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Tag: tinnitus

$85,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Tinnitus

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic tinnitus caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Christensen v. Jand) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2013 collision.  The Defendant denied liability but was found 100% liable at trial.  THe crash caused soft tissue injuries that largely recovered and also tinnitus which had a poor prognosis for recovery.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $85,000 Madam Justice Forth provided the following reasons:
51]         Accordingly, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that as a result of the accident Mr. Christensen suffered soft tissue issues, which have largely resolved, except for some mild early morning stiffness, and tinnitus, for which he will continue to suffer on a permanent basis…

[65]         Mr. Christensen has suffered a permanent injury in the form of a ringing in his ears. There is a high unrelenting squeal in his right ear. This sound was reproduced by a computer and played during the trial. The sound was highly irritating and objectionable. Mr. Christensen testified that since the accident, he has been hearing the same sound. It is with him at all times and has impacted his personality, his outlook on life, his ability to sleep, his relationship with his children, and his occupation.

[66]         There is no treatment that can stop this noise. He has had to learn to accept it but thinks about it every day. This causes him anxiety.

[67]         He finds that loud noises bother him. He has become grumpier with his children.

[68]         In order to help him sleep, he drinks. He testified that he drinks two beers and a full glass of wine every night to help him sleep. He has concerns with this consumption since alcoholism has been an issue in his immediate family.

[69]         He is not a complainer and has returned to all of his past activities, except coaching soccer. There was approximately a four to six month period when he was not running. He has returned to running approximately the same distance as before.

[70]         He immediately returned to his scheduled work and has continued working.

[71]         His sister, oldest son, and his friend Darren Babey, testified to the change in his personality in that he was grumpier and less patient after the accident. His sister was most concerned in the initial two years, when she saw signs of depression, anger, and frustration. She testified to conversations during the initial two years when she had to “talk him off the ledge a little bit when he didn’t think he could beat this” and he once told her, “he’ll commit suicide with this”. Gradually her brother started to accept the “new norm”.

[72]         It is to Mr. Christensen’s credit that he has returned to work and his activities. He has continued to care for his sons as a single father. He has been able to learn to live with the constant noise and has adjusted to life with it.

[73]         I have reviewed the various cases provided, and in assessing the particular circumstances of Mr. Christensen, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damage is $85,000.

$48,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Soft Tissue Injuries With Tinnitus

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for largely recovered soft tissue injuries with associated tinnitus.
In today’s case (Pichugin v. Stoian) the Plaintiff was involved in a modest rear end collision in 2010.  Fault was admitted.   The Plaintiff was uninjured at the scene but shortly thereafter started to experience neck and back pain.  These symptoms largely recovered by 2012.  In addition to the soft tissue injuries the Plaintiff suffered from tinnitus which was caused secondary to his whiplash injury.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $48,000 Mr. Justice Skolrood provided the following reasons:
[66]         I find on the evidence that Mr. Pichugin suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck and back as a result of the accident. Those injuries caused him pain and discomfort for approximately one and a half years after the accident but he improved steadily and his symptoms were largely resolved by the fall of 2012. However, I accept that he continues to experience periodic pain and discomfort in his neck and back, of relatively minor severity, largely related to physical activity…
 
[71]         I am satisfied that Mr. Pichugin’s tinnitus was caused by the accident. Dr. Longridge’s opinion to this effect is supported by the scientific literature as reflected in the Folmer and Greist paper. Even absent the findings in that paper, Dr. Longridge noted again that physicians have long recognized that whiplash can cause tinnitus. The defendant has not established any other likely, or even possible, cause that would serve to undermine Dr. Longridge’s opinion.
[72]         In terms of the impact of his condition on his activities and lifestyle, Mr. Pichugin testified that he is less able to help his wife with things like vacuuming and grocery shopping. However, it was also clear from the evidence that overall Mr. Pichugin is more active than he was prior to the accident as he has increased his activity level following his heart attack.
[73]         With respect to the tinnitus, he testified that while it sometimes causes him difficulty in getting to sleep, once he is asleep it does not interfere with the quality of his sleep. Moreover, he was unable to say with any degree of certainty how much sleep he loses as a result of the condition. Apart from some disruption while reading, there was no evidence that the condition otherwise interferes with his work or his recreational activities…
85]         In my view, the severity and effects of Mr. Pichugin’s tinnitus are less than what was experienced by the plaintiff in Yang and more in line with the condition suffered by the plaintiff in Maddex. However, Mr. Pichugin’s soft tissue injuries were more severe than those of the plaintiff in Maddex. Taking all of the circumstances into account, I find that an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages is $48,000.
 

Useful Insight into Cross-Examination in an ICBC Brain Injury Claim

When involved in an ICBC Injury Claim it is natural to want to know what the trial experience can be like. The best way to experience what the Court process is like is to actually attend a live trial and watch the evidence play out before you.  This is easy enough to do, particularly in larger centres around the Province, like in Vancouver or New Westminster, as an injury trial is occurring on almost any given day.
If you can’t do this you can read past court judgements to get a feel for the ways these claims can proceed at trial.  While this is not nearly as enlightening as witnessing a live trial some useful insight can still be gleaned.  If you are looking for a court judgement giving insight into the court process Reasons for judgement were released today reproducing extensive portions of a Plaintiff’s cross examination in an ICBC Brain Injury Claim that are worth reviewing in full.
In today’s case (Trevitt v. Tobin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 Motorcycle Accident in Surrey, BC.    The Defendant pulled into the Plaintiff’s line of travel while making a left hand turn.  The Defendant ultimately conceded the issue of fault.
The trial focused on the injuries the Plaintiff had the the appropriate award for compensation.  The Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a traumatic brain injury and as a result would suffer a serious ongoing disability.  The Plaintiff sought over $1.5 million dollars in total damages.
The Plaintiff’s claim with respect to his injuries and the extent of disability was largely rejected with Mr. Justice McEwan finding that “the physical evidence does not account for a head injury or concussion“.  In the end the Court found that the Plaintiff suffered from “general bruising and shaking up in the accident” and following a setback in his career ambitions he suffered from “ongoing difficulties with headaches, tinnitus and some balance issues“.  The Court found that these issues were ongoing by the time of trial (some 5 years later).  The Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) was valued at $60,000.
The Court heard from many very qualified physicians who gave opinion evidence with respect to the Plaintiff’s medical condition.  As is often the case in ICBC Injury Claims the court heard competing expert evidence from physicians called by the Plaintiff and the Defendant.  In determining which experts had the more useful evidence Mr. Justice McEwan pointed out that “what any given doctor ‘believes’ is only helpful to the extent taht the underlying information is plausible by the standards of the court“.
To this end, the The Plaintiff’s credibility and reliability were put squarely at issue in this trial.    The Defence lawyer argued that credibility was central to this case and engaged in an extensive cross examination relating to the Plaintiff’s credibility as a witness.  Portions of this cross examination are set out in paragraphs 15-18 and these give good insight into what cross-examination can be like in Injury Litigation.   Ultimately Mr. Justice McEwan held that the plaintiff gave some “unusual” and “inconsistent” evidence and that “he quite clearly cannot be relied upon for the accuracy of his observations about his condition“.

A Busy Day – 3 Car Crash Cases Released by BC Supreme Court

There is a lot to blog about today so I will have to keep these case summaries short.  The BC Supreme Court released 3 cases today that may be of interest to people advancing ICBC claims.
The first deals with the choice of forum of where to sue.  The Plaintiff was in a collision with a tractor trailer in 2007.  The crash happened in Alberta.  The Plaintiff lived in BC and the owner of the tractor trailer had a registered business office in BC.  The Plaintiff started the lawsuit in BC and the Defendant brought a motion that the case should be dismissed or stayed because the lawsuit should have been started in Alberta.
After summarizing the applicable law the court sided largely with the Defendants finding that:

[27] The purpose of this statement is encapsulated in British Columbia in s. 11(2)(f) of the CJPTA.

[28] I do not consider that as between British Columbia and Alberta there is no one forum that is not clearly more appropriate than the other. I am satisfied that, while there may be some advantage to the plaintiff in pursuing his claim in British Columbia, Alberta is the forum with the closest connection to the subject matter of the proposed litigation and that the facts upon which the proceeding against the non-resident defendant is based arise in that jurisdiction. I conclude that Alberta is clearly the more appropriate forum in which to litigate the proposed action.

[29] I was advised by counsel for the plaintiff that as yet there have been no proceedings commenced in Alberta. Neither counsel were able to advise me whether the plaintiff faced any statutory defences, such as a limitation defence, in Alberta. As there may be defences against the plaintiff’s claim in Alberta if proceedings are brought there which would not be available in British Columbia, I am not prepared to dismiss the plaintiff’s action in this jurisdiction.

[30] In the result, I will, however, direct that the plaintiff’s action in British Columbia be stayed, pending further order of this Court, should an action in Alberta be met with defences that are not available in British Columbia, or in the event that the plaintiff’s claim is resolved in Alberta.

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The second case released today dealt with Court Costs.  Typically when a case succeeds in Supreme Court the winner is entitled to court ‘costs’.  In theory this is to compensate the winner for having to trigger the judicial process to get whats fair.
After an 11 day trial as a result of a car accident the Plaintiff was awarded $81,694 in damages for injuries and loss.  In the trial the Plaintiff’s claim for past wage loss and cost of future care were dismissed.
The Defendant brought a motion asking the court to award the defendant ‘costs and disbursements for that portion of the proceedings ralted to the cloaims fr past income loss and cost of future care’ amongst other relief.  The motion was brought further to Rules 57(9) which states

Subject to subrule (12), costs of and incidental to a proceeding shall follow the event unless the court otherwise orders.

And rule 57(15) which states

The court may award costs that relate to some particular issue or part of the proceeding or may award costs except so far as they relate to some particular issue or part of the proceeding.

The court granted the motion stating that:

Analysis and Decision

[22] After analyzing the submissions of the plaintiff and the defendant, I reiterate that the plaintiff’s claims in this action were very exaggerated.  I am satisfied that the defendant has established that there are discrete issues upon which he succeeded at trial.  I agree that the defendant should receive his costs and disbursements related to the issues of past wage loss and the cost of future care and, conversely, that the plaintiff should be denied her costs and disbursements related to those issues.

[23] I also agree with the defendant that many of the witnesses testified entirely, or primarily, in relation to the two issues on which the plaintiff was unsuccessful.  I agree that the evidence of Mr. Scott, Mr. Parcher and Ms. Keller all concerned the issue of past wage loss.  In addition, much of Mr. Johnson’s evidence concerned an alleged lost employment opportunity.  I also agree, based on the clerk’s notes, that these witnesses accounted for approximately one day of trial.  In addition, I agree that half of the evidence of Mr. McNeil and the two reports submitted by Mr. Carson related to the claim for cost of future care, and that Mr. McNeil testified for more than one day and Mr. Carson for 45 minutes.

[24] Lastly, I am of the view that there was divided success in this action and I find that the apportionment of costs would therefore produce a just result.

Conclusion

[25] On the basis of the foregoing, I order that the plaintiff be denied her costs associated with two days of trial, and her disbursements associated with the issues of past wage loss and cost of future care, including the cost of care reports of Mr. McNeil and Mr. Carson.  In addition, the defendant is awarded his costs and disbursements for two days of trial.

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The third case of interest released today dealt with a car accident from 2003 which allegedly caused severe psychological injuries.
The crash occurred at an intersection in Surrey.  The Plaintiff was turning left on a green light.  The defendant entered the intersection approaching from the Plaintiff’s left.  The Defendant had a red light.  The accident then occurred.  The Defendant was found 90% at fault and the Plaintiff was found 10% at fault for failing the see the defendant’s vehicle which was ‘there to be seen’
The most contentious alleged injuries were brain injury and Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID).  The plaintiff did seem to suffer from DID, the question was whether the car crash caused this.
The court made the following findings with respect to injuries:

[159] The accident caused the plaintiff’s PTSD, various soft tissue injuries, a pain disorder, depression, tinnitus, and a visual vestibular mismatch which results in dizziness.  The accident dramatically reduced her enjoyment of life and caused the loss of various amenities of life.  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was a highly functional mother of three with an apparently limitless future.  In the aftermath of the accident, her life has been devastated.  She can no longer look after herself or her children.  She lives in an assisted living facility.  She is separated from her husband. Her future prospects are grim.

[160] While some of the plaintiff’s loss arises from her DID and is not subject to compensation, I find the plaintiff has suffered grievously as a direct result of the accident.  The accident clearly terrified her.  Much of her loss of enjoyment of life has been caused by her levels of anxiety and depression as she focused on what she could no longer do.  She was told that she had suffered a serious brain injury.  This led her to believe there was nothing she could do to improve her condition and contributed to her downward spiral.  Her tinnitus and dizziness are likely permanent.  The prognoses for her TMJ problems are guarded.  There is some optimism that her pain disorder will improve given her recent change in medication.  Similarly, over time her depression should respond to treatment.  Her PTSD, although serious in years immediately subsequent to the accident, now appears to be in partial remission.  Absent her DID, the plaintiff would now be on the road to recovery.  DID plays a major role in her present situation and limits, at least for the next few years, her future opportunities.

$150,000 was awarded for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life)

Close to $900,000 Awarded for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI)

Following a trial that lasted over 6 weeks, reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff close to $900,000 in damages as a result of a 2002 car crash that occurred in Vancouver, BC.
The Plaintiff, while stopped at a red light, was rear-ended by a Ford F150 pick up truck.  The force of the collision was found to be ‘sufficiently strong to cause the plaintiff to suffer bruising across his chest where the seat-belt had restrained him’.  The Plaintiff was able to drive away from the scene.
The Defendant did not admit fault but was found 100% at fault for this rear-end car crash.
The Plaintiff alleged various serious injuries including a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI), Post Concussion Syndrome, Tinnitus, Dizziness, Loss of Balance and Depression.
The defence denied these injuries and insisted that the Plaintiff’s complaints were exaggerated.
The Plaintiff’s claim was largely accepted.  The court found that the Plaintiff ‘indeed suffered a mild traumatic brain injury which has resulted in a constellation of problems including a post concussion syndrome, a cognitive disorder, a major depressive disorder with anxiety, a pain disorder; and the significant exacerbation of his tinnitus.’
In the end the Court assessed damages as follows:

(i)

General damages – non-pecuniary

$200,000.00

(ii)

Past loss of income

$171,250.00

(iii)

Future loss of income earning capacity

$400,000.00

(iv)

Loss of opportunity

$10,000.00

(v)

Special damages

$26,955.75

(vi)

Costs of future care

$77,449.00

(vii)

Management and Tax Gross up

(to be determined)

This case is worth reviewing for anyone advancing an ICBC injury claim involving a mild traumatic brain injury.  Madam Justice Boyd engages in a thoughtful discussion of the competing medical evidence and provides articulate reasons why the Plaintiff’s physicians opinions were preferred over those of the Defence experts.
The court also makes interesting commentary on Waddell Signs starting at paragraph 34 of the reasons, particularly that:

[34] The defence also stressed the findings of Dr. Sovio, the orthopaedic surgeon retained by the defence, who examined Young in January 2006.  He concluded the plaintiff had exhibited significant exaggeration of his symptomology during several tests- thus exhibiting a number of positive Waddell signs.  As he put it, the plaintiff’s perception of his symptoms did not match the findings on physical examination.  The defence relies heavily on this opinion to support a finding the plaintiff is guilty of malingering or symptom exaggeration.

[35] I accept both Dr. Coen’s, and Dr. Rathbone’s evidence that the Waddell signs are notoriously unreliable for detecting malingering.  As Dr. Rathbone testified, the Waddell signs are “distinctly unreliable” in cases where the patient suffers depression.  Indeed the literature presented to Dr. Sovio at trial echoed that warning.  In cross-examination, Dr. Sovio adopted the extract from the SPINE journal (Exhibit 67, Tab 6, SPINE Volume 23, Number 21, pp. 2367-2371) to the effect that non organic signs cannot be interpreted in isolation.  He accepted the following summary at the outset of that article:

Behavioural responses to examination provide useful clinical information, but need to be interpreted with care and understanding.  Isolated signs should not be overinterpreted.  Multiple signs suggest that the patient does not have a straightforward physical problem, but that psychological factors also need to be considered.  …Behavioural signs should be understood as responses affected by fear in the context of recovery from injury and the development of chronic incapacity.  They offer only a psychological ‘yellow-flag’ and not a complete psychological assessment.  Behavioural signs are not on their own a test of credibility or faking.

Of course, as I will later note, in early 2006 the plaintiff was significantly depressed.  I have no doubt that any number of psychological factors were at play in the course of Dr. Sovio’s examination which may well have presented as the non-organic signs detected.  However, I do not conclude that the plaintiff was deliberately malingering or exaggerating his symptoms during that examination.

BC Supreme Court awards $229,890 for Concussion and Chronic Back Pain

In written reasons for judgement released today, a Plaintiff who was injured in a 2003 single vehicle accident was awarded a total of $229,890 for his injuries and losses.
The Plaintiff, who was 18 at the time, was the centre passenger in a pick-up truck that lost control. The accident was significant. The truck “crossed a cattle guard and then hit loose gravel. The Driver lost control and the truck slid off the embankment. It rolled a number of times and apparently flipped end over end once. In ended up lying on its right side.”
For a time, the Plaintiff lost consciousness. He suffered a concussion and for a while suffered symptoms of headaches, light headedness, imbalance and tinnitus (ringing in the ears.) These symptoms resolved by the time of trial. He also had a neck injury which largely resolved and a shoulder injury which fully resolved by the time of trial.
The Plaintiff’s main injury by the time of trial was chronic low back pain.
4 doctors testified on the Plaintiff’s behalf. His family doctor painted a positive picture of the Plaintiff.
A specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation (physiatrist) testified that the Plaintiff suffered from a soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine (neck and low back).
A rheumatologist testified that the Plaintiff suffered from chronic back pain and that this pain “would have a significant negative influence upon his ability to compete in the workforce in the area of strenuous laboring jobs.”
A specialist in occupational medicine testified that the Plaintiff had not recovered from the soft tissue injuries to his back and that “it is unlikely the Plaintiff will have full resolution of his back injuries“.
The defence had the Plaintiff assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon. This is a common choice of ICBC for their ‘independent medical exams” when dealing with soft tissue injuries. The doctor hired by the defence testified that one of the factors leading to the Plaintiff’s ongoing complaints was ‘psychosocial factors‘ and that he would ‘strongly recommend that the plaintiff be assessed by a psychiatrist“.
The court preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s physicians and stated that “I conclude there is little, if anything, in (the defence doctors) report that would detract from the evidence from the other medical personnel or the lay witness evidence with respect to the Plaintiff’s present condition“.
In the end, damages were assessed as follows:

Non-Pecuniary Damages

$ 85,000

Past Wage Loss

$ 23,000

Future Wage Loss

$120,000

Cost of Future Care

$ 1,890

Total:

$229,890