Skip to main content

ICBC Claims and Medical Treatment; How Often Should I See My Doctor?


One common question I’m asked by people advancing ICBC injury claims is “how often should I see my doctor?“.  The short answer is “as often as necessary to properly diagnose and treat your injuries“.  Recovery should always be the main reason behind physicians visits, not litigation.
There is no magic number of times you need to see a doctor in order to be properly compensated for your injuries.  A person who sees their doctor 100 times prior to settling may receive less than a person who only receives medical attention a handful of times.  The severity and duration of injuries are some of the most important factors when valuing loss, not the number of medical treatments.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, highlighting this.
In today’s case (Co v. Watson) the Plaintiff was involved in a “T-Bone” collision in 2006.  Fault was admitted by the offending motorist.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s ICBC claim.   Mr. Justice Burnyeat found that the Plaintiff suffered from shoulder pain, back pain, neck pain and some sleep disturbance.  Some of the injuries improved prior to trial while other symptoms continued to bother the Plaintiff.
The Defendant argued that since the Plaintiff did not “regularly” attend to be treated by her GP that the Court should be weary of the Plaintiff’s credibility.  Mr. Justice Burnyeat rejected this argument and went on to award the Plaintiff $27,500 for her non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).  In addressing the topic of frequency of medical treatment the Court stated as follows:

[26]         Ms. Co did not regularly attend to be treated by Dr. Porten.  The credibility of Ms. Co was put in questions by Mr. Watson as a result.  In this regard, I adopt the following statement made in Mayenburg, supra, where Myers J. stated:

The defendants challenge the credibility of Ms. Mayenburg. They point to the limited number of times she visited physicians to complain about her pain. They also refer to the fact that she did not raise the issue of her injuries when she visited Dr. Ducholke on several occasions for other unrelated matters.

I do not accept those submissions, which have been made and rejected in several other cases: see Myers v. Leng, 2006 BCSC 1582 and Travis v. Kwon, 2009 BCSC 63. Ms. Mayenburg is to be commended for getting on with her life, rather than seeing physicians in an attempt to build a record for this litigation. Furthermore, I fail to see how a plaintiff-patient who sees a doctor for something unrelated to an accident can be faulted for not complaining about the accident-related injuries at the same time. Dr. Ducholke testified how her time with patients was limited.

In summary, Ms. Mayenburg’s complaints to her doctors were not so minimal as to cast doubt on her credibility.

(at paras. 36-38).

[27]         Taking into account the injuries suffered by Ms. Co as a result of the accident and the duration of the suffering relating to those injuries, I assess the general damages of Ms. Co at $27,500.00.

Non-Pecuniary Damage Awards Discussed for Chronic Pain with Pre-Existing Depression


Pre-existing medical difficulties can and do play a role in the process of awarding a Plaintiff damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life (non-pecuniary damages).  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing this area of law.
In today’s case (Beaudry v. Kishigweb) the Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by a 1/2 ton pick-up truck.  Fault was admitted for the crash.   The Plaintiff sustained a variety of soft tissue injuries affecting her neck, upper back and lower back.  These went on to cause chronic pain and headaches and the Plaintiff never fully recovered from the consequences of her injuries.
Prior to the accident the Plaintiff suffered from some medical difficulties and these included a chronic low grade depression.  Her pre-accident health made her more vulnerable to having a poor outcome following the accident.  The Defendant, who basically conceded that the Plaintiff did suffer from chronic pain as a result of the collision, argued that “whether or not the Plaintiff was a vulnerable individual (as a result of pre-existing conditions), she cannot be put back to a better position than she would have been had the accident not occurred“.
The Court went on to find that the accident did cause chronic pain which was not resolved at the time of trial.  The Court further found that the chronic pain would continue into the future, however, it would not prevent the Plaintiff from working full time or from carrying out her household responsibilities.  In awarding the Plaintiff $85,000 for her non-pecuniary damages Mr. Justice Rice made the following comments about damages for non-pecuniary loss for chronic pain with pre-existing difficulties:

[25]         The difficulty of assessing damages for soft-tissue injuries where the plaintiff has a complicated psychological and behavioural background is described in Rod v. Greco, 2003 BCSC 935, at para. 35:

As to physical injuries, because of the mechanics of the motor vehicle accident [the plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended] some must have been sustained by the plaintiff.  However, the complex psychological and behavioural history both pre and post accident outlined above made it difficult to identify them with any precision.

[34]         With the virtual admission by the defendants that the plaintiff now suffers from chronic pain, I must first of all decide what the condition of the plaintiff was just before the accident.  Clearly she was not in the best of shape and that must be taken into account.  She was susceptible to pain and worse, depression, some of which could be said was the result of lifestyle mistakes made in the past.  Having recovered from most of those, I agree that it is not fair to reduce what she would otherwise receive simply on the basis of a greater susceptibility because of her past.  On the other hand, to the extent that those past experiences would have revisited her earlier in life than is normal, account must be taken of that too.

[35]         Considering the whole of the evidence, I find that, indeed, the plaintiff suffers chronic pain as a result of the collision.  I award her $85,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

The Inability to Afford Therapy and the Duty to Mitigate Damages


As I’ve recently written, a Plaintiff has a duty to ‘mitigate‘ their losses after being injured otherwise the damages they are entitled to can be reduced.
The most common example of the ‘failure to mitigate’ defence comes up in personal injury claims where defence lawyers argue that a Plaintiff would have recovered more quickly and more completely had they followed through with all of the suggestions of their medical practitioners.  If evidence supporting such an argument is accepted then the Plaintiff’s award can be reduced.
What if a Plaintiff can’t afford to purchase all the therapies/medications recommended by their physicians?  Can their damage award be reduced in these circumstances?  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with this issue.
In this week’s case (Trites v. Penner) the Plaintiff, an apprentice plumber, was injured in a forceful rear end collision in 2005.  Fault for the crash was admitted by the rear motorist.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries.  He followed a course of therapy in the months that followed and enjoyed some improvement in his symptoms.  During his recovery ICBC (the Plaintiff’s insurer for ‘no fault’ benefits) discontinued “funding for (the Plaintiff’s) efforts at rehabilitation.”
At trial the Defence lawyer argued that the Plaintiff should have followed through with these therapies in any event and that his damages should be reduced for failure to mitigate.   Madam Justice Ker disagreed and took the Plaintiff’s inability to pay for his therapies into consideration.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[209] Financial circumstances are certainly one factor to consider in the overall reasonableness assessment of whether a plaintiff has failed to mitigate their losses.  What is reasonable will depend on all the surrounding circumstances.  One significant factor in this case however, is that as Mr. Trites was on his upward climb to recovery, ICBC determined that it would discontinue funding his efforts at rehabilitation.  As a consequence, Mr. Trites was left to fund his continued rehabilitation on his own.  Instrumental to continuing his recovery and functioning was not only attendance at the gym but other treatment modalities including massage therapy and chiropractic treatments and taking prescription medication.  All of these items had significant benefits to Mr. Trites but they also carried with them significant costs.  In the first half of 2007, Mr. Trites was unable to fund all these aspects of treatment and chose the prescription medication as it was essential to his pain management on a daily basis.

[210] I find that in these circumstances, Mr. Trites’ decision not to continue with a gym pass on a monthly basis for the first six months of 2007 was not unreasonable.  This is not a case where the plaintiff has refused to take recommended treatment.  Rather Mr. Trites was engaged in all aspects of the recommended treatments and ICBC was, until December 2006, paying for them.  Thereafter ICBC unilaterally discontinued paying for these treatments, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Trites was not yet fully recovered.  I cannot find that Mr. Trites acted unreasonably in determining how best to try and pay for all the treatment modalities that had been working for him in assisting his rehabilitation but were no longer going to be paid for by ICBC and were beyond his limited means at the time.  As Smith J. noted in O’Rourke v. Claire, [1997] B.C.J. No. 630 (S.C.) at para. 42 “it does not lie in the mouth of the tortfeasor to say that a plaintiff in such circumstances has failed to mitigate by failing to arrange and pay for his own rehabilitative treatment.”

[211] Accordingly, I find that the defence has not discharged its burden of establishing that Mr. Trites failed to mitigate his losses in this case.

You may be wondering if ICBC is allowed to, on the one hand deny a Plaintiff rehabilitation benefits, and on the other have the Defendant’s lawyer argue at trial that the Plaintiff should have pursued these benefits and therefor reduce the Plaintiff’s award.  The answer is yes and you can click here to read a previous article discussing this area of law, and here for the latest from the BC Court of Appeal on this topic.
Today’s case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of non-pecuniary damages and diminished earning capacity.
The Court accepted that the Plaintiff suffered moderate soft tissue injuries to his neck and back and these had a ‘guarded’ prognosis for full recovery.   $75,000 was awarded for his non-pecuniary damages and the Court’s reasons addressing this can be found at paragraphs 188-198.
The Plaintiff was also awarded $250,000 for diminished earning capacity.  He was an apprentice plumber and, despite his injuries, was able to continue to work in this trade in the years that followed the collision.  However he struggled in his profession and there was evidence he may have to retrain.  The court’s lengthy discussion addressing his diminished earning capacity can be found at paragraphs 213-239.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Plaintiff Credibility

As I’ve previously written, Plaintiff credibility plays an important role in most personal injury lawsuits.  This is particularly true in soft tissue injury cases.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court highlighting the impact that an adverse finding of credibility can have on a claim.
In today’s case (Sarowa v. Gill) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 motor vehicle collision in the lower mainland.  The defendant lost control of his vehicle and entered the Plaintiff’s lane of travel causing an impact which resulted in “significant damage” to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Fault was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim.
The Plaintiff gave evidence that that she suffered various soft tissue injuries which continued to bother her by the time of trial.  This was supported by the evidence of a physiatrist.  However, the Physiatrists evidence was not accepted by the Court because of  “deficiencies, omissions, and factual errors in (the doctor’s) report“.
Instead the Court preferred the evidence of Dr. Boyle, an orthopaedic surgeon ICBC arranged for the Plaintiff to see.  Dr. Boyle’s evidence included the following damaging observations:
Dr. Boyle’s opinion was that she had suffered a myofascial strain of the cervical and lumbar muscles as a result of the accident, but that the injury was mild.  He observed Ms. Sarowa to display exaggerated “pain behaviour” throughout the interview and examination.  He noted that she moaned, groaned and grimaced.  He said that patients who are in pain generally avoid a lot of movement in order to avoid discomfort, but Ms. Sarowa was restless.  When she was specifically asked to demonstrate range of motion it appeared quite limited, but she demonstrated a much freer range of motion spontaneously during the interview and other parts of his assessment.  He said that she could freely straight-leg raise from a sitting position, but couldn’t bend forward when standing ? an inconsistent presentation from an anatomical point of view.
The Court went onto to award little in the way of damages and in doing so made the following findings about the Plaintiff’s credibility:

[68]         Ms. Sarowa testified that she has not fully recovered from her accident injuries and continues to have neck and back discomfort, and frequent headaches.  As is usually the case, much of the plaintiff’s case rests on the extent to which the plaintiff is found to be a credible witness.  In this case, Ms. Sarowa was a less than satisfactory witness.  She was frequently evasive and non-responsive.  She was unable, or declined, to explain why she had claimed to be separated from her husband on December 31, 2007 when filing her 2007 tax return; but claimed at trial that she and her husband were back together at that time.

[69]         If she was being truthful at trial about the severity and duration of her accident injuries, than I would have to conclude that she omitted relevant information about her health when she applied for the job at Tim Horton’s in April 2007, and was deliberately untruthful when she applied for work at Brinks in September 2008.  I think it more likely that she was exaggerating the severity and duration of her injuries when testifying here at trial; as the evidence of her employers at Tim Horton’s and Brinks indicates she did not, in fact, demonstrate any difficulty with the physical performance of her job duties.

For those interested in this topic, this case is worth reviewing in full to get a sense of some of the factors courts look to when weighing a Plaintiff’s credibility in a soft tissue injury prosecution.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Shoulder Impingement in ICBC Claim


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing damages for accident related soft tissue injuries and shoulder impingement.
In last week’s case (Dial v. Grewal) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 BC motor vehicle collision.   Fault for the crash was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.  The Plaintiff faced some credibility challenges at trial and the Court found that she “exaggerated” some of her testimony about the extent of her symptoms however Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie found that the plaintiff did suffer real injuries including traumatic right shoulder impingement.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 the Court made the following findings:
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find on the evidence as a whole that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $50,000 for the injuries the plaintiff sustained to her neck and right shoulder, the aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition and headaches, and more minor injuries to her ribs, and dizziness…
[190] The purpose of a non-pecuniary damage award is to compensate a plaintiff for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities. While each award must be made with reference to the particular facts of the case, other decisions may assist the court in arriving at an award that is fair to both parties: Smaill v. Williams, 2010 BCSC 73 at para. 78…

[194]     The plaintiff relies on the following cases in support of her submission that $80,000 is the appropriate quantum for non-pecuniary damages: Kasic v. Leyh, 2009 BCSC 649;Predinchuk v. Spencer, 2009 BCSC 1396; Thomas v. Bounds, 2009 BCSC 462; and Lee v. Metheral, 2006 BCSC 1841.

[195]     I find, conversely, that these cases support higher awards than is fair in this case because the defendants have no obligation to compensate the plaintiff for symptoms attributable to her pre-accident low back condition.  That said, I find that an award that is just and fair to both parties is $50,000.

[196]     As I have already discussed, the plaintiff’s testimony about her symptoms and pain was at times vague and at others, exaggerated. Nevertheless, I accept that she suffered substantial pain for months after the accident, as is supported by the medical evidence in this case. Her pain gradually improved, and she was able to substitute for her husband at work about 14 to 18 months after the accident, albeit primarily for a few hours at a time but also with a few full-time shifts. By that time, her neck and shoulder pain were manageable. The aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition had also resolved such that her back had returned to its pre-accident condition.

You can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC Court cases awarding non-pecuniary damages for shoulder injuries.

BC Court Rejects ICBC's "LVI" Defence

One principle that has become clear in BC injury lawsuits is that ICBC’s LVI Policy of denying tort compensation in minimal vehicle damage accidents has no legal merit.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Mendoza-Flores v. Haigh) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate motor vehicle collisions.  She was injured in both.   ICBC accepted that the second accident caused some injuries but argued that the first crash “was incapable of causing the injuries complained of (by) the Plaintiff“.  Mr. Justice Harvey rejected this argument with the following useful comments:
[54] Regarding as the relationship between the damage to the two vehicles and the resultant claim for injuries suffered by one of the occupants, it is trite law that the fact that the damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle was minor does not lead to a conclusion that the resultant injuries are also minor: Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.).
The Court went on to award the Plaintiff damages for her injuries and loss including $40,000 for her non-pecuniary damages.   In reaching this figure Mr. Justice Harvey made the following findings:

[61]        In the result, I find that the plaintiff has experienced a moderate soft tissue injury which continues to cause both discomfort and poses problems in her employment to the present time.

[62]        The plaintiff never fully recovered from the effects of the first accident although it would seem, from the evidence, she was heading toward a complete resolution of her symptoms. Her symptoms just before the second accident were appreciably better than they are presently…

[67]        While unresolved to some extent, I do not view the evidence as proving the plaintiff’s injuries as permanent. Both from an investigative and treatment standpoint it appears there were, and are, further steps available to the plaintiff.

[68]        Reviewing her injuries and comparing them to the authorities I have been referred to, I conclude that $40,000 represents a proper global assessment of the plaintiff’s general damages arising from the two accidents.

You can click here to read my archived posts discussing other BC Court cases dealing with so-called Low Velocity Impacts.

More on ICBC Claims and Pre-Existing Asymptomatic Conditions

Quite often when people are injured in a car crash and experience pain they have X-rays or other diagnostic images taken of the painful areas.  Often times these studies show arthritis or other degenerative changes which didn’t pose any problems before the accident.
A common defence tactic is to argue that these degenerative changes would have become painful around the time of the accident in any event and therefore the person is entitled to less compensation.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with (and rejecting) such a defence.
In today’s case (Eblaghie v. Lee) the Plaintiff was injured when she was crossing the street in a marked crosswalk and was struck by the Defendant’s car.  Fault was admitted by the driver.  The Court found that the Plaintiff suffered ‘mechanical back pain…a soft tissue injury that affected the cervical spine” and also right knee “tear in the medial meniscus and patellofemoral derangement“.
The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s symptoms would have manifested even without the car crash because of underlying degenerative changes.  Mr. Justice Stewart outright rejected this argument holding as follows:
[19] I find as a fact that Dr. Regan is more likely than not correct when he says, in effect, that degenerative changes in the plaintiff’s spine were present as of February 27, 2007 but if they were asymptomatic – and I find as a fact that they were – then the onset, consistency and persistence of her pain and discomfort must lead to the conclusion that as a result of the defendant’s negligence that which had been asymptomatic became symptomatic.  The only other alternative is that we are in the presence of a remarkable coincidence.  And I reject that alternative as being so unlikely that it must be ignored.  In the result, the defendant’s negligence on February 27, 2007 is the head and source of pain and discomfort in the neck and low back that plague the plaintiff to this very day.
The Court found that the Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain were likely going to continue and awarded $60,000 for her non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).
The Court also had some critical comments to make with respect to the expert witness that testified for the Defendant.  The Defendant relied on Dr. Leith, whose opinion differed from the Plaintiff’s experts with respect to the cause of some of her symptoms.  Mr. Justice Stewart rejected Dr. Leith’s evidence and in doing so made the following critical comments:

[27] I must speak to the evidence of the orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Leith called to testify by the defendant.

[28] Dr. Leith’s evidence appears before me at Exhibit 13 Tab 2.  In addition, he testified before me.

[29] I found this witness’s evidence unhelpful.  There were a number of problems with his evidence and for this trier of fact the cumulative effect of these problems was such that I am not prepared to rely on Dr. Leith’s evidence on any point that actually matters.

[30] I will give a few examples of the problems I encountered.

[31] Dr. Leith’s simply dismissing out of hand the thought that overuse of the left knee as the plaintiff protected the right knee could result in damage to the left knee with resulting pain and discomfort is not “in harmony with human experience” (Cahoon v. Brideaux, 2010 BCCA 228, para. 4).  Deciding which evidence to rely upon is not simply a matter of counting heads, but – as noted above – it is a fact that two of the doctors who testified before me in effect say that Dr. Leith is simply wrong.  For this trier of fact common human experience and the opinions of the two doctors noted above carry the day.

Pain and Suffering Awards for Year Long Soft Tissue Injuries Discussed

Reasons for judgement were released today addressing the value of non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for 2 plaintiffs who suffered soft tissue injuries in a 2006 BC car crash.  I summarize the Court’s key findings in my continued effort to grow this public data base of damage awards in BC injury claims
In today’s case (Morrison v. Peng) the Plaintiffs (husband and wife) were rear-ended by a vehicle driven by the Defendant.  Fault was admitted leaving the Court to value the Plaintiffs’ injury claims.  Both suffered soft tissue injuries which lasted approximately one year.  In assessing the Plaintiffs non-pecuniary damages at $9,000 and $18,000 respectively Mr. Justice Masuhara summarized the injuries as follows:
[23] Having considered the evidence, I am of the view that Mr. Morrison suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck and back which can be characterized as mild, and that his symptoms resolved within a year.  Given my assessment of Mr. Morrison and the facts, my view is that he was able to do more than what he stated…
[26] Recognizing that the aforementioned cases are for guidance and that each case is to be determined on its own unique circumstances, I find a fair and reasonable non-pecuniary award to be $9,000.
________________________________________________________________________
[42] Ms. Jabs’ condition is somewhat complicated by the several conditions that she has identified in the report.  Based on the foregoing medical opinion, I find that that she suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper and lower back and that the symptoms she experienced resulting from the accident had a duration somewhat beyond one year of the accident.  Her chiropractic and massage treatments end at this point for about one year.  I would characterize her injuries as mild to moderate in severity. ..
[46] Recognizing that the aforementioned cases are for guidance and that each case is to be determined on its own unique circumstances, I find a fair and reasonable non-pecuniary award to be $18,000.
Feel free to visit the soft-tissue injury archives of this site to review other BC cases addressing non-pecuniary damages for soft tissue injuries.

The "Crumbling Skull" Doctrine: BC Injury Claims and Pre-Existing Degenerative Conditions


When a Plaintiff suffers injuries by the fault of another but the evidence establishes that the person would have likely suffered the same symptoms of pain because of a pre-existing condition the Plaintiff’s award of damages can be reduced to reflect this reality.  This principle of personal injury law is known as the “crumbling skull” doctrine.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In this week’s case (Booth v. Gartner) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 BC car crash.  The Defendant struck the Plaintiff’s vehicle when he entered an intersection against a red light.  ICBC admitted fault on behalf of the Defendant but disputed the extent of the accident related injuries.
At trial Mr. Justice Cole found that the accident caused a variety of injuries.  One of the most significant was low back pain which continued to the time of trial.  The Plaintiff did not have back pain before the car crash however she had severe pre-existing (although asymptomatic) facet arthritis in her low back.  The accident caused this condition to become painful.  The Court was persuaded that this condition had a likelihood of developing pain in the future even without the accident.  As a result of this finding the Court reduced the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages by 25%.  In reaching this result Mr. Justice Cole reasoned as follows:
[23] I accept Dr. Vallentyne’s opinion that the degeneration in her lower back is severe at two levels and it is likely she would have been troubled by lower back pain and stiffness at some time in the future, absent Accident #2. However, I am also satisfied that although the degeneration is pre-existing, there was symptomatic acceleration of the facet arthritis as a result of Accident #2…

[26] The CT scan of September 20, 2008, according to Dr. Vallentyne, “showed severe bilateral degeneration of the facet joints at the L4-5-S1 levels in addition to a minor 3 mm L4-5 degenerative anterolisthesis”.

[27] According to Dr. Vallentyne, degenerative changes take years to develop and he found it was probable that the plaintiff had degenerative changes of her lower lumbar facet joints prior to the 2007 motor vehicle accident. He concluded that “[g]iven that the degeneration is severe at two levels, it is likely that Ms. Booth would have been troubled by low back pain and stiffness at sometime in the future absent the 2007 MVA.”

[28] I am satisfied that there is a measurable risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, and I must take that into account in reducing the overall award.

[29] The principle to be applied is found in Zaruk v. Simpson et al., 2003 BCSC 1748, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 43 [Zaruk]. There the plaintiff had suffered a soft-tissue injury but some of her symptoms by the time of trial were consistent with degenerative changes. The Court was not satisfied that the general condition would have become symptomatic between the date of the accident and the date of trial, but concluded at para. 40, that there was a measurable risk that it would have become symptomatic in the future:

[40]   However, application of the crumbling skull doctrine may not result in the same reduction for past losses as future losses. Past losses must be assessed on the basis of a balance of probabilities. “Once the burden of proof is met, causation must be accepted as a certainty,” [Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458] ¶ 30). But for the assessment of future losses, “[a] future or hypothetical possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substantial possibility and not mere speculation,” (Athey ¶ 27)

[30] The Court then reduced non-pecuniary damages by 15% and future care damages by 20%.

[31] Because the plaintiff’s degenerative condition was described by Dr. Vallentyne as “severe bilateral degeneration”, I am of the view that a large deduction is appropriate in this case and I find an appropriate deduction for non-pecuniary damages is 25% and for future care damages, 30%.

As I previously wrote,  a great discussion of this area of the law was also provided in a recent case (Gohringer v. Hernandez-Lazo) where Madam Justice Russell summarized the law as follows:

[92] In a crumbling skull situation, as in this case, the plaintiff has a pre-existing condition which is active, or likely to become active.  The pre-existing condition “does not have to be manifest or disabling at the time of the tort to be within the ambit of the crumbling skull rule”: Barnes at para. 89, citing A. (T.W.N.) v. Clarke, 2003 BCCA 670, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 62. In crumbling skull situations, the defendant is only liable for damages caused by the accident and responsible for returning the plaintiff to their original position.  As Major J. stated in Athey: the defendant is liable for the additional damage but not the pre-existing damage: at para. 35.   The defendant is therefore not liable for the effects of the pre-existing condition that the plaintiff would have experienced in any event: A. (T.W.N.) at para. 52.  If there is a “measurable risk” that the pre-existing condition would have impacted the plaintiff in the future then, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, a court can take this into account in awarding damages: at para. 35.

[93] In addition, the defendant claims an independent intervening event, subsequent to the Accident, also had significant impact on the plaintiff.  An independent intervening event is an unrelated event, such as disease or a non-tortious accident, that occurs after the plaintiff is injured.  The impact of such events is taken into account in the same manner as pre-existing conditions: Barnes at para. 96.  Thus, the plaintiff is only entitled to damages which flow from the difference between his or her original position and their “injured position”: Athey at para. 32.  If the unrelated event would have impacted the plaintiff’s original position adversely, the “net loss” attributable to the accident at issue will not be as great and damages will be reduced proportionately: Barnes at para. 96.

[94] I note that our Court of Appeal has stated that a reduction in damages to reflect the impact of independent intervening events or pre-existing conditions applies equally to non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages: A. (T.W.N.) at paras. 36-37; Barnes at para. 90.

$35,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Low Back Pain With Poor Prognosis

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $64,000 in total damages as a result of BC car crash.
In this week’s case (Elgood v. Ellison) the Plaintiff was injured in 2006 when he was struck by a vehicle in Langley, BC.  The Plaintiff was walking in a marked cross-walk with the right of way when the Defendant driver made a left hand turn and struck the Plaintiff.  Fault was admitted and the trial focused solely on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Plaintiff suffered minor injuries to his legs and neck which quickly and fully recovered.  His most serious symptom was low back pain which persisted from the time of the accident through trial.   The evidence accepted by the Court was that the Plaintiff had mechanical pain around the lumbar spine and that these symptoms may be an ongoing problem for the Plaintiff.
(highlighted portion of illustration depicts the lumbar spine)
In awarding the 65 year old Plaintiff $35,000 for his non-pecuniary damages Mr. Justice Bracken made the following notable findings:

[39]        Dr. Hirsch concluded that the plaintiff has made a full recovery with respect to his legs and that he had a relatively minor neck injury that has now essentially resolved.

[40]        The more difficult problem is the lower lumbar spine area and Dr. Hirsch said that this condition was likely caused by the accident.  He described it as likely mechanical in nature and that it is exacerbated by stress or loading on the back.  He believes that the plaintiff should continue his home-based exercise program and perhaps attend for structured appointments with a kinesiologist or physiotherapist.  He also thought that some exercise such as tai chi, yoga, pilates or water-based exercises would be helpful.

[41]        He concluded that the plaintiff’s restrictions were attributable to chronic low back pain that was caused by the accident and that the prognosis for complete recovery was guarded given the plaintiff’s age and the duration of the symptoms.

[42]        He did believe that the plaintiff should be capable of performing his domestic chores but that he may have to pace himself and that he will have ongoing problems with more strenuous activities such as lifting, snow shovelling or completing significant household repairs.  He did not foresee any need for future care or for any surgery.

[43]        In summary, it appears that the plaintiff’s leg and shoulder injuries resolved very quickly and his neck pain diminished gradually over time, to the point where it is now only occasional pain and of a non-debilitating nature.  He had some early headaches which have now become occasional.

[44]        The significant pain that the plaintiff suffers is chronic low back pain that Dr. Hirsch predicts will likely be with him for the foreseeable future.  No doubt the low back pain will prevent him from doing many jobs, particularly those that require long periods of sitting.  Given his age and background, it is most likely that sedentary jobs will most likely be what are available to him.  He has sharply reduced his recreation, although some of the intense recreational and physical activities engaged in by the plaintiff would likely diminish in intensity over time due to the normal aging process regardless of his injury.  He will likely still have the ability to engage in mild recreational activities. The plaintiff says that even mild recreation or physical activity is too painful for him.

[45]        As Dr. Hirsch pointed out at p. 6 of his January 20, 2009 report:

Three years have elapsed since Mr. Elgood suffered his low back injury in the subject motor vehicle accident.  Given the duration of his symptoms, the prognosis regarding complete resolution of his low back pain has to be viewed as guarded at this juncture.  Given the temporal profile to date, I would consider it more likely than not that Mr. Elgood will experience low back pain indefinitely.  Low back symptoms of sufficient intensity will probably limit his ability to perform tasks which biomechanically stress his low back…

[51] While the plaintiff has been able to carry on with work, he and his wife both said that he has only been able to do so by enduring a level of chronic pain.  Based on the opinion of Dr. Hirsch, which I accept, his condition is not likely to be alleviated over time.  Bearing in mind his age and the impact of his injuries on his personal life and work life since the accident, in my view, the range of damages is between that of the plaintiff and defendant and I assess general damages at $35,000.