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Did ICBC Snoop in my Private Records When I Was Called for Jury Duty?

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 69 Comments on Did ICBC Snoop in my Private Records When I Was Called for Jury Duty?

Given ICBC’s admitted snooping in jurors private records in a recent personal injury trial in Victoria, BC, many people who have sat as jurors or even called as witnesses in ICBC Injury Cases may be wondering whether their records were compromised when they were called to court to perform their civic duty.

ICBC’s public take on the matter is that to the very best of ICBC’s knowledge “this was an isolated incident“.
For the sake of people who have sat on civil juries in the past and for the integrity of the administration of justice in BC I certainly hope that is the case.  However, ICBC has by their own admission not completed a full review of past jury cases at this time.  As I write this article ICBC’s website states that “we have already begun a full review of previous cases handled by the defence counsel in question” and “we are undertaking a review of past jury trials and will report on our findings”  so the possibility of this occurring in other ICBC jury trials cannot be excluded.
If you sat on a jury in an ICBC Case or were called as a witness in an ICBC case and are wondering whether your private records were compromised and misused can you do anything to get to the bottom of matters?  
The answer is yes and is contained in the BC Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.  This act makes public bodies (such as ICBC) more accountable to the public with respect to the protection of personal privacy and gives members of the public certain rights with respect to the access of records held by these bodies.
So, if you sat on a jury in an ICBC Claim and during that time had an active claim of your own and are wondering if ICBC misused your private records you can make an application under section 5 of the Act and ask ICBC to share your records with you including information about whether anyone from ICBC accessed your file during the time you were on jury duty.
If you have any questions about making a Freedom of Information Request for your ICBC records you can contact a BC Personal Injury Lawyer or a Lawyer experienced in privacy matters.  These requests are routinely made in ICBC claims and assistance can be provided by experienced people if needed.
What if you find out that your records were misused?  Hopefully ICBC will make proper amends if this is the case as “The responsibility of protecting the private information of our customers is something that ICBC takes very seriously.”  As I previously posted, a separate law called the BC Privacy Act, makes it a tort if your privacy was violated “willfully and without claim of right” and this legislation is worth reviewing for anyone concerned about their privacy and the potential misuse of private records by public bodies.

$45,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for Neck, Shoulder and Jaw Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Dental Injury Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 109 Comments on $45,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for Neck, Shoulder and Jaw Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released today (Romanchych v. Vallianatos) by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding just over $132,000 in total damages to a Plaintiff injured in a 2006 BC Motor Vehicle Collision.  
The collision was a rear-ender on the Alex Fraser Bridge in Delta, BC.  The crash was forceful enough to write off the 24 year old Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Madam Justice MacKenzie of the BC Supreme Court summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries as follows:  
I find on the totality of the evidence that the accident caused the plaintiff’s neck and shoulder injuries with associated headaches and jaw pain. While her symptoms improved over time, they have not resolved.   She currently suffers chronic neck and shoulder pain. She can manage her pain  level if she avoids aggravating her injuries by limiting her activities. The plaintiff is  also vulnerable to future episodes of jaw pain. I find in favour of the plaintiff’s  submission, except for small adjustments to the quantum of damages claimed. 
In awarding $45,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) the court engaged in the following analysis:
Conclusion on Non-Pecuniary Damages 
[71] On the whole, the expert opinions support a strong inference that the plaintiff’s injuries are chronic and that they will continue to affect her permanently. Given that she must limit her activities to minimize and manage her pain, the  evidence shows that it is probable that her pain and resulting limitations will continue  indefinitely. 
[72] I find on the totality of the evidence that the accident caused the plaintiff’s neck and shoulder injuries with associated headaches and jaw pain. While her symptoms have improved over time, they have not resolved.   
[73] I also find that the jaw symptoms which arose in August 2007 were indeed caused by the accident of July 4, 2006. I also observe that the jaw symptoms experienced in December 2006 may have been related to the accident as well.    
[74] Both counsel rely on the non exhaustive list of factors in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 19 at paras. 45-46. The award for general damages, will of course, vary according to the specific circumstances of the individual case, but the factors include:   
(a) age of the plaintiff;  
(b) nature of the injury;   
(c) severity and duration of pain;   
(d) disability;    
(e) emotional suffering; and   
(f) loss or impairment of life;    
(g) impairment of family, marital and social relationships;   
(h) impairment of physical and mental abilities;   
(i) loss of lifestyle; and   
(j) the plaintiff’s stoicism (as a factor that should not, generally speaking,   penalize the plaintiff: Giang v. Clayton, [2005] B.C.J. No. 163, 2005 BCCA 54 (B.C. C.A.)).   
[75] The defendant relies upon the following cases as being reasonably analogous to this case and as supporting an award in the range of $15,000 to $22,500 for general damages: Kain v. Kirkman, 2006 BCSC 1770; Nickerson v. Allen Estate, 2006 BCSC 562; Aulakh v. Poirier, 2006 BCSC 2027, and my own decision in Moore v. Cabral, 2006 BCSC 920. However, those cases are all distinguishable from this case.   
[76] The plaintiff relies upon the following cases as supporting an award of $50,000 for general damages in this case: Henri v. Seo, 2009 BCSC 76; Chin v. McCabe, 2006 BCSC 1589; and Pavlovic v. Shields, 2009 BCSC 345. In my view, these cases are reasonably similar to this case and reflect analogous general damages.    
[77] Therefore, an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000. 
One of the points of interest in this case was the courts comments on Dr. Goldstein. an oral medicine specialist, who ICBC often retains in jaw injury cases.  His evidence was rejected over the Plaintiff’s treating oral medicine specialist Dr. Gardner.  
Specifically, in finding bias in doctor Goldstein’s evidence, Madam Justice MacKenzie commented as follows:
[66] Dr. Goldstein’s bias in favour of the defendant’s case became evident during cross-examination. His attempt under cross-examination to distance himself from the meaning of the phrase emphasized in the above quote damaged his reliability as a witness. 
[67] I also view Dr. Goldstein’s opinion with scepticism because he was not forthright in his report about the fact that flexion extension injury from motor vehicle accident trauma could cause jaw symptoms. Under cross-examination, counsel for the plaintiff put one of Dr. Goldstein’s own articles to him in which he noted the close correlation between TMD and motor vehicle accident trauma. 

ICBC Snooping in Jurors Records, Apologies and the Privacy Act

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Jury Trials, Uncategorized.

BC Personal Injury Lawyers have been abuzz lately with the news that ICBC intentionally snooped into jurors claims histories while conducting the defence in a recent ICBC Injury Trial.
I have been following this story since it first came to my attention a few weeks ago.  It was reported by Ian Mulgrew of the Vancouver Sun and more recently by the Louise Dickson of the Victoria Times Colonist.  In a nutshell the facts behind the story are as follows:  
The Plaintiff was injured in 2 motor vehicle collisions.  She sued for damages.  The trial for both claims were to be heard at the same time.  ICBC chose to have both matters heard by Jury Trial.  At the beginning of trial the Plaintiff brought an application to strike the jury and have the matter proceed by Judge alone.  Mr. Justice Macaulay, the presiding judge, dismissed this motion and let the jury trial begin.  (click here to read the reasons denying the motion to strike the jury).
A few days into the trial a settlement was reached.  At the same time ICBC admitted to improper conduct, particularly snooping in the jurors private ICBC records.   This breach of privacy was apparently initiated by ICBC’s defence lawyer who asked an ICBC adjuster to provide her with the juror’s claims histories.  This admission concerned the presiding judge who discharged the jury and ordered that the ICBC defence lawyer and ICBCs’ corporate counsel appear before him for a subsequent hearing to shed some light on why the jurors claims histories were improperly disclosed to ICBC’s defence lawyer.
The following hearing took place today in the BC Supreme Court.  One thing that I and many other personal injury lawyers had hoped for was that some information would have come to light about the frequency with which this snooping has occurred in the past.  Particularly has ICBC improperly accessed jurors, plaintiffs or witnesses ICBC claims histories in other cases?  Unfortunately these important questions were left unanswered.  
Mr. Justice Macaulay held that the behaviour that came to his attention fell short of contempt of court however that it was improper and left serious concerns about the administration of justice in BC.  The Times Colonist reported that ” The justice again emphasized he had serious concerns that the unauthorized disclosure of the two claims history impacts the administration of justice.  Macaulay said it was not the responsibility of the court to investigate alleged breaches of the Information and Privacy Act, nor was it the function of the court to decide whether the lawyer’s conduct falls short of professional standards. Macaulay said he was concerned about fairness. If the plaintiff had called for a mistrial, Macaulay said he likely would have granted one.”
According to the Times Colonist “Macfarlane (ICBC’s corporate counsel) said ICBC had sent letters of apology to five of the eight jurors, but had been unable to contact the remaining three. Macaulay told him ICBC would not have the assistance of the court in contacting them.”
I wonder if ICBC’s letters of apology to the jurors make any mention of the BC Privacy Act and the fact that “it is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, willfully and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another“.  I hope that ICBC’s letters contain more than a mere apology but proper compensation for this improper use of the jurors records.  I further hope that this is an isolated incident and some sort of objective proof can be had to verify if this is the case.  
The concerns about this behaviour and its impact on the administration of justice are serious ones.  I commend the individuals at ICBC who came clean about this breach of Privacy but given the vast records that ICBC have in their database regarding British Columbians and the relative ease with which these can be accessed by ICBC adjusters this story should not end until there is a proper and verifiable assurance from ICBC that this is an isolated incident and that the jurors whose privacy was breached are properly compensated for this wrong. 

More on Rule 66, Rule 37B, ICBC Claims and Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 42 Comments on More on Rule 66, Rule 37B, ICBC Claims and Costs

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court dealing with 2 issues of interest to me, Costs consequences under Rule 66 and Rule 37B.
In today’s case (Schnare v. Roberts) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff sued for damages under Rule 66.  The Plaintiff made a formal offer of settlement and ICBC did not accept it.  The Plaintiff proceeded to trial and the verdict more than doubled the Plaintiff’s settlement offer.  (click here to read my previous post regarding the trial judgment).
Today’s judgment dealt with the costs consequences.  ICBC argued that the Plaintiff should be limited to costs under Rule 66 (which are capped at an amount less than regular Tariff costs under the BC Supreme Court Rules) because the lawsuit was brought initially under Rule 66.  Madam Justice Adair disagreed with ICBC’s submission and noted that since the trial went beyond the Rule 66 2 day limit that constituted ‘special circumstances’ which permitted the court to order costs outside of the Rule 66 costs.  Madam Justice Adair reasoned as follows:

[13]        Sub-rules (29) and (29.1) of Rule 66 provide (italics added):

(29)      Unless the court orders otherwise or the parties consent, and subject to Rule 57 (10), the amount of costs, exclusive of disbursements, to which a party is entitled is as follows:

(a)   if the time spent on the hearing of the trial is one day or less, $5 000;

(b)   if the time spent on the hearing of the trial is more than one day, $6 600.

(29.1)   In exercising its discretion under subrule (29), the court may consider a settlement offer delivered in accordance with Rule 37 or 37A whether or not other special circumstances exist.

Rules 37 and 37A have been repealed and replaced with Rule 37B.

[14]        In my view, Ms. Schnare’s case was not the type of case contemplated by Rule 66.  By October 2008, the parties themselves realized that two days would not be sufficient for trial.  Even a more generous estimate of three days turned out to be insufficient to deal with the evidence on the relevant issues in the case and with submissions (including submissions on the admissibility of documentary evidence).  Although court adjourned somewhat early in the afternoon on January 28, 2009, it sat late on January 29, 2009, to ensure that a witness’ evidence could be completed.  I did not consider counsel were inefficient in their use of time.  I am satisfied that the length of the trial itself constitutes “special circumstances” in this case.  See Kailey v. Kellner, 2008 BCSC 224, 56 C.P.C. (6th) 40, where, in comparable circumstances, Mr. Justice Parrett also found the length the trial constituted “special circumstances” justifying a departure from the fixed costs under Rule 66(29), and awarded costs on Scale B.

[15]        In my opinion, the appropriate order respecting costs (before considering matters under Rule 37B) was and is that the plaintiff should recover her costs on Scale B of Appendix B.

The second issue worth noting were the costs consequences under Rule 37B.  The Plaintiff argued that they should be awarded double costs from the date of their formal settlement offer onward.    Madam Justice agreed and engaged in the below analysis and in doing so made some critical comments about an expert physician (Dr. McPherson) who ‘was very closely tied to ICBC…for over a decade‘ in the defence of personal injury claims:

19]        Should the plaintiff’s January 26, 2009 offer have been accepted, and the costs of the trial avoided?  Analysis of this question is not to be based on hindsight once the final result is known, as noted in Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372, 63 C.P.C. (6th) 291, at para. 24.  Nevertheless, in my view, the defendants should have given that offer much more serious consideration when looking at the risks of going to trial. 

[20]        The defendants’ defence to Ms. Schnare’s claims for substantial damages rested primarily on the shoulders of their expert, Dr. McPherson, the only defence witness.  However, there were serious risks in that strategy.  Dr. McPherson was very closely tied to ICBC, and had been for over a decade.  This was not a secret, and had been the subject of media reports, which were used to cross-examine Dr. McPherson.  As counsel for the defendants must have appreciated, these ties made an issue of Dr. McPherson’s impartiality and credibility, and impaired his value as a expert.  Dr. McPherson’s evidence, unlike that of Dr. Van Rijn and Mr. McLean, did nothing to explain Ms. Schnare’s continuing symptoms and physical difficulties, and provided little assistance to the court.  His rejection of the possibility that there could be movement of Ms. Schnare’s sacroiliac joints led inevitably to his conclusion that her complaints could not be accident-related, and to speculate that Ms. Schnare possibly had a condition that Dr. McPherson conceded was extremely rare.  As I noted in my reasons, Dr. McPherson was unhelpfully dismissive of opinions other than his own.  In my view, the defendants’ reliance on Dr. McPherson’s opinions to defend against Ms. Schnare’s claims was unreasonable in face of the plaintiff’s eve-of-trial offer to settle.  The offer represented a very substantial discount from the amounts Ms. Schnare sought at trial.  A more reasonable assessment of the potential risk that Dr. McPherson’s opinions would be unpersuasive (as I found them) should have led the defendants to accept Ms. Schnare’s last offer, in which case the costs of the trial would have been avoided.  This factor supports the plaintiff.

[21]        The final damages awarded to Ms. Schnare were more than twice the amount of Ms. Schnare’s offer.  This factor also supports the plaintiff.

[22]        With respect to the relative financial circumstances of the parties, I consider this factor neutral.

[23]        Taking into account the underlying legislative policy behind Rule 37B, that Ms. Schnare’s offer represented a very substantial discount off her damage claims presented at trial and if accepted would have avoided the costs of the trial, and that the amount awarded was significantly more than the amount of Ms. Schnare’s offer, in my view it is appropriate to award the plaintiff double costs for steps taken after January 26, 2009.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Future Wage Loss

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized.

If you are injured through the fault of another motorist in BC and advance a tort claim with ICBC can you receive damages for future wage loss even if you have sustained no past wage loss by the time of settlement or trial?  The short answer is yes and today 2 cases were released by the BC Supreme Court illustrating this principle.  
In the first case (Kasic v. Leyh) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 rear-end collision.  He suffered relatively serious and chronic injuries which were summarized as follows by Madam Justice Morrison of the BC Supreme Court:

[138]      Mr. Kasic’s headaches and neck pain which he suffered immediately after the accident resolved within a fairly short time.  However his lower back pain has not.  Ever since the accident, he has had serious and chronic pain.  That continues to this day.  He has been motivated and compliant with regard to all treatments suggested, with the exception of the Pulsed Signal Magnetic Therapy.

[139]      The medical evidence is not in complete agreement as to the exact diagnosis that is causing the pain in the lower back; Dr. McGraw believes that it is the sacroiliac joint, Dr. Hershler is of the opinion that it is a bulging disc irritating a nerve, or a combination of that and the sacroiliac joint.  But there is agreement that Mr. Kasic’s symptoms are aggravated by his activities.  And there is certainly agreement from all the evidence tendered that Mr. Kasic is in continuous and serious pain.

[140]      Will it be a permanent disability?  Dr. Hershler holds out hope that there could be a significant improvement if Pulsed Signal Magnetic Therapy were pursued.  But this is not a form of treatment widely recognized by the medical profession, and certainly not by Dr. McGraw.  Dr. McGraw seemed to hold out hope that if there were a correct administration of the injection of the therapeutic block, that this could eliminate some or much of Mr. Kasic’s pain.  Certainly the one injection in October 2008 in that area worsened Mr. Kasic’s condition.

[141]      Whether either or both of these suggested treatments are to be tried will be a matter between Mr. Kasic and his medical advisors.  But at the present time, the evidence remains that Mr. Kasic is suffering continuous and debilitating pain, and it has been chronic pain since the date of the accident.  It has changed him physically, mentally and emotionally.

[142]      The changes to Mr. Kasic’s life as a result of his injuries are many.  He continues to need pain medication.  His previous activities of bowling, tennis, soccer, bocce ball, baseball and picnics are no longer activities in which he can participate.  He can help very little around the house, whether it is vacuuming, loading or unloading the dishwasher, moving furniture, or doing yard work.

[143]      He cannot plan to buy his own home, as he can no longer do the jobs and the outside work that he would normally have done.  His leisure activities with his wife and children have been diminished dramatically, as has his intimate and sexual life with his wife.  He has continuous problems sleeping, and his wife often sleeps in another room.  Mr. Kasic’s mood, disposition and temper have changed significantly.  He cannot do the most simple things such as dressing himself, taking a shower or brushing his teeth without unusual discomfort, positioning and pain.

[144]      An undisputed hard worker, Mr. Kasic stated, “I like to work hard to make more money for my family.”  His work history has indicated that, both before and after the accident.

[145]      Mr. Kasic’s ability to earn in the future has been compromised.  It is an asset he has, in part, lost.  His injuries have rendered him less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment, particularly those that require twisting, bending, standing, sitting for any length of time, or involve any kind of heavy work.  He is less marketable or attractive as an employee to potential employers.

[146]      One presumably has an obligation to advise a future employer if there are concerns such as chronic back problems.  This plaintiff has lost the ability to take advantage of job opportunities which he might otherwise have had.

[147]      Mr. Kasic appears to consider himself less capable and less valuable as a person, because of his condition.  He was 45 when this accident occurred.  He is 50 years of age now.  The real probabilities he faces are fewer jobs available to him, the chance of losing a job or jobs, and possibly having to retire early.  His reduced level of energy and inability to sustain work are factors to be considered.

Despite these serious and permanent injuries the Plaintiff had suffered a minimal wage loss by the time his tort claim against the at fault motorist went to trial.  In fact, the Plaintiff’s earnings increased from the time of the collision to the time of trial.  Depsite this the court held he was entitled to damages for loss of earning capacity and in assessing this loss at $100,000 the court reasoned as follows:

[152]      On the issue of loss of earning capacity, clear guidance can be found in the judgment of Huddart J.A. in Rosvold v. Dunlop.  Mr. Kasic’s capacity to earn income is an asset which has been, in part, taken away from him.  I have found that he has a permanent partial disability, and that limits his work in a number of areas, which in turn impairs his earning capacity.

[153]      The defence seems to suggest that Mr. Kasic has reached his goal upon coming to Canada, that his work as a caretaker together with a rental apartment in subsidized housing suggests that he has reached his earning capacity and goals.  They point to his past earnings, and note that he has steadily increased his earnings, which is true.  But as the courts have reminded us, past earnings are only one factor to consider.

[154]      The standard of proof to be applied in making an appropriate damage award under this category is simple probability, not the balance of probabilities.  And the Athey case reminds us that possibilities and probabilities, chances, opportunities and risks all have to be considered, as long as they do not amount to mere speculation.

[155]      Counsel for the plaintiff suggests that there is the possibility that Mr. Kasic will have to retire early, and I agree that this is a possibility.  Counsel argues that even if he had to retire just three years early, this would be a loss equivalent to $150,000.  This is based on Mr. Kasic’s earnings in 2007 of just over $40,000, and both counsel have factored in an additional $10,000 because of the generous housing allowance and benefits.  This would amount to a real loss of $50,000 a year or $150,000 if Mr. Kasic retired three years early.

[156]      Taking into account negative as well as positive contingencies, in my view an appropriate damage award for loss of earning capacity would be $100,000, and I award that amount.  In my view, the position taken by the defence with regard to this issue has been unrealistic, and their suggested figure of $10,000 under this category of damages does not meet the test of fairness and reasonableness.

In the second case released today (Weibe v. Peters) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff was a career tradesman who worked as a vinyl deck installer.  As a  result of the collision Mr. Justice Grist of the BC Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff “will continue to have long term back pain fron the injuries suffered fron the collision which will restrict him from certain forms of physical activity...”

Despite his injuries the Plaintiff lost a minimal amount of time from work by the time of trial.  In awarding $125,000 for the Plaintiff’s diminished earning capacity Mr. Justice Grist engaged in the following useful analysis:

[32]        The wage loss prior to the date of trial in this case is confined to a minimal number of days off because of back pain, with some time loss to attend doctors’ appointments and physiotherapy. The plaintiff has not been able to provide a record of this wage loss and I cannot fix any sum under this head. As to loss of future earning capacity, I accept that Mr. Wiebe took his present form of employment because he was not able to maintain the physical demands of installations of vinyl decks. Further, he was not able to obtain a management position that would have relieved him from the demands of actual installations. He acted appropriately in taking the position he now holds, which pays the same as his past employment without the benefits which that employment offered. Again, there is no evidence of the value of lost benefits. I accept the evidence that the employment through Mr. Hepple has very little security. He is the only employee and dependent on success of both the turkey farm and the concrete mantle manufacturing business. Mr. Hepple is happy with the plaintiff’s work, however, as both the plaintiff and Mr. Hepple acknowledged, the earnings provided are probably more than this form of employment can justify. If Mr. Wiebe cannot continue in this form of work, he will likely have to retrain or find some opportunity as a manager in a deck installation company, a form of work he hasn’t been able to secure despite efforts in the past. In light of the risk inherent in being let go by his present employer, on balance I think it most likely that Mr. Wiebe will have to face this change of employment in the future, and that retraining is the most likely prospect. I keep in mind the factors mentioned in Kwei v. Boisclair, [1991], B.C.J. No. 3344 (C.A.), and Brown v. Golaiy, [1985] B.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.). In setting damages under this head of loss, specifically:

1.         The plaintiff has been rendered less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment;

2.         The plaintiff is less marketable or less attractive as an employee to potential employers;

3.         The plaintiff has lost the ability to take advantage of all job opportunities which might otherwise have been open to him had he not been injured; and

4.         The plaintiff is less valuable to himself as a person capable of earning income in a competitive labour market.

[33]        The plaintiff has been well regarded by his employers and has shown industry and responsibility to his family in retaining employment through the difficulties to the present time. I expect this will serve him well in the future. Nonetheless, retraining and start-up in a substitute form of employment will require a considerable period of time before Mr. Wiebe will be able to reproduce his past level of earnings.

[34]        The cases cited vary widely in fixing the loss of future earning capacity. At the high end, in Fox v. Danis, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1437 (C.A.), damages under this head of loss totalled $750,000. This however, was a case involving an individual likely to lose all forms of full-time employment. In Demedeiros, the head of damage was compensated in the sum of $180,000. This case, however, involved a stone mason who may have lost the opportunity to succeed his father in a fairly remunerative family business. In Kerr, the plaintiff was a 54 year old school teacher who had lost his ability to participate actively in sports, but who continued in his employment. It was judged that he may be forced to retire earlier and may be restricted in gaining employment after retirement. Damages under this head were assessed in that case at $75,000.

[35]        I view the likely loss here as greater in scope than indicated in Kerr but not of the degree of loss in Demedeiros and Fox. I think the appropriate level assessment under this head is the sum of $125,000.

One More Rule 37B Case

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on One More Rule 37B Case

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, giving more interpretation to Rule 37B in ICBC Injury Claims (click here to read my previous posts on this topic).
In today’s case (Smagh v. Bumbrah) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle crash.  The defendant made an offer to settle the case for $20,000 plus costs and disbursements in 2006.  This offer was rejected and the plaintiff proceeded to trial.  After a 10 day jury trial in early 2009 damages of $2,200 were awarded.
The defendant applied for double costs from the date of the offer onward.  Mr. Justice Kelleher refused to grant this motion however he did award the Defendant costs from the date of the offer onward.  In doing so he made the following observations about Rule 37B:

[7]                Rule 37B came into force in July 2008.  It is common ground that Rule 37B applies, even though the offer was made before Rule 37B came into effect.  Subrules (4), (5), and (6) are relevant here:

Offer may be considered in relation to costs

(4)        The court may consider an offer to settle when exercising the court’s discretion in relation to costs.

Cost options

(5)        In a proceeding in which an offer to settle has been made, the court may do one or both of the following:

(a)        deprive a party, in whole or in part, of costs to which the party would otherwise be entitled in respect of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery of the offer to settle;

(b)        award double costs of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery of the offer to settle.

Considerations of court

(6)        In making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the following:

(a)        whether the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or on any later date;

(b)        the relationship between the terms of settlement offered and the final judgment of the court;

(c)        the relative financial circumstances of the parties;

(d)        any other factor the court considers appropriate.

[8]                Here the defendant seeks an award of double costs pursuant to Rule 37.  I turn to the considerations in Rule 37B (5)(b) and (6).

(a)        Whether the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or on any later date.

[9]                The plaintiff argues that, at worst, costs should only be awarded to the defendant commencing November 6, 2008.  That is when the defendant forwarded the report of Dr. Matushak, an orthopaedic surgeon who conducted an independent medical examination and whose report was not favourable to the plaintiff.  Before that time the plaintiff had the reports of her family doctor and two specialists.  All three of these physicians were supportive of her claim that her symptoms were related to the accident.

[10]            The difficulty with this submission is that these three reports were based on an acceptance of what the plaintiff told them.  Simply put, the jury did not believe what these physicians believed.

[11]            I conclude that the offer ought reasonably to have been accepted one week after it was made. 

(b)        The relationship between the terms of the settlement offered and the final judgment of the court

[12]            This factor favours an award of costs to the defendant.  The jury awarded an amount substantially less than the defendant’s offer.

[13]            However, this factor is not in itself determinative.  Decisions on damages by juries are somewhat more difficult to predict than assessments by judges.  Madam Justice Humphries put it this way in Lumanlan v. Sadler, 2009 BCSC 142, [2009] B.C.J. No. 224, at para. 35:

As well, an assessment of non-pecuniary damages, as every trial judge knows, is a difficult and somewhat subjective task, as hard as one tries to be consistent with other judgments.  A jury verdict can, of course, be even more disparate when compared to assessments by judges.

[14]            I agree with counsel for the plaintiff that the court should be cautious in placing too much weight on this factor.

(c)        The relative financial circumstances of the parties

[15]            The plaintiff is in difficult financial circumstances.  There is no evidence regarding the defendant’s financial position.  Counsel for the plaintiff argues that it is appropriate to consider the relevant circumstances of Ms. Smagh and the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, which defended the action on the plaintiff’s behalf.  She relies on Radke v. Parry, 2008 BCSC 1397, 64 C.P.C. (6th) 176, where Madam Justice Boyd made note of the “substantial disparity in financial circumstances between the parties”: at para. 42.  Her Ladyship went on to state at para. 42:

The defendants, represented by ICBC, had substantially greater resources to finance a trial than the individual plaintiff.

[16]            A different view was expressed in Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372, 63 C.P.C. (6th) 291, where Hinkson J. made the following comments:

[32]      Second, [the plaintiff] places her financial position against that of ICBC, as opposed to that of the defendants.

[33]      While I accept that it is likely that most drivers in British Columbia are insured by ICBC, the wording of subrule 37B does not invite consideration of a defendant’s insurance coverage.  There may be good policy reasons for this.  Insurance coverage limits with ICBC are not universal, and will vary from insured to insured.  Certain activities may result in a breach of an individual’s insurance coverage, or the defence of an action under a reservation of rights by ICBC.  A plaintiff will not and likely should not be privy to such matters of insurance coverage between a defendant and ICBC.

[34]      The contest in this case was between the plaintiff and the defendants, and the insurance benefits available to the defendants do not, in my view, fall within the rubric of their financial circumstances, any more than any collateral benefit entitlement that a plaintiff may have would affect that person’s financial circumstances for the purpose of determining their loss.

[17]            In Abma v. Paul, 2009 BCSC 60, [2009] B.C.J. No. 87, Madam Justice Gropper agreed with the reasoning in Bailey.  She distinguished the different circumstances in Radke, where the defendant accepted the plaintiff’s offer after 11 days of trial.

[18]            The decision in Bailey was also followed in Kanda v. Jackson (19 December 2008), Vancouver M030259 (S.C.)).

[19]            Although the matter is not settled, the emerging consensus appears to be that the financial position of ICBC is not determinative.  As Butler J. said in Arnold v. Cartwright Estate, 2008 BCSC 1575, 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 99, at para. 23:

[T]here will always be a substantial difference between the relative financial circumstances of the usual personal injury plaintiff and the defendant’s motor vehicle insurer.  That difference, in and of itself, is not enough for the Court to exercise its discretion to deprive the defendant of costs.  If that was the intent of the new rule, it would have been more clearly articulated.

[20]            This third factor is not helpful in this case.

(d)        Any other factor the court considers appropriate

[21]            While the relative financial positions may not be determinative, I am prepared to consider the financial circumstances of the plaintiff.  They are poor.  She invested in a laundry business which has now failed.  The lender holds a claim over her home.  As well, she is responsible for some or all of a $62,000 personal guarantee given in connection with the business.

[22]            The plaintiff has begun working at a small firm on an as-needed basis for $11 per hour.  She is unable to pay her bills.  She owes her law firm some $40,000 for disbursements.  These circumstances militate against an award of double costs.

[23]            I conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to costs up to November 2, 2006.  The defendants are entitled to costs, but not double costs, from November 2, 2006, to date.

[24]            There has been mixed success on this application for costs.  No costs are awarded in connection with this application.

ICBC Pain and Suffering Round-Up

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

With the Canucks losing game 6 and the series to the Blackhawks I figured its a fitting time to write about Pain and Suffering Claims in BC.
In the first case, Chan v. Kao, the Plaintiff suffered a left shoulder injury as a result of a 2006 motor vehicle collision.   Mr. Justice Verhoeven had credibility concerns with respect to some aspects of the Plaintiff’s testimony.  Despite this he concluded that “I have no difficulty in finding that Mr. Chan did in fact injure his left shoulder in the motor vehicle accident“.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss (damages for pain and suffering) at $22,000 the court summarized his injuries and prognosis as follows:
[65]            I accept that Mr. Chan has continued to have shoulder problems and pain since the accident.  The extent to which this has affected his work is impossible to gauge, in view of the unreliability of his evidence.  It seems likely that Mr. Chan has worked at various times and places since the accident, but has chosen not to testify about that work…

72]            In summary, I accept that the plaintiff’s left shoulder was injured in the motor vehicle accident, and that he continues to suffer, to some extent, from shoulder difficulties initially caused by the accident.  The evidence as to the extent to which the ongoing shoulder problem causes the plaintiff ongoing difficulty and disability with respect to his ability to work is subject to considerable doubt, due to the unreliability of the plaintiff’s evidence in this respect, and the lack of corroborating evidence.

[73]            While Dr. Lui’s prognosis of permanent disability is overly pessimistic, both orthopaedic surgeons are of the view that there are ongoing problems in the shoulder which require treatment.  In my view, treatment options have not been adequately explored.

In addition to referencing several cases dealing with pain and suffering values in BC for shoulder injuries this claim is worth reviewing to see how Mr. Justice Verhoeven dealt with his concerns regarding the credibility of certain aspects of the Plaintiff’s evidence.

The second ICBC Pain and Suffering Claim released today (Mattu v. Fust) involved a 2004 collision.  The Plaintiff was 39 years old at the time.  His vehicle was rear-ended with enough force to push it into the vehicle ahead of him.

The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries leading to chronic pain and headaches.  The court found that the effects of these would likely be permanent.  Madam Justice Brown summarized the medical evidence of the Plaintiff’s treating family physician as follows:

 

[31]            Dr. Parhar has been Mr. Mattu’s family physician since April 2004. He provided three reports to the court. In his first report of November 1, 2004, he diagnosed Mr. Mattu with paracervical, parathoracic and paralumbar muscle strain, left shoulder strain and muscle tension headaches.  He had received ice, heat, rest, exercises, massage therapy, kinesiology, acupuncture, herbal medicine and medications: anti-inflamatories, analgesics and muscle relaxants.  With respect to prognosis and recommendations, Dr. Parhar was impressed by Mr. Mattu’s motivation to recover and try different treatments, but was concerned that he may be trying too many modalities.  He recommended limiting treatment to massage and physiotherapy and increasing active modalities such as swimming and exercises.  He anticipated further treatment and improvement.

[32]            In his report of May 26, 2006, Dr. Parhar found that Mr. Mattu continued to have decreased range of motion in the cervical spine, tenderness in the paracervical and paralumbar regions.  He found muscle spasm in the paracervical and paralumbar regions.  His diagnosis remained the same.  His prognosis for full recovery had worsened.  Mr. Mattu had tried a variety of treatments with minimal success.  Dr. Parhar’s recommendations were unchanged, but he thought that Mr. Mattu’s condition had plateaued.

[33]            In his final report of September 16, 2008, Dr. Parhar considered the MRIs of Mr. Mattu’s spine taken September 19, 2006, and July 28, 2008, and concluded that Mr. Mattu’s injuries included cervical and thoracic disc herniations.  He said: “… it is unclear if the cervical and thoracic disc herniations were caused by the motor vehicle accident … but certainly, this motor vehicle accident made these spinal lesions symptomatic.”  He commented on Mr. Mattu’s efforts to recover: “… pursued many more modalities of treatment than most patients would have. Despite all of these modalities his pain symptoms persist.”  He concluded that the prognosis for a full recovery was poor, that Mr. Mattu’s condition had plateaued and further improvement in his functioning or symptomatology was unlikely  

In awarding $60,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss injuries and their effect on the Plaintiff’s life the court accepted the family physicians evidence and stated as follows  

[60]            I found the evidence of Dr. Parhar to be very helpful.  Dr. Parhar has seen Mr. Mattu regularly since shortly after the accident.  I accept his opinion that Mr. Mattu suffered paracervical, parathoracic and paralumbar muscle strain, left shoulder strain and muscle tension headaches from the accident; that his condition has plateaued; and that it is unlikely there will be further improvement.  I also accept the opinions of Drs. Parhar, Hershler and Hunt that the accident likely caused the disc herniations in Mr. Mattu’s back to become symptomatic.  Mr. Mattu will continue to need chiropractic treatment from time to time and would benefit from a personal trainer.

[61]            I have considered the cases which counsel have provided to me.  In my view, an appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss is $60,000.

Your Rights and the BC Election – BC Liberals vs. the NDP

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

As an injury claims lawyer there are several political-legal issues that I like to keep my eye on. Issues such as legal aid funding, tort reform efforts (code for limiting the rights of victims injured through the careless actions of others) and access to justice are all of interest to me.
With a  Provincial Election just around the corner where do BC’s 2 main political parties stand on these important issues?
Thanks to the efforts of the Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia (the “TLABC”), we now have some much needed insight.
The Trial Lawyers Association of BC posed the following 14 questions to the NDP, and the BC Liberal Party:
1.  If Elected, will you oppose the BCJRTF proposal for active case management?
2.  If Elected, will you oppose the BCJRTF proposal for curtailing discovery rights?
3.  If elected, will you oppose efforts to introduce no-fault automobile insurance in BC?
4.  If elected, will you support a change in legislation to allow damages for mental anguish and other intangible losses suffered by family members of people who are killed by the careless, reckless or illegal acts of others?
5.  If elected, will you oppose any effort to further restrict the ability of injured patients to recover damages in court for medical malpractice?
6.  If elected, will you support legislation that requires the court to consider an award of punitive damages where conduct of the defendant is found to be outrageous or unusually reckless?
7.  If elected, will you work to protect and enhance the tort system as a means of deterring unsafe conduct  and holding wrongdoers accountable for the injuries they cause?
8.  If elected, will you support a return to the previous law, which permitted accident victims to recover their gross earnings?
9.  If elected will you support a return to rights being debated in the legislature rather than being changed through regulations and therefor altered by ICBC and the provincial cabinet without open debate?
10.  If elected, will you support a return to payment of interest on non-economic damages?
11.  If elected,  will you support renewal of the legal aid system by providing legal aid to those who need it, and ensuring that those who represent them are adequately compensated for this work?
12.  If elected, will you support reinstating a legal aid system which funds family law legal services at least to pre 2000 levels, such that eligibility requirements are sufficient to meet the needs of the diverse communities of BC, and the funding is sufficient for counsel to attend to these cases in a manner that meets their practice standards while also permitting access to justice for those marginalized in society?
13.  If elected, will you support the revisions to the proposed family rules to address these concerns?
14.  If elected, will you support increasing the funding to provincial correction services to improve the quality of programs within those facilities?
Here are the Parties answers:
BC LIBERALS
1.  The BC Liberal government, in conjunction with the judiciary and senior members of the bar, convened the British Columbia Justice Reform Task Force to identify a wide range of ideas and initiatives to make the justice system more responsive, accessible and cost-effective.  Experience in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and Ontario, demonstrate that case management conferences reduce delays, increase predictability, reduce overall costs and lower court administration costs. The Task Force has learned from the experience of jurisdictions and has incorporated those lessons into the proposed changes. 
2.  The British Columbia Justice Reform Task Force has reviewed the experience of jurisdictions that have limited discovery and concluded there is no evidence that it has created unfairness, and studies have concluded that excessive document production and oral discovery are responsible for much of the delay and expense in civil litigation. The proposed rules strike a balance between the right of discovery and efficiency. Litigants must disclose all documents referred to in their pleadings, all documents they intend to refer to at trial and all documents that could be used to prove or disprove a material fact in the case. It is open to parties to apply to extend this scope of discovery in any case where a wider scope would be warranted.   
3.  A BC Liberal government has no intention of moving to a system of no-fault insurance in British Columbia, or of introducing caps, deductibles or thresholds      
4.  British Columbia’s Family Compensation Act governs the compensation for wrongful death cases involving family members. The BC Liberal government initiated a review of the entire Act, which is examining issues such as compensation for non-economic losses including pain and suffering and bereavement. Victims groups and other advocacy groups have offered valuable input during the consultation phase.   
5.  This issue relates to detailed aspects of the current system of personal injury compensation in British Columbia, which is a mixture of common law and statute law. We think it is important to engage law reform agencies, the legal profession and other affected groups in a careful consideration of these issues. Through its input, the Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia can help preserve and protect the basic principles of the tort system.     
6.  See above     
7.  The BC Liberals support our civil law system as both a system of compensation and deterrence. We also believe that the court system must be more accessible, accountable and affordable so that justice is available for all British Columbians. That is why the BC Liberal government invested $12 million over three years to reform the civil, family and criminal justice systems.   
8.  This issue relates to detailed aspects of the current system of personal injury compensation in British Columbia, which is a mixture of common law and statute law. We think it is important to engage law reform agencies, the legal profession and other affected groups in a careful consideration of these issues. Through its input, the Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia can help preserve and protect the basic principles of the tort system.    
9.  Changes to the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act must be debated in the legislature. Regulatory changes must be approved by Cabinet. The BC Liberals have no plans to alter this long-standing division of responsibilities.    
10.  This issue relates to detailed aspects of the current system of personal injury compensation in British Columbia, which is a mixture of common law and statute law. We think it is important to engage law reform agencies, the legal profession and other affected groups in a careful consideration of these issues. Through its input, the Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia can help preserve and protect the basic principles of the tort system.    
It is our view that injured plaintiffs should not have their compensation reduced by the effect of delay in payment. Whether the appropriate tool to achieve this objective is by payment of interest, by including the “time value of money” in the calculation of awards for non-pecuniary damages, or by some other means is a question that requires further consideration.      
11.  The BC Liberal government funds one of the most generous legal aid programs in Canada. Legal aid now provides full coverage for family matters involving domestic violence or child protection hearings and expanded legal information and education services. Legal aid has traditionally provided legal representation, paying private lawyers to fight each other in court. That is not what people need to effectively resolve disputes. Access to justice for disadvantaged people requires a continuum of services, including provision of information, support and advice, getting help through alternative dispute resolution and, in some cases, full legal representation.  
The BC Liberal government has implemented a more regionally-based structure with less administration; built up support programs like a 24-hour province-wide legal aid call centre; and provided more economical alternatives to court, like mediation, to focus legal aid dollars where they are needed most – delivering essential services. The new legal aid model reduces administrative costs and puts more money into direct services.    
12.  The BC Liberal government recently increased legal aid funding by $4.6 million. The money will provide family legal services for low-income families in crisis. The BC Liberals will continue to design efficient and responsive programs that make the justice system simpler and more affordable.   
In 2008/09 the BC Liberal government spent $29.9 million on access to justice services beyond the funding we provide to the legal aid program and includes services in addition to mediation and dispute resolution. The BC Liberal government took steps to ensure that legal representation for family disputes is available to eligible clients in emergency situations, including clients in financial need where the Province is seeking custody of a child.    
13.  The new vision of family justice embodied in the proposed rule changes builds on extensive efforts over the last several years to move the family justice system away from an adversarial process. The goal is a process focused on values of family autonomy, co-operation and the best interests of the child.   
The BC Liberal government introduced a notice to mediate process in November 2007 to help facilitate out of court resolution. An expanded Justice Access Centre pilot project was opened in Nanaimo, which offers services and supports with family justice issues. The BC Liberals want to make family disputes easier to resolve and more affordable through new rules of procedure.   
14.  The BC Liberals support programs within the provincial corrections systems that are targeted at reducing recidivism. The BC Liberal government supports programs designed to help offenders confront and deal with issues underlying their behaviors such as substance abuse, violence prevention and respectful relationships. In partnership with Justice Canada, the BC Liberal government supported the enhancement of Aboriginal programming in correctional centres and communities. Programs assisting inmates to upgrade their education and develop life skills are also offered.
The NDP:  
1 – Yes, we will oppose the BCJRTF proposal for active case management.   
2 – Yes, we will oppose the BCJRTF proposal for curtailing discovery rights.   
3 – Yes, we will oppose efforts to introduce no-fault automobile insurance in BC.   
4 – We believe that this issue needs consultation and further study.   
5 – Yes, we will oppose any effort to further restrict the ability of injured patients to recover damages in court for medical malpractice.   
6 – Yes, we will support legislation that requires the court to consider an award of punitive damages where conduct of the defendant is found to be outrageous or unusually reckless.   
7 – Yes, we will work to protect and enhance the tort system as a means of deterring unsafe conduct and holding wrongdoers accountable for the injuries they cause.   
8 – We believe that this issue needs consultation and further study.   
9 – Yes, we will support a return to rights being debated in the legislature rather than being changed through regulations and therefore altered by ICBC and the provincial cabinet without debate.   
10 – We believe that this issue needs consultation and further study.   
11 and 12:   
We are very concerned about the current state of legal aid in BC, particularly with respect to family law. We will work towards reinstating resources for legal aid services, starting with additional funding of $10 million annually for 2010/11 and 2011/12. As resources permit we will do more to fix B.C.’s legal aid system to ensure access for those who need it.   
13 – Yes, we will support revisions to the proposed family rules to address these concerns.  
14 – Yes, we will support increasing the funding to provincial correction services to improve the quality of programs within those facilities. 

Medical Records and ICBC Injury Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

ICBC Injury Claims tend to be record heavy.  It is important to understand the types of records that are typically used in ICBC claims and how these records can be used.
One of the most frequent records reviewed and used by lawyers involved in these cases are clinical records of treating physicians.  These records can be a rich source of information documenting a person’s complaints of injury, course of improvement, medical advice prescribed and other useful information.
When ICBC claims proceed to trial these records are often put to some use by the lawyers involved.  The extent to which each lawyer can use the records varies.  For example, a Plaintiff’s lawyer usually can’t use the records to corroborate the Plaintiff’s evidence at trial as doing so can offend the rule of bolstering a clients credibility by leading evidence of ‘prior consistent statments’.
ICBC Defence lawyers, however, often use prior recorded statements when cross-examining a Plaintiff with respect to injuries sustained in an ICBC claim.  This is one of the most frequent uses made of clinical records in ICBC claims.
It is important for lawyers and clients alike to understand the use that can be made of clinical records at both examinations for discovery and trial in their ICBC Injury Claims.
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Court of Appeal shedding light on this topic.   In today’s case the Plaintiff was awarded damages as a result of a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  The defendant appealed claiming that the damages awarded were excessive in the circumstances and that the trial judge made several errors.  In dismissing the appeal the BC Court of Appeal noted that while some errors were made none of these prejudiced the Defendant in the trial.  In doing so the court made some comments on the use to which clinical records can be made at trial.  I reproduce the highlights of this discussion below:

Medical Records Issues

[7]                During cross-examination of the plaintiff’s family physician, Dr. Dwyer, counsel for the defendant asked to have his clinical notes admitted as an exhibit.  Counsel stated that the defendant intended to rely on the absence from the notes of any notation of a complaint by the plaintiff related to limitations on his work capacity, particularly with respect to script writing.  Dr. Dwyer testified that he would have noted such complaints if they had been made to him.  Counsel argued that the clinical notes were admissible as business records under s. 42 of the Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124.  The trial judge questioned the admissibility of the portions of the notes that recorded the plaintiff’s complaints of symptoms.  He distinguished between the doctor’s notes of the results of his physical examination of the plaintiff and notes of the plaintiff’s subjective complaints to the doctor.  The trial judge considered the plaintiff’s statements to be hearsay.  He questioned the evidentiary value of the records apart from the doctor’s testimony, pointing out that the doctor was entitled to refer to his notes to refresh his memory and “there’s nothing preventing you from exploring all of these questions with this witness.”

[8]                The trial judge summarized his conclusions as to the attempted use of the notes to discredit the plaintiff’s account of symptoms in these terms (at paras. 35 to 37):

I accept Mr. Bancroft-Wilson’s evidence in regard to the onset of the headaches, and their intensity, frequency, and endurance.  Efforts to discredit him with alleged inconsistencies in doctors’ clinical notes were, in my view, not successful.  It must be borne in mind that the primary objective of physicians’ clinical notes is to refresh their own memories as to what transpired during a clinical examination, for the purposes of medical treatment.  These notes are not made for investigative and litigation purposes.  If this were the purpose then it would, in my opinion, be important for physicians to ensure that they have accurately recorded full and detailed accounts of what a patient said during a clinical visit and then have the patient verify the accuracy of the notes.

Physicians are not investigators.  They are neither trained to accurately record what a person says nor to draw out a fulsome account for litigation purposes.  The use of clinicians’ notes, made hastily during a clinical visit and never reviewed for accuracy by the patient, may operate unfairly to the patient as plaintiff or witness.  It should also be borne in mind that when a patient sees his or her physician with a complaint of significant pain, the circumstances are far less from ideal for obtaining full and accurate information.

I do not suggest by any of the foregoing that it is impermissible to use clinical notes to challenge a plaintiff’s credibility, but the frailties inherent in such recordings should be recognized. In the instant case, I find that the clinician’s notes do not have sufficient accuracy and reliability to undermine the plaintiff’s evidence where the notes allegedly differ from the plaintiff’s testimony at trial.

[Emphasis added]

[9]                The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in law by refusing to admit the clinical notes as admissions against interest.  This Court in Samuel v. Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd., 2007 BCCA 431, 70 B.C.L.R. (4th) 247, has recently confirmed that statements made by a plaintiff to doctors and recorded in clinical notes are hearsay and not admissible by the plaintiff to prove the truth of the symptoms complained of to the doctors.  The Court in Samuel was not concerned with the exception to the hearsay rule for admissions against interest.  Statements made by a plaintiff to doctors may be admissible under that exception when tendered for that purpose by the defendant or other party opposed in interest to the plaintiff; see Cunningham v. Slubowski, 2003 BCSC 1854 at para. 14.

[10]            I do not read the trial judge’s reasons as categorically rejecting the admissibility of clinical notes as a general proposition.  Rather he addressed the evidentiary weight of the notes.  I think that he went too far in the sentence underlined above when he stated that clinical notes are not made for investigative and litigation purposes.  That overlooks the fact that all of the medical doctors who testified, apart from Dr. Dwyer, were retained to provide independent medical opinions for the purposes of litigation.  Complaints of symptoms by a plaintiff to doctors must be supported by confirmation of those symptoms by the plaintiff’s testimony in court to provide an evidentiary foundation for the medical opinions; see, for example, Lenoard v. B.C. Hydro & Power Authority (1964), 50 W.W.R. 546 (B.C.S.C.).  Nonetheless, the accuracy of the doctors’ record of complaints is important to their opinions, and to that extent accuracy has obvious litigation implications.

[11]            While clinical records may be admissible as a record of admissions against interest in appropriate circumstances, in the instant case the defendant seeks to rely on the clinical notes to support the inference that the plaintiff did not complain to the doctor of the symptoms he alleges because the notes do not contain any reference to those symptoms.  In effect, the defendant is contending for an admission by omission.  In my view, that overstretches the limits of the admissions exception in the circumstances here.  The notes standing alone are of little if any weight for the purpose intended by the defendant and I think that the trial judge adopted the proper course in limiting their use to refreshing the memory of the doctors during their testimony. 

[12]            Viewing the trial judge’s reasons as a whole on this aspect of the case, I am satisfied that he did not reject entirely the admissibility of the clinical notes and he treated their significance as a matter of weight in the context of the doctors’ testimony.  For example, the trial judge observed that Dr. Dwyer’s notes supported the plaintiff’s complaint of back pain within four days of the accident.  The judge advised counsel for the defendant that she could renew her application to admit the notes later and counsel did not take up that opportunity.  I think that any evidentiary value attached to the notes was merged in the testimony of the doctors and there was no prejudice to the defendant arising from their formal inadmissibility as admissions against interest.

 

$115,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, Uncategorized.

In reasons for judgement released yesterday (Williamson v. Suna) by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, damages of just over $266,000 were awarded for injuries and losses as a result of a 2004 motor vehicle collision.
The Plaintiff was a 38 year old member of the Canadian Armed Forces at the time of the car crash.  The crash was a significant head on collision.  The issue of fault was admitted focusing the trial solely on damages.
The Plaintiff suffered various injuries and symptoms as a result of this crash including a mild traumatic brain injury, headaches, poor sleep, irritability and difficulties with memory.  While the medical evidence did not rule out further possible recovery the testifying physcians stated that the plaintiff would probably suffer from headaches, neck pain and consequences of the mild traumatic brain injury for many years to come.
In awarding $115,000 for the plaintiffs non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) Mr. Justice Goepel summarized the consequences of the injuries on the Plaintiff as follows:

[41]            Prior to the accident, Mr. Williamson was in good health.  He was physically active, and enjoyed activities such as fly fishing, scuba diving, sky diving, and competitive target shooting.  He was a former member of the Canadian national shooting team. 

[42]            After the accident, Mr. Williamson stopped skydiving and scuba diving.  While he still participates in target shooting, the enjoyment that he derives from that activity has decreased.  He explained that the noise from the rifle aggravates his headache, and the kick from the rifle aggravates his neck pain. 

[43]            Before the accident, Mr. Williamson was an active photographer.  He had taken a number of photography courses.  Since the accident, the enjoyment he derives from photography has decreased.  He has difficulty maintaining the static neck positions required to take quality photographs. 

[44]            Mr. Williamson testified that as a result of the accident and his headaches, he now seldom goes out in the evenings.  His irritability has obviously impacted on his family life.  Because of his headaches, he is unable to enjoy his young child as much as he should.

[45]            Mr. Williamson realizes that his injuries, particularly his difficulties with memory and concentration may eventually curtail his military career.  That possibility has caused him considerable anguish and diminished his enjoyment of life.

In addition to non-pecuniary damages, $150,000 was awarded for the Plaintiff’s diminished earning capacity.  Although he missed little time from work in the Canadian Armed Forces and in fact was promoted in the years after the car crash the court found that there was a possibility that the Plaintiff would not be able to continue in his current position or perhaps in the military  altogether as a result of his injuries.  Paragraphs 52-62 are worth reviewing for a discussion demonstrating how damages for future wage loss / diminished earning capacity can be made in an ICBC Injury Claim even where there is no wage loss from the time of the crash to the time of trial.