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ICBC's Part 7 Exam Thwarts Defence Medical Exam Application

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 48 Comments on ICBC's Part 7 Exam Thwarts Defence Medical Exam Application

As previously discussed, when a Defendant is insured with ICBC their ability to set up an ‘independent‘ medical exam can be compromised if ICBC exercised their rights to have the Plaintiff examined under section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation and if that exam went beyond what was required for a ‘part 7’ opinion.  Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Rossland Registry, demonstrating such an outcome.
In the recent case (Wocknitz v. Donaldson) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision.  Both the Plaintiff and Defendant were insured by ICBC.  Before litigation got underway ICBC had the Plaintiff assessed by a physiatrist.   As is not uncommon with these types of examinations, the report generated exceeded the narrow scope of Part 7 Benefit needs.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff obtained their own expert opinion from a physiatrist.  The Defendant’s brought an application to compel the Plaintiff to be assessed by another physiatrist and by a psychiatrist.  They argued this was necessary to ‘level the playing field’.  Mr. Justice Pearlman disagreed and dismissed the application.  In doing so the Court provided the following helpful reasons:

[14] In Robertson v. Grist, 2006 BCSC 1245, at paragraph 14, Madam Justice Dillon addressed the question of whether a Part 7 examination constitutes a first independent medical examination for the purposes of a tort claim. She said this:

[14]      Whether the Part 7 examination constitutes a first independent medical examination depends upon the scope of the examination, given the rest of the circumstances here.  There was no limitation on Dr. Jaworski’s examination and the request letter covered matters that would solely be relevant to a tort action.  The doctor’s report was not limited to a rehabilitation opinion about whether the injuries sustained in the accident totally disabled the plaintiff from work within 20 days of the accident and for a period of 104 weeks or less, the criteria in section 80 of the Part 7 benefits Regulations.  The examination was a first independent medical examination within the meaning of Rule 30.

[15] In this case, the letter from the adjustor instructing Dr. Findlay has not been put in evidence.  However, it is clear from Dr. Findlay’s report that it deals with matters which go beyond an inquiry restricted to Part 7 benefits, and deals with matters directly relevant to the tort claim. ..

[19] In this case, there have been no subsequent unforeseeable events which would, in my view, warrant a second examination by a physiatrist.

[20] With respect to the application of the defendants for an order for an independent medical examination by a psychiatrist, again this is not a case where such an examination is required in order to level the playing field.  This is not a case where the plaintiff has obtained or intends to obtain a psychiatric report.  An independent medical examination by a psychiatrist is a particularly invasive form of examination and, in the circumstances of this case, it is not one that I would be prepared to order.

[21] With respect to the defendants’ submission that because Dr. Findlay provided his report some nine months after the accident, he was not in a position to pronounce in any definitive way with respect to a prognosis, in my view the timing of Dr. Findlay’s examination was a matter that was entirely within the control of the defendants.  That does not provide a basis which would justify an order for a second independent examination by a physiatrist.  As counsel for the plaintiff has pointed out, it would still be open to the defendants to have Dr. Findlay review the report of Dr. Valentine, and the clinical records that have been produced, and to provide a rebuttal report for use at trial.

[22] The application of the defendants for the two independent medical examinations sought is dismissed.

More on the Steep Consequences of Part 7 Benefits Deductions in Tort Trials

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on More on the Steep Consequences of Part 7 Benefits Deductions in Tort Trials

As previously discussed, if you are insured with ICBC and fail to pursue your own Part 7 benefits a Defendant can reduce their liability by the amount of the benefits you should have pursued.  This can result in a very harsh damages deduction.  This was again illustrated in reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry.
In last week’s case (Thomas v. Thompson) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision.  The case went to trial in 2010 and the Plaintiff was awarded damages for various losses including the cost of future medical care.  One of the future care items was the cost of Lyrica.   The parties were invited to make further submissions regarding the future costs of this medication.
The Court accepted that the present day value of the Plaintiff’s future need for Lyrica totalled $147,939.   This entire award was then deducted because the Plaintiff could have pursued payment for this directly under his no-fault benefits.  In allowing this six figure damage reduction Mr. Justice Brooke provided the following reasons:







[4] The defendants say that rather than ordering the payment to the plaintiff of the present value of Lyrica as a cost of future care, the court must apply the provisions of s. 83(5) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act. This section in its entirety says this:

83

(a) within the definition of section 1.1, or

(b) that are similar to those within the definition of section 1.1, provided under vehicle insurance wherever issued and in effect,

but does not include a payment made pursuant to third party liability insurance coverage.

(2) A person who has a claim for damages and who receives or is entitled to receive benefits respecting the loss on which the claim is based, is deemed to have released the claim to the extent of the benefits.

(3) Nothing in this section precludes the insurer from demanding from the person referred to in subsection (2), as a condition precedent to payment, a release to the extent of the payment.

(4) In an action in respect of bodily injury or death caused by a vehicle or the use or operation of a vehicle, the amount of benefits paid, or to which the person referred to in subsection (2) is or would have been entitled, must not be referred to or disclosed to the court or jury until the court has assessed the award of damages.

(5) After assessing the award of damages under subsection (4), the amount of benefits referred to in that subsection must be disclosed to the court, and taken into account, or, if the amount of benefits has not been ascertained, the court must estimate it and take the estimate into account, and the person referred to in subsection (2) is entitled to enter judgment for the balance only.

[5] I am satisfied that the Part 7 benefits available to the plaintiff exceeded the present value of those benefits and judgment may not be entered for them.









For more information on the complexities of part 7 benefits and tort damage assessments you can click here to read my article “the two hats of ICBC“.

Part 7 Benefits Deductions and the "Two Hats" of ICBC

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized. 2 Comments on Part 7 Benefits Deductions and the "Two Hats" of ICBC


When a Plaintiff is awarded damages following a negligence claim from a BC motor vehicle collision, a Defendant can reduce the amount of damages they have to pay by the amount of no-fault benefits a Plaintiff can claim under their own policy of insurance from ICBC.  As recently discussed, this can result in a very harsh reduction.
The purpose for this deduction is so an accident victim doesn’t ‘double dip’.  That is, a person should not be paid twice for the same accident related expenses.  The reality, however, is that in most BC personal injury trials both the Plaintiff and Defendant are insured by ICBC.  This leads to a built-in conflict of interest.  At trial defence counsel appointed by ICBC will often argue that a Plaintiff’s claimed future medical care needs are not reasonable.  If the Plaintiff is awarded damages for future care the same counsel will then often argue that the award should be reduced as ICBC will pay for these damages under the Plaintiff’s own policy of insurance.
It is difficult to reconcile these two positions.  In 2009 the BC Court of Appeal found that trial judges can consider defence counsel’s trial submissions as a reflection of ICBC’s views with respect to the likelihood of payment of future insurance benefits.  Further reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention demonstrating this practical approach by trial judges in face of ICBC’s arguments.
In today’s case (Van Den Hemel v. Kugathasan) the Plaintiff was injured in two seperate collisions.   At trial the Plaintiff was awarded damages including $8,000 for cost of future medical care.  The Defendants then argued that all of this should be deducted as ICBC would likely pay these expenses under the Plaintiff’s policy of insurance.
Mr. Justice Stewart disagreed with this submission and in doing so acknowledged the reality that ICBC’s views were likely expressed through counsel at trial and the Court would be “naive” to ignore these.  Mr. Justice Stewart reduced the award by only $100 and in doing so provided the following helpful reasons:
[9]  … whether the kinds of treatment at the cost accepted in my judgement would be paid in their entirety by ICBC is problematic, and the position taken in the tort case by the defendants, – effectively ICBC – with respect to the nature, extent, and source of the plaintiff’s problems.  ICBC is stuck with having to wear two hats – defend the tort action versus administer Part 7 – but I would be naive if I ignored the significance of the position taken in the trial simply because ICBC has no choice but to wear two hats.  The need to be realistic in assessing the ‘uncertainties’ lies at the heart of what the Court of Appeal had to say in Schmitt v. Thomas and in Boota v. Dhaliwal.
As of today’s date Mr. Justice Stewart’s recent judgement remains unpublished but I would be happy to share a copy with anyone who contacts me and requests one.

Motorcycle Learner Licences, the Supervision Requirement and Breach of Insurance

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized. 118 Comments on Motorcycle Learner Licences, the Supervision Requirement and Breach of Insurance


Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal addressing the circumstances when a motorcycle learner will be held in breach of insurance for not being supervised by a qualified driver.
In today’s case (Hagen v. ICBC) the Plaintiff had a valid 6L learner’s licence.  One requirement of a learner’s motorcycle licence is for the learner to be supervised while riding by a fully licenced motorcyclist.  The Plaintiff was being supervised by his wife who had a valid motorcycle licence.   While riding in Vancouver in 2008 the Plaintiff was momentarily out of the view of his wife.  At this time he was struck by a truck making a u-turn and was seriously injured.
The Plaintiff applied to ICBC for no-fault benefits but ICBC refused to pay these arguing that the Plaintiff was in breach of his insurance for failing to comply with section 30.06 of the Motor Vehicle Act Regulations which read in part as follows:

Section 30.06 of the Motor Vehicle Act Regulations provides:

(4)        A person to whom a Class 6L licence is issued, … must not operate a motorcycle unless the person is under the direct supervision of another person who

(a) is at least 19 years of age, and

(b) holds a valid and subsisting driver’s licence, other than a learner’s licence … of a class that permits him or her to operate a motorcycle.

…

(5)        For the purposes of subsections (4) … direct supervision means that the person supervising can, at all times, see the other person while the other person is operating the motorcycle.

ICBC argued that “however momentary the separation of the vehicles may and consequent loss of sight may be, such loss of sight…negates eligibility for Part 7 Benefits“.  The trial judge disagreed with ICBC and ordered them to pay the Plaintiff no-fault benefits finding that ICBC’s interpretation would impose “financially devastating consequences on a person as a result of events over which he or she had no control”
ICBC appealed and failed.  In dismissing ICBC’s arguments the BC Court of Appeal provided the following useful reasons addressing the requirement of learner motorcyclists to be supervised:

[21]         One may ask whether it was intended that a learner motorcyclist would be in breach of the supervision requirement when, having arranged for supervision, the supervisor acted contrary to agreement and took another route? In my view the answer is no.

[22]         This discussion is akin to the discussion of “due diligence” urged upon us by the appellant in saying we need not concern ourselves with the “offence” consequences of the interpretation it advocates. It says Mr. Hagen could answer a charge of breaching the supervision requirement by saying that he demonstrated due diligence in his attempt to comply, and that his non-compliance was outside of his control. In other words, it says a charge of breaching s. 30.06(4) would be treated as a strict liability offence. If that is the case, why, then, should other consequences, perhaps more grave, adhere to Mr. Hagen in a civil context because his supervision failed in spite of his reasonable efforts to comply with the section?

[23]         Section 30.06(4) is directed entirely to the behaviour of the learner, and in my view s. 30.06(5), in articulating the requirement of observation at all times, must be read as focusing upon the behaviour for which the learner can be responsible. Taking this approach, s. 30.06 of the Regulations, read in context, requires the learner to take all reasonable steps to ensure he (or she) is being supervised in compliance with the Regulations. This requires the learner to arrange for supervision by a person who commits to keeping him in sight at all times, and requires the learner to refrain from driving where it is not reasonable for him (or her) to think such supervision is occurring. I readily acknowledge that there will be circumstances in which a supervisor who fails to follow may nullify the learner’s Part 7 benefits, as in a failure to keep sight of the learner for such a period of time or distance that the learner, acting reasonably, should have become aware the plan for supervision had been compromised. Thus there will be a factual question: did the learner take all reasonable steps to ensure he was being supervised? In this case that translates to the question: should the learner have been aware he was not in sight of the supervisor?

[24]         This is a case in which the supervisor, not the learner, made a mistake, a mistake which was so near in time and distance to the accident it was open to conclude Mr. Hagen could not be faulted for failing to detect his loss of supervision. The judge described the lack of supervision as momentary. He referred to evidence that Mr. Hagen had seen the supervisor behind him at the previous intersection. The judge considered the evidence of the street design and the evidence that the many stop signs had permitted some vehicles to fall in between Mr. Hagen and his supervisor. I consider it was open to him on the evidence to conclude that this was a case of loss of contact that did not put Mr. Hagen in breach of the Regulations.

[25]         It follows I would dismiss the appeal.

More on the "Harsh" Reality of Part 7 Benefits Deductions in ICBC Tort Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on More on the "Harsh" Reality of Part 7 Benefits Deductions in ICBC Tort Claims


Two Judgements were recently released by the BC Supreme Court discussing the “harsh” reality of Part 7 Benefits Deductions in ICBC Injury Claims.
As previously discussed, if you are entitled to receive Part 7 Benefits under your policy of insurance and don’t pursue these a Defendant who is responsible for injuring you in a BC Motor Vehicle Collision can reduce the amount of damages that they have to pay you by the amount of benefits you should have received from your own insurance coverage.  Often after trial ICBC will argue that some of the awarded damages should be reduced for this reason.  The first of the two recent judgments demonstrates that these deductions could operate in a punishing way for Plaintiffs.
In the first case released this week (Kirk v. Kloosterman) the Plaintiff suffered “catastrophic and tragic” injuries in a motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff, who had a learner’s licence to operate a motorcycle, failed to obtain a full licence at the end of his probation period and for this reason was considered uninsured by ICBC.  He was struck by a vehicle operated by the Defendant and suffered serious injuries.  He became paralyzed from near the waistline down.  His spinal cord became infected while in hospital and this “literally chewed up a further portion of the spinal cord so that he has lost a great deal of his thoracic capacity and now his arms and shoulders must bear his weight and provide all his strength“.
A jury found the Plaintiff 15% at fault for the collision and the Defendant 85% at fault.   Damages of nearly $4 million were awarded less 15% to reflect the Plaintiff’s liability.   Following verdict the Defendant (who was insured with ICBC) applied to have some of these damages reduced because the Plaintiff was allegedly in breach of his no-fault plan with ICBC.   Mr. Justice Crawford granted the motion and reduced the damages by approximately $200,000.  In doing so the Court noted that while this was “harsh and even punitive” a Plaintiff who disentitles himself to his own ICBC coverage can be faced with a statutory deduction in their tort claim.  Mr. Justice Crawford provided the following reasons:

[]           Ms. Kloosterman says the law is clear and settled: if the plaintiff acts so as to disentitle himself, then the Court must calculate and apply the deduction. She argues that Mr. Kirk would have been entitled to benefits under Part 7, had he possessed a valid driver’s licence.

[]           It is plain that the legislative intention is to prevent double recovery, that is, to prevent a plaintiff from recovering the same amount of monies both by way of the defendant through a tort action and by way of no-fault insurance coverage. Given the legislative intention, it seems harsh and even punitive to not only deny a plaintiff, who has been found substantially not at fault in a motor vehicle collision and awarded damages for losses sustained, no-fault benefits but also to deduct the amount of his or her potential entitlement to Part 7 from the tort award. However, the case law is binding on me, and can only be construed differently by the Court of Appeal:  see Baart v. Kumar, (1985), 66 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.); Si v. Enns, , 2001 BCSC 1120.

[]           Accordingly, I accept the defendant’s submissions on this issue and find that there must be a deduction.

In the second case released this week (Gignac v. Rozylo) the result was not nearly as harsh but the case still demonstrates the reality that applications for statutory deductions can be made following vehicle collision cases.
In Gignac the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle collision.  Following trial Mr. Justice Wilson awarded damages including $15,000 for ‘special damages‘ and just over $115,000 for ‘costs of future care‘.  (UPDATE August 17, 2012 – the BC Court of Appeal reduced the cost of future care award by about $40,000.  Their reasons can be found here) ICBC then argued that these awards should be reduced by $25,000 to account for the fact that the Plaintiff can obtain money from ICBC for these expenses under their own policy of insurance.
Mr. Justice Wilson largely rejected ICBC’s arguments and made a modest deduction of $2,000 of the awarded damages.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful comments about the “level of abstraction” of ICBC’s permissive benefits scheme:

[23]        As I understand Ms. Lewko, if a benefit is not “specifically listed”, then, an insured’s entitlement to the benefit is dependent upon “ICBC claims handling procedures”, or “ICBC claims handling policies”, or “ICBC policy”.

[24]        Legislative support for this approach is s. 88(2)(f), the “other” category, referred to above.

[25]        The statute does not direct me to determine entitlement to benefits pursuant to ICBC policy; the direction is to determine entitlement pursuant to the plan.

[26]        Section 88(2)(f) is subject to the opinion of the corporation’s medical advisor that an expenditure is likely to promote the rehabilitation of an insured.

[27]        The opinion of that medical advisor is a necessary condition before resort may be had to s. 88(2)(f) of the Regulation.  Absent the necessary condition, the corporation is not authorized to pay benefits.

[28]        Rehabilitation means restoration.  This plaintiff’s debilitating condition is chronic pain.  Current medical science has no cure for this condition.  I find it improbable that a medical advisor would opine that any of the goods and services contained in the assessment of future care costs, would promote the rehabilitation of this plaintiff.  Those goods are services were recommended by the occupational therapist as necessary to enable this plaintiff to maintain an optimum level of functioning, now and in the future, and to maximize independence and prevention of further disability.

[29]        Alternatively, if I am wrong in my interpretation of the legislation, and ICBC policy is a relevant factor, then the applicant has not persuaded me that it is more likely than not that this plaintiff is entitled to the benefits in controversy.  The scales are evenly balanced.  Policy may authorize the benefit or it may not.  According to Ms. Lewko:

11.       It is ICBC policy that the exercise of discretion for permissive benefits must be rationally connected to the relevant factors governing an objective assessment of the entitlement to the benefit.

That is a level of abstraction which does not allow for a determination of entitlement on a balance of probability.

[30]        In result, the cost of future care assessment is reduced by $2,000.

Costs Awarded To Plaintiff Following Successful Part 7 Action of "Limited Monetary Value"

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits.


As previously discussed, if a Plaintiff successfully sues in the BC Supreme Court and is awarded damages under $25,000 (the current monetary limit of the BC Small Claims Court) the Plaintiff will not be entitled to costs unless they had ‘sufficient reason‘ for suing in Supreme Court.  Useful reasons for judgement were released today by the BCSC, New Westminster Registry, addressing this issue after a Part 7 Benefits trial.
In today’s case (Derbyshire v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.   She was employed as a commercial painter and as a result of the crash became disabled from her own occupation.  She was insured with ICBC who provided one week of disability benefits and then refused to reinstate these.
The Plaintiff’s treating GP and a rheumatologist supported the fact that the Plaintiff was disabled.  ICBC obtained an ‘independent medical examination report‘ from an orthopaedic surgeon who concluded that the Plaintiff “should have been able to have resumed her previous level of activity” within 8 weeks of the crash.
The Plaintiff sued in the Supreme Court and ultimately was successful with Mr. Justice Saunders finding that ICBC was wrong in cutting off the Plaintiff’s rehabiliaiton and disability benefits.  The total value of the Plaintiff’s claim by the time of trial was well below $25,000 however the Court went on to award costs finding that Plaintiffs suing for on-going benefits under Part 7 have sufficient reason to sue in the Suprene Court.   Mr. Justice Saunders provided the following reasons:
I accept what Mr. Cabanos says regarding the apparent, at this point, potentially limited monetary value of the claim being within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court, but Mr. Milne is quite correct that the test for costs is whether it was appropriate to bring this action and this application in Supreme Court.  In my view, it was appropriate given the indeterminate size of the total benefits that could be granted to the claimant over the entire course of her disability and it was further appropriate with respect to the summary disposition mechanisms that are available in this court, the alternative in Provincial Court only being a full trial.

BC Supreme Court Finds Botox Covered Under ICBC's Part 7 Benefits

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized.


It is not uncommon for physicians to occasionally prescribe Botox Injections to treat symptoms of pain following motor vehicle collisions.  The Botox itself is not covered by the BC Medical Service Plan and people often turn to ICBC for funding of this expense.  Two recent decisions have addressed whether ICBC is obliged to fund Botox therapy when prescribed by a physician.
In 2008 Mr. Justice Macaulay provided reasons for judgement (Tiessen v. ICBC) finding that Botox is indeed a covered benefit under ICBC’s No-Fault Plan. The Court provided the following reasons:

[]           Counsel for ICBC seeks to impose too high a standard for proving that a recommended treatment is necessary.  I am satisfied that the treatment is necessary in the sense that the plaintiff needs short and long term pain relief for his lower back.  While it is impossible to predict that this particular treatment will succeed, it is nonetheless, on the evidence before me, a necessary physical treatment within the meaning of the section.

[]           There is no evidence to suggest that the proposed cost of the staged treatment is unreasonable.  The fact that the particular treatment is not covered by MSP does not establish that the cost is unreasonable.

[]           I am persuaded that the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he is an insured person to be benefited pursuant to Part 7 of the Regulations and a further declaration that he is entitled to receive medical rehabilitative benefits pursuant to the contract of insurance with the defendant under Policy Number 639 DER for the cost of Botox injections as recommended by Dr. Quartly.

Further reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that Botox is a benefit covered under Part 7.
In today’s case (Plensky v. Di Biase) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle collision.  A jury awarded the Plaintiff damages including just over $60,000 for the cost of her future medical care.   The court was then asked to reduce the award to take into account the future expenses that were covered directly by the Plaintiff’s Part 7 Benefits to avoid “double recovery”  (You can click here to read more about this topic).  Madam Justice Ross ultimately made a modest deduction to the Jury’s award.  Part of the deduction reflected the cost of future Botox injections which the Court accepted was a responsibility of ICBC’s under the Plaintiff’s Part 7 Benefits.
Today’s case coupled with Mr. Justice Macaulay’s 2008 decision make it clear that Botox can be covered under people’s own policies of ICBC Insurance.

MPIC No-Fault Benefits Not Available to British Columbians Injured in BC By MPIC Insured Drivers

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released today deciding the extent of no-fault benefits the Manitoba Public Insurance Company (MPIC) has to pay when a driver insured by them injures a person in British Columbia.
In today’s case (Schuk v. York Fire & Casualty Insurance Company) the Plaintiff was considered a pedestrian and was struck by a tractor trailer driven by an individual insured with MPIC.  The collision occurred in British Columbia.  The Plaintiff was severely injured but ICBC and MPIC did not agree as to who had to provide coverage.
Ultimately a lawsuit was brought and Mr. Justice Meyers ordered that both MPIC and ICBC had to provide the Plaintiff with benefits with MPIC being the primary insurer.  (You can click here to read my former post summarizing this previous decision)
Unfortunately the legal positioning did not end there.  Manitoba is a true no-fault jurisdiction meaning that people injured in Manitoba motor vehicle collisions have had their rights to sue for damages severely restricted.  As a trade off they have a relatively generous scheme of no-fault insurance benefits.  In today’s case the Plaintiff argued that MPIC had to provide the Plaintiff with the more robust MPIC benefits.  MPIC disagreed arguing that their obligation to pay no-fault benefits is governed by the lesser BC limits.  Ultimately Madam Justice Brown sided with MPIC and ruled that a British Columbian injured in BC by an MPIC insured driver is not entitled to claim the more generous MPIC no-fault benefits.  Madam Justice Brown provided the following reasons:

[16]         The issue before me turns on the proper interpretation of the Power of Attorney and Undertaking filed by the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation.  In this case, the relevant provisions of the undertaking provide that the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation undertakes to:

A. … appear in any action … against it or its insured …

C. … not to set up any defence to any claim … which might not be set up if the contract had been entered into in accordance with the laws relating to motor vehicle liability insurance contracts or plan of automobile insurance in the Province … and to satisfy in a final judgment rendered against it or its insured by a court … in respect of any kind or class of coverage … up to the greater of

(a) the amounts and limits for that kind or class of coverage … provided in the contract or plan, or

(b) the minimum for that kind or class of coverage … required by law in such province ….

[17]         There is no issue that the coverage for the kind or class of insurance, being no-fault benefits is greater in Manitoba.  The question is whether its undertaking makes MPIC liable to pay that amount to Ms. Schuk.  In my view, it does not.  The undertaking provides that MPIC will satisfy any final judgment rendered against it “in respect of any kind or class of coverage provided under the contract or plan”, and “in respect of any kind or class of coverage required by law to be provided under a plan” in British Columbia.

[18]         In this case, there is no coverage provided under the contract or plan to Ms. Schuk for no-fault benefits under Part 2 of the Manitoba Act.  To qualify for that coverage, a person must be a Manitoba resident or injured in an accident in Manitoba (s. 74).  As MPIC argues, the Manitoba standard automobile policy does not incorporate PIPP benefits.  PIPP benefits are available based upon statutory entitlement.

[19]         Here, Section B of the contract provided accident benefits “as required by law”.  The Manitoba legislation provides PIPP benefits only to those resident in or injured in Manitoba.  Those benefits are not “required by law” for one, like Ms. Schuk, who is not a resident of Manitoba and not injured in Manitoba.  The driver of a Manitoba licensed vehicle is not required to carry PIPP coverage.  The Section B endorsement carried a charge of $950 for “accident benefits coverage for those drivers not eligible for Personal Injury Protection Plan (PIPP)”.  I accept the submissions of Manitoba Public Insurance that this would be drivers who were not Manitoba residents and were not injured in Manitoba.

[20]         Ms. Schuk did not have PIPP benefits coverage under either the contract or the plan.

[21]         The other portion of MPIC’s undertaking, that is not to set up any defence which might not be set up if the contract had been entered into in the Province of British Columbia, also does not assist the plaintiff.  ICBC could certainly have set up the defence that it does not provide benefits under the Manitoba legislation; that Ms. Schuk does not qualify for PIPP benefits.

A Suggested Change at ICBC To Benefit British Columbians

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Tort Reform, Uncategorized. 71 Comments on A Suggested Change at ICBC To Benefit British Columbians


Whether you are a plaintiff lawyer, a defence lawyer, an adjuster or someone insured with ICBC I think we can all agree that there is one ICBC practice that could change to better serve British Columbians.  I’m talking about the practice of assigning the same adjuster to deal with Tort and No-Fault Benefit claims.
As I’ve previously discussed, ICBC usually fulfills two roles in the context of injury claims.  The first is that they insure people for “no-fault” benefits.  If you are insured, whether or not you are at fault for a collision ICBC provides some basic coverage for medical/rehabilitation expenses and a modest wage loss benefit in the event of total disability.  If you are seeking coverage ICBC assigns an adjuster to process your claim no-fault benefits.
At the same time ICBC usually provides coverage to the at fault party for any claims made against them.  When a faultless party is injured and wishes to be compensated for the full extent of their damages they make a tort claim.  ICBC assigns an adjuster to process these tort claims.  The difficulty, however, is that ICBC typically assigns the same adjuster to deal with the faultless parties claims for no-fault benefits and to process the tort claim made against the at fault party.
As a business decision ICBC’s policy makes sense.  Why assign two people to look after various claims being advanced as a result of a single event?  It is more cost effective to get one adjuster to learn about the crash, the parties involved, the various injuries and the claims being advanced.  As a practical matter, however, one person cannot fulfill both these roles in a completely impartial way.
In reality adjusters processing a no-fault benefits claim have a very different duty compared to an adjuster processing a tort claim.  In a no-fault benefits claim the adjuster owes a duty to the injured party to provide them with their insurance benefits.  If therapies are required these should be covered.  If disability occurs wage loss benefits should be provided.
In tort claims, however, the adjuster owes a duty to the at fault party.  If claims are being advanced the at fault party will want those settled for as little as possible as the funds are paid from their coverage.  It is difficult to imagine how one adjuster can fulfill these competing duties fairly and impartially.  The conflicting duties create an inherent conflict of interest.  (You can click here to read an article providing a real world example of how this conflict can play out to harm the interests of a person injured through no fault of their own).
After reading this you may be asking yourself whether ICBC’s practice is lawful.  Unfortunately, the answer is yes.  This practice has been brought before the Courts and is tolerated.
However, just because a practice is accepted does not make it right.  Since the Courts are not able to correct this practice the ability to change is in the hands of ICBC.
The solution is simple.  ICBC can assign separate adjusters to deal with tort and no-fault claims.  Once done ICBC can set up internal ‘walls’ to prevent the adjusters from accessing each others files.  This would add more fairness to the application process for no-fault benefits.  This would also help ensure that information shared by a party with their insurer to receive medical treatment is not automatically disclosed to the agent of the person responsible for causing the injuries.  This is a proposed change, I hope, we could all agree on.
As always, feedback is welcome on this forum and I’d appreciate views from others about this topic, particularly views from people who feel these proposed changes would not be beneficial.

The Inability to Afford Therapy and the Duty to Mitigate Damages

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized. 76 Comments on The Inability to Afford Therapy and the Duty to Mitigate Damages


As I’ve recently written, a Plaintiff has a duty to ‘mitigate‘ their losses after being injured otherwise the damages they are entitled to can be reduced.
The most common example of the ‘failure to mitigate’ defence comes up in personal injury claims where defence lawyers argue that a Plaintiff would have recovered more quickly and more completely had they followed through with all of the suggestions of their medical practitioners.  If evidence supporting such an argument is accepted then the Plaintiff’s award can be reduced.
What if a Plaintiff can’t afford to purchase all the therapies/medications recommended by their physicians?  Can their damage award be reduced in these circumstances?  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with this issue.
In this week’s case (Trites v. Penner) the Plaintiff, an apprentice plumber, was injured in a forceful rear end collision in 2005.  Fault for the crash was admitted by the rear motorist.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries.  He followed a course of therapy in the months that followed and enjoyed some improvement in his symptoms.  During his recovery ICBC (the Plaintiff’s insurer for ‘no fault’ benefits) discontinued “funding for (the Plaintiff’s) efforts at rehabilitation.”
At trial the Defence lawyer argued that the Plaintiff should have followed through with these therapies in any event and that his damages should be reduced for failure to mitigate.   Madam Justice Ker disagreed and took the Plaintiff’s inability to pay for his therapies into consideration.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[209] Financial circumstances are certainly one factor to consider in the overall reasonableness assessment of whether a plaintiff has failed to mitigate their losses.  What is reasonable will depend on all the surrounding circumstances.  One significant factor in this case however, is that as Mr. Trites was on his upward climb to recovery, ICBC determined that it would discontinue funding his efforts at rehabilitation.  As a consequence, Mr. Trites was left to fund his continued rehabilitation on his own.  Instrumental to continuing his recovery and functioning was not only attendance at the gym but other treatment modalities including massage therapy and chiropractic treatments and taking prescription medication.  All of these items had significant benefits to Mr. Trites but they also carried with them significant costs.  In the first half of 2007, Mr. Trites was unable to fund all these aspects of treatment and chose the prescription medication as it was essential to his pain management on a daily basis.

[210] I find that in these circumstances, Mr. Trites’ decision not to continue with a gym pass on a monthly basis for the first six months of 2007 was not unreasonable.  This is not a case where the plaintiff has refused to take recommended treatment.  Rather Mr. Trites was engaged in all aspects of the recommended treatments and ICBC was, until December 2006, paying for them.  Thereafter ICBC unilaterally discontinued paying for these treatments, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Trites was not yet fully recovered.  I cannot find that Mr. Trites acted unreasonably in determining how best to try and pay for all the treatment modalities that had been working for him in assisting his rehabilitation but were no longer going to be paid for by ICBC and were beyond his limited means at the time.  As Smith J. noted in O’Rourke v. Claire, [1997] B.C.J. No. 630 (S.C.) at para. 42 “it does not lie in the mouth of the tortfeasor to say that a plaintiff in such circumstances has failed to mitigate by failing to arrange and pay for his own rehabilitative treatment.”

[211] Accordingly, I find that the defence has not discharged its burden of establishing that Mr. Trites failed to mitigate his losses in this case.

You may be wondering if ICBC is allowed to, on the one hand deny a Plaintiff rehabilitation benefits, and on the other have the Defendant’s lawyer argue at trial that the Plaintiff should have pursued these benefits and therefor reduce the Plaintiff’s award.  The answer is yes and you can click here to read a previous article discussing this area of law, and here for the latest from the BC Court of Appeal on this topic.
Today’s case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of non-pecuniary damages and diminished earning capacity.
The Court accepted that the Plaintiff suffered moderate soft tissue injuries to his neck and back and these had a ‘guarded’ prognosis for full recovery.   $75,000 was awarded for his non-pecuniary damages and the Court’s reasons addressing this can be found at paragraphs 188-198.
The Plaintiff was also awarded $250,000 for diminished earning capacity.  He was an apprentice plumber and, despite his injuries, was able to continue to work in this trade in the years that followed the collision.  However he struggled in his profession and there was evidence he may have to retrain.  The court’s lengthy discussion addressing his diminished earning capacity can be found at paragraphs 213-239.