Skip to main content

Plaintiff 50% At Fault for Running Yellow Light

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.

As the BC Court of Appeal recently confirmed, there is a range of possible splits of fault following many intersection collisions.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further addressing this frequent type of collision.
In last week’s case (Ziani v. Thede) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 accident in Vancouver, BC.  He was travelling west on Kingsway.  As he approached the intersection of Boundary Road the light turned yellow.  He increased his speed to run the light.  At the same time the Defendant was approaching from the opposite direction on Kingsway making a left hand turn onto Boundary.  The Defendant testified that he had an advance green arrow although this evidence was not accepted with the Court finding that the Defendant was faced with the same yellow light that the Plaintiff had.

Madam Justice Bruce found that both motorists were equally to blame and in doing so provided the following reasons for judgement:




[24] On the facts of this case, the plaintiff entered the intersection on a yellow light and thus cannot be said to have the right of way. I am also satisfied that the defendant did not have an advance green light in his favour when he was attempting to turn left. Given the timing of the light sequences, and the evidence of the two independent witnesses, it would have been impossible for the defendant to have faced a green light when he was attempting to turn left. Had the defendant faced an advance green turn signal, the witnesses would not have seen a red light for oncoming east/west traffic at the time of the collision. Next in the sequence would have been a green light for through traffic on Kingsway. Moreover, Ms. Gjerding clearly testified that the defendant’s blue van was stopped in the left turn lane waiting for the through traffic to clear. This evidence is inconsistent with the defendant having the right of way with an advance green light.

[25] Thus on the facts of this case, the competing duties described in ss. 174 and 128 of the Motor Vehicle Act are squarely in issue. The burden of proof described in Dawes is not applicable where neither of the drivers had a presumptive right of way. Instead, the Court must examine the conduct of each driver to determine if they complied with their respective duties under ss. 174 and 128 of the Motor Vehicle Act…




[27] In my view, it is apparent that the plaintiff decided to increase his speed and “run” the yellow light in contravention of s. 128 of the Motor Vehicle Act in order to avoid the red light. It was only coincidental with the light turning yellow that he saw the defendant’s vehicle. It was not the presence of the defendant’s vehicle that led to the plaintiff’s decision to increase his speed in order to avoid a collision…

[29] In this case, however, I find the defendant did not assess whether the plaintiff was an immediate hazard or not when deciding to proceed with the left turn. Instead, the defendant wrongly assumed that he had the right of way due to the presence of an advance green signal. Instead of focusing on the oncoming traffic and any potential hazards created by those drivers, the defendant concentrated on ensuring there was no cross traffic or pedestrians in the crosswalk while he turned left. He looked left, then right, then left again before he looked ahead at oncoming traffic. By this time it was too late because the collision had already occurred. In my view, the defendant neglected to take the proper steps to ensure there was no oncoming traffic before he proceeded into the left turn. In this regard, I find the facts of this case are similar to those in Shirley where Mackenzie J. (as he then was) concluded that both drivers were at fault, the oncoming driver for running a yellow light and the left turning driver for proceeding into the turn when her view of the intersection and the oncoming traffic was partly blocked.

[30] For these reasons, I find that both the plaintiff and the defendant are at fault and their respective negligence both contributed to the accident. The degree of fault does not differ significantly. The defendant proceeded into a left turn without keeping a lookout for oncoming traffic due to his mistaken assumption that he had an advance green light. The plaintiff was equally at fault for increasing his speed and attempting to travel through the intersection before the light turned red and following an established amber. Accordingly, I find the plaintiff and the defendant each 50% responsible for the accident.

More Judicial Authority of "Responsive" Independent Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams. 45 Comments on More Judicial Authority of "Responsive" Independent Medical Exams

One of the New Rules which has received more attention than most is Rule 11-6(4) which deals with responsive reports.  The issue of whether the Court could order a Plaintiff to undergo a physical exam for a responsive report has been considered a good half dozen times.  In short the authorities have held that such an order is possible but the Courts have been conservative in making these orders to date.  Further reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this topic.
In this week’s case (Mahil v. Price) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision.  The Defendants did not order an independent medical report in the timelines allowed by Rule 11-6(3) and brought a motion for an exam less than 84 days before trial.  They argued that they only wished to obtain a ‘responsive’ report and that the report would comply with Rule 11-6(4).  Mr. Justice Voith held that such an appointment was permitted and allowed the order.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:








[21] Rule 7-6(1), formerly Rule 30, allows for the conduct of an independent medical examination. The object of Rule 30 was succinctly described by Finch J.A., as he then was, in Stainer v. ICBC, 2001 BCCA 133 at para. 8:

…the purpose of Rule 30 is to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence. …

[22] The object of placing the parties on an equal footing is, however, only achieved in real terms if the parties also adhere to those rules which govern the timely exchange of both initial expert reports and responsive expert reports.

[23] The important relationship of what was Rule 30 and what is now Rule 7-6(1) and those Rules which pertain to the time limits for the exchange of expert reports has been recognized in other decisions. In Wright v. Brauer, 2010 BCSC 1282, Savage J. said at para. 9:

In the context of an action seeking compensation for personal injuries, the parties are on equal footing with respect to medical evidence if they can independently obtain medical evidence and if such evidence is served in accordance with the Rules.

[24] In the case of Mackichan v. June and Takeshi, 2004 BCSC 1441, Master Groves, as he then was, said at para. 11:

… It is not simply a question of putting the parties on a level playing field at this stage, it is a question of really balancing the prejudice which will result to the defendants in not having a report and the prejudice that will result to the plaintiff in having a report prepared late which would no doubt, I expect, cause an adjournment of the trial.

[25] If the defendants have Dr. Gropper prepare a properly responsive report, and if that report is delivered in accordance with the Rules, the interests of both parties are concurrently advanced and safeguarded.

[26] I have, based on a request I made, been advised by counsel for the defendants that Dr. Gropper would be able to deliver his report in advance of the 42 days provided for in Rule 11-6(4).

[27] Notwithstanding some misgivings about some of the issues advanced by the defendants, I do not believe that it would be either prudent or appropriate for me to pre-determine that the specific concerns raised by the defendants will not, in fact, be properly responsive to the Reports.

[28] I have, however, earlier in these reasons, identified with some precision the very narrow issues that the defendants assert they wish to respond to in the Reports. These reasons should provide some safeguard against Dr. Gropper’s report extending or straying beyond its permitted ambit, whether inadvertently or otherwise. I note, as did Saunders J., as she then was, in Kroll v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (1995), 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 7 at para. 7 (S.C.), that truly responsive evidence:

… does not permit fresh evidence to masquerade as an answer to the other side’s report.

[29] I am therefore prepared to grant the defendants’ application. Costs are to be in the cause.









BC Injury Law Hits 1000 Posts

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.


With this brief post I’ve now hit 1000 updates.  It’s taken just over three years (and far too many hours to count) to reach this milestone.  Thank you to all my readers who have made this effort worthwhile.

ICBC Application to Move Lawsuit to Small Claims Denied, Court Finds it "Most Unsafe" to do so

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.


As previously discussed, Section 15 of the Supreme Court Act allows the Court to transfer a lawsuit to the Provincial Court (Small Claims) in certain circumstances.  Reasons for judgement were released today making it clear that such applications will rarely succeed in personal injury lawsuits.
In today’s case (Chang v. Wren) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision and sued for damages in Supreme Court.  ICBC brought an application to move the case to Small Claims Court.  Mr. Justice McEwan expressed “difficulty appreciating the motivation for the application” and dismissed it.  In doing so the Court noted the well-known delay in getting trial dates for personal injury lawsuits in Provincial Court and further the difficulty in predicting that any given case would be worth less than $25,000 in a summary hearing.  The following useful reasons were provided:


[3] I must say I find it unusual that a defendant brings such an application and had some difficulty appreciating the motivation for the application, given that the sanction in costs and in depriving the plaintiff of costs following a Supreme Court hearing would appear, in my view, to be more advantageous than the inevitable result of putting the matter down to Provincial Court, which would be a trial some eight months from when the trial is presently set in August of 2011 in Provincial Court, and a further proceeding by way of mandatory mediation in the Provincial Court.

[4] Whatever the merits of the respective parties’ positions as to the ultimate quantum of damages in this matter, it seems to me that the appropriate disposition is to see that it gets to trial before a competent tribunal as quickly as possible, and with as little procedural clutter as possible.  That militates strongly in favour of the Supreme Court retaining this matter within its precincts, where there is a far greater likelihood, in the present circumstances, of a trial being held when it is scheduled, than there is in the Provincial Court.

[5] Circumstances might be different if it could be reliably assumed that Provincial Court would get the matter on quickly and be done with it faster than a Supreme Court, but while I am not prepared to go so far as to say I take judicial notice of anything in particular, I certainly will observe that I do not think I can behave on the basis of that particular fiction.

[6] What this application amounts to is a request to the court to summarily assess the evidence without hearing from any witnesses or without hearing from the plaintiff herself and determine that the matter would come in under $25,000.  That would depend on the court reading the medical reports, essentially as the defence suggests I should, and I do not think it is something that a responsible court could really do.

[7] The plaintiff has chosen the Supreme Court of British Columbia.  She will have been advised of the hazards of bringing a Small Claim jurisdiction matter in this court, but if she is determined to proceed and to have a determination in Supreme Court, I think it would have to be established very, very firmly that the damages she claims could not exceed $25,000, before the court would entertain such an application.

[8] Counsel have provided some case law reflecting what the test is for bringing the matter down to Provincial Court.  My own view is that in a case where the liquidated damages could not possibly exceed $25,000, it might be clear, but in a case of this kind where the nuances of personal experience may have a significant bearing on the court’s assessment, perhaps even notwithstanding the medical evidence, it would be most unsafe to summarily decide that the case could not exceed the limits of the Small Claims jurisdiction.

[9] So on the basis that, first of all, it appears to be more efficient to continue in Supreme Court, and secondly, on the basis that it is, in any event, the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum, where there is any doubt about the appropriate jurisdiction, I think it better at this stage of this proceeding, post-discovery and a few months to trial, for the matter to remain in Supreme Court.

[10] I dismiss the application.


Wrongful Death Claims in BC and the Definition of "Spouse"

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.


BC’s Family Compensation Act permits a defined class of family members to sue for damages following the wrongful death of a loved one.  Spouses are part of this defined class.  However, the definition of spouse goes beyond legally married individuals and also includes a person who “lived and cohabited with the deceased in a marriage-like relationship, including a marriage-like relationship between persons of the same gender, for a period of at least 2 years ending no earlier than one year before the death“.
In last week’s case (James v. Gillis) Ms. James died in a motor vehicle collision in 2006.   Mr. Cornet claimed he was the spouse of Ms. James and sought damages under the Family Compensation Act.  ICBC took the position that he was not a spouse as defined by the Act and denied the claim.  The matter went to trial and ultimately Madam Justice Watchuk agreed that Ms. Cornet was a “spouse” as defined by the FCA and was able to claim damages.
While the relevant discussion is far too lengthy to reproduce here, the Court extensively canvassed the law regarding the definiton of spouse and “marriage-like relationship” for the purpose of FCA claims at paragraphs 48-52 of the reasons for judgement and these are worth reviewing in full for anyone interested in this area of the law.
While on this topic I should again point out that a proposed amendment to the Family Compensation Act passed First Reading this Spring and will hopefully pass into law during the Legislature’s next session.

Late Defence Medical Report Inadmissible For Going Beyond Responsive Evidence Exception

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on Late Defence Medical Report Inadmissible For Going Beyond Responsive Evidence Exception


When the New Rules of Court were introduced last year changes were made to the timelines to exchange expert reports.  An 84 day deadline was set out in Rule 11-6(3) and a shorter 42 day deadline is set out in Rule 11-6(4) for “responding reports“.   The first reasons for judgement that I’m aware of were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing whether to admit a late report under the “responsive evidence” exception.
In today’s case (Crane v. Lee) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  The Defendant ran a stop sign and admitted fault for the crash.   The Plaintiff’s expert provided evidence that she suffered from soft tissue injuries and a herniated disc.  The Defendant obtained an expert report which contradicted this finding and served this report less than 84 days before trial.  The Defendant argued that the report was responsive and should be admitted.  Mr. Justice Smith disagreed finding the report went beyond the narrow circumstances permitted in Rule 11-6(4).  In excluding the report the Court provided the following reasons:



[21] At the opening of the trial, counsel for the plaintiff objected to and sought a ruling on the admissibility of a medical report that the defendant intended to rely upon.  The report had not been served within the 84 days required by Rule 11-6 (3) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009.  Counsel for the defendant relied upon rule 11-6 (4), which reads:

(4)        Unless the court otherwise orders, if a party intends to tender an expert’s report at trial to respond to an expert witness whose report is served under subrule (3), the party must serve on every party of record, at least 42 days before the scheduled trial date,

(a)        the responding report, and

(b)        notice that the responding report is being served under this rule.

[22] Rule 11-6 (4) is intended to apply only to evidence that is truly responsive or in rebuttal to specific opinion evidence tendered by the opposite party.  It is not intended to provide defendants with a general exemption from the basic time limit for serving expert reports that is set out in Rule 11-6 (3).  Defendants who delay obtaining or serving expert evidence until after the plaintiff’s opinions have been received, then attempt to introduce all of their expert evidence as response, do so at their peril.

[23] In this case, I found that the report was not limited to true responsive evidence.  It stated the author’s opinion on the nature and cause of the plaintiff’s injury?the central issue that both sides had to address from the outset?and was based upon a review of all the medical records, including some not referred to by Dr. Field in his report.  As such, I considered it to be a free-standing medical opinion that ought to have been served pursuant to Rule 11-6 (3).  I ruled the report inadmissible, with the result that there was no expert evidence before me to contradict Dr. Field’s opinion.




The Court accepted the evidence from the Plaintiff’s expert and in assessing non-pecuniary damages of $100,000 Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:
[33] On review of all the evidence, I find that the accident for which the defendant has admitted liability caused soft tissue injuries to the plaintiff’s neck and upper back, which eventually resolved, and a herniated disc in the lower back that continues to cause pain and limitation.  To the extent that the accident may have aggravated a pre-existing condition, I find that in the years immediately preceding the accident that condition was minimally symptomatic and there is no evidence that it would likely have become worse but for the accident.  I accept the uncontradicted evidence of Dr. Field that the plaintiff’s current pain is likely to be permanent…
[45] The injury the plaintiff suffered has had a significant impact on her enjoyment of life.  She has back pain on a daily basis, fluctuating according to her activities.  She has lost what was formerly a very active lifestyle, giving up some activities that she formerly enjoyed, while continuing some others on a reduced level, accepting the trade-off of increased pain.  The only medical evidence before me is that this condition is likely to be permanent. She also suffers severe anxiety while driving, particularly in situations similar to those that gave rise to the accident, although there is no evidence that this condition is necessarily permanent…
[49] Taking into account the effect of the plaintiff’s injuries on her lifestyle, the permanent nature of her pain and the psychological impact, including her driving anxiety, and considering the cases cited, I assess the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $100,000.

Credibility, Chronic Pain and the "Inherent Frailty" of Subjective Injury Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 54 Comments on Credibility, Chronic Pain and the "Inherent Frailty" of Subjective Injury Claims

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing credibility and chronic pain claims based on subjective symptoms.
In this week’s claim (Sevinksi v. Vance) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision.  Fault was admitted by the offending motorist focusing the claim on quantum.  The Plaintiff sought fairly significant damages for disability due to a diagnosed chronic pain syndrome.  Her injuries were largely subjective putting her credibility squarely at issue.
The Court expressed several concerns about the Plaintiff’s credibility noting that “the Plaintiff was not forthright in her evidence….There also appear to have been instances where the plaintiff was not forthright with the independent doctors she attended before”  and lastly that “Aspects of (the plaintiff’s evidence) go well beyond a frailty of memory or a natural and excusable tendency to exaggerate or place given evidence in a positive light.  Here the Plaintiff sought to mislead and crate a history that is not forthright“.
Despite all this Mr. Justice Voith did accept that the Plaintiff was injured in the collision and that she had ongoing limitations due to these injuries.  Non-Pecuniary damages of $60,000 were assessed but this award was then reduced to $45,000 to take into account the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s credibility and damages the Court cited the well known passage from Mr. Justice McEachern in Butler v. Blaylok.  (making this an opportune place to repeat my views that the assertion that a higher burden of proof exists in subjective injury claims is questionable.)
Mr. Justice Voith provided the following reasons:

[43] The difficulties with the plaintiff’s evidence are magnified because of the lack of objective evidence to support her injuries. McEachern, C.J.S.C., as he then was, identified the difficulties associated with assessing the extent of an injury without the benefit of objective evidence in each of Butler v. Blaylok Estate [1981] B.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.) at paras. 18-19 and Price v. Kostryba(1982), 70 B.C.L.R. 397 (S.C.) at para. 1-4.

[44] In Maslen v. Rubenstein (1993), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 131 (C.A.), Taylor J.A., at para. 15.1, said:

…there must be evidence of a “convincing” nature to overcome the improbability that pain will continue, in the absence of objective symptoms, well beyond the normal recovery period, but the plaintiff’s own evidence, if consistent with the surrounding circumstances, may nevertheless suffice for the purpose.

[45] More recently, in Eccleston v. Dresen, 2009 BCSC 332, at para. 66, Barrow J. accepted that claims supported by only subjective evidence should be viewed with a “skeptical eye”. He further confirmed, however, that such claims can be supported by the “convincing force of collateral evidence”.

[46] Two propositions emerge from these cases. First, there is an inherent level of frailty in the case of a plaintiff whose assertions of injury are not supported by any objective evidence or symptoms. Accordingly, it is appropriate, in such cases, to treat the evidence adduced by or on behalf of the plaintiff with caution. Second, either the evidence of the plaintiff or collateral corroborative evidence may be sufficient to persuade the Court of the plaintiff’s position.

[47] In this case the usual difficulties associated with the wholly subjective complaints of a plaintiff are compounded by the reliability problems which are associated with the evidence of Ms. Sevinski.

[48] Notwithstanding some misgivings, however, I have accepted aspects of Ms. Sevinski’s evidence and am satisfied that these portions of her evidence are supported by additional collateral evidence before me…

[86] Having said this, the medical evidence establishes, and I have accepted, that the plaintiff does struggle with chronic pain syndrome. Her ability to function normally and to engage in the breadth of activities which she would like to, as well as to interact with her children and Mr. Rambold in a pain-free way, is diminished….

[89] Based on these considerations I assess Ms. Sevinski’s non-pecuniary damages at $60,000. This is without taking the question of mitigation into account.

Driver Found Not Negligent For Collision With Moose

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 60 Comments on Driver Found Not Negligent For Collision With Moose


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Powell River Registry, dismissing a personal injury lawsuit following a 2006 collision.
In this week’s case (Racy v. Leask) the Plaintiff was a passenger in the Defendant’s vehicle.  They were driving in a remote part of BC in the early evening when the vehicle encountered two moose on the roadway.  The driver could not avoid collision resulting in injuries to the passenger.  The passenger sued for damages although the claim was dismissed with Madame Justice Ker finding that the driver was not negligent.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:

[100] In this case, Ms. Leask acted immediately and appropriately upon first encountering the moose. Upon rounding the bend or corner in the road and seeing the moose, she gave a warning to Ms. Racy and at the same time applied the brakes to slow the vehicle as best she could without risking swerving in either direction. The two moose were not standing in the lane of travel but were moving toward it from the shoulder on the right hand side of the highway. The road conditions were dry. It was dark, and thus the moose were not half a mile away as Ms. Racy estimated. Rather, they were caught in the range of the headlights. There is no evidence as to what the range of the headlights on high beam for this model of vehicle is in this case. Ms. Leask was driving at least 10 km/h below the posted speed limit and was in all likelihood travelling at a speed of between 85 and 90 km/h. Ms. Leask reduced her speed to take into account the driving conditions including the fact that it was dark and the possibility of encountering wildlife.

[101] Significantly, and as in Pitt Enterprises and Fajardo, there is no evidence of what speed Ms. Leask would have to have been travelling at to have been able to stop her truck once the two moose became visible to her. Nor is there any evidence as to how far the defendant’s lights would have illuminated the highway in this case, something available in the case of Pitt Enterprises.

[102] In addition, the collision in this case did not occur in an area that could be described as a “moose alley” where it is more probable than not that moose will be found. While an accident may have occurred a year before in the same general area where a driver struck a moose, there is no other evidence to suggest this is an area where it is more probable than not that moose will be found. Ms. Leask was aware there might be wildlife in the area and had adjusted her speed accordingly and was wary of the possibility.

[103] As soon as Ms. Leask saw the moose she applied her brakes, but not with enough force to completely avoid colliding with the moose. I accept her evidence that the moose were fairly close to the vehicle, within the beam of the vehicle headlights, when she first encountered them and that they continued to move from the shoulder area to the vehicle’s lane of travel. Despite her efforts to avoid a collision by applying the brakes and maintaining a straight path, instead of swerving in either direction, the collision with the moose calf could not be avoided.

[104] Considering all the circumstances in this case, I conclude that the collision with the moose was not occasioned by any negligence or want of care on the part of Ms. Leask. I find that Ms. Leask was not driving at an excessive speed given the conditions. I also find that she was not negligent in failing to apply the vehicle brakes more forcefully or in failing to take any other evasive action such as pulling or swerving to the right or the left of her lane of travel. To have done so no doubt would have resulted in much graver consequences: a head on collision with either the mother moose or the calf. The plaintiff has failed to establish on a balance of probabilities the defendant was negligent in her response to seeing the moose on the highway. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s case fails and the action must be dismissed.
For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts dealing with single vehicle collisions and the inevitable accident defence.

Defence Expert's Evidence Rejected in Fibromyalgia Trial Based on "Advocacy"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

As previously discussed, expert witnesses have a duty to be objective when giving their evidence and opinions in a BC Supreme Court trial.  Rule 11-2 specifically sets out that “In giving an opinion to the court, an expert appointed under this Part by one or more parties or by the court has a duty to assist the court and is not to be an advocate for any party.”
If experts fail to abide by this requirement they risk having their opinions rejected and further being criticized by the Court.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, highlighting such a result.
In last week’s case (Marchand v. Pederson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 motor vehicle collision.  It was a rear-end collision and fault was admitted.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Court heard competing expert witnesses with the Plaintiff’s physiatrist (Dr. Apel) providing evidence that the collision caused various injuries including fibromyalgia.
This opinion was contradicted by a physiatrist retained by the Defendant (Dr. Nowak) who provided an opinion that the collision played a lesser role in the Plaintiff’s symptoms.
Dr. Nowak’s opinion was largely rejected with the court placing little weight on it.  Non-pecuniary damages of $65,000 were awarded with the Court providing the following reasons in assessing damages and criticizing the defence expert:
[44] I find Dr. Nowak’s evidence to be problematic. He initially refuses to answer a question based on assumptions. It is clear that he is wrong in his reading of the intake report of Dr. Kinakin where he assumed that the pain was remaining constant. He is not accurate in the date of the last chiropractic treatment. I am of the view that Dr. Nowak is more of an advocate than an expert and I give very little weight to his evidence. I prefer the evidence of Dr. Apel when it comes to the diagnosis of fibromyalgia and the other conclusions reached by Dr. Apel. I am satisfied that the plaintiff may have improved somewhat from her last visit with Dr. Apel but I am satisfied that she continues to suffer a long term disability in respect to the fibromyalgia in the lower and upper back. I accept Ms. Phillips’ functional capacity evaluation and the limitations that the plaintiff has in respect to job opportunities because of her physical restrictions. I am also satisfied that the report of Dr. Wallace is fair and balanced and should be given a great deal of weight. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that she stopped seeing her chiropractor, Dr. Kinakin, because she no longer had pain, but the chiropractor asked her to continue to see him because he was of the view that she had subluxation, which is poor posture so he was giving her treatment for that. She confirmed that she did not have any pain when she stopped seeing Dr. Kinakin. I accept her evidence….
[46] The function of non-pecuniary damages is to compensate the plaintiff for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities. Taking into account the relatively young age of the plaintiff (she is now 24 years old), the chronic nature of her injuries, the severity and duration of her pain, her disabilities, her emotional suffering and loss of her social and marital life, I am of the view that a proper award would be in the amount of $65,000.

Digital Vacation Photos and Metadata Production Ordered in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 2 Comments on Digital Vacation Photos and Metadata Production Ordered in ICBC Claim


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, ordering production of a Plaintiff’s vacation photos in an ICBC injury lawsuit.
In today’s claim (Abougoush v. Sauve) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision.  She alleged that her injuries disabled her for a period following this collision.  During this period she travelled to Las Vegas, Palm Springs and the Caribbean.   Photos were taken during these trips.
ICBC asked for the photos to be produced.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that any probative value in the photos was outweighed by Privacy concerns.  Mr. Justice Rogers reviewed the photos and ultimately ordered them disclosed.  The Court noted some difficulty reconciling the activities depicted in the photos with the “Plaintiff’s perception of what is a physical activity” based on her affidavit evidence.  In ordering production of the digital photos and metadata Mr. Justice Rogers provided the following reasons:


[7] The photographs in question depict the plaintiff in various indoor and outdoor tropical settings. The plaintiff is depicted engaging in various activities including swimming, walking on a beach, going on a catamaran power boat, and visiting the Grand Canyon. The photographs clearly establish that the plaintiff did not spend the majority of her time curled up in her parent’s motorhome or resting poolside in a chaise lounge.

[8] I have referred to the pleadings, of course, in order to determine what matters are in question, but I have also referred to the plaintiff’s Affidavit #1, particularly the extracts set out above. The pleadings establish that the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s physical injuries, their effect on her enjoyment of life and their effect on her ability to participate in physical activity are matters in question. The photographs, when they are compared to the plaintiff’s affidavit evidence, are clearly relevant to the plaintiff’s perception of what is a physical activity. They are also relevant to the plaintiff’s tolerance for physical activity over a several week period.

[9] The photographs do not show the plaintiff in embarrassing or socially unacceptable situations. There is nothing about the photographs that would prevent their owner from, for example, posting them on a social networking site such as Facebook. I do not consider that the plaintiff’s demeanour or comportment in any of the photographs in the binder is such that they must be withheld from the defendants in order to preserve her privacy.

[10] In my opinion, the plaintiff’s pleadings and her affidavit evidence make the entire photographic record of her trips to Las Vegas and Palm Springs, and to the Caribbean, relevant to matters in question in this suit. All of the photographs in the binder provided to me must, therefore, be produced to the defendants.

[11] From what I can see of the camera that the plaintiff used to take many of these photographs (the camera can be seen in the reflection off the plaintiff’s sunglasses in some of her self-portraits), I believe it was a digital device. Digital cameras typically record the time and date when the photograph was taken. Some cameras capture the camera’s GPS co-ordinates as well. These data are known as metadata. These data are relevant to a matter in issue in this lawsuit because they may provide information from which the camera user’s tolerance for physical activity from day to day or over several days may be inferred. More particularly, the metadata may be relevant to the plaintiff’s ability to, for example, be active throughout a given day and then go walking on the beach in the evening, or it may be relevant to the plaintiff’s ability to spend an evening at a nightclub until some given hour, and then tolerate swimming the next morning. For that reason, the metadata associated with these photographs must also be produced to the defendants. That discovery may be accomplished by providing the defendants with digital copies of the photographs with the metadata preserved intact in those copies.