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$5.2 Million Dollar Assessment For Cost of Future Care for Cyclist Struck by Tractor-Trailer

Written by admin on . Posted in Cost of Future Care Cases, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.


In what is one of the biggest personal injury trial awards in Canadian History, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing losses and damages of over $5.5 million dollars as a result of a BC motor vehicle collision.
In today’s case (MacEachern v. Rennie) the Plaintiff suffered a “severe brain injury when her head struck a passing tractor-trailer…in Surrey, BC.  She was 27 years old at the time. “.  The court found that as a result of her serious injuries “she will now require care for the rest of her life. ”
The trial was hotly contested and went on for many months starting back in March of 2009 (You can click here to read my archived posts documenting some of the contested interlocutory trial applications) Ultimately the driver of the tractor trailer was found 80% responsible for the crash for not keeping a proper lookout.  The Plaintiff herself was found 20% at fault for “making the careless decision to proceed (around a pickup truck) when she did, instead of waiting for traffic to clear“.
Given the Plaintiff’s catastrophic injuries she was found to require care for the rest of her life.   $5,275,000 was awarded to take care of these expenses.  The Plaintiff was also awarded the maximum Canadian law allows for negligently caused personal injuries for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).
The parties to the lawsuit agreed that this upper limit was an appropriate award.  In reaching this assessment Mr. Justice Ehrcke made the following comments:

[673] Following the accident, the plaintiff had a Glasgow Coma Score of 3. She was intubated and taken by ambulance to Royal Columbian Hospital, where she required emergency surgery upon admission. Dr. Lee, a neurosurgeon, performed a craniotomy to treat her depressed skull fracture and inserted a monitor for her intracranial pressure.

[674] Ms. MacEachern remained unconscious for weeks. She underwent further surgeries. When she eventually opened her eyes, she still did not recognize her family for months. Her coma slowly lifted, but she became severely agitated as a result of her brain injury.

[675] On June 20, 2006, she was transferred to the specialized Neuropsychiatric Program at UBC Hospital for three months, where she received one-on-one care, 24 hours per day. Through the care she received and through adjustments in her medications, she became stabilized and her behaviour dramatically improved. On September 15, 2006, she was discharged back to Royal Columbian Hospital, with a primary diagnosis of Disinhibited Frontal Lobe Syndrome. Although she remained severely disabled, she was now mobile and was able to speak and communicate.

[676] At Royal Columbian Hospital, her behaviour again deteriorated, and at times she required restraints and had to be locked in a padded room.

[677] In January 2007, Ms. MacEachern was transferred to Bear Creek Lodge. The upstairs part of this facility caters to geriatric patients, while the downstairs unit is a locked ward for persons with brain injuries. Ms. MacEachern currently lives there with 15-16 other persons ranging in age from 20-60 years. She has her own room. This facility has provided her with security, medications, and the basic necessities of life, but all parties are in agreement that Bear Creek Lodge is not suitable as a permanent placement for Ms. MacEachern.

[678] To summarize:  as a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered a depressed and comminuted skull fracture of the right front and parietal bones, shear hemorrhages from diffuse axonal injury, and focal hemorrhage to the left frontal and left temporal lobes of her brain. These injuries will have profound implications for the rest of her life. She has little short-term memory, and her behaviour is disinhibited. Mentally and socially, she presents much like a young child, yet in a mature woman’s body. She clearly will require a significant level of care for the rest of her life. She will never be able to work or earn a living….

[680] As mentioned above, in three 1978 cases (the “Trilogy”), Thornton v. School District No. 57 (Prince George) et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, and Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, the Supreme Court of Canada set a rough upper limit of $100,000 for non-pecuniary damages in cases of catastrophic injury.

[681] All parties in the present case agree that the plaintiff suffered the kind of catastrophic injury that should attract the rough upper limit set by the Supreme Court of Canada, adjusted for inflation. The evidence of Mr. Carson is that the present value of the rough upper limit, as of the beginning of this trial, is $324,800.

[682] There shall be an award for non-pecuniary damages in that amount.

My Interview on National Radio Today with Charles Adler: Bars That Over Serve Patrons

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, Uncategorized. 47 Comments on My Interview on National Radio Today with Charles Adler: Bars That Over Serve Patrons


Today I was interviewed by Charles Adler of Corus Radio on the topic of commercial hosts who over serve their patrons and civil lawsuits for damages.
The law in Canada has long recognized that a commercial host can be successfully sued if they serve patrons to the point of intoxication and those patrons then are injured or cause injury to others.  Coincidentally just last week I wrote an article discussing the responsibility of Canadian bars and nightclubs to take reasonable steps to see that their patrons are reasonably safe.
You can click on the following link to listen to my portion of the interview in full:
radio-interview-commercial-host-liability (I’d like to credit CJOB 68 Winnipeg / Corus Radio Network for providing me with a copy of the clip.)
This is my second interview with Mr. Adler and you can listen to my previous interview discussing ‘frivolous lawsuits‘ by clicking here.
As always, feedback is welcome!

ICBC Injury Claims, Breach of Insurance and the Health Care Costs Recovery Act

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Further to my previous posts on the BC Health Care Costs Recovery Act (click here for background information) I recently received clarification from the Ministry of Health Services about their position regarding the HCCRA’s applicability to ICBC Injury Claims where the Defendant is insured with ICBC but in breach of their policy.
After settling a recent claim ICBC’s lawyer and I requested clarification as to whether the Act applied.
I contacted Barbara Carmichael, a lawyer with the Legal Services Branch of the Ministry Attorney General.  Ms. Carmichael explained that the Governments position is that the HCCRA does not apply to these claims because Defendants in breach of insurance have an effective policy in place at the time “the injury is caused” thereby triggering the exception set out in 24(3)(a) of the Act.
Ms. Carmichael further explained that in cases where a Plaintiff is injured by an unidentified motorist or by an uninsured motorist (as opposed to a breached motorist) the Ministry takes the position that the HCCRA does apply.  (Click here to read my previous post discussing the HCCRA and Breach of Insurance situations where I conclude that it appears the Act applies but question whether any money needs to be paid under the HCCRA given the statutory deductions under s. 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation).  It will be a welcome development if the BC Supreme Court gets a chance to address this issue and clarify the application of the law in uninsured and unidentified motorist situations.
I hope the above information is of value to other BC injury lawyers or people prosecuting their own claim where the Defendant is alleged to be in breach of their policy of insurance with ICBC.

More on Non-Pecuniary Damages in BC Civil Sexual Abuse Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in Sexual Assault Civil Cases, Uncategorized. 107 Comments on More on Non-Pecuniary Damages in BC Civil Sexual Abuse Claims

As I previously posted, in British Columbia there is no ‘cap’ on non-pecuniary damages (compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) when a victim successfully sues for harm caused as a result of sexual abuse.
So what compensation is a victim of abuse entitled to for non-pecuniary loss?  Recently a case was released by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, discussing this area of the law.  In this case (CCB v. IB) the Plaintiff succeeded in a civil suit for damages as a result of sexual abuse.  The trial focused of quantum of damages.
The Defendant was the Plaintiff’s natural father.  The abuse lasted for about 5 years when the Plaintiff was aged 5-9.  The father was criminally convicted and served time in prison.  The Plaintiff sued and was awarded close to $600,000 in total damages including $250,000 for her non-pecuniary loss.
One factor that is focused on in these claims is the severity and duration of the abuse.  I won’t repeat the facts here but the nature of the absue is set out at paragraph 8 of the reasons for judgement.    The plaintiff suffered harm as a result of the abuse.  She was, however, described as ‘resourceful‘ and ‘resilient‘ and had ‘a good prognosis for recovery from many of the effects of her traumatic, parentified and neglectful early life experiences with her father‘.
Madam Justice Gray made the following findings with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries and prognosis:

[51]           I accept the opinions of Drs. Mills and Pullyblank described above.  In summary, I find that the defendant’s abuse of the plaintiff has caused her the following:

(a)      Generalized Anxiety Disorder, including additional features of trauma (including nightmares about the abuse and heightened trauma), phobia, and obsessive-compulsiveness/perfectionism;

(b)      depression and intrusive thoughts about the abuse;

(c)        lack of trust in others and lowered self-esteem;

(d)      educational underachievement, particularly in reading and math, which has so far resulted in a one to two year delay in her educational progression and may result in an inability to meet the potential she would have had without the abuse.

[52]           The plaintiff is described as resilient, and with proper assistance, her prognosis for increasing her education is good.  She is likely to suffer flare-ups of psychological symptoms, and is at risk for future mental health problems.

In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $250,000 the Court reviewed a handful of useful precedents and provided the following helpful comments:

[54]           In the leading case Y.(S.) v. C.( F.G.) , (1996), 26 B.C.L.R. (3d) 155, [1997] 1 W.W.R. 229 (C.A.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that the application of the “cap” on non-pecuniary damage awards set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the trilogy Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., , [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452, Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609, and Thornton v. School District no. 57 (Prince George), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, 83 D.L.R. 480, is not appropriate for intentional torts of a quasi-criminal nature, such as sexual abuse.

[55]           Because Y.(S.) lifted the cap on non-pecuniary damages in sexual abuse cases, the case law prior to Y.(S.) is of limited assistance.

[56]           In Y.(S.), the Court of Appeal also stated that in sexual abuse cases aggravated damages do not form a separate head of damages.  An award for non-pecuniary damages is assessed by taking into account aggravating circumstances, particularly in a case of sexual abuse, where the physical harm is not easily separated from the emotional and psychological harm.  Aggravating circumstances include the relationship between the parties, particularly if it is one of trust, the duration of the abuse, the number of assaults, the age of the victim, the degree of violence and coercion, the nature of the abuse, the physical pain and mental suffering associated with the abuse, as well as lack of remorse on the part of the defendant.

[57]           The Court of Appeal, at para. 55, noted the difficulties in quantifying damages in cases of sexual assault:

We are just beginning to understand the horrendous impact of sexual abuse.  To assess damages for the psychological impact of sexual abuse on a particular person is like trying to estimate the depth of the ocean by looking at the surface of the water.  The possible consequences of such abuse are not capable of critical measurement.

[58]           And further, at para. 56:

Comparison with the awards made in similar cases is helpful in maintaining consistency, and therefore giving fair and equivalent treatment to all victims.  But the impact on individuals in particular circumstances of sexual abuse is so difficult to measure that other cases can only provide a rough guide for assessment in this case.

[81]           The case law discusses the harm to the victims, but it is not a significant factor in determining quantum in such cases.  It is reasonable to presume harm, and as noted in Y.(S.), there are particular difficulties in measuring and predicting the lifelong effects of sexual abuse.  The fact that the plaintiff presently appears to be “resilient” is not a reason to diminish her award of damages.

[82]           The most significant aggravating factors are that the defendant was the plaintiff’s father and sole caregiver, that she was very young during the abuse, and that the acts were very invasive and serious.  The most similar case is Y.(S.).  In all the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to $250,000 for non-pecuniary damages.

I encourage anyone considering a BC Civil Lawsuit for damages for harm caused by historic sexual abuse to review this case and the precedents cited therein to gain a good understanding as to how BC Courts value pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life in these cases.

Another interesting aspect to this decision is the Plaintiff’s potential ability to collect on the judgement.  As previously discussed, a successful civil lawsuit for damages may not be worthwhile if the responsible defendant does not have the ability to pay.  Here the Defendant was criminally convicted and spent time in prison.  He very well may not have had the means to pay the judgement.  However, he was left an inheritance and the Court noted that this money “is available to be applied to a judgement in this case“.

Before getting into the time and expense of a civil lawsuit consideration should be given to the ability to collect on the judgement if the claim proves successful.  If the person directly responsible for the assault has no financial means the law of vicarious liability should also be canvassed.

Do Parties Have to Disclose Documents They Will Use to Impeach Opposing Expert Witnesses?

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.


When a party to a personal injury lawsuit wishes to use documents at trial those documents have to be disclosed to the opposing side as per the BC Supreme Court Rules otherwise the evidence may not be admissible.  Two recent cases from the BC Court of Appeal have clearly highlighted this.  Today, reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court considering the scope of documents that need to be disclosed.
In today’s case (Beazley v. Suzuki Motor Coroporation) the Plaintiff called a witness to give expert evidence.  The witness testified that he had limited knowledge of something known as the “Critical Sliding Velocity standard” and that he had “never proposed such a standard to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration“.
On cross-examination the Defence lawyer produced a letter written by the witness addressed to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration apparently “supporting the use of a Critical Sliding Velocity Standard“.
The Plaintiff’s lawyer objected to this cross examination arguing that the letter was not listed on the Defendant’s list of documents and therefore could not be used.  Mr. Justice Goepel disagreed finding that documents that are used solely for impeaching an expert wittiness’ credibility do not necessarily have to be listed.  Specifically the Court reasoned as follows:

[7] A party is obliged to list all documents that fall within the purview of Rule 26(1) including those documents that can properly be described as forming part of the solicitor’s brief: Stone v. Ellerman, 2009 BCCA 294, 92 B.C.L.R. (4th) 203; Dykeman v. Porohowski, 2010 BCCA 36. Neither Stone, Dykeman or the cases cited therein deal with the use of documents being introduced to impeach the general credibility of an expert witness.

[8] A party who chooses to call an expert vouches for that expert’s credibility. The type and nature of documents that might challenge such credibility are endless. They may include articles, letters, testimony, speeches or statements that the expert has made in the past. There may be other articles which critically challenge the expert’s conclusion. Most documents which go to challenge an expert’s opinion or credibility are not documents which are related to the matter in question in the action. They only become relevant because of the expert’s testimony and do not fall under the purview of Rule 26.

[9] This ruling does not apply to all documents that the defendants may wish to put to this or other witnesses. If a document is otherwise related to a matter in question, it is not protected from disclosure merely because it will be used in cross examination or forms part of the solicitor’s brief.

[10] The August 5, 1994 letter, however, only becomes relevant because of Mr. Heitzman’s testimony. It was not a document that need be listed and the defendant is entitled to use the document in cross examination.

[11] To the extent the plaintiffs object to other documents the defendants might wish to put to Mr. Heitzman, those objections will be dealt with as they arise.

BC Injury Claims and Production of Pre Accident Medical Records

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 46 Comments on BC Injury Claims and Production of Pre Accident Medical Records


Further to my previous post discussing this topic reasons for judgement were released today dealing with the extent of pre-accident record disclosure ICBC (or other defendants) are entitled to when a Plaintiff sues for damages for personal injuries in the BC Supreme Court.
In today’s case (Moukhine v. Collins) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 BC car crash.  The Plaintiff sued for damages.  In the Statement of Defence the lawyer plead that the injuries are not the result of an accident, but are were in fact pre-existing conditions.  (This is a rather ‘boilerplate’ pleading raised by the defence in almost every ICBC injury claim).  The defence lawyer then asked that the Plaintiff provide medical records which pre-date the accident by as much as 15 years.
The Court was asked to decide  “whether a mere allegation in a pleading that a plaintiff’s injuries are not the result of an accident, but are caused by his or her pre-accident health condition is enough, without more, to entitle a defendant to production of pre-accident medical records“.
Mr. Justice Harris went on to hold that in personal injury cases, the mere allegation by the Defence lawyer of a pre-existing condition may be enough to compel the disclosure of pre-accident records.  Specifically the Court reasoned as follows:

[18] In my opinion, nothing in Dufault is authority for the proposition that pleadings alone are insufficient to make an order under Rule 26(11) or that evidence is always necessary. Similarly, Dhaliwal does not address the relevance of pleadings as a basis for making a Rule 26(11) order. There is no reference in the judgment  to the issues pleaded in the action and whether pleadings  would have affected the outcome. The case deals only with the sufficiency of the evidence that was before the court. I do not draw from the case the proposition that pleadings standing alone and defining the issues in the action are never a sufficient basis to satisfy the court to make a Rule 26(11) order.

[19] In Marsh v. Parker, 2000 BCSC 1605 at para. 9, Master Horn concluded that Dhaliwal stood for the proposition that “there must be something either by way of evidence or by way of the pleadings which raises the plaintiff’s pre-injury state of health as an issue.”  I agree. Indeed, in Creed v. Dorio, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2479, Mr. Justice Edwards, at paragraph 13, rejected the proposition that “some evidence”  was necessary to establish relevance….

[22] In an appropriate case pleadings  are a sufficient basis on which to exercise a discretion to order production of at least some documents. In some cases it is reasonably obvious that records  may contain relevant (in the sense that term is used in Peruvian Guano) information and should be produced, subject to production following a Jones orHalliday format. Evidence may be required in order to resist a production order. That does not mean, however, that an order will always go on the basis of pleadings alone and it may be premature in some circumstances  to make such an order before discovery (see, for example, Mehdipour v. Shingler (18 March 2009), Vancouver M080517 (S.C.)). Merely pleading pre-existing conditions does not deprive the court of its discretion to refuse to make the order sought when, for example, there is no air of reality about the alleged connection between the documents sought and the issues in the action. Evidence may therefore, on occasion,  be required to establish the relevant connection to overcome the conclusion that the documents are  irrelevant to the claim.

I should point out that as of July, 2010 the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules come into force and the tests for what types of documents need to be exchanged will be narrower so it will be interesting to see how this area of law changes under the soon to be in place new system.

Motorist Found At Fault for BC Car Crash Despite Being Rear-Ended

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 67 Comments on Motorist Found At Fault for BC Car Crash Despite Being Rear-Ended

Further to my previous posts on this topic, the law is clear that a motorist who is rear-ended by another can be found at fault.  Such an outcome is somewhat unusual but given the right circumstances it can occur.  Reasons for judgement were released to today demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Cue v. Breitkreuz) the Plaintiff’s vehicle was involved in a rear-end collision.   He testified that he was rear-ended by the Defendant while he was stopped waiting to make a left hand turn.  An independent witness contradicted this account and testified that “the Plaintiff’s car accelerated, moved in front of the (defendant’s) truck, then slammed on the brakes” leaving the defendant with “(no) chance to stop before sliding into the plaintiff’s car”.
Mr. Justice Smith preferred the independent witness’ evidence over the Plaintiff’s and found the front motorist entirely at fault.  In reaching this conclusion the Court gave the following brief but useful summary of the law:

[15] Where there has been a rear-end collision, the onus shifts to the following driver to show that he or she was not at fault:  Robbie v. King, 2003 BCSC 1553 at para. 13. It is also the case that the driver of a following vehicle must allow a sufficient distance to stop safely in the event of a sudden or unanticipated stop by the vehicles ahead:  Pryndik v. Manju, 2001 BCSC 502 at para. 21, aff’d 2002 BCCA 639; and Rai v. Fowler, 2007 BCSC 1678 at para. 30.

[16] On the evidence before me in this case, I find that the defendant has discharged the onus upon him. I find that the plaintiff, by changing lanes in the manner that he did, created the situation in which the defendant did not have a safe stopping distance behind the plaintiff’s vehicle. Had the plaintiff not stopped, the defendant would have had the opportunity to slow down and allow the distance between them to increase. But when the plaintiff stopped immediately following the lane change, the defendant had no chance to avoid the collision. The defendant had no reason, in the moments leading up to the accident, to anticipate the plaintiff’s lane change and stop.

Can A Driver Be At Fault For A BC Car Crash If They Have The Right of Way?

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 58 Comments on Can A Driver Be At Fault For A BC Car Crash If They Have The Right of Way?

The answer is yes and reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal discussing this area of law.
In today’s case (Salaam v. Abramovic) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 car crash in Surrey, BC.  She sued for damages.  At trial her case was dismissed (you can click here to read my post summarizing the trial judgement) .  She appealed and the BC High Court overturned the judgement finding that the other motorist was 25% to blame for the crash.
By way of background the crash happened at a “T” intersection.  The Plaintiff was faced with a stop sign.  She attempted to make a left hand turn across a through highway.   The Defendant, travelling down the highway, had the statutory right of way and is considered the ‘dominant driver‘.  As he approached the intersection the Plaintiff entered into his lane and the crash happened.  In finding that the Defendant was partially at fault for the crash despite having the right of way the BC Court of Appeal stated as follows:

[26] The oft-quoted passages from the concurring judgment of Cartwright and Locke JJ. in Walker v. Brownlee, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 450 at 460-61 (S.C.C.), succinctly set out the duties of a driver in the dominant position:

The duty of a driver having the statutory right-of-way has been discussed in many cases.  In my opinion it is stated briefly and accurately in the following passage in the judgment of Aylesworth J.A., concurred in by Robertson C.J.O., in Woodward v. Harris, [1951] O.W.N. 221 at p. 223: “Authority is not required in support of the principle that a driver entering an intersection, even although he has the right of way, is bound to act so as to avoid a collision if reasonable care on his part will prevent it.  To put it another way: he ought not to exercise his right of way if the circumstances are such that the result of his so doing will be a collision which he reasonably should have foreseen and avoided.”

While the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case was set aside and a new trial ordered [[1952] 1 D.L.R. 82] there is nothing said in the judgments delivered in this Court to throw any doubt on the accuracy of the statement quoted.

In applying this principle it is necessary to bear in mind the statement of Lord Atkinson in Toronto R. W. Co. v. King, 7 C.R.C. 408 at p. 417, [1908] A.C. 260 at p. 269: “Traffic in the streets would be impossible if the driver of each vehicle did not proceed more or less upon the assumption that the drivers of all the other vehicles will do what it is their duty to do, namely, observe the rules regulating the traffic of the streets.”

While the decision of every motor vehicle collision case must depend on its particular facts, I am of opinion that when A, the driver in the servient position, proceeds through an intersection in complete disregard of his statutory duty to yield the right-of-way and a collision results, if he seeks to cast any portion of the blame upon B, the driver having the right-of-way, A must establish that after B became aware, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, of A’s disregard of the law B had in fact a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident of which a reasonably careful and skilful driver would have availed himself; and I do not think that in such circumstances any doubts should be resolved in favour of A, whose unlawful conduct was fons et origo mali.

[27] The defendant also cites the judgment of this Court in Pacheco (Guardian ad litem of) v. Robinson (1993), 75 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 at 277, 43 M.V.R. (2d) 44:

[15]      In my opinion, a driver who wishes to make a left hand turn at an intersection has an obligation not to proceed unless it can be done safely.  Where each party’s vision of the other is blocked by traffic, the dominant driver who is proceeding through the intersection is generally entitled to continue and the servient left-turning driver must yield the right of way.  The existence of a left-turning vehicle does not raise a presumption that something unexpected might happen and cast a duty on the dominant driver to take extra care.  Where the defendant, as here, has totally failed to determine whether a turn can be made safely, the defendant should be held 100 percent at fault for a collision which occurs.

[28] In Pacheco, the question was whether the plaintiff ought to have anticipated that the defendant, who was turning left at a controlled intersection, might proceed into his path when it was unsafe to do so.  In my view, the hazard posed by the plaintiff’s vehicle in this case is not analogous to the hazard posed by the defendant’s vehicle in Pacheco.  The defendant in the Pacheco case had done nothing to foreshadow that she would unlawfully cross into the plaintiff’s line of travel.  In contrast, in this case, the plaintiff had been in violation of the rules of the road continuously almost from the moment that the defendant saw her: she proceeded through a stop sign without coming to a full stop and continued to pull forward into his lane of travel as he approached the intersection.  Although he changed lanes to pull around her, she continued forward in a halting manner, not stopping at any time.

[29] The question in this case is whether the defendant exercised reasonable care in approaching the intersection.  When he was 350 feet away, the plaintiff’s vehicle started crossing the road and entered into his lane of travel.  A reasonable driver would have been put on notice that the plaintiff was not obeying the rules of the road and posed a hazard.  A reasonable driver would have exercised increased caution, paid close attention to the plaintiff’s vehicle and prepared to stop or to give it a wide berth.  Instead, the defendant insisted on his right of way.  A mere 100 feet from the intersection, when the plaintiff’s vehicle was fully in his lane of travel and still proceeding forward, the defendant changed lanes in an attempt to drive around her.  Until the last moment, he maintained his speed.  In the best case scenario, if the plaintiff had seen the defendant’s vehicle and stopped abruptly, the collision would have been avoided by mere inches.  Instead, the plaintiff continued forward, and the defendant’s vehicle struck the middle of the plaintiff’s vehicle.  In the circumstances, the defendant’s negligence contributed to the accident…

[34] In applying the “immediate hazard” test in order to determine negligence, the trial judge erred in law.  Applying the correct legal test to the defendant’s conduct (i.e., the test enunciated in Walker v. Brownlee), the defendant had a duty to take care when he approached the plaintiff’s car in the intersection, having had ample warning that she was not following the rules of the road.  A reasonable driver would not have insisted on right of way, and certainly would not have driven aggressively through the intersection, aiming to pass within inches of the plaintiff’s moving vehicle…

[38] I would find the plaintiff 75% at fault and the defendant 25% at fault.

BC Injury Claims for Passengers Injured in Single Vehicle Collisions – When Your Driver is At Fault

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases.

Here is video I recently uploaded to YouTube discussing injury claims (tort claims) brought by passengers when the driver of their vehicle is at fault for a single vehicle collision in British Columbia.
I have previously written about this topic and you can click here to read my archived posts discussing single vehicle collisions and the inevitable accident defence.
I hope this information is of assistance.

Why ICBC's "Low Velocity Impact Program" Is Not the Law in British Columbia

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized. 1 Comment on Why ICBC's "Low Velocity Impact Program" Is Not the Law in British Columbia

Countless people have been injured in car crashes over the years in British Columbia and had their injury claims denied by ICBC on the basis of the Low Velocity Impact Program.
I have written many times about this program explaining that it has no legal force in BC.  Reasons for judgement were released today proving this yet again and in doing so providing one of the better explanations of why a certain threshold of vehicle damage is not necessary in order to have a successful personal injury claim in this Province.
In today’s case (Gignac v. Rozylo) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2004 collision in Victoria, BC .  At trial a ‘senior estimator‘ employed by ICBC testified that the Plaintiff’s vehicle suffered “cosmetic damage only to the rear bumper cover. ‘ and that ‘there is no bumper misalignment or sheet metal damage‘.
The Plaintiff was injured but ICBC advanced the LVI defence arguing that “given the very minor nature of the collision it is difficult to conceive how someone could possibly be injured, or injured in the significant fashion the plaintiff claims‘.
Despite finding that the crash was ‘one of the more minimal contacts between motor vehicles in the history of the internal combustion engine‘ Mr. Justice Wilson outright rejected the LVI defence and in doing so provided the following very useful summary of the law:

[30] I am not persuaded that the third party’s argument is open to me to accept.  There are two propositions which lead me to that opinion.

[31] First, in Gordon v. Palmer , Thackray J. (as he then was) made the following observations:

I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury.  …  It is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have never heard it endorsed as a medical principle.

Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slips and falls.  … The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court.

[32] Second, in Price v. Kostryba,McEachern, C.J.S.C. (as he then was), said at para 4:

Perhaps no injury has been the subject of so much judicial consideration as the whiplash.  Human experience tells us that these injuries normally resolve themselves within six months to a year or so.  Yet every physician knows some patients whose complaint continues for years, and some apparently never recover.

[33] Therefore, I conclude that Gordon is authority for the proposition that the magnitude of forces unleashed, in any given contact, is not determinative of the injuries sustained.  Accordingly, in this case, there was a “real risk” of the harm now complained of.

[34] And, Price is authority for the proposition that, objectively, some patients, of “ordinary fortitude” sustain injuries which are permanent.  In this case, I am not dealing with the particular vulnerabilities of this particular plaintiff.

[35] In result, I find the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.  That is to say, the defendant’s carelessness caused, as I will describe below, the plaintiff’s injuries, in fact and in law.