Tag: surveillance

“Troublesome” ICBC Surveillance Practices Come Under the Judicial Microscope

Written by ERIK MAGRAKEN on September 11, 2019. Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for injuries sustained in a vehicle collision.

In the recent case (Williams v. Sekhon) the Plaintiff sustained serious and disabling injuries in a 2013 collision that the Defendant accepted fault for. In the defence of the claim the Defendants insurer, ICBC, conducted a ‘troublesome‘ amount of surveillance into the Plaintiff’s life. The Plaintiff requested that special costs be awarded for this. While the court did not go so far as to award special costs Mr. Justice Voith provided the following lengthy comments setting parameters into what is and is not reasonable surveillance:

Court Prohibits Surveillance During Defence Medical Exam

Written by admin on July 16, 2017. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7.

Useful reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, finding it is appropriate to prohibit a Defendant from conducting video surveillance of a plaintiff who is compelled to attend a Defence medical examination in a personal injury lawsuit.
In the recent case (Moquin v. Fitt) the Mr. Justice Thompson provided the following reasons justifying this restriction:

[21] The defendant nominates a R. 7-6 medical examiner, but it is the Court that appoints the examiner and orders the plaintiff to attend for the examination at a particular time and place. On the dates of the medical examinations, the plaintiff will not be in public on journeys of his own choosing. If the defendant or the defendant’s insurer takes advantage of the opportunity created by court order to engage in surveillance then the defendant might be seen by a reasonable observer to be acting in close concert with the Court. Partisan conduct aligned with the court order may be seen as lessening or compromising the Court’s neutrality, and the Court must, of course, zealously protect its reputation for impartiality.

[22] Barring surveillance on the trip to or from the medical examinations is hardly a significant barrier to the defendant’s ability to gather information, and in my view the imposition of a surveillance bar and the consequent chance that the trier of fact might be deprived of some relevant information is a small price to pay to guard the Court’s reputation. Returning to R. 13-1(9), I think the non-surveillance condition promotes the just determination of this proceeding — a stated object of the Rules — because it prevents the possibility of conduct which might degrade the perception of the Court’s impartiality.

Video Surveillance Erodes Personal Injury Claim; $4,000 Assessment for Modest Soft Tissue Injury

Written by admin on February 12, 2013. Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Although video surveillance is not always a useful tool in personal injury litigation, it sometimes is used effectively. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, illustrating such evidence assisting in challenging a personal injury claim.
In last week’s case (Berenian v. Primus) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision when he was travelling on foot and struck by the Defendant’s vehicle. Although liability was disputed the defendant was ultimately found 100% at fault for the collision.
The Plaintiff sought damages for soft tissue injuries which he says took 18 months to clear. He further advanced a claim that the injuries “have impacted his routine… because of them, he was not able to run in the usual fashion and it was in fact some time later that he was able to get back to his pre-accident routine“.
The Defendant “robustly disputed” this allegation and produced video evidence of the Plaintiff jogging in the month following the collision. Mr. Justice Williams concluded that the injuries sustained in the collision were “fairly minor” and assessed non-pecuniary damages at $4,000. In rejecting the claims of long-standing consequences from the injuries the Court provided the following comments:
50]         As part of its examination of the circumstances, the defence retained an investigator to observe the activities of the plaintiff. That resulted in video recordings being made; those were tendered in evidence at this trial. Those recordings show the plaintiff, on three separate occasions, leaving his downtown place of business and travelling on foot to the area of his residence in West Vancouver.
[51]         The first of those recordings was made on May 4. It shows the plaintiff as he slowly jogged from his place of business to his residence. On the way, he stopped and did some moderate physical exercise including push-ups. The elapsed time from his departure from his place of work to his arrival at his home was approximately 70 minutes.
[52]         Another recording was made the day following, May 5. Again, it shows similar activity; the elapsed time was 70 minutes.
[53]         The third observation was conducted on May 11. Again, the plaintiff is shown essentially jogging from his place of work to his home. The additional exercise was done along the way in the same fashion.
[54]         At trial, the plaintiff was confronted with this evidence, as well as testimony he had provided in the course of an examination for discovery, at a time when he was unaware of the recordings having been made. At the examination, he stated under oath that he had eased into his running gradually following the motor vehicle accident and had started running the entire distance from his place of work to his home approximately five to six months after the motor vehicle accident. He said that, post-accident, the trip would take him in the order of two hours, which he said was about 45-60 minutes longer than it had taken prior to the injury. His evidence at the examination for discovery was that his time to make the trip, prior to the motor vehicle accident, was in the order of 60-70 minutes.
[55]         At trial his testimony was different. He said that before the motor vehicle accident, he had been able to do the run and the en route workout in 40 minutes.
[56]         Quite predictably, the apparent discrepancy between these activities and the manner in which the plaintiff had represented his injuries and their effects was the basis of some real dispute at trial…
[68]         I am concerned with the veracity of the plaintiff’s claims regarding the extent, severity and effects of the injuries he suffered. The principal basis upon which the claim rests is his testimony, his description. There is not any notable objective evidence to support his assertions of the quite extensive nature of the consequences…
[70]         In the final analysis, I have very serious doubts as to the truth and reliability of the plaintiff’s description of the extent of the injuries and their impact upon him. My conclusion is that there was some soft tissue injury – bruising and discomfort – but it was fairly minor in that he was able to resume his running within a month. In view of that finding, while I accept there may have been some lingering residual discomfort, it would be of a fairly modest magnitude.
[71]         Similarly, as for his claims that his neck pain continued for 12 to 18 months, that the headaches persisted for six to eight months, and his complaint of low back pain, I find that he has not proven on a balance of probabilities that such injuries resulted in discomfort such as he describes. On the evidence, it was substantially less.

Facebook Photos Fail to Thwart ICBC Injury Claim

Written by admin on May 22, 2012. Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

As previously discussed, Facebook photo production is becoming a common occurrence in personal injury litigation. Despite the undesirable consequences on privacy expectations it is worth remembering that such photos, much like more conventional surveillance evidence, are not necessarily harmful in and of themselves. Surveillance evidence is only damaging to a personal injury claim when it depicts activities inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s evidence. Photographic evidence that does not reach this threshold is really of little value. This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Guthrie v. Narayan) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 rear-end collision. She suffered from chronic soft tissue injuries which were expected to cause on-going problems into the future. At trial the Defence introduced Facebook photos depicting the Plaintiff on a trip to Las Vegas. Mr. Justice Goepel found these to be of little value and assessed non-pecuniary damages at $65,000. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[27] I accept the testimony of Dr. Cordoni and Dr. Badii. I find that Ms. Guthrie sustained soft tissue injuries to the neck and back as a result of the motor vehicle accident. These soft tissue injuries have led to chronic neck and shoulder pain. I find that it is unlikely that there will be any significant change in her condition for the foreseeable future.

[28] I further find that Ms. Guthrie has aggressively attempted to deal with her injuries. She has followed the medical recommendations made to her. She has attended physiotherapy and message therapy. She took a series of painful IMS treatments. She works out regularly. She has done all she can to assist in her recovery.

[29] Unfortunately, however, Ms. Guthrie’s injuries have not resolved. They continue to seriously impact her daily life and will likely do so for the foreseeable future. The injuries have affected all facets of her life. She needs accommodation at work, cannot partake in some sports she formerly enjoyed, must avoid certain social events and even has difficulty when she attempts to cuddle with her boyfriend. She is no longer suited for many occupations and requires accommodation to carry out many of the occupations that are still available to her.

[30] In making these findings, I have not overlooked the pictures posted on Ms. Guthrie’s Facebook page concerning her trip to Las Vegas. Those pictures are of limited usefulness. Ms. Guthrie is seeking compensation for what she has lost, not what she can still do. The fact that she can spend a weekend with her friends in Las Vegas does not gainsay her evidence that she continues to suffer from the aftermath of the accident. She should not be punished for trying to get on with her life and enjoying it the best she can regardless of the limitations imposed on her as result of the accident…

[35] While the subject cases are of general assistance and provide a guideline as to the range of damages awarded in cases with some similarities to the case at bar, each case must be decided on its own facts. Of primary importance in this case is the age of the plaintiff, the manner in which the injuries have impacted on her life, and the medical evidence which suggests that any future improvement is unlikely. I note in the cases cited by the defendant the prognosis for the plaintiffs was much more favourable than that concerning Ms. Guthrie. I award $65,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Soft Tissue Injuries "Superimposed on Other Problems"

Written by admin on May 22, 2012. Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Sharifi v. Chaklader) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision in Vancouver BC. She was a passenger in a van travelling through an intersection when it was struck by a left hand turning driver. The Defendant was found fully liable for the crash. The Plaintiff had some pre-existing problems and the collision superimposed soft tissue injuries on these. These remained symptomatic at the time of trial. Despite some concerns with the Plaintiff’s evidence the Court assessed non-pecuniary damages at $50,000. In doing so Mr. Justice Willcock provided the following reasons:

[99]Weighing the evidence as a whole, I find that Ms. Sharifi suffered a musculoligamentous soft tissue injury to her cervical spine, upper back and shoulders on July 10, 2008. Those injuries were superimposed on a pre-existent left shoulder injury and on some pre-existent neck pain. Additional pain and suffering following the motor vehicle accident did not cause, but must have contributed to, the level of her ongoing stress and anxiety, and contributed to her tendency to suffer from migraine headaches. The injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident has continued to trouble her since; it has affected her capacity to enjoy life, and caused her to suffer an income loss.

[100]On a balance of probability I cannot find Ms. Sharifi suffered a concussion or an injury to her low back. Nor am I satisfied on the evidence that she has established she has suffered or is likely to suffer from post-traumatic degenerative osteoarthritis as a result of the soft tissue injury sustained in the July 2008 accident…

[103]Damages must be assessed on the basis that the plaintiff has suffered a soft tissue injury superimposed on the other problems documented in the records: a history of some neck pain, a left recurrent shoulder injury that limited her ability to lift, occasional migraine type headaches, stress, anxiety, fatigue and depression-like symptoms (but not clinical depression). Damages must be assessed on the basis some continuing recovery is probable. The functional impact of the injury is overstated by Ms. Sharifi. She is capable of most activities of daily living. I am not satisfied she has established that she is disabled from clerical employment…

[119] …I assess non-pecuniary damages in this case at $50,000.

Videotape Evidence "Of Some Assistance" in Impacting Personal Injury Claim

Written by admin on January 2, 2012. Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized.

As previously discussed, video surveillance is a reality in personal injury litigation and surveillance depicting a Plaintiff acting inconsistently with their evidence can impact an assessment of damages. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, demonstrating surveillance evidence in action.
In last week’s case (Wilkinson v. Whitlock) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision in Vernon, BC. The Defendant drove through a red light and was found fully at fault for the crash. The Plaintiff suffered from back problems as a result of the collision. In the course of trial the Plaintiff testified as to the effects of these injuries. ICBC introduced video surveillance evidence which gave the impression “of an individual less limited than (the Plaintiff’s) evidence at trial and on discovery would lead one to conclude“. Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following reasons considering this evidence:

[16] There is reason to approach the plaintiff’s evidence with caution. She was defensive and evasive in cross-examination. I accept that anxiety may explain her defensive posture, but it does not account for her tendency not to answer questions directly. I do not, however, take much from these circumstances.

[17] As to the videotape evidence, it is of some assistance. The plaintiff was videotaped in January and February of 2008, May of 2009, and June and October of 2010. The plaintiff’s left hip and groin became, on her description, excruciatingly painful for no apparent reason when she was shopping. Although Ms. Wilkinson could not recall the date of this event, I suspect it was likely in the fall of 2008. Ms. Wilkinson testified that although the pain in her hip or groin varies, it often causes her “to waddle” when she walks as opposed to walking with a normal gait. On examination for discovery she agreed that it caused her to waddle most of the time. She said that it was a particular problem when she walked after driving.

[18] The January and February 2008 videotape evidence is of little assistance – the recordings are brief and do not show the plaintiff walking to any extent. The May 2009 videotape evidence is much more extensive. On May 19, 2009 the plaintiff was at a gas station purchasing flowers. To my eye, her gait appeared normal. On June 14, 2009 the plaintiff was videotaped while at a garden centre, and again her gait appeared normal. A year later, on June 15, 2010, there is videotape of her walking. There is no apparent limp but she does appear stiff and careful in the way she moves. On June 17, 2010 Ms. Wilkinson was videotaped walking to her car with a grocery cart full of groceries. She was captured loading the groceries into the hatchback of her vehicle. She did all of that without apparent limitation. On June 19 of that year she purchased a three or four foot tall house plant which she loaded and unloaded from her car, again without apparent limitation. Finally, there is a lengthy videotape of her on June 19, 2010 at a garden centre with Mr. Bains and her daughter. She is captured squatting down, standing up, and walking about the store without noticeable limitation. In summary, the videotape reveals some minor stiffness or limitation on some occasions. There are also occasions when she appeared to have little or no visible limitation. Generally, the impression left by the videotape evidence is of an individual less limited than Ms. Wilkinson’s evidence at trial and on discovery would lead one to conclude.

Mitigation of Damages

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s application of the mitigation principle. Mr. Justice Barrow found that the Plaintiff was prescribed therapies that she failed to follow and these would have improved the symptoms. The Court did not, however, reduce the Plaintiff’s damages finding that it was reasonable for her not to follow medical advise given her financial circumstances. Mr. Justice Barrow provided the the following reasons:

[50] Returning to the principles set out in Janiak, and dealing with the second one first, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that continued physiotherapy at least during 2008 would have reduced some of the plaintiff’s symptoms and increased her functionality. Further, I am satisfied that the supervised exercise program that Mr. Cooper recommended would have yielded ongoing benefits. I reach this conclusion because Ms. Wilkinson did benefit from both Mr. Saunder’s and Mr. Cooper’s assistance. There is no reason to think those benefits would not have continued and perhaps provided further relief.

[51] The more difficult issue is whether it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to not have followed up on these therapies. She testified that it was largely due to a lack of financial resources. I accept her evidence in that regard. She was in the midst of renovations which were costly. In addition she had lost the assistance that Mr. Harrison was to have provided. The renovations were also time consuming and physically taxing. Further, she underwent a very difficult separation from Mr. Harrison which extracted both a financial and emotional toll. In all these circumstances I am not persuaded that the defendant has established that it was unreasonable for the plaintiff not to pursue a fitness regime more diligently than she did. Most of the impediments to the pursuit of such a program will be no longer exist once this trial is over. I will address the implications of that when dealing with the damages for future losses.

"Demystifying" Mild Traumatic Brain Injury

Written by admin on December 29, 2010. Posted in ICBC Head Injury Cases, ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized.

(Update: the Defendant’s Appeal of the below judgement was dismissed by the BC Court of Appeal on February 7, 2012)
Many of you may be aware of ICBC’s current “demystifying” campaign. There are many misunderstood topics related to injury lawsuits and one of the most prominent is that of mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI). Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, demystifying some of the arguments that are commonly raised in opposition to these claims.
In today’s case (Madill v. Sithivong) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2004 BC motor vehicle collision. The Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck on the passenger side by the Defendant’s vehicle. The issue of fault was admitted by the Defendant with the trial largely focussing on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The collision was not significant, from a vehicle damage perspective, causing little over $1,700 in damage to the Plaintiff vehicle. Despite this the Plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury in the crash. ICBC argued that the injuries were not serious in part because the vehicle damage was modest, the Plaintiff had a ‘normal‘ Glasgow Coma Scale score of 15/15 noted on the ambulance crew report and that the hospital records relating to the treatment of the Plaintiff noted that he suffered from “No LOC (loss of consciousness)” and “zero amnesia“.
The Plaintiff called evidence from Dr. Hunt, a well respected neurosurgeon, who gave evidence that the above facts were not determinative of whether the Plaintiff suffered from serious consequences related to MTBI. Madam Justice Morrison was persuaded by Dr. Hunts’ evidence and accepted that the Plaintiff suffered from long term consequences as a result of an acquired brain injury. In rejecting the defence arguments Madam Justice Morrison provided the following ‘demystifying‘ reasons:

[112] Dr. Hunt said he tries to concentrate on the individual. He finds it helpful to see the notes of the family doctor, which deal with initial complaints, as do the notes of the ER doctor and responders. But he notes that those doctors are very busy, and things get overlooked. The same is true with an ambulance crew. Dr. Hunt stated there may be no loss of consciousness, but there may be a loss of awareness. An ambulance crew may give a 15 score for the Glasgow scale, indicating normal, but that could be misleading. He also noted that someone may be described as being in good health pre-accident, but that would not mean he would not have issues.

[113] Dr. Hunt disagreed that the best evidence of whether the plaintiff was an amnesiac, were notes at the hospital of “no LOC” and “zero amnesia”. It was the evidence of Dr. Hunt that no matter how many times you see those terms, that a patient is alert and wide awake, that sometimes in looking at crew reports, the necessary information is not there. A person does not need to strike his head for a concussion to have occurred. It need only have been a shaking.

[114] It is important to explain what a mild traumatic brain injury is, he stressed; Dr. Hunt referred to the many concussions in sports. He said it is important to look at what happened following the accident, what symptoms have occurred and are continuing to occur. Patients often deny a loss of consciousness or a loss of awareness, and it may be so fleeting that they may well be unaware. But if the head has been shaken or jarred enough, this will equal a concussion, which is the same as a mild traumatic brain injury. There may be no indication of bruises on the head, but it still could be a concussion. Dr. Hunt noted that something prevented the plaintiff from exiting the vehicle, so the Jaws of Life was used.

[115] Dr. Hunt noted that Dr. Tessler agreed that the plaintiff had a cerebral concussion in his initial report, but it was the opinion of Dr. Hunt that Dr. Tessler was not up to date on mild traumatic brain injuries.

[116] In his evidence, Dr. Hunt listed some of the symptoms that are compatible with a concussion having occurred: headaches, altered vision, balance difficulties, general fatigue, anxiety, memory disturbance, inability to manage stress. “A concussion is a mild traumatic brain injury. We no longer grade concussions.”

[117] I found Dr. Hunt to be an excellent witness. He was cautious, detailed, thoughtful, low key, thorough and utterly professional. In cross-examination, he gave a minor clinic on mild traumatic brain injuries. He was subjected to a rigorous, lengthy and skilful cross-examination, which only served to expand upon and magnify his report and opinions.

[118] He commented on the history of Mr. Madill prior to the accident, pointing to a number of things that may have caused excessive jarring or shaking of the head, even if there had been no symptoms of concussion. He believes that the first responders’ observations are not always accurate as to what actually happened. He said he himself may not have identified problems of concussion at the scene of the accident. Ninety percent of people with concussions have headaches. They have difficulty describing the headaches, and they are not the same as migraine or tension headaches.

[119] Dr. Hunt was further critical of Dr. Tessler in opining that Dr. Tessler had diluted his opinion, and that he had concerns with the report of Dr. Tessler. He felt that Dr. Tessler was still “in the dark ages” with regard to mild traumatic brain injuries, that he has not had the advantages that Dr. Hunt has had in working with sports brain injuries. “Concussion is cumulative.”

[120] I found the report and the evidence of Dr. Hunt persuasive. He came across as an advocate of a better understanding of concussions or mild traumatic brain injuries, not as an advocate on behalf of the plaintiff.

In addition to the above, two other topics were of interest in todays’ case. Evidence was presented by ICBC though private investigtors they hired who conducted video surveillance of the Plaintiff. The Court found that this evidence was of little value but prior to doing so Madam Justice Morrison made the following critical observations:

[74] Much of the videotaping occurred while both the plaintiff and the private investigator were moving on streets and highways, driving at the speed of other traffic. The investigators testified they drove with one hand on the wheel and the other hand operating the video camera, up at the side of their head, to allow them to view through the camera what they were taping. That continues to be their practice today, according to at least one of the investigators, which was interesting, considering from whom they receive their instructions, a corporation dedicated to road safety.

Lastly, this case is worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of diminished earning capacity. In short the Plaintiff was self employed with his spouse. Despite his injuries he was able to continue working but his spouse took on greater responsibility following the collision. The Court recognized that the Plaintiff suffered from a diminisehd earning capacity and awarded $650,000 for this loss. Paragraphgs 193-210 of the judgement contain the Court’s discussion of this topic.

Challenging ICBC Surveillance Disbursements – Evidence of Necessity Required

Written by admin on December 27, 2010. Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 49 Comments on Challenging ICBC Surveillance Disbursements – Evidence of Necessity Required

If parties to a lawsuit can’t agree which disbursements were reasonably incurred they can ask the Court to decide the issue. As recently discussed, it is important for parties to bring appropriate evidence to Court to justify their disbursements. This was further addressed in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry.
In today’s case (Hambrook v. Sandhu) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 BC motor vehicle collision. In the course of the lawsuit ICBC made a formal offer to settle the claim for $75,000. About 16 months later the Plaintiff accepted the offer. The formal offer had a declining value reducing its amount by ICBC’s ‘costs and disbursements‘ incurred following the delivery of the offer.
After the offer was accpeted ICBC produced a bill of costs totalling almost $28,000. Once of the biggest disbursements included in this total were the accounts of a private investigator who was retained to conduct video surveillance of the Plaintiff. These accounts totalled almost $20,000.
The Plaintiff argued that ICBC’s disbursements were unreasoble. Eventually the BC Supreme Court was asked to decide the issue. Master Keighley sided largely with the Plaintiff and reduced ICBC’s account to just over $6,000. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons refusing the disbursements related to the private investigator and addressing the need for parties to come to Court with adequate evidence:

[11] As a general proposition, the party claiming reimbursement for sums expended in the course of litigation bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the charges claimed.

[12] I have suffered, on this assessment, from a paucity of evidence offered by the defendants in support of the disbursement claims. With respect to the Lanki Investigations Inc. invoices I have no evidence before me as to the necessity for or results of these investigations. I am told by counsel that the investigations, which consisted largely of video surveillance, were instrumental in resolving this claim. I have no evidence as to this effect, however, only records of the amount of time spent by various individuals. I note that the surveillance took place after the delivery of the offer to settle and in the last two weeks prior to trial. Mr. Smith says that the surveillance materials were of little value and that the case settled when it did because of a clarification in the law of costs and a change in his client’s employment. The former, he says, meant that his client would potentially net more money as a result of accepting the offer than he had previously anticipated, and the second meant a substantial limitation of his claim for loss of future earnings. These details are confirmed to some extent by the plaintiff’s affidavit of February 6, 2009. In the circumstances, while I am not prepared to say that the defendants’ expenses for surveillance were entirely unreasonable, I am compelled by the tariff item and the case law to allow them only if settlement was achieved as a result of the services provided. In the absence of any evidence from the defendants on this point, I cannot do so. The Lanki accounts are disallowed.