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Diminished Earning Capacity Awards Without Past Wage Loss

(UPDATE February 9, 2012:  The Damages in the below case for Diminished Earning Capacity and Cost of Future Care were reduced somewhat by the BC Court of Appeal on February 9, 2012)

A common misconception is that a person cannot claim for diminished earning capacity (future wage loss) in an ICBC Claim when there has been no past wage loss.  As I’ve previously discussed, this simply is not true.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In last week’s case (Morlan v. Barrett) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate motor vehicle collisions.  Fault was admitted by the Defendants in both actions.  The Court found that both crashes caused a single indivisible injury (chronic widespread pain eventually diagnosed as fibromyalgia).
The Plaintiff’s injuries and limitations caused her to change employment to a job that was less physically demanding.  Fortunately, her new job paid a better salary and the Plaintiff had no past wage loss from the time of her first crash to the time of trial.  Her injuries, however, were expected to cause ongoing limitations and the Plaintiff claimed damages for diminished future earning capacity.  Mr. Justice Stewart agreed the Plaintiff was entitled to these damages and assessed the loss at $425,000.  In reaching this assessment Mr. Justice Stewart gave the following useful reasons:
[7] The plaintiff found work at the Electrical Industry Training Institution (EITI) in 2008 and is employed there as a Program Coodinator.  The job is far less demanding and the commute is only 20 minutes.  The job is also far less rewarding in terms of job satisfaction.  Having to change jobs was a huge blow and this will be reflected in the non-pecuniary damages I award later.  By happenstance the plaintiff’s salary actually went up when she switched jobs.  For that reason there is no claim for loss of earning capacity to the date of trial.  But there is a claim for loss of opportunity to earn income – including benefits – in the future…

[17]        Pure happenstance resulted in her suffering no loss of income to the date of trial, i.e., she got a less demanding job which happened to pay more than her job at the B.C. Fed.  But a reduction in her capacity to earn income has been made out.  Her having to give up her job at the B.C. Fed demonstrates that the circle of secretarial or administrative positions for which she could, if necessary, compete has been narrowed.  (Exhibit 6, a “Functional Capacity Evaluation” and Exhibit 5, the report of an “Occupational Health Physician” simply confirm the obvious.)  To put it in familiar terms:  she is less marketable as an employee; she is less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment; she has lost the ability to take advantage of all job opportunities which might otherwise have come her way; and she is less valuable to herself as a person capable of earning income in a competitive labour market (Rosvold v. Dunlop, 2001 BCCA 1 at paragraph 10).  The live issue is whether there is a real and substantial possibility that the reduction in her capacity to earn income will in fact result in lost income – including benefits – in the future (Sobolik v. Waters, 2010 BCCA 523, paragraphs 39-43).

[18]        As noted earlier, having considered the whole of the evidence placed before me I rely on the evidence of the plaintiff’s family physician, Dr. Beck, as I peer into my crystal ball and consider the plaintiff’s future.

[19]        The fact that the balance of the medical evidence does not replicate what Dr. Beck said at Exhibit 4 page 6 – that the plaintiff has “plateaued even slightly worsened over the past year” – and indeed the evidence of the rheumatologist, Dr. Shuckett is quite different – is neither here nor there as having considered the whole of it I say as the trier of fact that Dr. Beck was an impressive, thoughtful witness of great experience who offered up her opinion against a background of having dealt with the plaintiff for 25 years and, more particularly, having had close supervision of the plaintiff’s medical condition since January 6, 2007 and the advent of the motor vehicle accidents.  In saying that I have not lost sight of the fact that Dr. Beck has in fact retired.

[20]        Having considered the whole of the evidence together, I say that three real and substantial possibilities have been made out:  that the plaintiff’s condition will improve; that the plaintiff’s condition will remain as it is; and that the plaintiff’s condition will worsen.  In “giv[ing] weight according to their relative likelihood” to these three hypothetical events I find that the possibility of her condition improving barely rises above mere speculation and that the possibility of her remaining the same and the possibility of her condition worsening are both great (Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 at paragraph 27).

[21]        I find that there most certainly is a real and substantial possibility that the reduction in the plaintiff’s capacity to earn income will result in lost income – including benefits – in the future.  Beyond the fact that nothing in life is certain and that she may yet find herself on the job market there is the real and substantial possibility that even if she remains in her current job until the end of her working career, her working career will end earlier than it would otherwise have absent the effects on the plaintiff of the defendants’ negligence.  That is so because it is a real and substantial possibility that her fibromyalgia will remain as it is but common experience dictates that as one moves into one’s latter years the ability to work in spite of a condition that drains one’s energy diminishes.  Independently of that, it is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff’s fibromyalgia – and with it loss of energy – will worsen.  I make that finding having considered the whole of the evidence including that of the plaintiff as to her recent experience and of all of the doctors and concluded as the trier of fact that I rely most on the evidence of Dr. Beck.

[22]        I take into account factors beyond those that relate to the state of the health of the plaintiff and her ability to work.  The plaintiff has established a real and substantial possibility – not mere speculation – that had she not had to forfeit her job at the B.C. Fed she would have, within a few years of the date of the motor vehicle accidents, taken advantage of an opportunity to perhapsmove up in the hierarchy of the B.C. Fed to the point of becoming a Director and with that received an increase in salary and benefits.  That is the net effect of the evidence of the plaintiff and of Lynda Bueckert.  Moreover, as of January 6, 2007 the plaintiff had to assume that she would retire from the B.C. Fed when she turned 65.  After January 6, 2007 the law changed.  I find that the plaintiff’s love for her job at the B.C. Fed combines with my picture of what she was before January 6, 2007 and results in my accepting her evidence to the effect that it is a real and substantial possibility that absent the defendants’ negligence she would have continued to work at the B.C. Fed even after she had turned 65.  I have considered the positive and negative vagaries of life, i.e., the contingencies.  Having considered the whole of it I award the plaintiff $425,000.

Clarity Provided by BC Court of Appeal on Tax Deductions in ICBC Loss of Income Awards


There has been some uncertainty in the law over the past few years over the amount that is to be deducted by trial judges when awarding past income loss in tort claims arising from BC motor vehicle collisions.  This issue was clarified in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Court of Appeal.
In today’s case (Laxdal v. Robbins) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision and sued for damages.  She was awarded $3,306 for past loss of income.  Section 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act requires past income loss awards to be reduced to “net income loss” after taking income tax into account.
The trial judgement did not reduce the wage loss award finding that “In my view, the authorities support the conclusion that where the gross award is at or below the amount exempt from taxation, there would be no tax payable so that the net past income loss would be the same as the gross past income loss….Accordingly there will be no deduction for income tax as the amount of past wage loss is below the personal exemption”
ICBC disagreed and appealed this finding.  ICBC argued that any past loss of income awards need to be combined with actual income earned during the year of the loss and tax consequences need to be determined using the global figure.  The BC Court of Appeal agreed and provided the following clarity in this contentious area of personal injury law:

[18]         I have concluded that the trial judge was incorrect in interpreting ss. 95 and 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act as not requiring a reduction in her award for past loss of income to reflect the tax consequences when that loss is combined with earned income during the same period. The words of those sections must be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense.

[19]         Having found that the losses all occurred in 2006, the trial judge ought to have combined the respondent’s 2006 income with the past income loss award for the purpose of determining the income she would have earned for income tax purposes “as if she had continued working” (as per Tysoe J.A. at para. 185 of Lines). To achieve this result, the appellant proposed the use of what has been referred to as the “stacking approach”.

[20]         I am satisfied that, where an income loss can be attributed to a particular tax year or years, the language of ss. 95 and 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act requires a resort to the stacking approach. Although Tysoe J.A. explained in the examples he referred to in Lines that “it was the intention of the Legislature to give a discretion to the judge to determine what period or periods are appropriate for the determination of net income loss in all of the circumstances”, once that determination is made, the legislation requires a deduction from the gross income loss to take into account the provisions of the Income Tax Act of British Columbia, the Income Tax Act of Canada and the Employment Insurance Act of Canada for the relevant year or years…

[22]         As Tysoe J.A. observed in Lines at para. 180:

… It does seem somewhat odd for the income loss allocated to a particular year to be reduced according to one set of tax rules (i.e., the tax rules for the preceding year), while the plaintiff’s actual earnings for that year are taxed according to a different set of tax rules (i.e., the tax rules for the year in which the income was earned).

[23]         The application of the stacking approach in accordance with the legislation will result in the combination of the award for past income loss with the other income earned for the same year, but the application of the enumerated legislation from the preceding year to only that portion of the total income for that year represented by the award. While the result is a cumbersome calculation, I see no need to resort to any exceptional construction of the legislation, as discussed by Lamer J., as he then was, in R. v. Paul, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 621 at 662, in order to achieve the legislative intent of ss. 95 and 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. Section 95(a) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act refers in each of its subsections to taxes or premiums as the enumerated Acts “read on December 31 of the calendar year before the calendar year in respect of which the net income loss is to be determined”. In my view, this wording accommodates awards for either single or multiple years of income loss by permitting a judge to allocate the loss as discussed at para. 184 of Lines, and to then subject the award for that year or years to the effect of the specified legislation based on their provisions for the preceding year.

[24]         A feature of the present legislation that does not arise in this case is the inability of a person injured in a motor vehicle collision to take advantage of any tax planning, such as a contribution to a Registered Retirement Savings Plan. In Lines Tysoe J.A. concluded at paras. 190-194 that such a notional contribution could not be allowed when calculating net income loss under ss. 95 and 98. While the inability to take advantage of such tax planning will not place the injured person in the same position that he or she would have been in, but for the accident, the application of the stacking approach will come as close to so doing as possible, while at the same time giving effect to the intent of the Legislature.

[25]         In this case, the respondent’s total reported income for the year 2006 was $40,175.00. The respondent paid $6,024.05 for federal and provincial income tax that year, which represented an overpayment of $202.26.

[26]         I conclude that the appropriate means by which to arrive at the respondent’s net past income loss is:

a)       to determine her income from other sources during 2006 ($40,175.00);

b)       add that figure to her income loss after taking into account the sick benefits she received ($3,306.24);

c)       determine the tax that would be payable on $43,481.24, based upon the 2005 income tax rules and regulations by computing the amount in accordance with the provisions of theIncome Tax Act of British Columbia, the Income Tax Act of Canada and the Employment Insurance Act of Canada applicable to the calendar year ending December 31, 2005 and on $40,175.00 based upon the 2006 income tax rules and regulations by computing the amount in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act of British Columbia, the Income Tax Act of Canada and the Employment Insurance Act of Canada;

d)       subtract the difference between the two tax figures determined in c, above;

e)       then deduct d from the income loss award, net of sick benefits that she received.

Filling in the Gaps – Lack of Expert Evidence and Future Wage Loss Awards


Generally when a Plaintiff advances damages for diminished earning capacity (future wage loss) in a personal injury lawsuit expert evidence is called to address the long term prognosis and consequences of a Plaintiff’s injuries.  Interesting reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, making such an award despite the lack of medical opinion evidence addressing the issue.
In today’s case (Helgason v. Bosa) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 motor vehicle collision.  Her vehicle was t-boned by the Defendant.  Fault for the crash was admitted.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
In support of her case the Plaintiff attempted to introduce two medico-legal reports written by her GP.  The first report, dated May 11, 2009 stated that “You have asked me to comment with regard to [the plaintiff’s] loss of earning capacity.  I do not feel that [the plaintiff] is less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment and I do not feel she is less marketable or attractive as an employee to potential employers as a result of the motor vehicle accident.”
As time passed the doctor changed her mind and wrote a second report indicating that the Plaintiff’s injuries would cause a diminished earning capacity.  The Defendant argued that the second report did not comply with the Rules of Court and that it should be excluded from evidence.  Mr. Justice Silverman agreed.  This left the Court with only the doctor’s first report providing an opinion of the Plaintiff’s future earning capacity.
The Defendant’s lawyer then argued, given the first report, the Court should not make an award for diminished earning capacity.  Mr. Justice Silverman disagreed and filled in the gaps addressing this issue with factual evidence presented at trial.  The Court went on to award the Plaintiff $45,000 for this loss and in doing so provided the following helpful reasons:

[48]         It does not follow from my ruling that I must conclude that the doctor’s opinion as of May 11, 2009, was still her opinion at trial.  Clearly, it was not.  However, the most significant consequence of my ruling is that there is no expert opinion in evidence with respect to future issues to support the plaintiff’s argument that I should be awarding damages for various of the plaintiff’s future concerns.

[49]         It does not necessarily follow from that, that the plaintiff is unable to mount an argument that there is still a sufficient basis for me to make the findings that she argues are appropriate.  The plaintiff argues that there is still sufficient evidence for me to draw the inferences which she argues I should draw, even without the opinion expressed in the inadmissible report.  It is noteworthy, in that regard, that when the defendants argued for the ruling with respect to admissibility, one prong of its argument was that the non-compliant report was not “necessary” because there was already other evidence with respect to the various future issues.

[50]         I am satisfied that indeed there is other evidence from which various inferences about the future might be drawn.  That other evidence consists of the following:

1.       Comments in the admissible report that do make projections into the future which are consistent with the position that the plaintiff takes:

“I do not think that [the plaintiff] has reached maximum medical improvement and she will continue to improve over the next 18 – 24 months.”

“Her present employment as a yard planner has a potential to exacerbate her symptoms.”

“I am not advising that [the plaintiff] change her current employment, but I will agree that her current employment does exacerbate her symptoms to a moderate degree.”

2.       The plaintiff’s own evidence at trial of her ongoing difficulties.

3.       The doctor’s oral evidence about various visits of the plaintiff since May 11, 2009, and the observations which she made (although her opinion arising from those visits was not admissible)….

[52] I am satisfied from the foregoing that the injuries, and other difficulties caused by the MVA, are ongoing and will continue to be ongoing, and will negatively affect the plaintiff’s capabilities and abilities in the future.

More on the New Rules of Court and Proportionality: Withdrawing Deemed Admissions


As previously discussed, the BC Supreme Court Rules permit parties to a lawsuit to ask the opposing side to make binding admissions through a “Notice to Admit”.  If the opposing side fails to respond to the Notice in the time lines required they are deemed to have made the sought admissions.  Once the admission is made it cannot be withdrawn except by consent of the parties or with the Court’s permission.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, considering the Court’s discretion to withdraw deemed admissions.
In today’s case (Piso v. Thompson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2003 collision.  She sued for damages alleging longstanding injuries as a result of this crash.  In the course of the lawsuit ICBC’s lawyer served the Plaintiff with a Notice to Admit claiming that the Plaintiff was fully recovered within two years, that there was no claim for past wage loss nor a claim for diminished earning capacity.  The Plaintiff’s lawyer neglected to respond to the Notice in the timelines required resulting in the admissions being inadvertently made.  ICBC then brought an application for summary judgement.
The Plaintiff brought an application asking for permission to withdraw the admissions.  ICBC opposed arguing there would be no prejudice to the Plaintiff if she was faced with these admissions as she could sue her own lawyer in negligence to make up for any damages the unwanted admissions caused.  Master Caldwell rejected this argument and permitted the Plaintiff to withdraw the admissions.  The Court cited the principle of ‘proportionality‘ in reaching judgement.  Master Caldwell provided the following useful reasons:

[20]         Rule 7-7 provides a mechanism to streamline and make more efficient the litigation process. It rewards efficiency and encourages a focus on issues which matter and which are truly in dispute. It provides penalties and disincentives for failure to admit that which should properly be admitted by way of cost sanctions. It certainly provides for much more extreme outcomes in appropriate circumstances but it also provides for judicial discretion in excusing or relieving from such extreme outcomes in appropriate circumstances.

[21]         In my respectful view Rule 7-7 does not, nor was it intended to, create a trap or add an inescapable obstacle to ensnare or trip up sloppy or inattentive counsel to the detriment of the parties to the litigation.

[22]         The current Rule 1-3(a) continues the long-standing object of the rules:

The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.

[23]         There is no question in my mind that the failure in this case was a sloppy, inadvertent and possibly even negligent failure on the part of former counsel for the plaintiff. I am satisfied that the plaintiff himself cannot be faulted in any way for the oversight; he had neither actual notice of the document in question from his lawyer nor an opportunity to provide a reasoned and considered response.

[24]         The refusal of leave to withdraw these admissions will deny the plaintiff his opportunity to have his claim heard on the merits. The argument that the plaintiff can have his relief by way of a professional negligence claim against his former counsel fails to recognize the further delay and expense of such a claim. In the context of proportionality such an option does not seem appropriate from a financial or court resource prospective.

[25]         In my view this is precisely the type of situation which warrants an order allowing the withdrawal of a deemed admission while providing for the other party in costs and other accommodations.

[26]         The plaintiff is granted leave to withdraw the admissions.

Over 36,000 Reasons for Learning Motorists to Drive With A Qualified Accompanying Passenger


Reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating some of the real world consequences drivers with a learner’s licence could face if they are found to be in breach of their policy of insurance.
In today’s case (King v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision.  4 vehicles were involved in the crash.  The Plaintiff was insured with ICBC and they paid out over $36,000 with respect to the claims made from the crash.  At the time of the collision the Plaintiff had a Class 5L learners licence and was operating his vehicle “without a qualified accompanying passenger“.   As a result he was found in breach of his insurance.   He was found to be the at fault motorist and ICBC asked that he pay them back the over $36,000.
The Plaintiff sued ICBC arguing that he was not at fault and that he was not in breach of his insurance.  ICBC counterclaimed for $36,613.33.  Prior to trial ICBC made an offer to settle their claim against the Plaintiff for $33,000.  The Plaintiff declined this offer and proceeded to trial.  Ultimately Mr. Justice Pearlman found the plaintiff was the at fault motorist and that he was in breach of his policy of insurance.  He ordered that he pay back ICBC the funds they paid out with respect to the collision claims.
The Court went further and ordered that the Plaintiff pay ICBC double costs for failing to accept their pre trial offer.  In reaching this judgement Mr. Justice Pearlman provided the following reasons:

[30]         The plaintiff’s claim failed as a result of the court finding that neither his testimony, nor that of his witness, Ms. Gromova, was credible.  The court found that the plaintiff had wilfully made a false statement respecting Ms. Gromova’s presence in the vehicle at the time of the accident.

[31]          The over-riding principle is whether, if the Offer to Settle had been accepted, there would have been significant, or any savings in litigation costs to the parties or to the court: LeFler v. Anderson, 2008 BCSC 1563, at para. 18. Here, acceptance of the offer would have spared both parties the significant costs of a four day trial where the amount in dispute was, exclusive of court order interest, less than forty thousand dollars.

[32]         Taking all these factors into consideration, I conclude that an award of double costs should be made in this case, and is consistent with the objective of deterring unreasonable conduct in litigation.  I find that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time to consider the defendant’s Offer to Settle, following its delivery on September 24, 2010.  Taking into account the disclosure of the will say statements of the defendant’s witnesses on September 29, and allowing Mr. King a reasonable time to consider his position, and the defendant’s Offer following the delivery of the will say statements, I find that the defendant is entitled to an award of double costs  commencing October 7, 2010.

RESULT

[33]         The defendant will recover its costs and disbursements of this action from its commencement until October 7, 2010.  Those costs will be at Scale B.

[34]         The defendant is entitled double costs commencing October 7, 2010 and to disbursements incurred after October 7, 2010.  Disbursements will be allowed in the amount incurred, rather than at a double rate.

Driver Liable to Passenger Ejected from Box of Truck

(Update November 2, 2011 – Note the below case was modified by the BC Court of Appeal with a finding that the motorist should be 100% at fault due to the absence of any evidence of contributory negligence)
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, discussing the issue of fault when a passenger riding in the box of a truck is ejected and injured.
In today’s case (Vedan v. Stevens) the Defendant driver allowed 4 children sit in the box of his pick-up truck.  The 12 year old Plaintiff was one of these children.  In the course of the trip the defendant “first became aware of a problem when he heard pounding on the cab of his truck…he stopped the truck and determined that one of the children, the plaintiff, was no longer in the truck box. He looked back and could see the plaintiff lying in the middle of the road“.
Madam Justice Beames determined that the Plaintiff rose from a seated position in the course of the trip and then was ejected.  The court held that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were at fault with the Defendant shouldering most of the blame.  Madam Justice Beames provided the following reasons:
[31] There is no question that the defendant was responsible for allowing the plaintiff and the other children to ride in the box of his truck. He did not have to allow the plaintiff to get into the box of the truck, and he had enough seats and seat belts, I find, inside the truck to accommodate all of his passengers, including the plaintiff…

[34] I find the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and that he breached that duty and failed to exercise a standard of care of a reasonable person in the same circumstances. That negligence was clearly causally connected to what happened to the plaintiff. The plaintiff would not have been injured had the defendant not allowed him to ride unrestrained in the box of his truck. It was foreseeable, in my view, that what occurred would or could occur.

[35] I turn now to the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff…

[44] In the circumstances of this case, I would not find that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent simply by riding in the back, or the box, of the truck. He was allowed to be there by an elder from the Sun Dance ceremony which featured community, trust and respect for elders. However, I do find that the plaintiff was, by getting up from a seated position on the floor of the box in a moving truck, negligent in fact.

[45] Consequently, the defendant has proved contributory negligence…

[53] In all of the circumstances of this case, I apportion fault between them as follows: the plaintiff, 25 percent; the defendant, 75 percent.

Late Examinations for Discovery and the New BC Supreme Court Rules


Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing the right to conduct an examination for discovery in the two weeks proceeding trial under the New Civil Rules.
In today’s case (Lewis v. Lewis) the Plaintiff sued for damages as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision.  ICBC was a statutory third party in the lawsuit and failed to exercise their right to examine the Plaintiff for discovery in a timely fashion.  ICBC served the Plaintiff with an appointment to attend a discovery 10 days before trial.  The Plaintiff objected arguing, amongst other things, that discoveries are not permitted within the two weeks prior to trial.  ICBC applied for an order compelling the Plaintiff to attend.
In support of their application ICBC argued that the prohibition preventing discoveries in the two weeks preceding trial no longer exists in the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules.   Mr. Justice Harvey, while not directly addressing this issue, dismissed ICBC’s motion and in doing so made it clear that the rules of Court operate so as to make it difficult for a party to be permitted to conduct a late discovery.  Mr. Justice Harvey provided the following reasons:
[7]  In response to (ICBC’s argument) Mr. Parsons, on behalf of the plaintiff, says that a clear reading of Rule 12-4(3) makes clear that the new rules still contemplate a prohibition against any step, including an examination for discovery, within the period prescribed in Rule 12-4(2).
[8] Rule 12-4(2) reads
A trial certificate must be filed at least 14 days before but not more than 28 days before the scheduled trial date.
[9] I am not persuaded in these circumstances I need to decide that very interesting issue, because I have also been referred to Rule 12-4(6) which says that:
A party who fails to file a trial certificate under subrule (1) is not, without leave of the court, entitled to make further applications.
[10]  The third party has not filed a trial certificate nor could they have given the requirement to have conpleted examinations for discovery as part of the requirement of “readiness”.  Now, 10 days before trial, it is too late to do so.
[11]  Counsel for the third party see this as an excuse allowing them to, at this late date, seek the Court’s leave for the application to compel the plaintiff’s attendance at the proposed discovery.
[12]  That, with respect, is disingenuous.  It has been open to the third party to conduct its discovery since the time it became a party.  That was in October of 2008.
[13]  Instead, the third party has chosen to rely on the defendant to take the lead in this litigation…
[14]  The third party has, at the last moment, unilaterally set down an examination for discovery over the objections of counsel for the plaintiff as to timing.  Counsel is busy with trial preparation for a 15 day jury trial.
[15]  The third party failed to provide conduct money and failed to file a trial certificate in accordance with the rules…
[16]  Contrary to the Rules, leave was not sought to bring the application when short leave was sought before the Master who heard the application.  The application for short leave was brought without notice and counsel for the plaintiff was unable to draw to the Court’s attention the failure of the third party to (1) require leave for their application and (2) failure to provide conduct money to the plaintiff.
[17]  In those circumstances, I am not prepared to gran the third party the leave required to bring this motion.

Back To Basics: Proving Fault in a BC Personal Injury Claim


When suing for damages as a result of a personal injury claim (specifically a Negligence claim) there are 3 basic matters that must be proven.  These were discussed in reasons for judgement released earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry.
In this week’s case (Brooks-Martin v. Martin) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 motorcycle crash in Saanich, BC.  She lost control of her bike.  She claimed that another motorcyclist, who was travelling in front of her, swerved in front of her causing her crash.  She sued the other motorist and also a  company she alleged was responsible for failing to clean up gravel spilled onto the road which allegedly contributed to the crash.
At the close of the Plaintiff’s claim the Defendant brought a ‘no-evidence’ motion and asked the Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim.  Mr. Justice Halfyard refused to do so and provided the following succinct reasons summarizing the law of no-evidence motions and the basic requirements of a successful lawsuit for negligence in British Columbia:
[5] The legal test that must be met by a defendant who makes a motion for non-suit has been stated many different ways by many different courts. Based on the authorities, I would state the rule in this way:  In order to succeed on a motion for non-suit, a defendant must persuade the court that there is no evidence which is capable of proving one of the essential elements of the cause of action alleged against the defendant. The court must not weigh evidence or attempt to make findings of fact or to assess credibility. If an inference which is essential to the plaintiff’s case would be “mere speculation,” the defendant’s “no evidence” motion should be granted. See Fenton v. Baldo 2001 BCCA 95 at paragraphs 25-26; Seiler v. Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 2003 BCCA 696 at paragraph 12; Craigdarloch Holdings Ltd. at paragraphs 14 and 30; and Tran v. Kim Le Holdings Ltd. 2010 BCCA 156 at paragraph 2….

[27]        A plaintiff who sues for damages for personal injury allegedly caused by the defendant’s negligence, must prove:

a)    That the defendant owed him or her a duty of care;

b)    That the defendant did an act or failed to do an act, which act or omission fell below the standard of care required of the defendant; and

c)    That the defendant’s said act or omission caused an accident (which caused injury to the plaintiff).

(See Linden & Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 8th edition (2006), page 108)

[28]        In my opinion, there is some evidence which, if believed, could support findings of each and every essential element of the cause of action alleged against MacNutt. To my mind, none of the disputed inferences required to support the plaintiff’s case at this stage, would be “mere speculation.”

[29]        It was for these reasons that I dismissed MacNutt’s motion for non-suit.

Mechanical Back Pain and Diminished Capacity For Stay at Home Parents Discussed


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, discussing non-pecuniary damages for mechanical back pain and further discussing awards for ‘diminished earning capacity‘ for stay at home parents who intend to return to the workforce.
In this week’s case (Bergman v. Standen) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 motor vehicle collision.  Fault for the crash was admitted by the other motorist.  The Plaintiff was 27 years old at the time of the crash and did not have “an established record of employment because of the conscious choice she and her husband made to have and raise their children to school age with the benefit of a stay-at-home-mother”.
The Plaintiff sustained injuries in the crash which included soft tissue damage and mechanical back pain.  Some of these symptoms were expected to be permanent although there was room for improvement with further therapy.  Mr. Justice Barrow assessed the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $75,000.  In arriving at this figure the Court provided the following reasons:
[63] To summarize, Ms. Bergman was a 27-year-old mother of two young children, who suffered a Grade II whiplash injury to her neck and upper back, which resolved after several months and left her with no recurrent symptoms. She also suffered contusions, bruises to her face and chest, and a sore wrist, which resolved without ongoing difficulties shortly after the accident. Finally, and most significantly, she suffered a mechanical injury to her lower back that, I am satisfied, caused her significant pain and discomfort in the four and a half years since the accident. I am not persuaded that the discomfort is as significant as Ms. Bergman describes it, but it is nevertheless significant. I am satisfied that her lower back will remain symptomatic indefinitely. If, however, she follows the advice of Dr. Travlos and others, and commits to a program of physical conditioning and determines to work through the limitations that her low back may present, rather than dwelling on them, the degree to which that injury will affect her life in the future will moderate. In light of this, I am satisfied that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $77,500. This amount includes $2,500 for past loss of housekeeping capacity for reasons I will explain below.
This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of diminished earning capacity (future wage loss) awards for Plaintiffs who are out of the workforce at the time of their injuries.   As previously discussed there is nothing preventing such plaintiffs from being awarded damages for future wage loss given the right circumstances.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s loss at $65,000 Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following useful reasons:
[80] Ms. Bergman does not have an established record of employment because of the conscious choice she and her husband made to have and raise their children to school age with the benefit of a stay-at-home mother. I accept that Ms. Bergman planned to and will return to work when her youngest child reached school age. I accept that the sort of work she is destined to do will likely involve an emphasis on physical as opposed to mental exertion. There is a mill in Lavington that Ms. Bergman thought about applying to. She impresses me as the sort of person who would find work of that nature rewarding and challenging. It is with a view to those real and substantial possibilities that the question of her indefinite, albeit moderating disability, needs to be assessed….
[84] I recognize that Dr. Coghlan, in his September 21, 2009 report, concluded that he would “not restrict her activity level in terms of jobs on the basis of today’s findings”. I am not sure that the opinions of the physiatrists are in conflict. Whether they are or not, I am satisfied that Ms. Bergman has established an impairment of her capital asset, being her ability to earn an income in the future. Valuing that loss is necessarily an imprecise exercise. Lacking any better measure, I consider that an award equivalent to between one and two years of Ms. Bergman’s likely future annual income to be reasonable. I fix her loss of future earning capacity at $65,000.

My 2010 Canadian Law Blog Award Nominations


The Canadian Law Blog Awards (the Clawbies), are awarded once a year to recognize outstanding Canadian legal blogs.
The nomination process involves peer endorsement and from these a select number of blogs are chosen for recognition.  The Clawbies “started back in 2006 with the sole intention of creating exposure for the great blogs published by the Canadian legal industry. The results will again be released on New Year’s Eve, but as we strongly state each year, the “true value” of these awards is found in the nomination process.”  Last year I was fortunate enough to be awarded a Clawbie for best Canadian Practioner’s Blog.  This year I’m proud to have been nominated again.
I usually make my endorsements via twitter but thought I would repeat these in this short post.  This year the following great Blogs deserve consideration:
1) Best Canadian Law Blog (or Blogger) Award: Last year’s winner deserves consideration for a repeat.  The sheer number of quality contributors and posts on Slaw make this Canadian legal blog stand out nationally and internationally.
2) Best Practitioner Blog – Since the folks behind the Clawbies aren’t opposed to recognizing multiple winners I’m going to make multiple nominations for this competitive category.  Three blogs get my nod this year.  Antonin Pribetic’s The Trial Warrior Blog stands out not only for his bold views but also because he demonstrates that a legal blog can, in fact, be interesting.   Dan Michaluk’s All About Information is timely and authoritative and Donna Seale does a great job discussing human rights issues in the Canadian workplace.
3) Legal Culture and Non-Legal Audience Awards –Garry Wise’s Wise Law Blog is one of the first and best Canadian legal blogs.  He shares views that go well beyond his practice areas and caters to a wide national and international audience.  For these reasons Garry should be considered for an award in these two categories.
4) Friend of the North Awards – This award is intended to recognize US bloggers that look north of the border to network and exchange ideas.  While Eric Turkewitz’s New York Personal Injury Attorney Blog does not necessarily contain much (if any) Canadian content, he hands down authors one of the best personal injury blogs in the US and (to steal a line from the formidable Kevin O’Keefe) if he keeps it up much longer he may just give personal injury lawyers a good name.
6) EuroCan Connection Awards – This award recognizes European law blog friends who highlight and link to Canadian law blogs.  Last year’s winner Mike Semple Piggot keeps ahead of the competition and deserves yet another nod from his friends in the Great White North.
7) Practice Management and Best Legal Technology Award: Although these are two separate categories I thought I’d combine them and nominate both Jordan Furlong and David Bilinsky.   Lawyers young and old would be wise to pay attention to Jordan’s views as he, more than most any other Canadian, has his finger on the pulse of change in the legal profession.  David gets credit for being one of the forces inspiring this blog to get off the ground and has kept BC lawyers well appraised of all things legal tech.
8) Law Librarian Blog Award – Both Connie Crosbie and BC’s own The Stream deserve recognition here.  (full disclosure, I am an occasional guest blogger at The Stream, however, the blog stands on it’s own two feet quite well absent my contributions)
10) Best New Law Blog Award – There are no shortage of great new Canadian legal blogs thanks in large part to efforts of people like Steve Matthews.  I’ll leave it to others to make nominations in this competitive category.
11) Law Professor Blog Award – Two great professors get the nod here, first Michael Geist, who is a regular blogger and probably Canada’s foremost authority on Copyright issues.  A newcomer to the blogging world (and the first Canadian law school Dean I’m aware of blogging) is Lorne Sossin who has gotten off to a strong start on behalf of the Osgoode Hall Faculty of Law.
There are many others like Doug Jasinksi who deserve recognition for their contributions to the Canadian legal blogging landscape and I look forward to others nominations for the 2010 Canadian Law Blog Awards.