Author: admin

Defendant Awarded Double Costs for Successfully Defeating Claim Where "Walk Away" Offer was Made

Written by admin on June 14, 2010. Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized.

Rule 37B, the BC Supreme Court Rule dealing with formal settlement offers, continues to be shaped by the Courts. One factor that is not yet firmly established is what effect a “walk away” offer made by a Defendant has after a Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed at trial.
When a party sues for damages in the BC Supreme Court and later decides that their lawsuit is likely going to lose at trial they can discontinue. If this is done the Defendant is able to seek their costs at the time of discontinuance unless they waive this right. A common strategy of Defendants when they are confident they will win at trial is to make a formal “walk away” offer where they waive their right to costs if the Plaintiff discontinues. If the Plaintiff does not take the offer and goes on to lose at trial the Defendant may be entitled to ‘double costs’ which could easily add up to tens of thousands of dollars. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court dealing with a walk away offer.
In this week’s case (Riley v. Riley) the parties were involved in a lawsuit involving the transfer of real-estate between family members. (although this was not a personal injury case there is no reason why the Court’s reasoning cannot be used in the injury claims context). Prior to trial the Defendant made a formal offer under Rule 37B for the Plaintiff to walk away from the lawsuit on a ‘no costs‘ basis. The Plaintiff refused the offer, went to trial where her case was dismissed. The Defendant then asked the Court to award ‘double costs‘ and Mr. Justice Greyell agreed to do so. In concluding that this was a fair result the Court provided the following reasons:

[20] In MacKinlay v. MacKinlay Estate, 2008 BCSC 1570, Savage J. also considered the effect of Rule 37B when a nominal offer was made. The issue was whether double costs should be awarded where the successful defendant had made a nominal offer to settle. He held, at paras. 34-35:

[34] While a nominal offer might be described as strategic, it was a strategy aimed at persuading the Plaintiffs to discontinue the proceeding, an outcome that is favourable as compared to the outcome the Plaintiffs obtained at trial. Such an offer is one of the few tools in the arsenal of a defendant of relatively modest means which might exert pressure on a plaintiff pursuing an unmeritorious claim.

[35] In this regard, albeit in the context of the former Rule, the Court of Appeal in Kurylo v. Rai 2006 BCCA 176, 53 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, at ¶ 7 said:

…. When a defendant assesses his position in litigation of any kind he may consider that the plaintiff has no case and if the case goes to trial, will fail. But the defendant may also be willing to make some minor offer which would carry with it the costs in the hope that the action will go away and that he will not, thereafter, incur large legal bills to establish his legal position that the plaintiff has no case.

[21] I see no logical distinction between a nominal offer and an offer such as that made by the defendant in this case. The principle is the same. One party is provided with an offer to settle and if not successful at trial in advancing its position relative to the offer it may be held accountable for costs of pursuing the matter to trial.

[22] The second factor referred to in Rule 37B(6) clearly favours the defendant. The judgment upheld the position she outlined in the offer to settle. Had the plaintiff accepted it he would have saved not only his legal costs but also the legal costs he must pay to the defendant as the successful party.

[23] There are no other relevant circumstances which bear on my determination of double costs. The caution expressed by Hall J.A. in Catalyst Paper Corporation v. Companhia de Navegaçäo Norsul, 2009 BCCA 16, 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 17, is applicable in this case. Based on the considerations in the above paragraphs, I conclude the plaintiff shall pay double costs to the defendant. Those double costs shall commence seven days from the date the offer was made.

As mentioned at the start of this article, the formal offer Rule is still being shaped and the result of a ‘walk away’ offer is still not certain. To read a case where the Court refused to award double costs where a walk away offer was made you can click here.
In my continued efforts to get us all prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I will again point out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B so the issue of the effect of ‘walk away’ offers will continue to be judicially shaped moving forward.

Gas Station Found Liable for Slip and Fall on Ice; $40,000 Non-Pecs for Dislocated Kneecap

Written by admin on June 13, 2010. Posted in ICBC Knee Injury Cases, Occupier's liability claims, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week dealing with fault and damages arising from a slip and fall incident at a North Vancouver gas station.
In this week’s case (Foley v. Imperial Oil Limited) the Plaintiff, an insurance adjuster for ICBC, slipped and fell on ice located near a car wash at an Esso Station in North Vancouver. He suffered various injuries, the most serious being a dislocated knee. He claimed the Defendants were liable for his injuries and sued for damages. The Defendants disagreed arguing that they took reasonable care to keep the area clear of ice.
Mr. Justice MacKenzie agreed with the Plaintiff and found the Defendant responsible for the incident. The evidence showed that when cars left the car wash water would drip down and sometimes freeze causing ice. The Court found that the Defendant did not take adequate steps to warn of this known hazard. In finding the gas station at fault the Court reasoned as follows:

[69] The defendants maintained no regular patrol for ice, but left the frequency of patrol for ice to the employees. Mr. Morrow testified that when he did patrol, he occasionally found ice, and then he would apply fresh salt. So the presence of ice would move him to reapply salt. This indicates either that he was not salting enough, or the defendants were not sufficiently addressing the problem. Both Mr. Morrow and Mr. Christian knew that dripping water from cars would wash the salt away.

[70] In short, the washing away of salt by the water dripping from cars leaving the car wash bay, and then freezing, constituted an unusual hazard of which the defendants were aware, but the plaintiff was not. Mr. Morrow knew the ice was hard to see, particularly if it was clear, and covered by water dripping from cars. He saw the ice on which the plaintiff slipped and it was covered by water. Therefore, it was hard to see.

[71] The defendants did nothing to warn users of the car wash about the risk of ice. They could easily have put out the orange warning cones that conventionally alert people to risk, or posted readily visible signs warning of the risk of ice. The expense would have been minimal. They could also have improved the drainage to avoid the washing away of the salt, or closed the car wash, as they had done on a couple of occasions before when it was cold enough for ice to form at the known area of risk. The patrol for ice, and salting could have been more frequent.

[72] In MacLeod v. Yong, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2108 (S.C.) at para. 8, Mr. Justice Burnyeat listed a series of factors that are relevant in considering whether an occupier has fulfilled the duty imposed by s. 3 of the Occupiers Liability Act. These factors include “whether an unusual danger was present, whether a warning had been provided to the plaintiff, the ease or difficulty and the expense with which the unusual danger could have been remedied, and any prior record of safe usage of the premises by others or by the plaintiff.”

[73] In considering whether the defendants have breached their duty to take reasonable care to ensure the plaintiff would be reasonably safe on the premises, I must consider all the circumstances of the case, including: the slip and fall was reasonably foreseeable and the defendants were clearly aware of it; the efforts made by the defendants depended on the judgment of employees who were prone to human error and who were occupied with other duties; and it would have been easy and inexpensive for the defendants to put up a warning sign, or orange cones at the location they knew was particularly hazardous.

The Court went on to award the Plaintiff $40,000 for his injuries which included a dislocated knee cap. In reaching this award Mr. Justice MacKenzie provided the following reasons:

[126] The plaintiff’s most serious injury in the slip and fall was his dislocated right patella (kneecap). He also had a minor scrape on his head and strained wrists and abrasions that were bandaged at the hospital. He took nine days off work as the combined result of his knee and wrist injuries.

[127] The dislocated kneecap caused the plaintiff excruciating pain. There was profuse swelling and a very large bruise. It was swollen and red for a few weeks or a month or more after the fall.

[128] The plaintiff initially required crutches because he could not bear his weight. He also used a brace afterward, and tapered off his use of both the crutches and brace. The evidence as to how long he used both varies somewhat, but is simply a matter of inaccurate recording or memory, and not the plaintiff’s dishonesty.

[129] The wrist pain lasted a month or two, and he had a very stiff neck with pain for a week or two…

[135] The knee pain, while gradually abating, had essentially plateaued by the spring of 2007. It was getting stronger and better, but he still felt pain and instability in the right knee in the spring of 2007. He saw his doctor in the spring and summer of 2007 and the doctor recommended he see a specialist, Dr. Forsyth, at the McGavin Clinic at UBC…

[140] In the summer of 2008, the plaintiff’s symptoms improved again and he noticed fewer symptoms. The pain ranged from nothing to 20 out of 100, or quite modest discomfort. However, knee stamina for walking and standing had not improved. Sitting for prolonged periods made his knee ache. He also noticed increased joint sounds in his knee, especially when climbing stairs. The plaintiff was forthright in admitting that he had some such sounds in both knees before the slip and fall, but after it, he noticed increased joint sounds in his right knee which he still notices…

[168] The damages awarded in each case are specific to the particular facts. In this case, the plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer chronic pain and loss of enjoyment of life. His condition is likely to remain stable, although there is a risk that he may develop post-traumatic arthritis in the future, which could have further negative impact on his daily activities.

[169] Based on my findings and upon reviewing the cases, I find an award of non-pecuniary damages of $40,000 is appropriate.

BC Injury Law Podcast: Non-Pecuniary Damages

Written by admin on June 11, 2010. Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, Uncategorized.

This is the first in what I intend to be a series of podcasts discussing topics of interest involving ICBC and other BC personal injury claims.
Today’s topic is valuing a person’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) as a result of injuries caused by the fault of another. To listen simply click on the following link: bc-injury-law-podcast-non-pecuniary-damages
The case discussed in this Podcast is Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34 and can be found by clicking here.

ICBC Claims, Uninsured Motorists, and the Definition of "Highway"

Written by admin on June 11, 2010. Posted in Uncategorized. 60 Comments on ICBC Claims, Uninsured Motorists, and the Definition of "Highway"

Did you know that if you are injured in BC by a motorist who does not have any insurance at all you can still seek coverage of your tort claim directly from ICBC? The reason you can do this is because of Section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act which requires ICBC to pay the damages directly when an uninsured motorist negligently injures others.
There are limits to ICBC’s liability under this section, and one such limitation is that the collision has to occur on a ‘highway‘. If the crash does not occur on a ‘highway‘ then ICBC does not need to pay damages under section 20. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George registry, dealing with exception.
In today’s case (Pierre v. Miller) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. The collision took place on Finlay Forest Service Road, a fairly remote road in British Columbia. The Defendant was not insured and ICBC defended the case directly by the authority given to them under section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. ICBC’s lawyer brought a motion for a declaration that Finlay Forest Service Road is not a highway.
Mr. Justice Meiklem agreed with ICBC finding that the road was “a forest service road” and therefore not a highway and ordered that ICBC did not have to pay the Plaintiff anything for his injuries under section 20.
In reaching this conclusion the Court gave the following summary of the definition of “Highway” for the purpose of Uninsured Motorist Claims:

[3] In order for ICBC to be liable to pay a claim under the provisions of the s. 20 of the IMV Act, the claim must arise out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle on a highway in British Columbia. This follows from the definition of “claimant” and “uninsured motorist” in s. 20 of the IMV Act. “Highway” is defined in the IMV Act as meaning a highway as defined in the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996. c. 318 (“MVA”). The MVA definition of highway is:

“highway” includes

(a) every highway within the meaning of the Transportation Act,

(b) every road, street, lane or right of way designed or intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles, and

(c) every private place or passageway to which the public, for the purpose of the parking or servicing of vehicles, has access or is invited,

but does not include an industrial road;

[4] The MVA also defines “industrial road” as follows:

“industrial road” means industrial road as defined in the Industrial Roads Act, and includes a forest service road as defined in the Forest Act and land designated as a development road under section 8 (1) of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act;

[5] The definition of an industrial road in the Industrial Roads Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 189 is not applicable in this case but the Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157 definition of forest service road which is part of the definition of an industrial road in the MVA is in issue. The Forest Act defines a “forest service road” as follows:

“forest service road” means a road on Crown land that

(a) is declared a forest service road under section 115 (5),

(b) is constructed or maintained by the minister under section 121,

(c) was a forest service road under this definition as it was immediately before the coming into force of this paragraph, or

(d) meets prescribed requirements;

[6] The motor vehicle accident in this case occurred on a road known and marked as the Finlay Forest Service Road. The applicant ICBC argues that the Finlay Forest Service Road falls within the Forest Act definition because it is declared to be a forest service road and because it was constructed or maintained by the Minister of Forests. The respondent plaintiff argues that the Finlay Forest Service Road is a highway by way of public expenditure to which s. 42 of the Transportation Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 44 applies and also because it is used by the general public for the passage of vehicles. Alternatively the plaintiff argues that if the Finlay Forest Service Road is a forest service road it does not satisfy the definition under the IMV Act because it is a Community Use Forest Service Road rather than an Industrial Use Forest Service Road, it is not primarily for the transportation of natural resources or machinery materials or personal and it is not maintained by the Ministry of Forests and Range.

[7] Another statutory provision of interest although not directly helpful in characterizing the Finlay Forest Service Road is s. 56 of the Transportation Act which enables the Lieutenant Governor and Council, with the consent of the Minister of Transportation and Highways and Minister of Forests and Range to order that a forest service road cease to be a forest service road and become an arterial highway or a rural highway. There is no evidence that this has occurred in this case.

BC Court of Appeal: No Litigation Privilege During Investigative Stage

Written by admin on June 10, 2010. Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

As I’ve previously written, litigation privilege is a principle which allows parties in a law suit to keep evidence from the other side. In order to successfully take advantage of litigation privilege the document not only has to have been created in the reasonable contemplation of a lawsuit but also for the ‘dominant purpose‘ of use in such a lawsuit.
If a document was made for multiple reasons (ie – investigating a potential claim and defending against a potential claim) the law will likely require disclosure. Today the BC Court of Appeal released useful reasons summarizing this area of law.
In today’s case (Mathew v. Delta School District #37) the Plaintiff ‘slipped and fell on some ice at a school’. Shortly after the incident the school’s principal, a teaching assistant and a custodian made notes documenting what occurred. The Plaintiff started a lawsuit and asked for these. The Defendant refused to produce these claiming they were privileged. The dispute made it all the way to the BC Court of Appeal who found that the documents were not privileged as they were made during the ‘investigatory stage‘. The BC High Court provided the following very useful reasons:

[11] The investigatory stage to which the master referred is well recognized in the authorities. In Hamalainen at para. 24, the following was quoted from a speech in Waugh v. British Railways Board, [1980] A.C. 521 at 541, attributing it to what Lord Denning had said in that case:

If material comes into being for a dual purpose – one to find out the cause of the accident – the other to furnish information to the solicitor – it should be disclosed, because it is not then “wholly or mainly” for litigation. On this basis all the reports and inquiries into accidents – which are made shortly after the accident – should be disclosed on discovery and made available in evidence at the trial.

[12] The investigatory stage was discussed in Hamalainen as follows:

[26] Even in cases where litigation is in reasonable prospect from the time a claim first arises, there is bound to be a preliminary period during which the parties are attempting to discover the cause of the accident on which it is based. At some point in the information gathering process the focus of such an inquiry will shift such that its dominant purpose will become that of preparing the party for whom it was conducted for the anticipated litigation. In other words, there is a continuum which begins with the incident giving rise to the claim and during which the focus of the inquiry changes. At what point the dominant purpose becomes that of furthering the course of litigation will necessarily fall to be determined by the facts peculiar to each case.

[13] It was, on the evidence, open to the master to regard the notes as being made in the investigatory stage as opposed to the later litigation stage. They were made directly following Mr. Mathew’s accident. I recognize it may be argued that, in the circumstances, there was little in the way of an investigatory stage here. But that is a matter to be determined on the peculiar facts of each case and I am unable to accept that the evidence foreclosed the significance the master appears to have attached to the notes being made as quickly as they were in relation to the incident.

The Problem With Losing An ICBC Injury Claim at Trial

Written by admin on June 10, 2010. Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized. 60 Comments on The Problem With Losing An ICBC Injury Claim at Trial

When Plaintiffs have their injury claim dismissed in the BC Supreme Court, not only do they get nothing to compensate them for their injuries, they actually end up having to pay the Defendant money. How can this be? The reason is something called “costs“. Generally speaking, the loser has to pay the winner’s Court costs and disbursements.
So how much money are we talking about here? The answer is thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, sometimes even over one hundred thousand dollars. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, demonstrating this.
In this week’s case (Pearlman v. Atlantic Trading Company Ltd.) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision in 2004. He sued the party he claimed was responsible for his injuries. He also sued ICBC alleging that ICBC “had requested a medical report from his family doctor whose authorization to provide the report had been revoked by the Plaintiff.”.
A jury dismissed the Plaintiff’s first claim and a Judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s second claim. ICBC was awarded their Court costs. The BC Supreme Court assessed these at $66,000 for the two claims combined. The Plaintiff then appealed these costs awards. Madam Justice Gropper dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeals and upheld the awards.
While this case does not contain any unique or novel principles of law, it is worth reviewing because it demonstrates the stark realty that people can pay a very high price if they are on the losing end of an ICBC claim in the BC Supreme Court.
If you are interested in more information on costs consequences in BC Supreme Court injury lawsuits you can click here to read my archived posts on this topic.

There is Nothing "Mild" about Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Written by admin on June 9, 2010. Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 2 Comments on There is Nothing "Mild" about Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI) are generally categorized as Mild, Moderate and Severe. Despite what the name suggests, there is nothing necessarily “mild” about the effects of a mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI). Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster registry, doing a great job explaining this.
In today’s case (Cikojevic v. Timm) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2002 crash. She was 17 at the time. She was a passenger in a truck that drove off the road and hit a tree. The force of the collision “threw her head into the windshield hard enough to star it“.
All of the medical experts that examined the Plaintiff (both her own and those hired by ICBC) agreed she suffered a mild traumatic brain injury in this crash. The consequences of this never fully resolved and the Court accepted she would struggle with life long difficulties. Mr. Justice Brown awarded the Plaintiff over $1.4 million in total compensation including $1 million for her diminished earning capacity over her lifetime. The case is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s discussion of this head of damage. Prior to awarding damages Mr. Justice Brown provided the following useful quote about “mild” TBI:

[251] Although experts sometimes disagree on whether to call an injury a mild concussion or a MTBI, either term is suitable.

[252] “Mild” describes the severity of the organic injury, not its effect.

[253] Although the organic severity of an injury usually associates with the severity of symptoms, sometimes symptoms can be severe while the organic injuries to the brain are mild.

[254] Upwards of 85% of people suffering uncomplicated MTBI recover within six months. The recovery range lies between 85% and 95%, depending on the expert’s views and the literature they accept. I find that around 90% of people suffering uncomplicated MTBI recover according to scientific literature. However, as noted by Dr. Anton, such statistics are of no value when dealing with a patient who falls into the subset of people who never fully recover. Each case must be evaluated individually.

[255] The cognitive and emotional effects of MTBI can severely disable and impact the injured person’s life.

You can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC personal injury cases dealing with Traumatic Brain Injury.

Gross vs. Net Special Damages At Trial in ICBC Claims

Written by admin on June 9, 2010. Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits, Uncategorized. 57 Comments on Gross vs. Net Special Damages At Trial in ICBC Claims

Special Damages are out of pocket expenses a Plaintiff incurs as a result of the fault of another. In an ICBC claim some of the typical special damages are costs for therapies and medication.
When a tort claim goes to trial a Plaintiff is entitled to recover their special damages from the at fault party. There is a very important exception to this in ICBC Claims, and that is if the Plaintiff’s special damages are covered by his own ‘no-fault’ insurance from ICBC an at fault defendant is entitled to reduce the amount of special damages by the amount the Plaintiff claimed or could have claimed under their own policy of insurance. (You can click here to read a previous post of mine for more background on this topic)
At trial, then, should a Plaintiff advance a claim only for expenses that have not already been covered by ICBC or should they advance a claim for all of their out of pocket expenses? Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing this.
In today’s case (Gasior v. Bayes) the Plaintiff was injured when his bicycle was struck by a vehicle. At trial a Jury awarded the Plaintiff $488,500. The trial judge then reduced portions of this award to account for ‘no-fault’ benefits the Plaintiff would be entitled to.
ICBC, on behalf of the defendant, appealed arguing that the trial judge was incorrect in some of her deductions. The Defendant claimed that a Plaintiff has to advance all of their special damages at trial (including money already reimbursed by ICBC) so that a proper deduction can be made after the special damages are assessed. The Court of Appeal disagreed and provided the following useful practice tip:
[17] The defendants argued that under the provisions of s. 25 of the Act, it was only appropriate for a plaintiff to advance a claim for all special damages (gross basis), allow the trier of fact to pass on this figure and make an award, and thereafter permit the defendant to deduct from such award all no-fault benefits previously advanced. This methodology has some attraction on the basis of simplicity (and avoidance of the sort of confusion that seems to have bedevilled this case). However, as pointed out by counsel for the plaintiff, when trying to conform to such methodology in a case before a jury, it becomes very difficult to avoid references to insurance and the insurer. As well, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to become aware of all expenditures paid on a no-fault basis by the insurer. If these hurdles could be satisfactorily overcome, the methodology argued for by the defendants may be preferable, but I consider that advancement of a special damages claim on a net basis can be an acceptable approach, especially in a jury trial. That methodology which will most effectively avoid the possibility of any infringement of the rule against double recovery is to be favoured and I would leave it to the good sense of counsel and trial judges to seek to achieve such result in any given case. Clear communications between respective counsel and the trial judge are essential for the achievement of such result. I would note there was some deficiency in clarity of communication in this case.

Defence Medical Exams – Best Expert Not Required to "Level the Playing Field"

Written by admin on June 9, 2010. Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on Defence Medical Exams – Best Expert Not Required to "Level the Playing Field"

(Update: November 14, 2011 – The case discussed in the below post in now publicly available. Master Scarth’s reasons for judgement can be accessed here)
Further to my previous posts about Independent Medical Exams in BC Supreme Court Injury Claims unpublished reasons for judgement recently came to my attention (Hou v. Kirmani BCSC Vancouver Registry, 20091119) dealing with the ability for a Defendant to have an injured party undergo multiple exams where the first defence expert feels an opinion from a second expert would be of benefit.
In this recent case the Plaintiff was a pedestrian who was apparently struck by a vehicle. She suffered “multiple injuries including traumatic brain injury“. One of her most serious injuries was a foot and ankle injury. She consented to attend a Defence Medical Exam with an orthopaedic surgeon. He provided the following opinion:
(the Plaintiff) would benefit from an opinion from a foot and ankle orthopaedic surgeon, as further surgical intervetnion may be of benefit to her and this might include surgical correction of her deformity so as to allow her to bear weight and walk short distances more appropriately. …I do not feel further passive treatment for her left foot and ankle will be of any benefit to her..
The Defendant brought a motion to compel the Plaintiff to be examined by a second orthopeadic surgeon, this time one with a specialty in foot an ankle injuries. The Plaintiff opposed arguing a further exam was not necessary. Master Scarth agreed and dismissed the motion. In doing so the Court made the following comments about the purpose and limitations of Defence Medical Exams:
…I am not of the view that Rule 30 is intended to allow follow-up on every issue which is raised by experts who examine the plaintiff.
Dr. Arthur was chosen, and I accept the submissions of the plainitff in this regard, with the knowledge that there were concerns regarding this plaintiff’s ankle. Thee is, it is fair to say, nothing new since Dr. Arthur was retained, apart from his reticence to provide an opinion. And he does not say, I do not believe, that he is not qualified to give the opinion which is missing, if it is missing. He simply says, I think it is fair to conclude, that in the best of all worlds she would be seen by an orthopaedic surgeon with a subspeciality training. In my view that is not the purpose of Rule 30.
As mentioned above, this is an unreported judgement but if anyone wants a copy feel free to contact me and I’ll be happy to e-mail a copy of the transcript.