre-accident and accident-related causes) is frequently painful, restricts his activities and enjoyment of life, and causes him stress and anxiety.  On my assessment, 85% of those problems are attributable to the injuries he suffered in the accident.  The accident-caused injuries are degenerative, as is his pre-existing knee condition, though the degeneration associated with the accident injuries has already manifested itself and the degeneration associated with his pre-accident condition is likely to occur later, perhaps much later.

[119]     As Dr. Calvert noted, it is likely that the plaintiff will have persistent knee pain with weight-bearing activity.  He is likely to have increasing knee symptomatology in keeping with osteoarthritis and he may also require further arthroscopic surgery or even partial or full knee replacement surgery at some point in the future…

[125]     Based on the cases cited and a consideration of all of the Stapley v. Hejslet factors, and bearing in mind the 85-15 apportionment made previously concerning the cause of Mr. Reddy’s ongoing knee problems, I consider that non-pecuniary damages are appropriately assessed in the amount of $80,000.

Motorist Faulted For Crash After Driving Too Fast In Foggy Conditions

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases.

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, assessing fault for a fatal collision which occurred during foggy conditions.
In today’s case (Roy v. McGinnis) the Plaintiff was driving a motor home which had stopped at a T intersection approaching a highway.  The Plaintiff attempted to turn left on the highway.  The area was covered in dense fog and visibility was poor.  The Plaintiff failed to appreciate that the Defendant was travelling down the highway as the Plaintiff entered the intersection.  Both motorists were found equally to blame for the crash, the Plaintiff for entering an intersection when it was unsafe to do so and the Defendant for failing to drive safely given the conditions.  In reaching a conclusion of equal blame Mr. Justice Groves provided the following reasons:

[30]         I conclude that on November 25, 2004, by operating his loaded tandem truck at a speed of at least 90 to 100 km/h when the visibility was limited to less than 100 feet due to dense fog, such that an operator driving reasonably for the road conditions would more likely have driven at close to 50 km/h, the defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent manner in that he breached the standard of care established by s. 144(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act by operating a vehicle at an excessive speed considering the visibility and weather conditions.  I further conclude that this negligence was at least a partial cause of the accident in that, but for the unreasonable and excessive speed at which McGinnis was operating his vehicle, McGinnis could have avoided the impact with Roy’s vehicle, just as Smith had avoided impact when travelling at 50 km/h.

[31]         In so concluding, I note the defendant’s argument and supporting case law that, as a servient driver turning into a lane where the defendant had a right of way, the plaintiff bears the onus of proving that a reasonable and skillful driver would have had sufficient opportunity to avoid a collision (Walker v. Brownlee and Harmon, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 450 at 461).  Here the collision occurred over a very short period of time; however, I have found above that a reasonable driver would have been travelling much slower and so would have had more time to perceive the danger.  I therefore find that the plaintiff has met his burden of proving that a reasonable and skillful driver would have had a sufficient opportunity to avoid the collision.

[32]         I also find that the plaintiff was negligent…

[36]         As such, I conclude that the plaintiff was negligent in that he failed to comply with s. 175(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, when he entered a through highway and in doing so failed to exercise appropriate caution and to yield the right of way to traffic, traffic which was so close so as to constitute an immediate hazard.

[37]         However, based on the evidence before me, I cannot draw any particular conclusion as to the relative level of negligence of these two negligent drivers.  Better put perhaps, I cannot conclude based on the evidence before me which driver was more negligent.  On the one hand, the plaintiff was clearly the servient driver, but on the other hand, the defendant was, I find on the evidence which I accept, driving at a speed far in excess of what would have been safe for the road and weather conditions he encountered on that day.  

[38]         As such, relying on s. 1(2) of the Negligence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 333, I apportion liability between the plaintiff and defendant equally.  As such, the defendant is 50% responsible for the damages resulting from the accident and the plaintiff is 50% responsible for the damages resulting from the accident. 

$160,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Major Depressive and Somatic Symptom Disorders

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Psychological Injury Cases. 50 Comments on $160,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Major Depressive and Somatic Symptom Disorders

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic psychological issues following a collision.
In today’s case (Cornish v. Khunkhun) the plaintiff was involved in an intersection collision in 2010.  Both the Plaintiff and Defendant were found equally to blame for the crash.  The Plaintiff suffered from a  major depressive disorder and somatic symptom disorder following the collision.  Her non-pecuniary damages were assessed at $160,000 and in reaching this figure, prior to factoring in the liability split,  Mr. Justice Skolrood provided the following reasons:

[131]     The evidence of Ms. Cornish’s condition was largely uncontradicted. I find that she suffers from a Major Depressive Disorder, as found by Dr. Riley, as well as a Somatic Symptom Disorder which results in her experiencing chronic pain. I also find that she experiences confusion and memory loss which Dr. Riley notes is consistent with her depressive disorder.

[132]     I also find that Ms. Cornish’s injuries have had a significant impact on her enjoyment of life. Her own evidence, and that of her supporting witnesses, paints a compelling before and after picture of a once vibrant woman who, as Ms. Fraser-Biscoe said, is now a different person…

[139]     The evidence is clear that Ms. Cornish had previously suffered from symptoms of depression and that she had a pre-existing back injury. With respect to the depression, I am satisfied on the evidence that it was in remission at the time of the accident and that her current psychological condition was caused by the accident.

[140]     In terms of her pain condition, prior to the accident Ms. Cornish’s back condition caused some limitations with respect to her physical capacity, particularly as it related to her work. She was only able to do light work. However, I accept that the accident aggravated her condition and is the cause of her current chronic pain or Somatic Symptom Disorder.

[141]     The cause of Ms. Cornish’s confusion and memory loss is less clear as there is no neurological evidence addressing these symptoms. However, I accept Dr.  Riley’s opinion that her condition is related to her depressive disorder which I have found was caused by the accident…

[146]     Given the ongoing nature of Ms. Cornish’s symptoms and their impact on her enjoyment of life, I find that a reasonable award of non-pecuniary damages is $160,000.00.