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Fast Track Costs Apply Despite 4 Day Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 15.

As previously discussed, Rule 15 is applicable to BC Supreme Court injury trials with a quantum of less than $100,000 or to trials that can be completed in three days or less.   This week reasons for judgement were published by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, addressing what costs flow following a Rule 15 trial which exceeds three days.
In this week’s case (Travelbea v. Henrie) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision.  Following a four day trial which was prosecuted under Rule 15 damages of just over $68,000 and costs were awarded.  The Plaintiff sought costs under the Tarriff and the Defendant argued that the capped costs of Rule 15 should apply.  Mr. Justice Barrow agreed with the Defendant and noted that there is nothing sufficient in a trial exceeding three days to depart from Rule 15 costs.  The court provided the following reasons:
6]             In general, the case was conducted in accordance with the parameters set by Rule 15-1. The plaintiff did not conduct an examination for discovery of the defendant. The defendant’s examination for discovery of the plaintiff was completed within two hours. There were no interlocutory applications by either party. The only substantive exception to the limitations imposed by the fast-track regime is that the trial spanned four days…
[10]         The only aspect of this case to which the plaintiff points by way of special circumstance is that the trial was set for four days and, in fact, took almost four days to be heard. I am not persuaded that the circumstance is sufficient to justify otherwise ordering. First, when the notice of trial was filed indicating that four days would be necessary, the plaintiff was content that the matter should remain in the fast-track regime. That is apparent by virtue of the endorsement on the notice and the fact that no application to the court or request to the defendant was made seeking to remove the case from the regime. Second, although the trial took more than three days, it took only marginally more, less than half a day.
[11]         I acknowledge the plaintiff’s submission that the case may have taken much longer had counsel not dealt with the matter so efficiently and co-operatively. To accede to that submission would be, in effect, to sanction a party for doing that which the Rules are intended to promote, namely, to conduct trials in an expedient and efficient way.
[12]         In the result, I am satisfied that the lump sum costs provided for in Rule 15 ought to be imposed in this case, and I order that the plaintiff is entitled to costs under Rule 15-1(15)(c) in the amount of $11,000.

$115,000 nonpecuniary assessment for fractured femur and chronic pain disorder

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Femur Injury Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for various injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident.
In the recent case (Taylor v. Depew) the plaintiff was riding a motorbike which was involved in a head-on collision with a dune buggy on a narrow road near Campbell River BC.  Fault was disputed with the court ultimately finding that both motorists were to blame.  Liability was split with the plaintiff shouldering 30% of the fault and the defendant 70%.
The plaintiff suffered various injuries the most serious of which was a fractured femur.  This resulted in ligamentous laxity in his knee.   In addition to this the plaintiff suffered disc herniation’s in his low back and ultimately went on to develop chronic pain syndrome.
In assessing nonpecuniary damages at hundred and $115,000 Madam Justice Fenlon provided the following reasons for judgement:
57]         After the accident, Mr. Taylor’s life changed dramatically. In the days immediately following the accident, he underwent surgery to install a rod and pins to stabilize his femur; he remained in hospital for one week. Two further surgeries on his left leg were required: in October 2001 to remove the proximal locking screw; and in March 2003 to remove the remaining hardware in his leg. The recovery from all three surgeries was long and painful, lasting a number of weeks.
[58]          Mr. Taylor required assistance with day-to-day tasks such as cooking, cleaning and bathing during these recovery periods. After the first surgery he had the help of a homecare nurse, and then his friends Sarah Zimmer and Jamie Gonzalez assisted him. The two women helped him again after the second and third surgeries. The surgeries have left Mr. Taylor with marked permanent scarring on his left hip and knee.
[59]         Before the accident, Mr. Taylor had enrolled in an environmental engineering degree program to commence in September 2001. He tried to carry on with his plan to return to school but the pain killers he was taking made it difficult for him to concentrate and his general physical condition and inability to drive made it hard to attend classes. Depression set in and ultimately Mr. Taylor abandoned the environmental engineering program.
[60]         Mr. Taylor has had difficulty dealing with the changes to his life caused by the accident. For a few months he turned to street drugs and alcohol. He became depressed and uses anti-depressants like Effexor to help relieve the symptoms of depression.
[61]         Although Mr. Taylor has seen some improvement in the state of his injuries over time, he still experiences pain on a daily basis. When he sits, stands, or walks for long periods he suffers from pain and numbness in his left leg…
[72]         Awards of damages in other cases provide a guideline only. I must apply the factors listed in Stapley to Mr. Taylor’s particular case. I conclude that an award of $115,000 is an appropriate sum for non-pecuniary damages…

Costs Ordered To Be Paid To Insured Defendant; Not Insurer

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14. 64 Comments on Costs Ordered To Be Paid To Insured Defendant; Not Insurer

When an ICBC insured Defendant is awarded costs following successfully defeating a BC Supreme Court lawsuit, do the costs get paid to the litigant or to the insurer?  To date there are contradictory authorities addressing this (you can click here to read a case awarding costs to the party and here for a case awarding them to ICBC).
Adding to the uncertainty, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, indicating that the personal defendant gets the benefit of the costs payment.
In this week’s case (Nadeau v. Okanagan Urban Youth & Cultural Association) the Plaintiff was injured when struck by a vehicle.  He sued a personal defendant arguing he was the driver and also ICBC arguing that they were liable in the event that the personal defendant was not the driver.  The Claim against the personal driver was ultimately dismissed and the claim against ICBC succeeded.
The Defendant was awarded costs, however, Mr. Justice Powers found that a ICBC should be responsible for payment of the costs to the  personal Defendants.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[135]     . I order that the plaintiff recover 85 percent of his costs from the defendant, ICBC, at Scale B. I also order that the plaintiff recover the costs he is required to pay to Mr. Usseni and James Mugambi and James Kibigi from the defendant, ICBC. I am satisfied that this is one of those cases which fall within Rule 14-1(8) of the Civil Rules, where the plaintiff should recover the costs it pays to those defendants as a disbursement in its bill of costs against the defendant, ICBC.
[136]     The central issue in this proceeding on liability was which vehicle struck the plaintiff and who was operating that vehicle. If it was not the vehicle owned by Ms. Mutanda and driven by Mr. Usseni, then it would be a vehicle operated by an unidentified driver. The only question with regard to liability of the defendant, ICBC, for the unidentified driver, was whether the accident occurred on a highway so that s. 24 of the Act applied. Of course, the extent of the negligence of the operator and of Mr. Nadeau were also in issue, but those were in issue in any event.
[137]     In this case, not only was it reasonable for the plaintiff to bring its action against Mr. Usseni and Ms. Mutanda, James Kibigi and James Mugambi, as well as ICBC pursuant to s. 24 of the Act, it was the only course available to the plaintiff. There were real and legitimate issues of fact as well as issues of law that could not be resolved without a proper trial. The cause of action against each defendant was the same. The only issue was which defendant was liable depending on findings of fact.
[138]     In my opinion, it would be unfair to require the plaintiff to pay the costs of Mr. Usseni, Ms. Mutanda, James Kibigi and James Mugambi, without the ability to recover those costs from the unknown driver, or in this case, ICBC, pursuant to their liability under s. 24 of the Act.

Sensible Compromise Suggested in Face of Late Medical Developments

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 12. 51 Comments on Sensible Compromise Suggested in Face of Late Medical Developments

When medical developments unfold deep in the litigation process it is not uncommon for adjournment applications to be granted.  Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing such a situation urging parties to make reasonable compromises to accommodate these developments.
In the recent case (Dhillon v. Bowering) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions that the Defendants admitted fault for.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon who felt some of the Plaintiff’s symptoms may be due to a possible labral tear.  An MRI was suggested.  The Plaintiff obtained an MRI which did indeed show bilateral labral tears.   The Plaintiff served an updated medical report addressing this.  This report, however, was authored and served outside the timelines required by the Rules of Court due to the timing of the MRI.
The Defendants requested a defence medical exam to address this issue.  The Plaintiff consented to this late examination provided the Defendants did not object to the late report the Plaintiff served.  The Defendant did not agree to these terms and instead brought an adjournment application.  Master Taylor refused to adjourn the trial noting the Plaintiff bore some risk in proceeding as the Plaintiff’s late report may not be admitted.  In suggesting compromise in such cases Master Taylor provided the following reasons:
[12]         So on one hand we do not have Dr. Shuckett’s report in evidence, and now we have defendants asking for an adjournment so that they can do what they need to do to buttress their case because of the report of Dr. Shuckett, which is not in evidence.
[13]         In my view, this problem could have been easily resolved by both parties agreeing to the late service of Dr. Shuckett’s report as well as the DME report from Dr. O’Brien and the matter would have proceeded.  Now we are faced with an adjournment application of a trial that is 11 days away, the first accident which occurred more than five years ago…
[18]         Well, with the greatest of respect to counsel, I do not know if prejudice would be an operating theme here in this application.  I think what is more to the point, and I pointed that out to counsel at the early stage of this application, is that, first of all, there is a hurdle that plaintiffs have to get over before a defendant should be even concerned about this fact.  The fact that they have not had a DME with respect to a labral tear in the left hip is not so much their concern but rather the causal connection.  I have not seen anything in any of the reports that would be suggestive in any way whatsoever that there is anything but the accident as a causal connection.  Now, if that is the only reason, ultimately, that the defendants are relying upon for an application for adjournment in this matter, then I think the defendants do not succeed in their application.
[19]         Accordingly, I dismiss the application for adjournment, and I will award costs to the plaintiff in any event of the cause, not payable forthwith. 
 

Fibromyalgia and PTSD Claims Rejected, $40,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Lingering Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Adding to this site’s BC soft tissue injury caselaw database, reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, assessing damages for a lingering Grade II soft tissue injury.
In the recent case (Nokleby v. Fiddick) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 rear-end collision.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.  The Plaintiff suffered from soft tissue injuries to his neck and shoulder and these continued to be symptomatic at the time of trial and were expected to linger into the future.  The Plaintiff also advanced allegations that the collision caused fibromyalgia and PTSD although this evidence was not accepted.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages for the lingering soft tissue injuries at $40,000 Madam Justice Hyslop provided the following reasons:
[83]        I find that the plaintiff, as a result of the accident, injured his neck which caused headaches and injured his left shoulder. I find that as a result of the shoulder injury the plaintiff can continue with his employment activities and all his activities and responsibilities both at home and on the farm. I find that in performing some of his farm activities he may experience some discomfort…
[85]        I find also the plaintiff’s shoulder injury interferes with him being able to split wood to heat his house. The plaintiff claims that as a result of his injuries, in particular his shoulder causes him to fall more. However, Dr. Laidlow found no medical explanation for this…
[90]        I award the plaintiff $40,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages. In doing so, I take into consideration the difficulties the plaintiff suffered in pursuing his farming activities.
 

Field Used as Parking Lot Deemed "Highway" In ICBC Hit and Run Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 152 Comments on Field Used as Parking Lot Deemed "Highway" In ICBC Hit and Run Claim


One of the restrictions in bringing a lawsuit against ICBC for damages caused by an unidentified motorist is the incident needs to occur on a “highway“.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, addressing the definition of highway in the context of a hit and run claim.
In this week’s case (Nadeau v. Okanagan Urban Youth and Cultural Association) the Plaintiff was struck by an unidentified motorist while standing in a field that was used as a parking area for an outdoor concert.  The Plaintiff sued ICBC for damages.  The Court ultimately decided that given the use of the private property at the time it was a highway and the unidentified motorist claim could proceed.  In so finding Mr. Justice Powers provided the following reasons:
[82]         The Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318 defines “highway” as follows:
“highway” includes
(a) every highway within the meaning of the Transportation Act,
(b) every road, street, lane or right of way designed or intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles, and
(c) every private place or passageway to which the public, for the purpose of the parking or servicing of vehicles, has access or is invited,
but does not include an industrial road;
[83]         In the present case, the issue is whether the place where the accident happened falls within the definition of “highway” in s. 1(c) of that definition. The defendant, ICBC, denies that the place where the accident occurred was a “highway” on the basis that it is a private place to which the public did not have access, or was not invited for the purposes of parking.
[114]     On June 30, when Mr. Nadeau attended the concert with his friend, Mr. Jong, they parked in an area that Mr. Jong described as an area where people with passes parked. However, there is no evidence about what passes were needed, even when this area was controlled by security. There were passes for security, crew, media, artists, guests, all access and production. It is not even clear that everybody that entered this area with a vehicle required a pass. They used their pass to get into this parking area. On July 1, when they returned, Mr. Jong’s memory is that they passed through the secondary gate and that he had to show a pass to security people at this gate. He recalls there were a couple of rows of parked vehicles in this area. He says that later in the evening, before the accident, when he came and went, that there was no security at this gate, he was not stopped, and was not required to provide any pass. Mr. Nadeau’s evidence as well is that he does not recall any security at this gate later that evening on July 1, when they attended. Mr. McMann’s evidence was that initially, in the secondary area, people needed a pass to park in this area, but then things got slack. Mr. Tosh Mugambi could only be sure that the VIP area was being strictly controlled. There were a number of different kinds of passes. The concert goers had ticket stubs, but there were a large number of different kinds of passes, artist passes, VIP passes, guest passes, and the guest could be anybody, including volunteers, or anybody who happened to receive a pass from either one of the organizers or even the owners of the property who had a number of passes.
[115]     The area has been described as a field and physically it was a field. It is private property. However, it was being used as a parking lot when the accident occurred. At some point during the concert, there was some control over who had access to this area. However, that was not consistent throughout the concert, and I am satisfied that by the evening of July 1, this secondary area was no longer being controlled or restricted by the organizers or by security. The public had access to this area for the purposes of parking. The primary parking for the concert goers was in the general parking area, but there was no longer any control or restrictions on parking in the secondary area. Therefore, I am satisfied that for several hours before and, certainly at the time of the accident, this was a place in which the public had access for the purposes of parking. The public at this time included concert goers who might proceed through this secondary gate and clearly included anyone who was there in order to carry on the business of putting on or assisting in some way with the concert, or their friends or supporters. The people that had access at that time was a broad enough group to fall within the definition of the public in s. 1(c) of the Motor Vehicle Act.

Lawyer Ordered to Pay Costs Personally for "Shoddy Piece of Counsel Work"

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 3.

In an illustration of a seldom used power, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, ordering a Plaintiff’s lawyer to pay costs to Defendants personally pursuant to Rule 14-1(33) after bringing an unsuccessful application to renew a lawsuit.
In this week’s case (Drover v. BCE Inc.,) the Plaintiff sued various Defendants challenging system access fees collected by cellular companies.   It was a proposed class action.  The lawsuit was filed in 2004 and various Defendants were served the lawsuit via fax.  Some Defendants questioned the propriety of fax service to which the Plaintiff’s lawyer responded “we believe the Court will accept service by Facsimile“.
No steps were taken to perfect service until 2012 when the matter was brought before the Court with the Plaintiff asking the Court to permit “the plaintiffs to serve the statement of claim”.  The Court refused noting that the Plaintiff’s lawyer “did not bother to consider the relief that might be available under the Rules.  Instead, he seemed to be content with putting a general concept in his application in the hope of attracting the court’s sympathy.”  The Court found this was “unacceptable” and dismissed the application after canvassing the factors under Rule 3-2(1).
Mr. Justice Weatherill awarded multiple Defendants costs and further ordered that the Plaintiff’s lawyer personally pay these.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[62]         In my view, this is an exceptional case.  The conduct of counsel for the plaintiffs has caused costs to be wasted through delay and neglect.  Plaintiffs’ counsel neglected this action for over 8 years.  When he got around to dealing with it by bringing this application, he failed to set out the proper relief.  Furthermore, the application was not supported by any evidence explaining either the delay or the failure to comply with the Rules regarding the need for an endorsement and proper service.  Moreover, the application was brought against defendants against whom there was no basis for the order(s) sought.  To say that this was and has from the outset been a shoddy piece of counsel work would be an understatement.
[63]         I am ordering that E.F. Anthony Merchant, Q.C. be personally liable for the foregoing awards of costs, payable forthwith.

Plaintiff Ordered to Pay Defence Costs for Failing to Accept “Reasonable” Settlement Offer

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9.

In a fairly typical exercise of a Court’s discretion pursuant to Rule 9-1(5), reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Plaintiff to pay a Defendant’s trial costs for failing to accept a reasonable pre-trial formal settlement offer.
In last week’s case the Plaintiff sustained a fracture wrist in a motor vehicle collision.  The fracture went on to cause long term complications
The Plaintiff advanced damages over $500,000.  At trial the Plaintiff was awarded $121,000 in damages, $85,000 of which was for non-pecuniary loss.  Prior to trial the Defendant tabled a formal offer of $210,000.  It is noteworthy that this offer was tabled the last week before trial and was only open for acceptance for two days.  The Court found that in these circumstances the offer was reasonable and stripped the Plaintiff of post offer costs and further ordered the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s trial costs.  In doing so Mr. Justice Curtis provided the following reasons:
[8]             In personal injury claims, in which liability has been admitted, there is in most cases a somewhat predictable range of possible awards.  It is to be expected that counsel taking a case to trial will have discussed with their clients the possible range of damages, the evidentiary issues and the risks of and expense of proceeding to trial.  It is to be expected therefore that as the trial approaches, counsel and their client have in mind a possible range of recovery and the risks of litigating.  Naturally, a plaintiff hopes for an award in the high end of the range and the defendant for an award at the low end.
[9]             The Rule relied upon by the defendant is clearly intended to encourage settlements on the basis of reasonable offers.  To be fair, of course, the offer must have been one which ought reasonably to have been accepted, and must have been presented in a reasonable manner and in sufficient time to be properly assessed.
[10]         Clearly, in this case, the plaintiff and her counsel were of the opinion that it was worth taking the chance that she would do better than the offer at trial.
[11]         In my opinion, on my analysis of the medical evidence put forward to support the claim for future care costs, there was little likelihood of an award of $400,000 for future care costs, however, the general damages could have been $100,000 and $15,000 was received for the in trust claim – which suggests the $210,000 new money offer was an offer of something like $100,000 for future care costs.
[12]         In my opinion, a rigorous analysis of the evidence for the claim for costs of future care at the time the offer was open would have lead to the conclusion that the offer was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted.  The recovery at trial, particularly for future care costs was markedly less than offered.
[13]         In the circumstances I find that a just result between the parties in this case is an order the Plaintiff recover the costs of her action up to Friday, March 16, at 4:00 p.m. when the offer expired and that the defendant recover costs thereafter, both to be assessed according to Scale “B”.

Welcome "The Verdict" Readers

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, Uncategorized.


Last year I had the pleasure of authoring an article addressing social media use by lawyers at the invitation of David Bilinsky, who works as a Practice Management Advisor at the Law Society of BC.
The article has now been published in issue 134 of TLABC’s The Verdict.  For those of you visiting for the first time after reading this article  welcome!    Below are a list of some of my more popular archived topics.  Feel free to browse around and contact me if you have any questions about the topics canvassed in the article.
Facebook Use in BC Personal Injury Litigation
Indivisible Injury Caselaw Comments
Examination for Discovery Caselaw Developments
Judicial Criticism of Expert Witness Advocacy
BC Supreme Court Costs Cases
Mitigation of Damages
Expert Witness and Independent Medical Exam Caselaw Archives
Rule 15 Caselaw Developments
And just for fun, an off-topic post which proved to be the most visited article published here.
 
 

Lack of Financial Means Defeats "Failure to Mitigate" Allegations

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases. 53 Comments on Lack of Financial Means Defeats "Failure to Mitigate" Allegations

As discussed on numerous occasions, a Plaintiff who fails to take reasonable steps to aid in their own recovery can have their damages reduced for a ‘failure to mitigate’.  In considering weather a Plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment is reasonable their personal circumstances are taken into account.  It is well established that lack of funding can reasonably excuse a course of otherwise helpful therapy.   Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further demonstrating this principle.
In this week’s case (Rozendaal v. Landingin) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions.  She was faultless for both.  She suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, shoulders and upper back which continued to the time of trial and were expected to carry on in the future.  Non-Pecuniary damages of $40,000 were awarded.
The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s damages should be reduced due to her failure to carry on with physiotherapy.  Madam Justice Holmes found that greater therapy indeed would have made a difference but given the Plaintiff’s circumstances her failure to attend was not unreasonable.   In dismissing the defendant’s arguments the Court provided the following reasons:
[66]         On the medical evidence, I find that Ms. Rozendaal likely could have improved to a greater extent and more quickly had she undertaken a focussed course of strengthening and conditioning therapy or training designed for her particular injuries, such as Dr. O’Connor outlined in his second report.  The various forms of massage Ms. Rozendaal undertook gave her relief from her pain, but, as Dr. O’Connor explained, passive therapies did not help rehabilitate the muscles which, ultimately, were causing that pain.
[67]         The question is whether Ms. Rozendaal acted unreasonably by failing to undertake the recommended therapies or programs.  I find that in her particular personal circumstances, she did not.  ..
[70]         As I find, Ms. Rozendaal’s life circumstances left her unable to fund any form of ongoing treatment or therapy.   From their early days together, she and Mr. Landingin have worked extremely hard to educate themselves for careers and to provide financial support and loving care for their young family.  It is clear from the evidence that life was not easy for them.  I have no difficulty accepting that other financial priorities displaced ongoing physiotherapy or active rehabilitation for Ms. Rozendaal, particularly since it seemed to her that massages from Mr. Landingin and exercises she did at home were just as helpful. 
[71]         As I find, Ms. Rozendaal was mistaken in this assessment.  However, it was only when Dr. O’Connor saw Ms. Rozendaal before preparing his second report (of January 18, 2012), and asked her to demonstrate the exercises she had been doing since he had seen her six months earlier, that he realized that he had not given his instructions specifically enough:  Ms. Rozendaal was doing light aerobic work and some gentle neck exercises, but no real strengthening.  Dr. O’Connor testified that because Ms. Rozendaal had evidently misunderstood his recommendation in the previous report, he described the recommended conditioning more explicitly in the second report.
[72]         The law does not require perfection in the pursuit of rehabilitation.  It requires instead that a plaintiff make efforts which are reasonable and sincere in the plaintiff’s own personal circumstances:  Gilbert at para. 203.
[73]         On this basis, in Tsalamandris v. MacDonald, 2011 BCSC 1138 at paras. 227-30, varied on other grounds 2012 BCCA 239, the Court found no failure to mitigate where the plaintiff was unable to pursue the recommended treatments because of life circumstances that included a pregnancy, the care of small children at home, and her inability to perform the recommended exercises properly without the help of a personal trainer.
[74]         I find similarly that Ms. Rozendaal’s efforts at rehabilitation were reasonable and sincere in her own personal circumstances.