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Retrial Ordered After "Inconsistent" $765 Jury Award in Personal Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Jury Trials.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a retrial after a jury awarded special damages but nothing for non-pecuniary loss in a personal injury lawsuit.
In today’s case (Harder v. Poettcker) the Plaintiff proceeded to jury trial after alleging injuries in a collision.  The jury found the Plaintiff 85% at fault for the crash and awarded a total $5,100 in damages, which were all based on out of pocket expenses and awarded nothing for non pecuniary damages.  After applying the split of fault this left an award of $765.
The presiding judge found a new trial was necessary as it was inconsistent to award money for special damages yet nothing for non-pecuniary loss for the injuries underlying the need for those damages.  In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Sigurdson provided the following reasons:

17]         Notwithstanding the importance of attempting to enforce a jury’s verdict and the fact that even apart from the 85% contributory negligence award against the plaintiff, the award was at best either very modest or nil, I am driven to conclude that to award nothing for non-pecuniary damages but award $1,200 for special damages is an inconsistent verdict.

[18]         Although a possible rationalization of the award is that the jury intended to award the plaintiff say $400 for non-pecuniary damages but rounded it down in accordance with my instructions to zero, I reject that. I find the jury intended to award nothing for non-pecuniary damages. Even if the jury intended to award only a nominal amount for non-pecuniary damages, I think that would still create an inconsistent verdict: see Le v. Luz, 2003 BCCA 640.

[19]         I also reject the submission that the jury verdict could properly be interpreted to mean that they intended to award something for non-pecuniary damages under a pecuniary heading.

[20]         Although the defendant argues forcefully that there was coherence and consistency in the jury verdict, I respectfully disagree. I find that the jury award, although small from the plaintiff’s perspective, is inconsistent and judgment cannot be entered on the defendant’s motion.

[21]         The question then arises whether I can and should sever the issues of liability and damages and enter judgment on liability for the plaintiff including the contributory negligence finding and direct a retrial only on damages, or whether I should order a retrial of the entire case.

[22]         I have concluded that I am bound by the considered decision of my brother Weatherill J. in Kalsi. Although severance may be ordered in many cases before trial, this is not an appropriate case to have issues that are largely dependent on credibility decided by different triers of fact.

[23]         Given that there must be a retrial, how should that take place? A further trial by a new jury would be months, or a year or more, ahead. The mode of trial by jury was at the plaintiff’s request but now he wants the retrial by judge alone. The plaintiff now consents to and requests a retrial being conducted before me.

[24]         I think for a number of reasons that the retrial should be before me. I heard all of the evidence and the submissions of counsel. Given the fact that it would be a lengthy time until the matter is retried before a jury, and given the age of the plaintiff and the question of cost to the parties, I think it is appropriate that I conduct a retrial based on the evidence I have heard and I so order. Accordingly I exercise my discretion under the governing rule that the retrial take place before me without a jury.

[25]         I have heard the submissions of counsel and a recording of those submissions is available to me to refresh my memory. Counsel may make further submissions in writing on liability and damages provided they do not repeat what I have already heard in the submissions to the jury. I ask that the plaintiff file his argument within three weeks and the defendant his argument within three weeks following, with the plaintiff having a right of reply within a week. I will then hand down a written decision.

$100,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Back and Neck Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for chronic neck and back pain caused by a vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Tourand v. Charette) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 rear end collision that the Defendant accepted responsibility for.
The Plaintiff suffered chronic neck and back pain as a result with symptoms lingering at the time of trial and expected to continue into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 Mr. Justice Joyce provided the following reasons:

[119]     It is true that there were occasions in the past when the plaintiff experienced episodes of neck, shoulder and back pain, for which she received chiropractic treatments. Some of these episodes were associated with prior motor vehicle accidents and others appear to have been brought on by the physical activities in which she engaged, including her participation in karate. However, I am satisfied, on the whole of the evidence, that prior to the Accident the plaintiff was not experiencing the kind of chronic pain and symptomology in her neck and low back that she has experienced since the Accident in question. I am satisfied that the causal connection between her present symptomology neck and low back and the Accident has been established. In short, but for the Accident the plaintiff would not be in the physical condition that she now finds herself.

[120]     Ms. Tourand plaintiff had some pre-existing degenerative changes in her neck and low back, but I am satisfied that her current symptoms are not due simply to the progression of that degeneration. Rather they are due to either an aggravation of a pre-existing condition or to trauma that has made symptomatic that which was not previously symptomatic.

[121]     I accept that in the years before the Accident, the plaintiff was a physically active, social person, who enjoyed life and was enjoyable to live with and be around. I find on the basis of the evidence of her husband and friends that she is now a very different person. The Accident has negatively impacted her ability to enjoy physical activity and perform former household management tasks to the same extent as before. It has led to difficulty sleeping, depression and has affected her marital relationship.

[122]     On the other hand, I also find that the other life events that the plaintiff has endured since the Accident, in particular, the difficulties that her children experienced and with which she has been integrally involved, have probably contributed to the severity and prolongation of her symptoms.

[123]     Ms. Tourand is not, however, incapacitated. She can still manage most of her household chores, with moderation and careful sequencing of the tasks. There seems to be consensus among the experts that Ms. Tourand is capable of some employment, provided it does not involve heavy physical tasks and provided she is not required to either sit or stand in one position for a prolonged period of time.

[124]     I am also of the view that it is probable that the plaintiff’s physical capacity and general well-being will improve if she becomes more active, including: engaging in a program involving further physiotherapy under the direction of a kinesiologist or physiotherapist, swimming and psychotherapy to deal with the emotional affects of her symptoms. In my view, based upon a consideration of all of the evidence, it is still open to the plaintiff to accept that advice and follow that treatment path; and that, if she does so, she can expect to achieve some further reduction in her symptomology and improvement in her functioning and enjoyment of life…

[128]     Considering the nature of the chronic pain caused by the motor vehicle Accident; the poor prognosis for anything like a full recovery; the relatively young age of the plaintiff; and the effects that the symptoms have had and will likely continue to have on the quality of her life in the future, I assess non-pecuniary damages at $100,000.

Slow Moving Prosecution Plays Role in Fast Track Removal Application

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 15.

Reasons for judgement were released today finding that a slow moving prosecution, in part, was a factor in removing a claim from Rule 15.

In today’s case (Bagri v. Bagri) the Plaintiff alleged injury as a result of two collisions, the first in 2007 and the second in 2009.   The matters were prosecuted subject to the fast track Rule (Rule 15) and the Defendants brought an application to remove the claims from this rule.
In finding that the claims were not suited for fast track prosecution, both based on the claims potential value and the likely length of trial, the Court also commented on the speed of prosecution.  In removing the cases from the fast track rule Master Scarth provided the following reasons:

[28]         There are other factors which support a finding that these actions are not fast track actions. Given that the earlier accident is from almost 8 years ago, the fast track procedures have not assisted the parties in resolving the disputes quickly or efficiently. In contrast, applying fast track procedures restricts the defendants’ right to proceed as a jury trial and caps their potential costs. While it has not been made out that the plaintiff has invoked Rule 15-1 specifically to defeat the defendants’ jury notice, it is fair to conclude that, in the circumstances, using fast track procedures would negatively impact the defendants more than it would positively assist the plaintiff or advance the purposes of Rule 15-1.

[29]         In my view, taking all these factors into account, it is fair to conclude that Rule 15-1 does not apply to these proceedings. Accordingly the application by the defendants to remove the actions from fast track is allowed.

No Negligence Found in Case of Failed Emergency Brake

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, finding a motorist was not negligent for having a faulty emergency brake which led to a pedestrian collision.
In the recent case (Little v. Einarsen) the Plaintiff pedestrian was struck by an unoccupied vehicle which “rolled downhill from where it had been parked“.
He sued the vehicle owner alleging negligence.  The Court dismissed the lawsuit finding that the vehicle likely rolled because its emergency brake failed and the owner did not know, nor ought to have known, that the defect existed.  In dismissing the claim Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:

[18]        The uncontradicted evidence is that Ms. Einarsen’s car rolled downhill from where it was parked while its emergency brake was engaged. The fact that the emergency brake failed to perform its principle function leads to the obvious inference that it was in some way defective. The inference is further supported by admissible business records from the repair shop that indicate the emergency brake was repaired or adjusted within days or, at most, a few weeks after the accident.

[19]        In the absence of any direct or circumstantial evidence pointing to any other cause, it must be concluded that the accident would not likely have occurred if the emergency brake had been functioning properly. Putting it in slightly different terms, the accident, on the balance of probabilities, would not have occurred but for the failure of the emergency brake to perform its intended function.

[20]        Whether Ms. Einarsen can be held at fault for that failure depends on whether it was foreseeable—whether she knew or ought to have known about a defect or inadequacy that might cause the emergency brake to fail.

[21]        An owner of a vehicle owes a duty not to use it or permit it to be used if he or she knows or ought to have known that it is defective in any way that might cause an accident. The court will find that an owner ought to have known about a defect that would have been detected by the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill: Dyk v. Protec Automotive Repairs Ltd., 1998 CarswellBC 3834 (S.C.) at para. 81.

[22]        In Newell v. Towns, 2008 NSSC 174, the court said at para. 175:

[175]    ….However, an owner is not liable for all consequences that may flow from an accident that happens as a result of a mechanical defect in a vehicle. Liability only occurs for those defects that went uncorrected, when either the owner knew, or should have known by the exercise of reasonable care, of their existence.

[23]        There is no evidence that the emergency brake had failed in the past or of any defect of which Ms. Einarsen knew or should have known. Arguably, the age of the car heightened Ms. Einarsen’s duty to be satisfied that all components were in good working order. I find that, by having the vehicle inspected only two months before the accident, she had done what was reasonable to comply with that duty.

[24]        There is no evidence that the mechanics who performed that inspection failed to notice or repair a problem with the emergency brake or that Ms. Einarsen had any reason to believe they had. There is no evidence of any problem with the emergency brake that became apparent between the dates of the inspection and the accident.

[25]        In short, while Mr. Little clearly suffered injuries, he has failed to meet the burden of proving that they were caused by anything Ms. Einarsen did or failed to do or by any mechanical defect she could have detected with ordinary care, caution, or skill. In view of that failure to prove liability and a resulting entitlement to damages, it is not necessary to comment upon or attempt to resolve the many issues about the nature and extent of Mr. Little’s injuries.

[26]        The action must be dismissed with costs.

Court Has "Inherent Jurisdiction" To Order Party To Produce Medical Report Addressing Their "Capability"

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal confirming it is within the BC Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction for a judge to order a party to produce a medical report addressing whether that party is “capable or incapable of managing” their litigation.
Today’s case (Walker v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company) the Plaintiff sued the Defendant alleging breach of contract.  The lawsuit had a complicated procedural history and in the course of an application a Chambers judge ordered that the lawsuit could not continue until the Plaintiff’s “doctor or psychiatrist write a report to the court and advise whether the Plaintiff is capable or incapable of managing this litigation”.
The Plaintiff appealed this order but the BC Court of Appeal upheld it finding it was in the inherent jurisdiction of the Judge to make such an order.  In reaching this conclusion the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[34]        This, then, was the dilemma facing Weatherill J. when Ms. Walker argued that R. 20-2(14) applied to her as a “person under disability”. As I have said, he found that there was a real question as to whether she comes within this phrase. In my opinion, there is no doubt that this question had arisen and that it had to be answered before he could possibly accede to the contention made by Ms. Walker herself that a “step in default” could not have been taken against her. As Ms. Murray argued in her factum, it was entirely within the Court’s discretion to request the assistance of a current medical report addressing Ms. Walker’s capacity before the matter could proceed further. This step is required for the Court to protect its own process and thus comes within its inherent jurisdiction. Ms. Walker’s designation under the Act may be relevant, but is not determinative of the issue under Rule 20-2.

[35]        If it turns out that Ms. Walker is a “person under legal disability” within the meaning of the Rule, then a litigation guardian will have to be appointed under R. 20-2. The Rule is a “complete code” in the sense that it does not permit persons under legal disability to bring or defend proceedings in Supreme Court except through a litigation guardian.

[36]        It follows that I see no error in the chambers judge’s making the order he did.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Back Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for lingering injuries caused by two vehicle collisions.
In the recent case (Ali v. Rai) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions in 2011.  He was found faultless for both.  The collisions caused a lingering back injury which remained symptomatic at the tie of trial and the symptoms were expected.  The Court found both collisions caused the injury and it was indivisible.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Madam Justice Duncan provided the following reasons:

[134]     On the whole of the evidence, I find the plaintiff suffered back and neck injuries as a result of the two accidents at issue before me along with headaches and sleep issues. I cannot find the injuries divisible as between the two accidents. The plaintiff was not fully recovered from his injuries after the First Accident when the Second Accident occurred. This is reflected in Dr. O’Connor’s opinion that the First Accident aggravated the plaintiff’s underlying condition, he was improving by the time of the Second Accident, and that accident did not cause additional injuries, simply a re-aggravation.

[135]     I find the plaintiff’s neck pain had substantially cleared up by the summer of 2011. The aggravation in 2012 which caused the pain to manifest in the right side instead of the left is unexplained and I cannot find it was as a result of the accidents. The plaintiff continues to suffer from back pain to this day. I find it limits his work and recreational activities. I will have more to say about it under the individual heads of damages…

[137]     The plaintiff is now 50 years of age. He has a chronic back injury and suffered from a neck injury for some months after the accidents in addition to headaches and disturbed sleep. The back injury continues to affects his social life. He does not do as much volunteer work as he once did. He has to sit in a chair to pray rather than join his contemporaries and use prayer mats. He cannot sit through a movie or drive long distances. He cannot referee soccer at the high level he once did and he no longer plays recreational soccer due to the impact of the accidents. His back injury has affected his mood and his wife feels it has affected their social and intimate life. The plaintiff does not contribute to work within the home as he once did, nor does he feel able to perform yard work or work that arises from the tenanted basement. Overall, the plaintiff’s back injury has permanently altered all aspects of his life…

[140]     As noted above, while I found the plaintiff’s neck condition had improved by the summer of 2011 and there was no evidence as to why it was aggravated in 2012 and transferred to the opposite side, his back injury continues to affect him. He was a formerly active, engaged and giving member of the community whose quality of life and self worth has been affected by his injury. Balancing all of the factors, I find a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $60,000.

BC Court of Appeal – Vicarious Liability Under the Privacy Act is an Open Question

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues.

Today the BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgement finding it is an open ended question whether BC’s Privacy Act allows an employer to be vicariously liable when an employee willfully violates the privacy of another.
In today’s case, (Ari v. ICBC) a proposed class action, the Plaintiff sued ICBC alleging various improprieties arising from an employee improperly accessing “the personal information of about 65 ICBC customers“.
A chambers judge dismissed all of the claims except one under BC’s Privacy Act which makes it a tort  “for a person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another.“.
ICBC argued this section does not permit them to be sued for an employees wrongdoing.  The BC Court of Appeal disagreed and found it is an open ended question of whether vicarious liability can be attached to this statutory tort and that the issue needs to be addressed through the trial process.  In allowing this claim to survive the pleadings motion the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[25]        It is not clear that s. 1 of the Privacy Act should be interpreted as limited in the same fashion as the relevant provisions in Nelson. Section 1(1) states that “[i]t is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another”. There is no language (as there was in Nelson) that clearly limits a plaintiff to recovery of damages from the person identified in s. 1(1). While, as the chambers judge observed, vicarious liability for acts of intentional and deliberate wrongdoing has generally been rejected, it is not unheard of (see: Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 682). To the extent that s. 1(1) of the Privacy Act requires deliberate wrongdoing, it is not per se incompatible with vicarious liability.

[26]        Although Nelson may provide, by analogy, a basis for denying the availability of vicarious liability, I cannot conclude that the chambers judge erred in finding the appellant’s claim is on this basis, not bound to fail.

[27]        Alternatively, ICBC says that there is a policy argument which supports its position that there is no cause of action in vicarious liability. For policy reasons ICBC says, employers should not be held vicariously liable for wilful breaches of privacy under the Privacy Act.

[28]        ICBC also contends that the question before the chambers judge was whether vicarious liability should be imposed due to policy considerations. It says that the appropriate question to ask is: should liability lie against a public body for the wrongful conduct of its employee, in these circumstances? The question necessarily demands some exploration of the evidence about the connection between ICBC’s security procedures and the security lapse that occurred, as well as a weighing of the policy considerations involved. It is reasonable to conclude that a factual matrix is necessary in order to fairly address whether ICBC’s conduct materially enhanced the possibility of committing the breach of privacy, and to determine the connection between the impugned conduct and ICBC’s conduct. In other words, to clearly determine how public policy considerations affect the viability of the vicarious liability claim, some evidence is required.

[29]        ICBC submits in the further alternative that ss. 73 and 79 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act bar recovery for vicarious liability. Section 79 provides that the Act prevails where it conflicts with the provisions of other legislation. Section 73(a) prohibits proceedings against a public body for damages resulting from good faith disclosure or non-disclosure of all or part of a record under the Act.

[30]        As the disclosure alleged was not a good faith disclosure, s. 73 has no application to the circumstances of this case.

[31]        I am of the view that the question of vicarious liability on the facts of this case cannot be resolved on a pleadings motion. It is not plain and obvious the claim would fail. The chambers judge considered that the appellant ought to have the opportunity to develop and argue this aspect of his claim. I see no error in her conclusion.

[32]        For these reasons I would dismiss ICBC’s cross-appeal.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Soft Tissue Injury With Associated Headaches

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing non-pecuniary damages of $60,000 for chronic soft tissue injuries with associated headaches.
In today’s case (Hinder v. Yellow Cab Company Ltd) the Plaintiff was involved in an intersection collision.  The Defendant denied liability but was found fully at fault at trail.  The Plaintiff suffered a variety of soft tissue injuries, some of which resolved.  She continued to have neck symptoms with associated headaches at the time of trial (some five years later) which were expected to linger into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey provided the following reasons:

[140]     The Plaintiff is a young woman, age 29 at the time of the accident. While her soft tissue injuries did not appear to be severe and some resolved, she has been left with neck pain and headaches that regularly progress to become very painful and disabling, forcing her to stop whatever she is doing. The medical evidence is that even with significant medical intervention, the neck pain and cervicogenic headaches are likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Debilitating headaches occur about every two weeks. The Plaintiff is not a complainer. She is stoic, a hard worker and she carries on despite the pain. Her home life and recreational activities have been impaired to a significantly lesser degree than likely would have been the case for a less strong and stalwart person. That does not mean, however, that she does not suffer while incapacitated by the neck pain and headaches; and she clearly misses pursuing her sports activities, particularly downhill mountain-biking, with her pre-accident intensity. She has maintained her family and social relationships because of her positive attitude and how well she generally manages her chores and commitments at home and at work in the face of her neck pain and headaches…

[149]     For these reasons, I find that an award of $60,000 in non-pecuniary damages is appropriate in the present case.

BC Court of Appeal – Jury Trial OK in Case With 40 Expert Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12, Jury Trials.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal finding a personal injury lawsuit with 40 expert reports totaling over 700 pages was not too complex for a jury to determine.
In today’s case (Rados v. Pannu) the Plaintiff alleged serious injuries as a result of a motor vehicle collision including “a traumatic brain injury; a vestibular injury that has impaired the appellant’s balance and induced bouts of nausea, dizziness and vomiting; various musculoligamentous and other physical injuries; and, a major depressive disorder”.
The Defendants elected a jury trial and the Plaintiff objected arguing the case was ‘too complex’ and pointed to the sheer volume of competing expert evidence.  The Plaintiff pointed to many cases where discretion was exercised to strike a jury in similar cases.  In finding that judicial discretion does allow for competing results and more than ” adding up the number of experts and medical issues or the number of pages of documents or the length of trial” is needed the Court provided the following reasons:

[22]         As I turn to consider the appellant’s argument, it is useful to remember that a decision whether to strike a jury notice is not only discretionary, but also engages important issues of trial management. The determination of such issues is properly a matter for the trial court. Furthermore, the onus is on the applicant to displace the presumptive right to a jury: MacPherson v. Czaban, 2002 BCCA 518 at para. 17, leave to appeal ref’d [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 480. Accordingly and appropriately, decisions of this kind attract considerable deference from this Court. These decisions turn critically on an assessment by the trial court of multiple factors bearing ultimately on the question whether a matter can be conveniently tried with the jury or should be heard without one.

[23]         The appellant points to numerous cases in which jury notices have been struck which share similarities with this case in terms of the number of medical issues, the number of experts, the nature of the issues and the length of trial. He suggests the result in this case cannot be reconciled with the results in those cases. Thus, he argues that the bar for striking a jury notice has been raised to a level beyond anything that can be accounted for by the inevitable variability of outcome inherent in the exercise of discretion.

[24]         I accept that, as was pointed out in Cochrane v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2005 BCCA 399 at para. 28:

It is unassailable that decisions under Rule 39(27) are driven by the particular facts of the case.  Even so, the facts in prior decisions are helpful in determining whether the discretion to grant or refuse an order to strike a jury notice has been exercised judicially.

[25]         It follows from this that, even allowing for the inevitable variation in outcomes arising from exercises of discretion, one would expect decisions with broadly similar facts to produce broadly predictable outcomes if discretion is being exercised judicially…

[30]         In my opinion, while other similar cases can assist in assessing whether discretion has been exercised judicially, broad and general similarities may mask material differences. The analysis does not begin and end with adding up the number of experts and medical issues or the number of pages of documents or the length of trial. Those factors may be indicative of whether the trial may be conveniently heard with a jury, but they are not necessarily the last word. They were not here because the judge delved deeply into an analysis of the factual circumstances engaged in the trial and exercised his discretion based on his assessment of those circumstances.

[31]         The appellant is not able to point to any relevant factors the judge failed to take into consideration in exercising his discretion, nor can he point to any irrelevant factors he did consider. He is not able to point to any consideration receiving too much or too little weight. In short, the appellant was not able to direct us to any specific error in the exercise of discretion that would warrant this Court interfering with the order.

[32]         The appellant suggested that if this order is not set aside, this Court would be endorsing a much higher bar for striking a jury notice than has previously been the case in this province. I do not accept that submission. In my view, this case turned on its specific and particular factual circumstances as they stood at the time of the application and as they were analyzed by the judge.  The judge then properly applied the relevant considerations to the exercise of his discretion. The case turned on its facts and does not represent a departure of principle or a resetting of the height of a bar.

[33]         Finally, it should be pointed out, as the chambers judge did, that when this matter comes on for trial, the trial judge “may order the trial to proceed without a jury if the interests of justice then require the making of such an order”. It may be that the case that goes to trial may be quite different to what now appears to be the case. As noted by Seaton J.A. in Ball v. Novlesky, [1981] B.C.J. No. 677 (C.A.) at para. 16, we and the chambers judge can examine the issue only on the basis of the record before us. The case at trial may be different and the trial judge would be free to deal with the issue then, if necessary.

[34]         In my opinion, the submissions of the appellant do not rise above an attempt to reargue the case that was rejected by the chambers judge. I do not think that the appellant has identified any error in principle in the exercise of the chambers judge’s discretion. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.

$20,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for 17 Month Long Soft Tissue Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, assessing $20,000 in non-pecuniary damages for recovered soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Scott v. Hoey) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision caused by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff was 13 years old at the time of the collision and alleged she sustained injuries which permanently impacted her and sought significant damages.  The Court rejected much of the Plaintiff’s claim noting credibility concerns.  The Court did accept that the collision cause soft tissue injuries which fully resolved in 17 months.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages of $20,000 Mr. Justice Bowden provided the following reasons:

[169]     In my view the facts and reasoning of Barrow J. in Jensen v. Felker, 2008 BCSC 541, suggest that the amount of non-pecuniary damages awarded in that case approximate those that should be awarded in the case before me. After reviewing a number of authorities where short term injuries produced symptoms in the plaintiffs for 12 to 14 months, Barrow J. awarded non-pecuniary damages of $18,000.

[170]     While the evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff’s injuries resolved within a period of about six months following the accident I am prepared to assess non-pecuniary damages on the basis that some of her symptoms may have continued until November 2007, which is a period of about seventeen months after the accident.

[171]     I award the plaintiff $20,000 in non-pecuniary damages.